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 D a t a G e n e r a l
4400 Computer Drive, Westboro, M A 015 80  
Telephone (617 ) 366-8911
May 1, 1987
National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Gentlemen:
Although I am not quite certain on what basis I was sent a copy 
of the Exposure Draft of your Report, I appreciated getting it. 
I now am taking advantage of your offer to comment thereon.
I agree in principle with the Exposure Draft. "The Tone at the 
Top" and accountability are invaluable in terms of protecting 
and conserving assets, reputation included. However, I submit 
that Paragraphs 320 and 330 (page 175) under "Scope of Work" 
ignore the role of business oriented security departments, and 
the need for internal auditors and security personnel to work 
in ways which compliment each others efforts.
The Report makes no allowance for the existence of security 
departments as essential to successful business operations. 
Instead it conveys the impression that the internal audit 
function is the sole protector of a company's assets. 
ecurity is, or certainly should be, equally responsible for 
rotecting and conserving those assets. It also is the proper 
venue for conducting those investigations which are unrelated 
to financial matters, and for generally overseeing compliance 
with corporate policies and procedures in matters which are 
not of a financial nature.
Over time I have found more security directors who acknowledge 
the value of internal audit than I have internal auditors who 
will admit that security also performs an essential service.
The Exposure Draft tends to perpetuate this. In my opinion 
this does a disservice to the business community.
Harvey Burstein 
Corporate Director
Safety/Security 
Staff Attorney
HB/11a
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Bernard B. LynnCertified Public Accountant_______Consultant — Government Contracts
May 4, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sir or Madam:
I appreciate receiving a copy of the Commission's April 1987 exposure draft and the opportunity of submitting my views on this comprehensive product. Despite its extensive coverage, I was disappointed to find the draft completely ignored the significant area of fraudulent financial reporting in connection with national defense procurement.
Although financial reporting relating to procurement involves every federal department and agency, I have limited my comments to the defense field. The Admini­stration's annual budget request for national defense again exceeds $300 billion. Adding defense-related expenditures by NASA, Departments of Energy, Commerce and Transportation and others, and the super secret ("black") programs, the funds for which are scattered throughout the budget without identification, indicate appro­priations approximating $350 billion. Even in today's economy, this is not an insignificant figure.
Rather than again detail my views on this point, I have attached a copy of my December 26, 1986 letter to Mr. Treadway which I believe is equally pertinent to the April exposure draft. The essence of my suggestions is that the Commission should at least recognize the special problems involved in financial reporting relating to federal procurement which arise when the General Accounting Office (GAO), the various federal inspectors general, and the federal contract auditors, especially the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), demand, and in many instances are obtaining, access to companies' internal audit reports and working papers, min­utes of boards of directors meetings, and just about every corporate record and paper, regardless of its remoteness to government contracts and irrespective of its confidentiality.
GAO has recently initiated legislation under which the larger defense contrac­tors would be required to submit extensive periodic financial and cost information about sales, costs and profits on both government and unrelated commercial work.This data would be attested to by the companies' independent CPAs and submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). GAO is particularly insistent that it obtain statutorily mandated access to all records and officials of the companies, and the CPA firms, and OMB.
3003 S. Atlantic Avenue, 21A1 Daytona Beach Shores, FL 32018 904-767-1561
N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g , page 2
Many o f  us in v o lv e d  in  th is  area are persuaded th a t  f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  r e la t ­
in g  to  procurement in  an environm ent where fe d e ra l government in v e s t ig a to rs  and 
a u d ito rs  have gained access to  v i r t u a l l y  every co rp o ra te  document and o f f i c i a l  in  
t h e i r  zealous search f o r  fra u d  m e rits  sp e c ia l c o n s id e ra tio n . I am c e r ta in ly  no t 
recommending ex te n s ive  d ig re s s io n  in to  th is  area a t  the  expense o f  the  o v e ra ll 
s u b je c t o f  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g .  On the  o th e r hand, i t  does no t seem 
a p p ro p ria te  to  com p le te ly  igno re  th is  s u b je c t.
Nor is  in te r e s t  in  th is  m a tte r l im ite d  to  the m ajor defense c o n tra c to rs  such 
as Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon and o th e r la rg e  
companies h e a v ily  in vo lve d  in  defense c o n tra c ts ,  and numerous s m a lle r companies a 
s u b s ta n tia l p o r t io n  o f  whose work c o n s is ts  o f  such c o n tra c ts . General Motors and 
Ford in  the au tom otive  f i e l d ,  fo r  example, perform  on many such c o n tra c ts  and the  
la t t e r  company was re c e n t ly  com pelled by subpoena to  make a v a ila b le  to  DCAA a u d i­
to rs  some o f  the  most in t im a te  in te rn a l c o n tro l and management records o f  th a t  
company. In  o th e r f ie ld s ,  companies such as General E le c t r ic ,  W estinghouse, S y l-  
va n ia , and RCA, to  m ention bu t a few , a lso  share th is  in te r e s t .
And then , o f  course , th e re  are  the  CPA f irm s ,  the  "B ig  8 ,"  and many o the rs  
whose re p o r ts  and w ork ing  papers would become a v a ila b le  to  government a u d ito rs /  
in s p e c to rs  under th is  le g is la t io n .
I do no t f in d  re p re s e n ta tiv e s  o f  the  above mentioned companies re fe r re d  to  in  
the  exposure d r a f t .  As to  CPA f irm s ,  a l l  o f  them m a in ta in  spearate " s p e c ia l ty "  o r ­
g a n iz a tio n s  whose e f fo r t s  are  devoted s o le ly  o r  m a in ly  to  c o n s u lt in g  w ith  the  f irm s  
c l ie n ts  on f in a n c ia l and co s t re p o r t in g  and re la te d  in te rn a l c o n tro ls  concern ing 
government c o n tra c ts . Thus you may have consu lted  w ith  a s e n io r p a rtn e r o f  a m ajor 
accoun ting  f irm  who devotes ve ry  l i t t l e ,  i f  any, tim e to  t h is  area.
As to  o th e r o rg a n iz a t io n s , re p re s e n ta tiv e s  o f  the  F in a n c ia l E xecutives I n s t i ­
tu te  have t e s t i f i e d  and subm itted  p o s it io n  papers r e la t in g  to  the  problems crea ted  
by the governmental in t ru s io n  in to  every fa c e t o f  companies' f in a n c ia l and cost 
da ta . D esp ite  F E I's  cons ide rab le  in te r e s t  in  th is  m a tte r , I wonder whether the 
o f f i c ia l s  so in vo lve d  have had any in p u t in to  the exposure d r a f t .
Many members o f  the  I n s t i t u te  o f  In te rn a l A u d ito rs  have been undertak ing  
spec ia l in s t r u c t io n ,  on a crash b a s is , to  re v is e  t h e i r  programs to  avo id  fra u d  
a lle g a t io n s  by defense and GAO a u d ito rs / in s p e c to rs ,  and a number o f  these f irm s  
have engaged CPA f irm s  w ith  e x p e rt is e  in  th is  area to  a s s is t  them. I must assume 
th a t  the  AICPA and I IA  re p re s e n ta tiv e s  in vo lve d  in  you r s tudy d id  no t in c lu d e  the 
many members o f  these o rg a n iz a tio n s  devo ting  so much o f  t h e i r  e f f o r t  to  these 
problems.
I a p p re c ia te  th a t  you r ve ry  comprehensive and commendable p roduct is  in  i t s  
la te  stages and can understand th a t  the  exposure d r a f t  w i l l  n o t be sub jec ted  to  
ex te n s ive  re v is io n s .  I would urge you, however, to  a t  le a s t  pu t fo r th  an in te n s iv e  
e f f o r t  to  develop a p e rs p e c tiv e  on fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  r e la t in g  to  de­
fense (and to  a le s s e r  e x te n t,  o th e r fe d e ra l)  procurem ent. There are h ig h ly  placed
o f f i c ia l s  in  the  companies mentioned e a r l ie r ,  and o th e rs , and p a rtn e rs  in  a l l  m ajor 
CPA f i rms, who are  ded ica ted  a lm o s t  e n t i r e ly  to  th e se problems . A t the  le ast ,  i t
seems to  me, a task  fo rc e  should be e s ta b lis h e d  to  develop an appendix to  you r
f in a l  r e p o r t ,  to  dem onstrate an awareness o f  th is  s u b je c t.
S inc e r e ly ,
B B l: r /a t ta c h . B. B. Lynn
Bernard B. L y n n
Certified Public Accountant_____________ _ _____
Consultant — Government Contracts
December 26, 1986
James C. Treadway, Jr., Chairman
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, MW 
Washington, DC 20006
Dear Mr. Treadway:
Many thanks for the copy of your November 18 Houston speech on "A Pre-Exposure 
of the Commission's Exposure Draft."
For reasons outlined below, my interests in this area focus mainly on its rela­
tionship to procurement by the federal government, especially the Department of 
Defense (DOD). This involves certain different and unusual facets which, if time 
permits, might well be incorporated, even if briefly, in the final draft.
A few words may be useful in explaining the nature of my interest and indeed why, 
it seems to me, the accounting profession should evidence greater interest in this 
facet than indicated by AICPA meetings and publications at both national and state 
levels.
On a personal note, submitted just so you would understand where I'm coming from,
I am a recent recipient of the AICPA 40 year honorary membership. Throughout, most of 
my interest and attention have focused on the financial aspects of defense procurement. 
My government service includes over a decade with the Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA), including 4 years as that Agency's national director. As you know, DCAA is 
responsible for auditing the financial representations of firms proposing and performing 
on DOD contracts, as well as contracts awarded by NASA and several other federal depart­
ments and agencies.
I spent almost an equal period of time with one of the "Big 8" firms, providing 
consulting and management advisory services to the firm's clients engaged in government 
work and, for the last several years have been performing this type of work for my own 
clients.
Our burgeoning federal budget now includes about $300 billion for DOD, a substan­
tial portion of which is spent for the acquisition of weapon systems, supplies and 
services. Related procurement is also made by NASA, Department of Energy, General Ser­
vices Administration, and other departments and agencies. I shall not take the time or 
space to present the voluminous, related statistics because I am certain arrays of 
figures are not necessary to establish the importance of this area to our economy and 
to financial reporting.
3003 S. Atlantic Avenue, 21A1 • Daytona Beach Shores, FL 32018 • 904.767-1561
James C. Treadway, J r . ,  12 /26 /86 , page 2
Recent years have w itnessed an unprecedented p reoccupation  by the fe d e ra l govern­
ment w ith  "procurem ent f ra u d ,"  a term emphasizing bu t no t l im ite d  to  accoun ting  and 
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  m a tte rs . Th is  in te r e s t  and re la te d  a c t i v i t i e s ,  in c lu d in g  in c re d ib le  
increases in  the number o f  a u d ito rs  and in v e s t ig a to rs  added to  the  fe d e ra l p a y r o l l ,  seem 
to  exceed the  comparable in te r e s t  and a c t i v i t y  in  the o th e r a reas.
The In sp e c to r General A c t o f  1978, as amended, e s ta b lis h e d  IG o rg a n iz a tio n s  in  
v i r t u a l l y  every m ajor fede ra l departm ent and agency, w ith  m ajor m iss ions o f  d e te c tin g  
and re p o r t in g  on fra u d , and a s s is t in g  the J u s t ic e  Department in  p rosecu ting  the perpe­
t r a to r s .  Semiannual re p o rts  are subm itted  by each IG to  the  P re s id e n t 's  Council on 
I n te g r i t y  and E f f ic ie n c y  and the  PCIE issues co n so lid a te d  re p o rts  trum pe ting  sav ings , 
d e te c tio n s  o f  fra u d , waste and abuse, e tc .
Fraud d e te c tio n  is  b ig  business in  the fe d e ra l government f a r  beyond the  SEC and 
a l l  IGs; the General Accounting O ff ic e  (GAO), and o th e r fe d e ra l o rg a n iz a tio n s  p u b lis h  
H o tlin e  numbers and addresses to  which one and a l l  are exhorted  to  re p o r t  suspected 
fra u d . Encouraged (and prodded) by the  DOD IG , Department o f  J u s t ic e ,  GAO, and c e r­
ta in  congress iona l e lem ents, DCAA is  c u r re n t ly  devo ting  unprecedented tim e and co s t in  
frau d  d e te c t io n . Charges and a l lo c a t io n s  o f  costs  to  DOD c o n tra c ts  which the  a u d ito rs  
p re v io u s ly  considered as q u e s tio n a b le  o r  e rroneous, are  now s c ru t in iz e d  m e tic u lo u s ly  
to  determ ine whether a su sp ic io n  o f  fra u d  m igh t conce ivab ly  be re p o rte d .
A number o f  the  la rg e s t  c o n tra c to rs ,  as w e ll as many s m a lle r  ones, are being con­
t in u a l ly  accused o f  fra u d  and are undergoing damaging t r i a l s  in  the  communications 
media and be fo re  cong ress iona l in v e s t ig a t in g  com m ittees. In  some in s ta n c e s , the 
government f a i l s  to  s u s ta in  i t s  charges; in  o th e rs , c o n tra c to rs  are suspended o r de­
ba rred , and in d iv id u a ls  c o n v ic te d . The c u rre n t heavy government emphasis on fra u d  in  
th is  area is  re fe rre d  to  as the  " c r im in a liz a t io n  o f  p rocurem ent."
I b e lie v e  the problem o f  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  in  defense procurement 
presents s ig n i f ic a n t  and unusual fa c e ts  which m e r it  c o n s id e ra tio n  by you r Commission.
I have d iscussed some o f  them in  the attachm ent to  th is  le t t e r .
S in c e re ly ,
Bernard B. Lynn
BBL: r  
A tta ch .
James C. Treadway, Jr., 12/26/86 ATTACHMENT
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING - SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
As noted briefly in the covering letter, the 1980s have witnessed unusual govern­
ment preoccupation with "fraud, waste, and abuse." The major focus has been on so- 
called "procurement fraud," a general term which includes fraudulent financial 
reporting as well as other forms of fraud.
The books, records, financial reports, income tax returns, and other data of de­
fense contractors are examined in considerable detail by the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA). These examinations range from occasional visits by "mobile" teams to 
continuous audit/investigation by resident teams which, at the larger contractors, may 
consist of 40 or more full time DCAA auditors and concurrently by a larger number of 
contract administration representatives, such as cost and price analysts, who also 
delve into various records.
Access to Records
Financial representations by contractors relating to procurement include:
Pricing proposals, consisting of estimated costs and proposed profits to perform 
contracts which the government has indicated it will award. Such proposals are general­
ly required except for small purchases and "sealed bid" contracts.
Proposals for annual billing and final indirect expense rates which are used for 
bidding, interim billing, progress payments, and other purposes.
Interim and final contract cost submissions where the initially negotiated contract 
price is subject to revision based upon ultimate cost, performance, and other factors.
Termination settlement proposals submitted when the government terminates contracts 
for its "convenience."
Claims for equitable contract price adjustments where the costs of performance 
have been increased by formal or constructive changes by the government, including 
delays and disruptions and defective government-furnished materials.
The mission of the government contract auditor is to examine the contractor's re­
cords which support these representations and issue an advisory report to the contract­
ing officer. The auditor "questions" any cost which be believes is unreasonable in 
nature or amount, or where the portion allocated to a contract exceeds that computed in 
accordance with certain "Cost Accounting Standards" established by the government, or 
which are otherwise "unallowable" based on government acquisition regulations or the 
auditor's opinions. As noted in the covering letter, considerable emphasis is currently 
directed to identify accounting and reporting errors with fraud.
Traditionally, some contract auditors have been interested in examining contractor 
records which appeared to be beyond those necessary to support the contractor's repre­
sentations. Whether in the nature of fishing expeditions or for other purposes, such 
interests were restrained by most contractors who believed, as stated in a judicial ruling 
that "government auditors should not roam unrestricted throughout a contractor's plant." 
Accordingly, auditors' requests for records beyond those considered essential to support 
the financial and cost representations were frequently challenged by contractors and 
differences were settled either by compromise or by intervention of the contracting 
officer.
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Defense contractors have been on the receiving end of considerable criticisms 
from the DOD 16, DCAA, GAO and certain congressional elements. The storm of hostility 
culminated in the enactment of the 1986 DOD Authorization Act., P.L. 99-145, on Novem­
ber 8, 1985. This act, among other things, granted subpoena authority to DCAA, author­
ity which even contracting officers do not have. Although the conference report accom­
panying this bill specified that in providing the subpoena authority Congress did not 
intend to expand the kinds of records to which DCAA may have access, the Audit Agency, 
in the opinions of many observers, implemented the statute for just such purposes.
For example, in a recent subpoena duces tecum, DCAA demands included the following 
records for the five years preceding that date: all records of the contractor's inter­
nal audit department, including reports, working papers, work schedules, personnel 
records, etc.; all annual and five-year plans (budgets and forecasts); and all minutes 
and associated records of board of directors meetings. These records are in addition 
to the voluminous data which this company has been providing to the government resident 
auditors over many years.
In June 1986, the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard 
Commission) reported: "Our study of defense management compels us to conclude that
nothing merits greater concern than the increasingly troubled relationship between the 
defense industry and government." The Commission noted the increasing attention and 
resources being expended by DOD to detecting unlawful practices but expressed the concern 
that "a plethora of departmental auditors and other overseers - and the burgeoning di­
rectives pertaining to procurement - also have tended to establish a dysfunctional and 
adversarial relationship between DOD and its contractors. Widely publicized investiga­
tions and prosecutions have fostered an impression of widespread lawlessness, fueling 
mistrust of the integrity of defense industry."
The Packard Commission submitted a number of cogent recommendations for both DOD 
and industry and its suggestions for improved self-governance by contractors parallel, 
in part, those presented as the tentative conclusions of the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Assisted by a major CPA firm, the Packard Commission 
formulated a number of specific suggestions, including the establishment or enhancement 
of internal audit capability. In this connection, however, the Commission stated:
Government actions should not impede efforts by contractors to improve 
their own performance. The Commission is concerned that, for example, 
overzealous use of investigative subpoenas by Defense Department agencies 
may result in less vigorous internal corporate auditing.
* * * * * * * * *
Government actions should foster contractor self-governance. DOD should 
not, for example, use the investigative subpoena to compel such disclosure 
of contractor internal auditing materials as would discourage aggressive 
self-review.
Although many of the Commission's recommendations have been implemented in whole 
or in part, no action has been taken to date to place any restraint upon DCAA's increas­
ing demands for virtually limitless access to contractor records by issuing subpoenas 
or threats of doing so.
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Voluntary Disclosures
Among the many recommendations to improve contractor self-governance, the Packard 
Commission concluded:
Each company has the obligation to self-govern by monitoring compliance
with the federal procurement laws and adopting procedures for voluntary
disclosure of violations of federal procurement laws and corrective
actions taken.
Although it has taken little or no action to date on such recommendations as dis­
couraging the use of subpoenas, which produce a chilling effect on aggressive internal 
auditing, and eliminating the redundancy of contractor surveillance by DCAA, DOD IG, 
various contract administration organizations, etc., the Department of Defense moved 
promptly to prod industry to adopt the recommendation for voluntary disclosure.
The ink had scarcely dried on the Packard Commission's final report to the Presi­
dent when the Deputy Secretary of Defense wrote to the top 100 defense contractors en­
couraging them "to consider adopting a policy of voluntary disclosure as a central part 
of your corporate integrity program."
DOD's program for voluntary disclosure includes contractor commitment to "cooper­
ate fully with the government in any ensuing investigation or audit." As to incentives 
for abandoning their constitutional rights under the fifth amendment, DOD promised in­
dustry it would "seek to expedite the completion of any investigation and audit conduct­
ed in response to a voluntary disclosure, thereby minimizing the period of time neces­
sary for the identification of remedies deemed appropriate by the government." Under­
standably, the dubious advantage of expeditious investigation and following action 
resulting from the voluntary disclosure was viewed as a questionable incentive by many 
contractors.
The Secretary of Defense vigorously pursued this program. In an address delivered 
on October 30, 1986, he joined in urging voluntary disclosures by companies doing busi­
ness with DOD. He acknowledged, briefly: "We cannot ask industry to develop codes of
conduct, and then leave fuzzy the legal implications of various actions. Government 
must uphold its end of the bargain." Unfortunately, Secretary Weinberger did leave 
this matter fuzzy. Nor did the audience find encouragement in the statistics he provi­
ded on the increasing number of contractor suspensions and debarments in past years and 
his promise: "The 1986 figure will be even higher."
With increased DOD prodding, including the availability of the Department's high 
level officials to address meetings and seminars, a number of such events have taken 
place and are scheduled for this Winter to discuss voluntary disclosure. DOD speakers 
emphasize the value of this program but continue to be extremely vague when questioned 
about the incentives for contractors to make such disclosures. As a result, many at­
torneys have been vigorous in cautioning contractors of the possible adverse implications.
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As a final point on this subject, DOD recently announced its proposal to include a 
"Contractor Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Awareness Program" clause in prime and subcontracts 
exceeding $25,000. In essence, contractors will be required to maintain an ongoing pro­
gram orienting their employees as to the kinds of actions which could constitute various 
kinds of fraud, the employees' responsibilities to report any actions which indicate the 
possibility of fraud, and their freedom from being discharged, demoted, discriminated 
against, or from other reprisals for reporting possible fraudulent activities. The 
clause requires that posters must be conspicuously displayed containing information 
about Hotline telephone numbers and related instructions for reporting suspicions of 
fraud.
Major contractors are continually being importuned to enter into advance agreements 
with the government which set out the kinds of programs they shall establish to assure 
ethics in business practices, including voluntary disclosures. At this writing, the 
government representatives in the Defense and Justice Departments remain vague as to 
the consideration which will be accorded to these companies beyond expeditious investi­
gation and related action. Although a number of companies have entered into such agree­
ments, they are being cautioned by their attorneys of the inherent dangers. For ex­
ample, at a recent seminar the point was made that a company or its officials who report 
that their employees may have committed fraudulent acts open themselves to litigation 
by such employees which may subject them to monetary and other penalties associated with 
slander and libel.
Perhaps the work of your Commission is too far along or perhaps the commissioners 
may consider fraudulent financial reporting relating to government contracting somewhat 
too specialized a subject to warrant special coverage. I would hope, however, that the 
commissioners give this matter serious consideration in the light of the substantial 
impact on so many businesses, of every size, which are involved in this area.
If the Commission does devote some consideration to this area, I would hope its 
forthcoming recommendations will include a recognition of the environment in which de­
fense contractors currently operate. Specifically, what would be your recommendations 
regarding (1) the internal audit function where all of its work and personnel must be 
made completely available to DOD auditors/investigators, and (2) voluntary disclosures 
to the government of fraud or other irregularities?
BERNARD B. LYNN, CPA
3Jefferson B a nkshares, Inc.
123 EAST MAIN STREET. CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 22901
May 5, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sirs:
Thank you for the April 1987 Exposure Draft of the Report of the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Overall, your report is excellent.
With respect to Objectivity of the internal Audit Function on 
pages 33-34, I offer the following comments:
1. One of the better ways to ensure independence and objectivity 
is to have the Audit Committee approve the expense budgets 
and staffing levels for the internal auditors. In addition, 
internal audit salaries should be approved by the Audit 
Committee. In this manner, the Audit Committee assures the 
adequacy (credentials, experience, training, size) and 
independence/objectivity of the internal audit staff.
2. Independence and objectivity should not necessarily preclude 
the internal auditor from being part of the management team. 
The internal auditor can be a valuable asset to established 
management/policy groups so long as his/her role is advisory 
and not policy making (other than with respect to the audit 
function itself). The internal auditor can be much more 
valuable to the organization if he/she has insight to the 
planning process and direction of the corporation (knows what 
is going on) rather than having to find out.
With respect to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors on 
pages 35-39, there is no mention of the responsibility to oversee 
or overview the internal audit function. The section on Internal 
Audit Function and Chief Internal Auditor indicates the reporting 
relationship with the Audit Committee. The recommendations for 
the Audit Committee should dovetail those concepts. Why should 
the Audit Committee be concerned exclusively with the external 
auditors (principally financial aspects) when the major emphasis 
of internal audit work is ensuring adequate internal controls are 
present? Can you have consistent accurate financial reporting 
without adequate internal controls?
With respect to the Audit Committee Chairman's Letter, the letter 
should explain in detail any areas that either the internal or 
external auditors are precluded from auditing and why.
As stated previously, overall I think this report is excellent.
If possible, I would appreciate your sending copies of the 
Exposure Draft to the three external directors of my company that 
comprise the Audit Committee. Their names and addresses follow:
Henry H. Harrell 
Post Office Box 25099 
Richmond, Virginia 23230
Alex J. Kay, Jr.
Post Office Box 26603 
Richmond, Virginia 23261
Alson H. Smith, Jr.
Post Office Box 422 
Winchester, Virginia 22601
Thank you.
Sincerely,
David L. Smith, CBA 
General Auditor
DLS:sf
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A F und  Co n c en tr at in g  in A lter n a t iv e  En e r g y  in v estm en t
May 7, 1987
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Comment Section
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania A ve.
Washington, D.C.
20006
Gentlemen:
RE: Comment, as Solicited, to draft dated May 1, 1987
I write to you on behalf of a publicly registered mutual fund 
with $3,500,000.00 in its portfolio.
Your proposal seems limited to public companies. However it would 
appear to be directed to l arg e public companies. We take one 
topic for illustration.
Accounting:
Our solo practitioner accountant has his office above a candy 
store. We are delighted with his service. He has never to our 
knowledge been sanctioned or sued. He cannot consult with his 
partners. He has none. If our accountant needed peer review and 
independent oversight he could not afford us as clients and he 
has so told us. Nevertheless, when we were audited by the SEC for 
six working Jays we came out like a rose. Would we have done 
better with a large accounting firm whose fees we cannot afford ?
The NASD has recently inquired as to why our investment advisor 
accounting reports no liabilities. We were obliged to prepare 
more reports. The answer was - we have none. We pay our bills , 
usually in advance or upon receipt and borrow no money. Why do we 
need to make reports like that ? I surmise that the answer is 
because of reports like yours .
The same kind of comments apply to the rest of your report.
It is almost religious in our country to give praise to small 
business and to small new business. It is amazing that we come 
into being and exist when the regulatory structure is examined.
It is my v i e w that your report does not propose for us a 
solution; it is part of the problem. My comment is : " We have
e n o u g h  r e g u l a t i o n .  E n f o r c e  existing regulation. Fraud was 
adequately defined more than 300 years ago".
Yours
Maurice L. Schoenwald, President
Components 
for Electronics
CTS Corporation
C o r p o r a t e  Offices
9 0 5  N o r t h  W e s t  B o u l e v a r d  T e l e p h o n e  (219) 2 9 3 - 7 5 1 1  
Elkhart. I n d i a n a  4 6 5 1 4  T W X  8 1 0 - 2 9 4 - 2 1 6 7  C a b l e  C T S
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CTS May 7, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I read with interest your recent exposure draft of your conclusions 
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. In general, I have no problem 
or negative comments regarding your report. I found it to be very 
thorough and following along the lines of my own philosophy.
However, I would like to recommend that as an additional step to 
address the Fraudulent Financial Reporting issue, the SEC should 
consider requiring some type of reporting regarding the change of 
Chief Accounting Officers. I feel that this, along with the report 
on the changing of external auditors, may more thoroughly address 
this issue.
Regards,
Very truly yours,
CTS CORPORATION
William D. Baker 
Controller
WDB/j
DREXEL UNIVERSITY
College of Business and Administration
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Henry R. Jaenicke 
C. D. Clarkson Professor 
of Accounting
509-J Matheson Hall 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
(215) 895-2118
M ay 1 2 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D .C .  2 0 0 0 6
G e n t l e m e n :
F i r s t ,  l e t  m e c o n g r a t u l a t e  t h e  C o m m is s io n  a n d  i t s  s t a f f  o n  a  
j o b  w e l l  d o n e .  H a v i n g  s a i d  t h a t ,  h o w e v e r ,  I  w i s h  t o  c o m m e n t o n  
t h e  C o m m i s s i o n 's  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  A IC P A  s h o u l d  r e o r g a n i z e  
t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  t o  c o n s i s t  o f  8 t o  12  m e m b e r s ,  h a l f  
o f  t h e m  n o t  e n g a g e d  i n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g .
A s a  l o n g - t i m e  o b s e r v e r  o f  t h e  a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  
p r o c e s s ,  a n d  a s  t h e  o n l y  n o n - B o a r d ,  n o n p r a c t i t i o n e r  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
A S B 's  A u d i t o r  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  T a s k  F o r c e  ( w h i c h  d e v e l o p e d  t h r e e  o f  
t h e  t e n  r e c e n t l y  e x p o s e d  ASB p r o n o u n c e m e n t s ) ,  I  u r g e  y o u  t o  
r e c o n s i d e r  t h a t  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  Y o u r  r e p o r t  a c k n o w l e d g e s  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n 's  r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  s e t t i n g  a u d i t i n g  
s t a n d a r d s  i n v o l v e s  h i g h l y  t e c h n i c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o l i c y  
a s p e c t s ,  b u t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  a b o u t  ASB s i z e  a n d  c o m p o s i t i o n  
a n d  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  f o r  i m p l e m e n t i n g  i t  d o  n o t  a d e q u a t e l y  r e f l e c t  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  f i r s t  o f  t h o s e  tw o  f a c t o r s .
T h e  t h r e e  s t a t e m e n t s  d e v e l o p e d  b y  t h e  A u d i t o r  C o m m u n ic a t i o n s  
T a s k  F o r c e  ( a u d i t o r ' s  r e p o r t ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  w i t h  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s ,  a n d  e x a m i n i n g  MD&A), a s  w e l l  a s  a  f o u r t h  i s s u e  
r e c e n t l y  a d d e d  t o  i t s  a g e n d a  ( c o m m u n i c a t i n g  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  s y s t e m s  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  w h e n  c o n d u c t i n g  a n  
a u d i t ) ,  a d m i t t e d l y  i n v o l v e  t o p i c s  o f  g r e a t  i n t e r e s t  t o  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t  p r e p a r e r s  a n d  u s e r s  ( w h o s e  i n p u t  w a s  a n d  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  
t o  b e  s o l i c i t e d ) .  B u t  e v e n  t h o s e  t o p i c s ,  w h i c h  a r e  s u r e l y  a m o n g  
t h o s e  w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a s p e c t s ,  r e q u i r e d  a n  
e x t e n s i v e  p e r i o d  o f  l e a r n i n g  a n d  d e b a t e  o v e r  h i g h l y  t e c h n i c a l  
i s s u e s ,  n o t  t o  m e n t i o n  c o u n t l e s s  h o u r s  o f  h a g g l i n g  o v e r  e q u a l l y  
t e c h n i c a l  l a n g u a g e .  I  s i m p l y  c a n n o t  i m a g i n e  w h a t  t h a t  T a s k  F o r c e  
a n d  t h e  ASB w o u l d  h a v e  w r o u g h t  i f  h a l f  o f  t h e i r  m e m b e rs  h a d  b e e n ,  
l i k e  m y s e l f ,  n o t  e n g a g e d  i n  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  p r a c t i c e .  A n d  my
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eyes absolutely glaze over when I think about nonpractitioners 
writing standards on such arcane topics as audit sampling, 
letters for underwriters, and supplemental mineral reserve 
information —  topics that are probably more representative of 
the usual ASB agenda than its high public profile agenda of the 
past two years.
The goal the Commission apparently seeks —  a heightened ASB 
focus on and awareness of policy aspects —  is admirable, but it 
can be accomplished in ways that do not detract from the level of 
technical knowledge that the Board needs, a level that I believe 
is only rarely present in nonpractitioners. For example, more 
nonpractitioners could be added to the present Board, an advisory 
committee of nonpractitioners could be created, or the Board's 
Planning Subcommittee, which controls the Board's agenda, could 
be expanded by the addition of nonpractitioner, non-Board members 
to serve as an oversight or advisory council. I urge the 
Commission to consider these or other means of achieving its 
objectives. What is needed is a means of ensuring that public 
policy issues are adequately considered, without detracting from 
the technical, practice-oriented skills that have been one of the 
Board's greatest strengths.
Very truly yours,
Henry R. Ja enicke
HRJ : jc
7HEALTHCARE AFFILIATES, INC.
May 14, 1987
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT 
FINANCIAL REPORTING 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Commissioners:
I have reviewed the Exposure Draft sent to our corporation and 
find your recommendations and conclusions very informative. I 
have been with my company for the past four years and would like 
to share my thoughts that might possibly be of value to your 
Commission.
When a corporation or institution is responsible for reporting to 
the SEC I feel that the education first must begin at this level, 
with the SEC in conjunction with the various accountancy boards 
providing the education. (Academic education requirements will 
take time to institute the required programs and is certainly 
crucial in long-range planning, but is secondary at the moment).
The SEC requires audited annual reporting, but does require 
quarterly reports to be audited. This should be changed. If a 
company wants the benefits of being a public corporation then 
that compnay should be required to bare the costs of quarterly 
audit reviews. Your comments of fourth quarter write-offs is in 
my opinion a result of the annual audit. Had quarterly reviews be 
made mandatory by the SEC then write-offs would not have been 
picked up in audit and reported only in the fourth quarter.
The SEC should require the CPA firms that are registered before 
them that conduct these audits to make available to the client 
along with the SEC educational material/classes to make every 
accounting employee aware of what constitutes fraudulent 
reporting. In a large company the various internal controls 
that are suggested and maintained by the audit team are primarily 
to insure management that no fraud is being perpetrated against 
them, not the SEC and the public stockholders. Employees that 
participate in the preparation of financial statements should be 
required to sign documentation that would be filed supplementally 
with the the auditors that they are not participating to the best 
of their knowledge in any fraudulent reporting. This 
disclosure would be made in the MD&A report to the SEC in the 
annual and quarterly reporting.
23961 Calle De La Magdalena, Suite 243, Laguna Hills, CA 92653 (714) 855-8728
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Another reason  fo r  q u a r te r ly  a u d it  review s i s  th a t  th e  fo o tn o te s  
need to  be c o n s ta n tly  updated . The company's o p e ra tio n s , 
management, r i s k  f a c to r s ,  l i t i g a t i o n s ,  proposed o p e ra tio n s  a l l  
change, as w ell as th e i r  f in a n c ia l  p o s i t io n . These item s a re  
never updated in  th e  q u a r te r ly  re p o r tin g  u n t i l  they  a re  re v ise d  
a t  th e  annual a u d it  between management and th e  a u d itin g  firm . 
Conceivably a company can be bankrupt and th e  p u b lic  would never 
know u n t i l  th e  annual re p o r t when th e  MD&A l e t t e r  d isc lo se d  th a t  
i t  f e l t  th a t  th a t  company was no longer a going concern .
In  summation, I f e e l  i t  i s  th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of th e  SEC and th e  
d i f f e r e n t  accountancy o rg a n iz a tio n s  to  s e t-u p  more s t r in g e n t  
re g u la t io n s  fo r  c o rp o ra tio n s ; and th e  e d u c a tio n a l t r a in in g  to  be 
implemented by th e  a u d itin g  f irm s  perform ing th e  a u d i ts .
S in c e re ly ,
Pamela Hallam 
C o n tro lle r
8410 8. HOLLYWOOO AVE. 
DALLAS, TX 75308
18th May 1987
Dear Sir: 
H a v i n g  r e a d  y o u r  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t ,  I  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  m a k e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o p o s a l s
(1) Every public company be required to have aninternal audit function, be it one or more person headed by a suitably qualified person.(2) This person 
either by a CPA or suitably qualified(a "Certified Internal Auditor" type examination or profession could be instituted as well)(3) An nternal audi  repor  be incl d in thecomany's anualreprt, addressing may of the andards 
prosed bythCminacg/
compliance therewith. Hoping the above are of interest to you. 
Yours sincerelyJonathan Pitaway  
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MANFRED E. PHILIP 
Certified Public Accountant
Member—American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
May 26, 1987
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr. Chairman National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006
Re: Exposure Draft of May 1, 1987
Dear Mr. Treadway:
I have read the very informative brochure containg the above exposure draft. In general I agree with most of the statements and recommendations and therefore I will limit myself to two points, namely:
1. The standard accountants' report;2. The role of the boards of accountancy.
1. The Standard Accountants' ReportI refer to my letter of December 15, 1986. In that letter I said that the space available in a company's annual report is simply insufficient to explain the role of the independent auditor, the constraints imposed on the accountant to keep the fee in reasonable bounds and the fact that a historical financial statement does not answer the question what the future will bring which is what creditors and investors want to know. My suggestion is to publish and distribute widely a brochure of approximately 50 pages which explains in detail how historical financial statements are compiled and audited, what are their limitations and what additional information investors and creditors need to know before they can make intelligent decisions.
2. The role of the State Board of AccountancyI was very disappointed by the restrained language on page 70 describing the toothless tigers which today masquerade as boards of accountancy. Unfortunately most boards regulating professions are governed not by the various professions but by a centralized State Department of Regulate Agencies which (a) dees not want to see, hear or speak any evil and (b) wants to do anything on the cheap. The professions must regain control of the function to police their weak brethren. Since the legislatures are not willing to tax the general public for the cost of vigorous enforcement the various professions will have to assess their member for the amount it takes to do the job.
Respectfully yours,
Manfred E. Philip  
P.O. BOX 384 BOULDER, COLORADO 80306 TELEPHONE: (303) 442-8457
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May 28, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Sirs:
Thank you for the opportunity to express my comments on the April 1987 
Exposure Draft - Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting. Before expressing my comments, I would like to 
commend the Commission on their efforts. For many well-run 
enterprises, the Exposure Draft supports the efforts to establish a 
control environment that insures proper financial reporting. For 
those enterprises where the control environment is lacking, the 
Exposure Draft provides a framework to establish such an environment. 
My comments as set forth below are based upon my twenty-eight plus 
years as a public accountant auditing New York Stock Exchange clients 
and upon my ten plus years as a corporate comptroller and vice 
president of a Fortune 500 company with world-wide operations.
Before making comments about specific recommendations in the Exposure 
Draft, I would like to express my views on two areas —  Audit 
Committees which are treated with importance in the Draft and a 
subject not treated in the draft, the audit staff of a public 
accounting firm.
AUDIT COMMITTEES
Your report places great emphasis on the need for enterprises to have 
audit committees comprised solely of independent directors. You state 
that:
"An audit committee consisting of independent directors is the primary 
vehicle a board of directors uses to discharge its responsibi1 ity with 
respect to the company's financial reporting. An informed and 
vigilant audit committee represents one of the most effective 
influences for minimizing fraudulent financial reporting. Boards of 
Directors of all public companies should have an independent audit 
committee vigilantly overseeing the financial reporting process."
Unfortunately your theoretical concept of Audit Committees is far 
removed from the real world. It should be recognized that in all 
companies except those in financial difficulty or similar 
circumstances that management picks the directors for their companies, 
whether public companies or private companies. Management also 
decides committee membership. Management decides the frequency and 
content of meetings of directors and meetings of committees of 
directors. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to assume that 
an audit committee will be established that could operate with the 
oversight responsibility for financial reporting. My experience 
indicates also that the quality of the members of the audit committees 
varies considerably. Many of the directors assigned to the audit 
committees have little experience in the area of financial reporting
N a t i o n a l  Commission on F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p or t i n g__________Page 2
10a
and little interest in the subject. It is interesting to observe that 
managements appear reluctant to appoint retired public accountants to 
their boards. W here an audit committee member has the necessary 
financial reporting background, it often happens that his or her 
questions concerning the financial reporting process are resented by 
the other members of the committee and sometimes by the management as 
an intrusion into the management of the company. Since the audit 
committee's meeting time is usually for a limited time —  for example, 
one hour every quarter or two hours every six months, etc. —  
questions by a knowledgeable member sometimes restricts the topics 
that can be covered.
In order to achieve the Commission's objective to have an "independent 
audit committee vigilantly overseeing the financial reporting 
process," it would appear that some alternative method must be devised 
whereby companies would be required to appoint an independent 
qualified person picked by the stock exchange as a director and as the 
chairman of the audit committee. Furthermore, the stock exchange 
should also require the listed company to permit the appointed 
chairman to set the dates and the length of the audit committee 
meetings. The qualities and experience necessary for qualification as 
an "independent qualified person" might be determined by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission with assistance of the public 
accounting profession and other bodies.
AUDIT STAFF OF A PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
The Commission's report sets forth a number of excellent 
recommendations concerning the audit process, but fails to make any 
recommendations concerning the       an audit team. The
Commission should keep in mind that partners of accounting firms
do not make audits. Furthermore, in many accounting firms, review of 
working papers is made by a manager and not by the partner in charge 
of the audit.
The actual auditing of an enterprise is performed by very young 
auditors. The senior or supervisor in charge of the audit may have 
three or four years experience. The audit team manager with perhaps 
four to six years experience usually has other teams to supervise and 
therefore is only periodically reviewing the work of each team. The 
problem is further confounded by the extreme turn-over of team 
personnel. It is not uncommon to have a complete new team of auditors 
each year. It has been my experience that continuity of team 
personnel is a must if an indepth, knowledgeable audit is to be 
conducted. Otherwise, as the team performs the audit following the 
audit program devised for that client, there is always the possibility 
that the inexperienced personnel will not see the "trees for the 
forest." Reviews will accomplish little, other than to see that the 
program steps have been initialed.
I strongly recommend that the Commission consider this very important 
area of detection and perhaps prevention of fraudulent financial 
reporting as an area where improvement by accounting firms is needed. 
Some recommendations might be made as follows:
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1. Accounting -firms should prepare plans to reduce the turnover of 
audit personnel, so that audit staffs become more experienced.
Working conditions, salaries and benefits should be improved in order 
to encourage longer periods of employment.
2. The time requirements for promotion to senior, supervisor 
positions should be extended substantially.
3. Changes in audit teams on an engagement from year to year should 
be avoided or kept to a minimum. The senior audit personnel on an 
engagement should have had at least three years prior experience on 
that engagement and a total of at least six years experience as an 
auditor.
4. The audit committee should be informed as to the qualifications 
and experience of the audit team each year.
COMMENTS REGARDING SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Pages 39 and 41 - Management Report and Audit Committee Chairman's 
Letter. The illustration of a Management Report as set forth on pages 
188 and 189 is entirely too long. The example should be shortened.
It is also suggested that information as to the Audit Committee's 
activities should be included in the Management Report, thereby 
eliminating the Commission's recommendation for a separate letter.
Page 42 - Quarterly Reporting. The recommendation that Audit 
Committees should approve financial results prior to public release is 
an unreasonable recommendation that would unduly delay the publication 
of quarterly results. I suggest that the following sentence should be 
inserted to replace the second sentence of the recommendation:
"This oversight should include reviewing such results with financial 
management and determining the results of the quarterly financial 
results review by the independent public accountants."
Page 43 - Setting Standards for Internal Control. Internal controls 
vary from company to company because of organization and type of 
business. Therefore, an appropriate internal control system for one 
company is entirely inappropriate for another company even in the same 
business. A number of the public accounting firms issued material on 
internal control procedures in connection with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and these manuals have been helpful to companies in the 
review of their internal control policies under that Act. However, it 
is my opinion that any attempt to arrive at a "common reference point" 
with regard to internal control procedures would result only in an 
academic exercise of little, if any, benefit. I urge the Commission 
to delete this recommendation from their final report.
Page 49 - Timely Review of Quarterly Financial Data. As I recall, the 
SEC rules regarding the review of quarterly financial data permitted a 
review by independent accountants together with an opinion thereon or 
no review at the time of the quarterly statements. However in the 
latter case, the review would be required in connection with the 
annual audit and if the review indicated that the previously submitted
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quarterly figures required revision, that the quarterly results 
included in the annual report had to indicate the revision. Of 
course, it was also necessary to file the appropriate report with the 
SEC of the need for revision. In practice, many companies opted to 
have the quarterly financial data reviewed prior to public release 
without the public a c c o u n t a n t 's opinion. Therefore, it would seem 
that their is little need for the Commission's recommendation. In the 
commentary accompanying the recommendation, the Commission comments on 
the fourth quarter write-offs. The Commission should take note that 
goals and plans for the ensuing year are usually adopted in the fourth 
quarter and that many of the write-offs result from decisions reached 
in connection with goals and plans for the next year.
If any of my comments or suggestions are unclear or require 
amplification, I will be pleased to respond to your questions.
Very truly yours,
W i l l i s  A. Smith
1Mobil Corporation 150 EAST 42ND STRETNEW YORK, NEW YORK 1017-566
PHILIP W. MATOS CONTROLER
June 5, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING EXPOSURE DRAFT - APRIL 1987
Dear Sirs:
Our comments on four of the Comission's Recommendations for the Public Company contained in Chapter 2 follow:
Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that their internalaudit functions are objective (page 33).
We agree with this recommendation. We do not agree, however, on the need for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to conduct regularly scheduled meetings with the chief internal auditor on at least a quarterly basis. The Mobil chief internal auditor has direct and unrestricted access to the CEO when needed, and has a scheduled annual meeting with the CEO. He is free to meet more frequently as required. We believe that, in these circumstances, it is inappro­priate to mandate quarterly meetings.
Recommendation: Management and the audit committee should ensurethat the internal auditors' involvement in the audit of the entire financial reporting process is appropriate and properly coordinated with the independent public accountant (page 34).
We agree with this recommendation. We strongly believe that the responsibilities of the internal auditors and the independent public accountants should be clearly defined and mutually understood, and that audit work should be properly coordinated to avoid omission or duplication. The work of the internal auditors complements and supports the work of the independent public accountants. We do not agree, however, on the necessity for the internal auditors to be involved in the audit of financial statements at the consolidated
11a
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level. Considering their greater degree of independence, we believe 
it is preferable for the independent public accountants to be pri­
marily responsible for the audit in this area. In addition, since 
the independent public accountants are responsible for certifying 
the financial statements, their involvement at this level must, of 
necessity, be substantial and it may be difficult to effectively 
involve the internal auditors in this work.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule 
to include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter signed 
by the chairman of the audit committee describing the committee's 
responsibilities and activities during the year (page 41).
We agree that it would be beneficial to include in the annual report 
to stockholders a section describing the audit committee's responsi­
bilities and activities during the year. Since the proposed section 
would form an integral part of the annual report and the Form 10K 
which is signed by all the directors, we do not see the need for 
such information to be presented in letter form signed by the chair­
man of the committee.
Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight of 
the quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include 
approving financial results prior to public release (page 42).
We disagree with this recommendation. We agree that the audit com­
mittee's responsibilities should include oversight of the quarterly 
reporting process as a part of their general oversight function. We 
do not agree, however, that the committee should be required to 
approve in advance the release to the public of quarterly financial 
results since such responsibility is neither practical nor compat­
ible with the Commission's characterization of the role of the audit 
committee as an overseer of the financial reporting process. We 
believe that the audit committee's role should be to satisfy itself 
that the control structure within the company is adequate to protect 
the integrity of the quarterly reporting process.
Sincerely,
JRB/sc
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6 B o u to n  S t .  N o. 8 
S ta m fo rd ,  CT 06907
N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , N.W.
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C . 20006
G e n t le m e n :
I  j o i n  th e  many who commend you f o r  th e  e x c e l l e n t  s e r v ic e  
you  and th e  s t a f f  o f  th e  C o m m iss io n  h a ve  r e n d e re d  by p r e p a r ­
in g  th e  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  o f  y o u r  r e p o r t .  I t  c o n t a in s  many 
s u g g e s t io n s  v a lu a b le  t o  g o v e rn m e n t as  w e l l  as  t o  th e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r .  P r a c t i c e s  o f  many g o v e rn m e n ta l e n t i t i e s  w i l l  
d o u b t le s s ly  be in f l u e n c e d ,  and im p ro v e d ,  by  y o u r  r e p o r t .
F o r  t h i s  re a s o n  I  com m ent fro m  th e  g o v e rn m e n ta l p e r s p e c t i v e ,  
th o u g h  y o u r  r e p o r t  i s  p r im a r i l y  in te n d e d  t o  a p p ly  t o  in v e s ­
to r -o w n e d  c o r p o r a t io n s .
I  w o u ld  l i k e  o nce  a g a in  t o  c a l l  t o  y o u r  a t t e n t i o n  one 
c o n c e rn ,  w h ic h  may n o t  have  r e c e iv e d  s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  in  
th e  o r i g i n a l  d r a f t .  U n le s s  I  o v e r lo o k e d  i t ,  th e  r e p o r t  does  
n o t  c o n t a in  any  e x p l i c i t  c a v e a t  a b o u t  th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e ’ s 
r e l i a n c e  on th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r .  I  b e l ie v e  t h a t  t h i s  
d is c u s s io n  s h o u ld  be e x p a n d e d . I t  w o u ld  a ls o  be d e s i r a b le  
i f  th e  r e p o r t  e x p l i c i t l y  r e c o g n iz e d  t h a t  th e  g r e a t e r  d i v e r ­
s i t y  o f ,  and c o n f l i c t  among g o a ls  o f  " s t a k e h o ld e r s ”  o f  
g o v e rn m e n t ( t h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  among th o s e  a f f e c t e d  by g o v e rn ­
m ent and t o  whom i t  s h o u ld  be a c c o u n ta b le ) ,  may im p ly  th e  
need  f o r  e ven  m ore e x te n s iv e  s te p s  t o  a s s u re  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  
th a n  i s  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  in v e s to r - o w n e d  c o r p o r a t io n s .  S p e c i f i ­
c a l l y ,  th e  s o r t  o f  d u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p  you e n v is io n  f o r  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t ,  v i s - a - v i s  m anagem ent and th e  a u d i t  c o m m it­
t e e ,  may be even  m ore  p r o b le m a t ic  i n  g o v e rn m e n t.  I  am n o t  
s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  you  m o d ify  y o u r  re c o m m e n d a t io n s ,  f o r  th e y  
a re  v a lu a b le ,  m e re ly  t h a t  th e  r e p o r t  c o u ld  be im p ro v e d  by 
m ore e x t e n s iv e  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  p ro b le m .
R e c e n t ly  I  had th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  h e a r  one o f  y o u r  s t a f f  
a s s i s t a n t s  ( p r o v id e d  by one o f  th e  la r g e  a c c o u n t in g  f i r m s )  
d is c u s s  th e  r e p o r t .  When I  asked  a b o u t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  he 
r e p l i e d  t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  C o m m is s io n  had h e a rd  some say  
t h a t  i t s  re c o m m e n d a t io n  r e g a r d in g  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  w o u ld  n o t  
w o rk ,  b u t  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  p r i v a t e  m e e t in g s  w i t h  th e  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t o r  w o u ld  a b s o lv e  th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
and p la c e  th e  b u rd e n  on th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r .  T h is  may n o t  
be a f a i r  p a ra p h ra s e  o f  h i s  com m ent, n o r  an a d e q u a te  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t io n  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  th e  is s u e ,  
b u t ,  to  th e  e x t e n t  i t  i s  a c c u r a te ,  I  w o u ld  s u b m it  t h a t  t h i s  
a p p ro a c h  i s  n e i t h e r  f a i r  t o  th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  n o r  c a lc u ­
la t e d  to  a s s u re  th e  r e a l i t y  o f  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  t o  th e  c o m m it­
te e  and th e  s h a r e h o ld e r s .  I n  g o v e rn m e n t,  e s p e c ia l l y ,  s u c h  
a m b ig u i t y  may be th e  s o u rc e  o f  p ro b le m s .
It is truly difficult to balance the factors involved to 
find the optimal arrangements for accountability. I have no 
simple formulation to offer, but one approach to improve the 
report might involve more explicit recognition of the 
dilemma, an assertion that the Commission nevertheless 
recommends the procedures described, and an explanation of 
its rationale. This might be expanded with an example of 
the kind of adjustment that may be desirable in government, 
including explicit recognition that the audit committee must 
rely primarily upon the independent auditor to verify the 
representations of management, including those of an inter­
nal auditor reporting to management. I believe that a 
majority of a government’s audit budget should be devoted to 
independent audit (whether performed by an independent 
public accounting firm or by employees of the unit reporting 
administratively to the audit committee), rather than to 
internal audit. In industry it is common belief and prac­
tice that an increasing share of the audit budget can and 
should be devoted to internal audit, as the corporation 
becomes larger and more complex. This pattern does not 
apply to government. Another way of formulating this 
observation is to say that the role and scope of the inde­
pendent audit in government must necessarily be broader than 
in industry. In improving practice for industry, the 
Commission should be careful to avoid inadvertent and 
unintended adverse effects on accountability arrangements in 
government.
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the report, and 
look forward to widespread acceptance of its recommenda­
tions.
Very truly yours,
Robert W. Bramlett
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June 9 , 1987
National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
In response to your request for reactions, suggestions, and 
opinions on the Report of the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, enclosed for your consideration 
is the presentation " Certified Public Accountant - Public 
Trustee - Publicly Owned Company".
Acknowledgment of receipt and your comments would be appreciated.
Sincerely,
Joseph M. Cassano, CPA (Retired)
5915 Craig Street 
Springfield, Virginia 22150
Member
AICPA
DC Institute of CPA 
Enclosure
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CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 
PUBLIC TRUSTEE - PUBLICLY OWNED COMPANY
INTRODUCTION
The introduction to the "Report of the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting" summarizes its three major 
objectives by stating that "our mission has been to identify 
causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting 
and steps to reduce its incidence".
This presentation respectfully proposes reform not included in 
the meritorious Treadway Commission Report, and is based on the 
supposition that the accounting profession should innovate a 
more effective audit committee in the publicly owned company 
(SEC registrant).
Basically, the function of the audit committee of a publicly 
owned company should be expanded to the status of a quasi-judicial 
function, within the framework of the publicly owned entity.
The quasi-judicially empowered audit committee should logically 
be administered by individuals who are licensed in the legal or 
accounting professions, and preferably licensed in both professions.
Presently, the qualified certified public accountant is uniquely 
competent to fill this position of trust as a member of the 
audit committee.
The public trustee concept will enhance the audit committee 
function with the same degree of professionalism that the CPA 
has displayed in the independent audit function, and will provide 
an effective deterrent to fraudulent financial reporting.
IMPLEMENTATION - AICPA
The AICPA should designate and establish a new category of CPA 
service; namely, "Public Trustee - Publicly Owned Company"; 
outlining the scope and attribute of the service to be rendered.
The AICPA should define the educational and professional experience 
qualifications necessary to accept an engagement as a "CPA - 
Public Trustee".
- 1 -
13 b
This specialist would be qualified to serve as a member of 
the audit committee of a publicly owned company.
The CPA - Public Trustee would retain his independence, even 
though his observable function may appear to be internal in 
nature.
The CPA - Public Trustee would serve a single term of 3 or 4 
years. If more than one CPA - Public Trustee were required, 
terms of service would be staggered to expire in different 
years to maintain continuity of service.
The CPA - Public Trustee, while serving in this capacity, 
would not be a business associate of any other CPA or CPA firm.
IMPLEMENTATION - PUBLICLY OWNED COMPANY
The publicly owned company would initiate the internal action 
necessary to retain the services of a CPA - Public Trustee as 
a member of its audit committee.
The scope of service rendered by CPA - Public Trustees would 
vary from full time engagements to limited service required; 
depending on the size, operations, and specific needs of the 
publicly owned company.
DUTIES OF "CPA - PUBLIC TRUSTEE"
* Perform the normal duties of a member of the audit committee 
of a publicly owned company. These duties should not include 
any managerial responsibilities other than those directly 
related to the audit committee function.
* Maintain the degree of independence inherent in audit 
engagements performed by the public accounting profession.
* Attend meetings of the board of directors.
* Exert a quasi-judicial influence on corporate activity, 
with authority to retain legal counsel.
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BENEFITS TO PUBLICLY OWNED COMPANY
* Opportunity to demonstrate its self-discipline capability 
by reforming its audit committee function, and consequently 
reversing the trend of increased government regulation of 
its operations.
* Promotion of investor interest, with concurrent increase 
in the value of its capital stock or equity interest.
* Public relations benefit from the projection of an image of 
integrity and sincere concern for the public welfare.
* The public trustee concept provides continuity and uniform 
standards of professional performance in the administration 
of the audit committee function of a publicly owned company
BENEFITS TO INVESTORS
* Creation of an alter ego for the stockholders or equity 
owners.
* The public trustee concept could provide a quasi-owner 
influence on management accountability and performance.
* Additional assurance of the financial security of their 
investment. This is especially vital for the expansive 
pension fund investments which often provide the major 
source of income for current and future retired persons.
BENEFITS TO ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
* Enhances its professional image with the public.
* Expands its sphere of operations in response to a 
perceivable public need. *
* Preserves the role and responsibility of independent 
auditors.
CONCLUSION
The p r e s e n t  o p e r a t io n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  c o n g lo m e ra te  p u b l i c l y  
owned com pany i s  v a s t  and  c o m p le x ,  w i t h  f i n a n c i a l  and  human 
r e s o u r c e s  r e m in is c e n t  o f  th e  o r i g i n a l  t h i r t e e n  c o lo n ie s  w h ic h  
fo rm e d  o u r  n a t io n .
O ur fo rm  o f  g o v e rn m e n t h a s  t h r i v e d  a nd  s e rv e d  th e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t ,  
b a s e d  on th e  in g e n io u s  p re m is e  o f  th e  s e p a r a t io n  o f  p o w e rs  
th r o u g h  th e  c o u n te r b a la n c e  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e ,  e x e c u t iv e  and  
th e  j u d i c i a l  f u n c t i o n s .
A d o p t in g  t h i s  c o n c e p t  i n  o u r  p r e s e n t  c o n g lo m e ra te  p u b l i c l y  owned 
c o m p a n ie s  c o u ld  be th e  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e fo r m  n e e d e d  t o  re s p o n d  
p o s i t i v e l y  t o  th e  r a p i d l y  c h a n g in g  e n v iro n m e n t  and  t o  b e s t  s e rv e  
th e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t .
The c o r p o r a t e  l e g i s l a t i v e  ( d i r e c t o r s )  and  e x e c u t iv e  ( o f f i c e r s )  
f o r c e s ,  jo in e d  b y  a d i s c e r n in g  q u a s i - j u d i c i a l  ( a u d i t  c o m m it te e /  
CPA -  p u b l i c  t r u s t e e )  f o r c e ,  c r e a te s  a n  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l  e n v ir o n m e n t .
C o n g r e s s io n a l p o s tu r e  on i t s  p e r c e p t io n  o f  a d e q u a te  r e fo r m  i s  
a p p a r e n t .  R e fo rm s  b y  th e  a c c o u n t in g  p r o f e s s io n  w h ic h  a re  deemed 
in a d e q u a te  by  C o n g re s s  c o u ld  r e s u l t  i n  a d d i t i o n a l  r e s t r i c t i v e  
g o v e rn m e n t r e g u la t i o n  o r  g o v e rn m e n t a u d i t s  o f  p u b l i c l y  owned 
c o m p a n ie s .
C o n s id e r in g  a l l  o f  th e  f a c t o r s  w h ic h  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  th e  in c id e n c e  
o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  th e  p u b l i c  t r u s t e e  c o n c e p t  
c o u ld  c o n c e iv a b ly  b le n d  i n t o  a n d  s u p p le m e n t some o f  th e  c o n c e rn s  
a n d  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  o f  th e  R e p o r t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on 
F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .
*  *  *
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M e d a l i s t  I n d u s t r i e s ,  I n c .
J u n e  9 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h in g t o n ,  DC 2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  S i r :
A t  y o u r  i n v i t a t i o n ,  I  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  o f f e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  com m ents 
on  t h e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t  o f  t h e  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  
on  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .
My f i r s t  com m ent i s  t h a t  I  h a r d l y  e n d o rs e  m o s t o f  t h e  re c o m ­
m e n d a t io n s  h e r e in  a nd  I  f e e l  t h a t  on  an  o v e r a l l  b a s is ,  t h e  
r e p o r t  i s  w e l l  t h o u g h t  o u t  and  i s  a c o n s t r u c t i v e  s te p  i n  
a d d r e s s in g  t h i s  p r o b le m .  H o w e v e r, t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  s p e c i f i c  
a re a s  on  w h ic h  I  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  m ake some s u g g e s t io n s  f o r  
im p ro v e m e n t .  T he se  a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :
1 .  T h e  m a n d a t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  a l l  c o m p a n ie s  h a v e  a n
e f f e c t i v e  a nd  o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n .  I  b e l ie v e  
t h e r e  a r e  a p p r o x im a te ly  2 0 ,0 0 0  p u b l i c l y  h e ld  c o m p a n ie s  i n  
t h e  U n ite d  S t a t e s .  I  b e l ie v e  M e d a l is t  i s  p r o b a b ly  som ew here  
b e tw e e n  th e  o n e - th o u s a n d th  and  tw o - th o u s a n d th  l a r g e s t  o f  
th e s e  2 0 ,0 0 0  c o m p a n ie s .  F o r  y o u r  p o i n t  o f  r e f e r e n c e ,  I  am 
a t t a c h in g  a c o p y  o f  o u r  1986 a n n u a l r e p o r t .
We h a v e  o p e r a te d  w i t h o u t  an  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  f o r  a 
num be r o f  y e a r s  a n d  r e a l l y  h a v e  f e l t  no  n ee d  t o  i n c u r  t h e  
a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t s  a s s o c ia te d  t h e r e w i t h .  F rom  my 30 y e a r s  
e x p e r ie n c e  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  c o m m u n ity ,  I  h a v e  s u rm is e d  t h a t  
t h e  m a jo r i t y  o f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n s  f a l l  i n t o  one  o f  
tw o  c a t e g o r ie s ;  e i t h e r  t h e y  a r e  u s e d  as a t r a i n i n g  o r  e n t r y  
l e v e l  jo b  f o r  p e o p le  who a s p i r e  t o  a p o s i t i o n  o f  d i v i s i o n a l  
c o n t r o l l e r s ,  e t c .  o r  t h e y  becom e a r e s t i n g  home f o r  o ld e r  
f i n a n c i a l  e x e c u t iv e s  f o r  a num be r o f  y e a r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  
r e t i r e m e n t .
I  am s u re  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  m any f i n e  p r o f e s s io n a l  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t  s t a f f s  f u n c t i o n i n g  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  l a r g e r  m u l t i ­
n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n ie s .  H o w e v e r, I  am s u re  t h a t  t h e  c o m m is s io n  
d o e s  n o t  e n v is io n  t h e  t y p e  o f  a u d i t  f u n c t io n  as  d e s c r ib e d  
a b o v e  and  w h ic h  I  f e e l  i s  m o s t p r e v a le n t  i n  m any o f  t h e
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companies I have observed over a number of years. The type 
of function which I am sure the commission is considering 
would consisit of a staffing of at least a few people with 
secretarial help and in our situation, I feel would only add 
unneeded cost to our operation.
Although we are a fairly large company, we do operate nine 
distinct divisions and because of this the relative pieces 
of the accounting puzzle are relatively small and not unduly 
hard to control. We operate the corporate staff with a 
total of 10 people including secretarial help and would see 
absolutely no need to add two or three people as internal 
auditors to this group merely because of some regulatory 
imposed requirement. I feel that in gross size, we are 
probably in or close to the upper 10% of all publicly held 
companies and if internal auditing is really inappropriate 
in our company as it appears to us, I am sure that there are 
many, many companies smaller than ours for which it would 
also be inappropriate. In addition, I feel this requirement 
would be a distinct disincentive for small emerging 
companies to avail themselves of the public capital markets 
to finance their growth since companies in this stage of 
development are probably least in a position to incur the 
additional two to three hundred thousand dollars of 
additional expense that an internal audit function would 
envision.
I do not object to the recommendation per say but I do feel 
that the recommendation should be tempered to apply only in 
circumstances where it would appear to be most appropriate. 
The draft form indicates that all public held companies 
should have an effective enough objective internal audit 
function. I think the important thing is that internal 
control operate effectively and if this can be accomplished 
in a given set of circumstances without an internal audit 
function, I feel no need for a regulatory requirement be 
maintained.
2. My second area of concern is the requirement that the audit 
committee and outside auditors be involved in the quarterly 
financial information. I have no objections to management 
reviewing press releases and announced earnings with audit 
committee members or, as in our case, as we do with the 
entire Board of Directors at a regularly scheduled quarterly 
board meeting prior to the time that earnings are released. 
However, I do object to the requirement that the outside 
public accountants review these quarterly results.
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I think in some point in time, you have to trust the 
financial management people to prepare accurate financial 
information. Your proposal to require that this information 
be reviewed by the outside auditors, in my opinion, is 
self-serving to the public accounting profession which I 
know is one of the sponsors of the commission. If the audit 
process as such has failed to correct or prevent fraudulent 
financial reporting on an annual basis, I question the 
wisdom of the commission in recommending that a work of a 
less detailed nature which would be an unaudited review 
would have any positive impact upon the correctness of the 
information being reported. Why impose a control which is 
working less than effectively on an annual basis upon the 
quarterly financial information.
In addition, the whole idea of additional reviews of the 
quarterly financial information is not consistent with the 
current requirement for timely financial reporting. In our 
practice, if we really have any unusual financial accounting 
problems to be faced in a quarter, we will voluntarily 
discuss them with our outside auditors prior to preparing 
our quarterly earnings release. In the absence of unusual 
items which are infrequent, we prepare a comprehensive 
memorandum after the release of the earnings detailing the 
accounting considerations which were used in the preparation 
of the quarterly financial reporting. A copy of this is 
furnished to our auditors within a week or two of the 
earnings release. They have an opportunity to contact us if 
they are not in agreement with anything in this memorandum 
or certainly to point out what they feel would be a more 
proper procedure in subsequent quarters' reporting. This 
system has worked well for approximately ten years and I 
really see no reason to change it.
3. My third comment is in relationship to the commentary
throughout the report about the problem with unusual charges 
suddenly appearing in financial statements. I do not feel 
that the imposition of additional reviews by audit 
committees, outside auditors, internal auditors, etc. will 
have any impact on this problem. This problem clearly 
relates to the fact that there are no specific accounting 
standards or principles on which one can be judged as to the 
appropriate time to report an unusual item or special 
charge. I think the correct solution to this problem is to 
direct or assist the Financial Accounting Standards Boards 
to develop meaningful accounting principles in this area.
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This problem should be no greater than many of the other 
problems such as lease accounting, mergers and acquisitions, 
pension accounting, etc. which have been corrected over the 
years through the development of specific accounting 
principles.
A general comment is that some of the recommendations do not 
appear to give any consideration to cost benefit analysis and I 
would like to point out that if our 20,000 American companies 
that are publicly held are to continue to operate in the world 
markets on a competitive basis, there really should be great 
concern and caution in developing regulatory procedures that 
require the imposition of additional costs such as internal 
auditing, outside auditors' review of quarterly results, etc. 
merely for the sake of meeting some regulatory requirement.
Very truly yours
James L. Sievert 
Finanical Vice President 
and Treasurer
JLS/ale
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W illam ette Industries, Inc.
Executive Offices 3800 First Interstate Tower
Portland, Oregon 97201 
503/227-5581
June 9, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Re: Exposure Draft
Gentlemen:
At the present time, no one obviously knows what will be the 
final use of the recommendations of the commission. Therefore, 
we are writing this response from the perspective that in the 
future, a portion or all of the recommendations made by the 
Commission may be enacted into law or carry the weight of 
official pronouncements such as the FASB or SEC. However, our 
basic belief is that, like most evils of society, fraudulent 
financial reporting cannot be legislated away and an additional 
set of rules has the potential to create significant additional 
cost without significant additional benefit. We believe it is 
a tribute to our financial market system that it has and can 
withstand the rare uses of fraudulent financial reporting, 
without catastrophic effects in the marketplace.
Nevertheless, we offer the following comments upon the 
recommendations proposed by the Commission:
1. There has been much criticism over the years of the amount 
of "boilerplate" language contained in annual reports. It 
appears that your recommendation that both the audit 
committee chairman and the chief executive and accounting 
officers include letters in such report discussing their 
responsibilities and activities will significantly add to 
such criticism. We believe that such letters are neither 
read or used in any way by users of financial statements 
and are simply to provide ammunition for future 
shareholder lawsuits should adverse financial conditions 
develop for whatever reason.
2. In most instances, requiring audit committee review of 
quarterly reporting will result in additional cost and 
potential delays in earnings releases. If the intent did 
exist to publish fraudulent quarterly financial 
statements, it is highly doubtful that any review by an 
audit committee would discover such intent. In addition,
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with the other steps that are suggested for audit 
committees, it would appear that if they were not 
satisfied with the overall environment in which financial 
reporting is performed this additional step also would 
achieve nothing. Therefore, the costs of implementing 
such an approval process would far outweigh the benefits 
which we judge to be negligible.
3. The establishment of another body to guide public 
companies on internal control appears as one more layer of 
bureaucracy in this world. No single body can develop 
internal control guidelines which are applicable and 
usable by all companies because of the diverse nature, 
size and complexity of the companies that would be covered 
by those guidelines. Countless organizations have issued 
guidelines for internal controls over the years, most 
notably by Big Eight accounting firms after the passage of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Another group to study 
the issue will not add much in the way of beneficial 
guidelines at this point.
4. We agree that independent public accountants should be 
more responsive to their responsibility for the detection 
of fraud. From our perspective of being the one audited, 
additional audit work, however, does not appear to be the 
answer. Rather, a redirection of their efforts from 
trivial, unimportant matters to more substantive issues,
i.e., smarter auditing recognizing risks. Far too often 
it appears that auditors "lose sight of the forest and 
only see the trees." Until they are required to be 
responsible for fraud detection, the incentive appears to 
be lacking for them to change their ways.
5. We strongly disagree with the proposal to require 
independent public accountants to review quarterly 
financial data prior to release. Most importantly this 
will significantly delay the timing of earnings releases. 
Secondly, if fraudulent financial reporting is taking 
place when annual financial statements are being audited, 
the likelihood of anything being discovered in a pre­
earnings release quarterly review are remote.
6. With regard to reorganization of the Auditing Standards 
Board we agree that it would be a welcome addition to have 
CPA's not currently in public practice serving. We 
believe this will provide fresh insight and perspectives 
from industry, academia and others. We do not agree, 
however, with the recommendation they be non-CPA's. The
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educational process necessary to bring many of these 
individuals up to the same level will reduce the overall 
effectiveness of the Board.
7. We strongly agree that the SEC should review its current 
position regarding indemnification. With the pressures of 
today's insurance markets and the stated desire to improve 
the overall quality of audit committees and boards of 
directors, to attract top quality candidates, there must 
be some assurance they will not be in financial jeopardy 
from frivolous lawsuits.
8. We believe the Commission is proposing a significant 
change in the basic nature of the SEC from a regulatory 
oversight agency to a law enforcement and prosecutorial 
agency. While obviously the latter has existed and has 
received much more public attention recently with "insider 
trading" prosecutions, the proposals appear strongly in 
favor of increasing the scope and power of the SEC as a 
law enforcement agency rather than a regulatory body.
While not opposed to change, we believe the SEC is already 
a very powerful agency that doesn't need more powers added 
to its arsenal. Our primary objections are in the area of 
additional SEC enforcement remedies and increased criminal 
prosecution. We believe current powers are sufficient and 
have proved adequate over the years.
9. Finally, we endorse whole-heartedly the Commission's 
recommendations for education. This will significantly 
increase a student's knowledge and awareness of financial 
reporting ethics and the regulatory process.
Unfortunately, this is an area which is overlooked in the 
drive to know as many facts as possible; all, however, 
outside of a structured ethical system to use them.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposals of
the Commission.
Very truly yours
C. w. Knodell
Executive Vice President 
Chief Financial Officer, 
Secretary and Treasurer
pdk
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R A L P H  S. S A U L
1600 ARCH STREET 
PHILADELPHIA. PA 19103
J u n e  1 2 ,  1987
G e n tle m e n :
T h e se  com m ents on  th e  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  a re  s u b m it t e d  i n  re s p o n s e  t o  
t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  l e t t e r  o f  May 1 ,  1987 i n v i t i n g  p u b l i c  com m e n ts .
The C o m m is s io n 's  r e p o r t  c l e a r l y  d e m o n s tra te s  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  t o  re s p o n d  t o  t h e  n ee d  f o r  im p r o v in g  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y .  The r e p o r t  s e r v e s  as a fra m e w o rk  f o r  
im m e d ia te  a c t io n  b y  a l l  c o n s t i t u e n c ie s  h a v in g  an i n t e r e s t  i n  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A t  th e  same t im e ,  i t  p r o v id e s  a fra m e w o rk  
f o r  f u t u r e  a c t io n .
T h e se  com m ents s u g g e s t  some m in o r  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  m a k in g  th e m  m ore  e f f e c t i v e .
The C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  A u d i t  C o m m itte e s  
do  n o t  f u l l y  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  p ro b le m s  o f  t h e  s m a l l ,  p u b l i c l y  
h e ld  com p a n y . W h ile  t h e  r e p o r t  a c k n o w le d g e s  t h a t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
s m a l l  c o m p a n ie s ,  i t  may n o t  be  p o s s ib le  t o  im p le m e n t  t h e  l e t t e r  o f  
t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  s u g g e s t  p r o c e d u re s  f o r  r e s p o n d in g  
t o  t h e  s p i r i t .  S m a l le r  c o m p a n ie s ,  as  y o u  k n o w , f r e q u e n t l y  do  n o t  
h a v e  in d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  and  i f  t h e y  d o ,  t h e r e  may n o t  b e  e n o u g h  
o f  th e m  t o  fo rm  an A u d i t  C o m m itte e . B e ca u se  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  
a t t r a c t i n g  q u a l i f i e d  in d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  t o  s m a l l  c o m p a n ie s ,  I  
t h i n k  t h e r e  w i l l  be  m any r e q u e s ts  f o r  e x e m p t io n  u n d e r  t h e  p ro p o s e d  
SEC r u l e .  U n d e r th e s e  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  w o u ld n ' t  i t  m ake s e n s e  t o  
r e q u i r e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e s  f o r  l a r g e r  c o m p a n ie s  w i t h  s e c u r i t i e s  
t r a d e d  on  th e  Amex and  i n  t h e  NASD N a t io n a l  M a rk e t  and  th e n  f o r  
s m a l le r  c o m p a n ie s  t o  s p e l l  o u t  p r o c e d u re s  and  c o n t r o l s  e q u iv a le n t  
t o  an A u d i t  C o m m itte e ?
A n o th e r  re c o m m e n d a t io n  t h a t  may c a u s e  p ro b le m s  i s  t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n  
t h a t  t h e  A u d i t  C o m it te e s  s h o u ld  a p p ro v e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  p u b l i c  r e le a s e  
o f  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s .  F o r  m any c o m p a n ie s ,  t h i s  may b e  a 
cum bersom e and  u n n e c e s s a ry  r e q u i r e m e n t  i f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m it te e ,  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t s , p e r fo r m  a r e g u la r  r e v ie w  o f  
q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts .  T h ro u g h  an a f t e r  t h e  f a c t  r e v ie w ,  th e  
A u d i t  C o m m itte e  c a n  in t r o d u c e  t h e  same d i s c i p l i n e  i n t o  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  
r e p o r t i n g  p ro c e s s  as  a p r e - r e le a s e  r e v ie w .
W h i le  I  u n d e r s ta n d  t h e  re a s o n  f o r  t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n  t h a t  th e  C h a irm a n  
o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  in c lu d e  a l e t t e r  i n  t h e  A n n u a l R e p o r t  t o  s t o c k ­
h o ld e r s ,  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n  may e le v a t e  fo rm  o v e r  s u b s ta n c e .  The 
C o m m is s io n  may r e c e iv e  o b je c t io n s  t o  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n  on  th e  g ro u n d
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that it exposes directors to additional liabilities. To me, this 
objection misses the point. Directors do have liabilities and they 
should not seek to avoid them. My objection to this recommendation 
is that it may unnecessarily discourage competent people from serving 
as directors or as Audit Committee members. I believe that the 
Commission could accomplish the purpose of this recommendation by 
having the names of the Audit Committee members listed in the Annual 
Report as some companies now do.
There is a practical problem with the recommendation that the Audit 
Committee approve in advance each use of management advisory services 
by the external auditors. Frequently, management will use external 
auditors for special services in connection with acquisitions, system 
studies, tax advice and other similar matters on an immediate basis.
The requirement that the Audit Committee review each such use of the 
external auditors in advance and make certain findings with respect to 
each special use, will inhibit the use of the external auditor for 
special services. The effect of the Commission's recommendation is to 
create an incentive for management to use another auditor or consultant 
when it may be more cost effective to use the independent public account­
ant.
Finally, there is a real need to raise the status of the independent 
public accountant both with the Audit Committee and the full Board.
All too frequently, external auditors are treated as technicians - 
not as trusted advisors to the corporation. With the decreasing im­
portance of outside legal counsel, the external auditors are frequently 
the only independent source of advice to the Board. I hope that the 
final report of the Commission will emphasize this role of the indepen­
dent public accountant and recommend ways to bring the external auditor 
more deeply into the corporate governance process. The quality of the 
outside audit and auditors on the engagement directly reflect the status 
and importance assigned by the Board and management to the independent 
public accountant. The Commissions's report should make that point.
I hope these comments are helpful to the Commission.
Sincerely ,
 
National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
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R egina ld  H . Jones 
P. O. Box 8300 
260 Long Ridge Road 
Stamford, Connecticut 06904 
(203) 373-2136
June 12, 1987
N a t io n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P e n n sy lva n ia  Avenue, N.W.
W ash ington, DC 20006
G entlem en:
As th e  cha irm an o f  th e  a u d it  com m ittee  o f  th re e  New Y ork  S tock  
Exchange l i s t e d  com panies, I  have read y o u r Exposure D r a f t  w ith  
in t e r e s t .  I t  i s  a most com prehensive docum ent, b o th  th o u g h t fu l and 
p ro v o c a t iv e .
I  s h a l l  c o n f in e  my comments to  those  s e c tio n s  o f  C hapte r Two 
th a t  d e a l w ith  in te r n a l  a u d it  and th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  a u d it  com m ittee  
o f  th e  board  o f  d i r e c to r s .  As a p re fa c e  to  th e se  comments, I  w is h  to  
acknowledge my g e n e ra l su p p o rt f o r  th e  p o s i t io n s  taken  by th e  Commission 
and to  emphasize th a t  I  am q u e s tio n in g  o r  ta k in g  e x c e p tio n  o n ly  to  
l im i t e d ,  s p e c i f ic  recom m endations in  th e  D r a f t  and n o t to  i t s  o v e r a l l  
in te n t  n o r th r u s t .
In  S e c tio n  I I I B ,  th e  Commission, in  d is c u s s in g  th e  c o m p o s itio n  
o f  th e  in te r n a l  a u d it  s t a f f ,  may w is h  to  c o n s id e r add ing  a sentence 
u n d e rs c o r in g  th e  im po rtance  o f  h a v in g  EDP s p e c ia l is ts  on th e  s t a f f  s in c e  
so much r e l ia n c e  is  p la ce d  on c o n t ro ls  ach ieved  th ro u g h  management 
in fo rm a tio n  system s.
In  th e  same s e c t io n  th e re  is  a s ta te m e n t, " th e  a u d it  com m ittee 
shou ld  re v ie w  th e  appo in tm en t and th e  d is m is s a l o f  th e  c h ie f  in te r n a l  
a u d i t o r . "  I  t r u s t  th e  Commission a p p re c ia te s  th a t  th e  a u d it  com m ittee  
must p la c e  heavy re l ia n c e  on th e  recom m endations o f  th e  c h ie f  f in a n c ia l  
o f f i c e r  excep t f o r  th e  most unusua l o r  e g re g io u s  s i t u a t io n s .
In  S e c tio n  IV , " th e  Commission recommends th a t  th e  chairm an o f  
th e  a u d it  com m ittee  w r i t e  a l e t t e r  d e s c r ib in g  th e  co m m itte e 's  a c t i v i t i e s  
and r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  f o r  in c lu s io n  in  th e  annua l re p o r t  to  
s to c k h o ld e rs . ”  I  ta k e  e x c e p tio n  to  t h i s  recom m endation. I t  i s  my 
p o s i t io n  th a t  e ve ry  annua l r e p o r t  shou ld  c o n ta in  a s ta te m e n t o f f in a n c ia l
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responsibility signed by both the chief financial officer and the chief 
executive officer. This statement should cover the work of the audit 
committee. Further, the proxy statement should list the members of the 
audit committee, their responsibilities and activities, and the number of 
committee meetings held. If these practices are followed, a letter 
signed by the chairman of the audit committee is redundant.
The recommendation that the audit committee approve in advance 
management advisory services performed by the company’s independent 
public accountant is controversial and debatable. It is usual to review 
such work at the end of the year when the audit committee receives a 
letter on such work and fees as provided by the SEC Practices Section of 
the AICPA. If there should be questions as to the composition or nature 
of such work or the magnitude of the fees, then constraints can be put on 
such future work. I realize that such a review is after the fact, but 
the knowledge that such a review takes place is a restraining influence 
on activities that could possibly influence the auditor’s independence. 
Further, I question that an advance review could be conducted on a timely 
basis.
In Section VI, I would suggest the insertion of the word ”both” 
in the recommendation so that the wording reads . . . "discussed with 
both its old and new auditors . . . .”
Further, in Section VI is the recommendation that the audit 
committee approve quarterly financial results prior to public release.
It is not feasible to require such approval, if quarterly results are to 
be issued on a timely basis. Many corporations do not have a formal 
review of their quarterly results by independent public accountants, and, 
even in those cases where such a review is performed, a letter is not 
always prepared by the public accountants for transmittal to the audit 
committee. The delay in releasing quarterly results that would result 
from the Commission’s recommendation could be most damaging to 
shareowners. I do agree that management should inform the audit 
committee of significant changes in accounting or financial reporting 
practices, and do this in advance of adopting them, so that the committee 
can assure itself that the quarterly results released to the public will 
include reference to such changes. Such a recommendation should not 
interfere with prompt release of results.
Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to read this 
Exposure Draft on a topic of great interest to all concerned with 
comprehensive and accurate financial reporting.
pd
Sincerely, 
Reginald H. Jones
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dairy mart convenience stores, inc.
240 SOUTH ROAD, ENFIELD, CONNECTICUT 06082
(203 ) 741-3611
June 15, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Dear S irs :
I  am enc los ing  fo r  you my comments on the Treadway Com m ission's Exposure 
D ra ft  R eport. As a whole , I  b e lie v e  th is  is  a f in e  document th a t  should 
serve to  improve the r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and p ra c t ic e s  o f  c o rp o ra tio n s , Boards 
o f D ire c to rs  and o u ts id e  a u d ito rs .  However, I  do have some concerns rega rd ing  
s p e c if ic  areas which are discussed below.
My p rim ary  concern is  the  recommendation on page 49 on the  Report concern ing 
t im e ly  rev iew  o f q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l  da ta . I  s tro n g ly  acknowledge th a t  the 
p rim ary  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  fo r  any f in a n c ia l  in fo rm a tio n  l ie s  w ith  in te rn a l 
company management. The p rim ary  c o n s id e ra tio n  concern ing q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l 
da ta  is  fo r  accura te  in fo rm a tio n  d issem inated on a t im e ly  bas is  fo r  the  genera l 
investm ent community. I  fe e l th a t the  requ irem ent to  have independent p u b lic  
accountants rev iew  such q u a r te r ly  data w i l l  r e s u lt  in  de lay  o f the  re lease  o f 
t h is  in fo rm a tio n , and p o te n t ia l ly  r e s u lt  in  a leakage o f in fo rm a tio n  ra th e r  
than in  a t im e ly ,  fa c tu a l d isse m in a tio n . O bviously when the  o u ts id e  accountants 
come in  to  rev iew , the  company has a lrea dy  completed c o m p ila tio n  o f  numbers 
fo r  re le a s e . I  b e lie v e  such a de lay  can r e s u lt  in  more harm than good. In  
a d d it io n ,  t h is  requ irem ent would add to  the  cos t o f  the o u ts id e  accoun tan ts ' 
s e rv ic e s .
S econda rily  to  t h is  I  have a re la te d  concern about the  requ irem ent fo r  
a u d it  committees approving f in a n c ia l  re s u lts  p r io r  to  p u b lic  re le a se . W hile 
I  agree in  concept, I  would l i k e  to  know more o f the s p e c if ic s  o f th is  
proposed requ irem en t. Since the a u d it  committee is  n o rm a lly  comprised o f 
o u ts id e  d ire c to rs  whose persona l schedules may no t co in c id e  w ith  re lease  dates 
o f co rpo ra te  r e s u lts ,  th e re  cou ld  be some problems w ith  t im e ly  d issem ina tio n  
o f da ta .
My f in a l  m ajor concern is  the recommendation on page 42 o f the Report 
should a company change i t s  independent p u b lic  accoun tan ts . I  am opposed 
to  the proposed ru le  th a t a company must d iscuss p u b lic ly  the  na tu re  o f 
any m a te r ia l accounting  o f a u d it in g  issues d iscussed w ith  i t s  o ld  and new 
a u d ito rs  d u rin g  the  th re e  year p e rio d  preced ing the change. I  have no 
o b je c t io n , and am in  f u l l  agreement, th a t  a company should d iscuss any 
disagreement concern ing accoun ting  o r a u d it in g  issu e s . However, the 
d is c lo s u re s  o f normal and re c u rr in g  accounting  and a u d it in g  issues w i l l  
send a wrong message to  many readers o f such d is c lo s u re s . There are so 
many judgement c a l ls  in  the normal re p o r t in g  process th a t  I  fe a r th is  ru le  
would become a g ia n t can o f worms.
Thank you fo r  the  o p p o rtu n ity  to  comment on your d r a f t  re p o r t .
Very t r u ly  yours
Lawrence D. Handler 
E xecu tive  V ice  P res iden t and C h ie f 
F in a n c ia l O ff ic e r
LDH/kmb
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L o m b a r d  a s s o c i a t e s
201 SPEAR STREET, SUITE 1600 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94105 
(415) 921-2848
J u n e  1 5 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e ,  NW 
W a s h in g t o n ,  DC 2 0 0 0 6
C o m m e n ts  o n  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  d a t e d  M ay 1 ,  1 9 8 7
G e n t le m e n :
T h e  r e p o r t  o f  y o u r  C o m m is s io n  w a s  o u t s t a n d i n g  a n d  m o s t  h e l p f u l  
i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e .  A s  a n  i n v e s t m e n t  b a n k e r  
f o r  15 y e a r s  w ho  h a s  w o r k e d  w i t h  m a n y  c o m p a n ie s  a n d  t h e i r  
a c c o u n t a n t s  i n  r a i s i n g  c a p i t a l  a n d  a s  a p r i v a t e  l i t i g a n t  i n  a 
s h a r e h o l d e r  d e v i a t e  s u i t  i n  a  c o m p a n y  w i t h  a f a i l e d  a u d i t ,  I  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  i s s u e s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  y o u r  r e p o r t .
T h e  o n l y  s u g g e s t i o n  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  i s  i n  
t h e  a r e a  o f  P e e r  R e v ie w ,  a n d  I  e n c lo s e  m y l e t t e r  t o  t h e  SEC 
w i t h  t h r e e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  w h ic h  I  w o u ld  a l s o  o f f e r  t o  t h i s  
C o m m is s io n .
S
 
C h a r le s  P . S t e t s o n ,  J r
C P S , J r : g f
E n c lo s u r e
Lombard Associates SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA 94105 
(415) 921-2848
June 15, 1987
Jonathan G. Katz 
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Judicial Plaza 
Washington, D.C. 20549
Subject: File S7-13-87
Dear Mr. Katz:
I am writing to commend the proposed rules for "Independent 
Accountants Mandatory Peer Review". While I am in favor of 
the rules as promulgated, I believe the rules could be 
strengthened with respect to individual audit failures.
I raise this issue with a background of 15 years as an 
investment banker who has worked closely with accountants in 
numerous financings and a private litigant in a pending 
shareholder derivative suit.
Audit failures, particularly when they are not picked up by 
accountants, continue to mislead investors. In the extreme 
and in this case, such audit failures can involve the most 
serious fraud on the public investor —  self-dealing, misap­
propriation, negligence and willful misconduct. There does 
not appear to be any reliable current mechanism other than 
expensive litigation to enjoin this kind of activity. Defen­
dants in this type of matter have usually unlimited assets in 
the form of shareholder capital to defend themselves and to 
seek dismissal on technical grounds rather than deal with the 
merits. A recent trend of some concern are attempts to in­
sulate liability to directors and officers by individual 
indemnification and by statute.
As a result of this experience, I would favor:
1. Final rules that would as a minimum require the 
selection and independent review of the audit which 
is subject of private litigation by another account­
ing firm •
• Automatic referral of cases involving litigation or 
commission investigation to Peer Review organizations 
preferably on an annual basis
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3. A mechanism to appeal to an oversight independent 
accounting board specific audits involving audit 
failure.
The public trust and confidence would benefit greatly from 
this kind of review.
J r .
Enclosures
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IN REPLY REFER TO
PFD 7 -5 0 2
DEFENSE CONTRACT AU D IT  AGENCY 
CAMERON STATION 
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22304-6178
1 5 JUN 1987
N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , NW 
W a s h in g to n ,  DC 20006
G e n tle m e n :
I  r e v ie w e d  t h e  May 1 , 1987 E x p o s u re  D r a f t  o f  f i n d i n g s ,  
c o n c lu s io n s  a n d  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w i t h  c o n s id e r a b le  i n t e r e s t .  
The r e p o r t  p r o v id e s  e x c e l l e n t  c o m m e n ta ry  o n  t h e  f a c t o r s  w h ic h  
f r e q u e n t l y  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  and  
m any s o u n d  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  t h a t  w o u ld  s e r v e  t o  re d u c e  th e  
n um be r o f  o b s e rv e d  o c c u r r e n c e s .
C o n te n t  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n  r e p o r t  w i l l  be  o f  v a lu e  i n  
c o m p le t in g  an  o n - g o in g  a s s e s s m e n t o f  DCAA a u d i t o r  
c o m m u n ic a t io n s  w i t h  t h e  s e n io r  m anagem ent o f f i c i a l s  and  b o a rd s  
o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  la r g e  d e fe n s e  c o n t r a c t o r s .
S e v e r a l  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n ’ s  recom m ended  c h a n g e s  i f  
im p le m e n te d ,  w i l l  p r o v id e  a d d e d  i n s i g h t  i n t o  o u r  a n n u a l a u d i t  
p la n n in g  p r o c e s s  and  a s s e s s m e n t o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  a t  m a jo r  
c o n t r a c t o r  l o c a t i o n s ,  a n d  as s u c h  we h e a r t i l y  s u p p o r t  th e  
c o m m is s io n 's  e f f o r t s .  T he se  in c lu d e :
A n n u a l r e p o r t i n g  o n  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m it te e  a nd  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .
An a n n u a l r e v ie w  b y  th e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ’ s 
r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t p r o c e s s  a nd  m a n a g e m e n t' s  re s p o n s e  t o  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i d e n t i f i e d  r i s k s .
A d d i t i o n a l  p u b l i c  r e p o r t i n g  o f  p r i o r  a u d i t  is s u e s  
w h e n e v e r  t h e r e  i s  a t r a n s i t i o n  b e tw e e n  tw o  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t in g  
f i r m s .
E s t a b l i s h in g  an  in d e p e n d e n t  b o d y  t o  p r o v id e  g u id a n c e  on  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  f o r  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s .
I f  f u r t h e r  com m ent o r  a s s is ta n c e  i s  d e s i r e d ,  do  n o t  
h e s i t a t e  t o  c o n t a c t  me. I  c a n  be  re a c h e d  a t  (2 0 2 )  2 7 4 -7 3 2 3 .
S in c e r e ly ,
W i l l i a m  J .  S h a rk e y  
A s s i s t a n t  D i r e c t o r  
P o l i c y  a nd  P la n s
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_ N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  A c c o u n t a n t s
FOUNDED IN 1919 AS THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COST ACCOUNTANTS 
T U L S A  C H A P T E R
June 15, 1987
National Comission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Re: Report of the National Comission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
I would like  to address two areas of the exposure draft of the Commission's report. F irs t, the 
increased role of the internal auditor. Second, the recomendation for exchange of information 
between regulatory exminers and the independent public accountant.
The Commission's report makes several recommendations re lating  to the increased role of the internal 
auditor and the importance of an effective internal audit function w ithin public companies. The 
Comission has also made a number of recommendations re lating  to c la rify in g  the role of - the 
independent public accountant. The Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA has recently published ten 
exposure drafts of auditing standards that w ill address many of the Commission's concerns and 
recommendations.
The In s titu te  of Intenal Auditor's study on the role of the internal auditor noted that "There is a 
trend toward increased reliance by independent public accountants on the work of the internal auditor, 
particu la rly  in the areas of control evaluation and computer systems." In reviewing the work of both 
the Treadway Comission and the exposure drafts of the Auditing Standards Board, i t  appears that a ll 
of the recommendations directed at the relationship between internal and external auditors are 
directed at the internal auditor. The Standards fo r the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, 
Section 550, requires the director of internal auditing to "coordinate internal and external audit 
e ffo r ts ." External auditors, however, are under no such d irection. SAS # 9 states, "The work of 
internal auditors cannot be substituted for the work of the independent a u d ito r ... ." The external 
auditor may take internal audit work into consideration when planning audit testing, but there must be 
at least some duplication of the internal auditor's work.
I strongly agree with the Comission's recommendations that a ll public companies should have an 
internal audit function and that the work of the internal auditor should be coordinated with the 
external auditor to prevent duplication of e ffo rt.  However, public companies w ill res is t pressure to 
establish professional internal audit departments i f  the independent public accountant is required to 
duplicate the work of the internal auditor. Host current audit lite ra tu re  supports revision of 
SAS # 9. I believe that i t  would be appropriate for the Comission to recomend review and revision 
of SAS # 9.
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The Commission's report also recomends that "financial ins titu tio n  regulatory agencies should provide 
for the exchange of information between the regulatory examiner and the independent public 
accountant." The report, in the discussion of th is  recommendation, suggests that th is  concept of 
sharing of information should be applied to a ll regulated industries and regulatory examiners. By 
implication, th is  recommendation could be carried to operational audit functions of internal auditors 
and regulatory examiners of the National Transportation Safety Board, or other such government 
agencies.
In discussing the findings of research studies into the problem of fraudulent financial reporting, the 
Commission natored that the auditor was often given false or misleading information by management. In 
an environment where i t  is already d if f ic u l t  fo r the independent public accountant to get re liab le  
information, adding the requirement information be exchanged with government regulators would serve to 
complicate the audit process.
Stephen J. Lawler, CIA 
Director of Manuscripts 
N.A.A., Tulsa Chapter
Note) —  The opinion expressed is solely that of the w ritte r and is not intended to propose an 
o ff ic ia l position of the Tulsa Chapter of N.A.A.
22
F M C C o rp o ra tio n
Executive Offices
200 East Randolph Drive 
Chicago Illinois 60601 
312 861 6000
June 15, 1987  FM C
The National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Gentlemen:
We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the Report of The 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. We 
congratulate the Commission on its thorough research and 
documentation and believe that the report, overall, provides a 
sound program for restoring faith in the business community.
While the incidence of fraudulent reporting has been small, all 
of the business community has, nevertheless, suffered as a result 
of its occurrence.
For the sake of brevity, our comments are restricted to those 
recommendations which we believe are in need of modification.
Recommendation 2: Public companies should maintain internal
controls that are adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent 
financial reporting.
It is virtually impossible to establish and maintain an internal 
control system to prevent fraud, especially if it includes 
collusion. We suggest rewording the recommendation as follows:
Recommendation: Public companies should establish and maintain
a system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurance as to the integrity and reliability of the financial 
statements, the protection of assets from unauthorized use or 
disposition, and the prevention and detection of fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Such wording would be more consistent with the text which follows 
the recommendation and would alleviate our concerns.
Recommendation 6: Public companies should ensure that their
internal audit functions are objective.
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We do not agree th a t the ch ief in ternal auditor should report 
adm inistratively  to the CEO. The internal aud it function is an 
extremely important element in the control system, the maintenance 
of which is  generally the resp o n sib ility  of the c o n tro lle r  or the 
CFO. To remove the ch ief in ternal auditor from the control of the 
person prim arily responsible for the control s tru c tu re  i t s e l f  would 
not be an improvement to the system. We believe the ob jec tiv ity  and 
independence of the ch ief in ternal auditor can be maintained through 
oversight by the audit committee, and we suggest th a t the report 
place more emphasis on th is  re la tio n sh ip .
We also  disagree th a t the ch ief in ternal auditor must be an 
experienced aud it professional. Obtaining someone with these 
q u a lifica tio n s  may not be p rac tical for some companies and may be 
unsuitable for o thers. We do believe i t  is  important th a t the audit 
committee be involved in the h iring  and term ination of the ch ief 
in ternal aud ito r.
Recommendation 14: The audit committee should approve in advance
the types and the extent of management advisory services th a t 
management plans to engage the company's independent public 
accountant to perform.
We do not agree th a t i t  is  necessary or desirab le  for the audit 
committee to  become invol ved in operational concerns of th is  
nature. I t  is  important th a t the committee be made aware of the 
engagements and the re la ted  fees but p rio r approval is  impractical 
and unnecessary.
Recommendation 16: All public companies should be required by SEC
ru le  to  i nclude i n th e ir  annual reports to  stockholders a l e t t e r  
signed by the chairman of the aud it committee describing the 
committee's re sp o n s ib ilitie s  and a c t iv i t ie s  during the year.
We do not agree th a t a separate l e t t e r  from the audit committee is 
needed in the annual report to shareholders. The management report 
could include a b r ie f  descrip tion  of the audit committee's duties 
and the frequency of th e ir  meetings, but more than th is  is 
information overload. The members of the aud it committee are 
id en tified  in the proxy statem ent.
Recommendation 17: Management should advise the aud it committee
when i t  seeks a second opinion on a s ig n if ic an t accounting issue.
We suggest the recommendation be reworded as follows:
Recommendation: Management should discuss with the audit
committee any s ig n if ic a n t accounting issue for which an opinion 
was sought from a second independent public accounting firm.
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This change should be made to  c la r i f y  th a t the discussion w ith the 
aud it committee could take place a fte r  the second opinion is  sought 
ra ther than concurrently or beforehand.
Recommendation 18: When a public  company changes independent public
accountants, i t  should be required by SEC ru le  to  d isclose p u b lic ly  
the nature o f any m aterial accounting or aud iting  issues discussed 
w ith  i t s  old and new auditors during the three-year period preceding 
the change.
We believe th a t th is  recommendation places undue emphasis on 
disputes over accounting or aud iting  issues as the reason fo r 
changing aud ito rs . There are many reasons fo r  aud ito r changes, and 
disagreement over aud iting  issues is  probably the less l ik e ly  
cause. The present Form 8-K d isclosure requirements are adequate to  
keep investors informed o f such disagreements occurring w ith in  the 
la s t  three fis c a l years.
Recommendation 19: Audit committees should increase th e ir  oversight
o f the qua rte rly  reporting  process. This oversight should include 
approving fina nc ia l re su lts  p r io r  to  public  release.
We do not agree th a t au d it committee approval o f in te rim  resu lts  
should be required p r io r  to  public  release. The choice o f whether 
to  review and approve in te rim  re su lts  or to  re ly  on the in te rna l 
au d ito rs , external auditors or the fina nc ia l contro l system, should 
be a decision o f the au d it committee. A requirement fo r  p r io r  
approval would l ik e ly  delay the tim e ly  issuance o f quarte rly  
inform ation to  the detriment o f the investing  p u b lic .
We would be pleased to  elaborate on any o f these comments.
Very t r u ly  yours,
David G. Harmer 
Contro ll er
j g
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Dear Mr. Treadway:
The accompanying is the Society's response to the Exposure
Draft the Commission released in May. We hope that our comments 
and recommendations will be helpful in the preparation of your 
final report.
If we can be of further assistance to you or your Commission, 
please let us know. A copy of our response has been sent under 
separate cover to each Commissioner.
Best regards.
 
 
Robert L. Gray, CPA 
Executive Director
James C. Treadway, Jr., Chairman
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
1701 Pennyslvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
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P R E F A C E
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants is
pleased to submit comments on the April 1987 Exposure Draft of the 
Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
We want to commend the Commission for presenting its views in a concise
manner, and on a timely basis. We are in overall agreement with the
recommendations, taken as a whole, as they were intended. However, we 
do wish to submit comments for your consideration in specific areas in
which we either do not agree or believe a modification would enhance
the recommendation.
Our Society is composed of over 29,000 certified public
accountants, 65 percent of whom are involved in some level of public 
accounting or auditing practice and 30 percent of whom work in
government or industry as internal auditors, financial executives,
general executives, etc. (The remaining five percent of our membership 
is comprised of retired CPAs.) Accordingly, our comments will be
limited to areas within our sphere of expertise, which encompasses all
of the areas in your report with the exception of the regulatory and
legal environment.
This document was prepared by a special task force of the Society 
and represents the views of our membership at large. The format, for
your convenience, follows that of your Exposure Draft. The italicized
material, taken directly from the Commission’s complete set of
recommendations, is followed immediately by Society comment and
recommendation, if any, in print. An absense of editorial comment 
following a recommendation may be considered an indication of general 
agreement.
T a s k  F o r c e  M e m b e r s
J. Roger Donohue, CPA Marilyn A. Pendergast, CPA
Robert L. Gray, CPA Martin Rotheim, CPA
Richard J. Guiltinan, CPA, Chairman
COMMENTARY ON SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
C h a p t e r  O n e :  O v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  S y s t e m  a n d  F r a u d u l e n t
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
No recommendations
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  w e  d o  n o t  h a v e  a n y  c o m m e n t s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  
t h e  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  s y s t e m .
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T h e  T o n e  a t  t h e  T o p
Recommendation: For the top management of a public company to
discharge its obligation to oversee the financial reporting process, it 
must identify, understand, and assess the factors that may cause the
company's financial statements to be fraudulently misstated.
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal controls
that are adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
Recommendation: Public companies should develop and enforce written
codes of corporate conduct. Codes of conduct should foster a strong 
ethical climate and open channels of communication to help protect
against fraudulent financial reporting. A company’s audit committee
should review compliance with the code annually, including compliance
by top management, and report thereon to the board of directors.
W e  c o n c u r  i n  y o u r  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  c o r p o r a t e
e n v i r o n m e n t  a n d  t h e  p e r s o n a l  e x a m p l e  s e t  b y  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  b o t h  
f u n d a m e n t a l  t o  h o n e s t ,  e t h i c a l  b u s i n e s s  p r a c t i c e .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  a  
" f r a m e w o r k "  o f  m e a s u r e s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a n d  s u p p o r t  s u c h  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t  i s  
a  v e r y  p o s i t i v e  s t e p ,  a n d  w e  a g r e e  w i t h  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  i n  t h i s  
a r e a .
A c c o u n t i n g  F u n c t i o n  a n d  C h i e f  A c c o u n t i n g  O f f i c e r
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain accounting
functions that can effectively meet their financial reporting 
obligations.
W e  w o u l d  a n t i c i p a t e  m u c h  i n t e r e s t  a n d  c o m m e n t a r y  i n  
t h i s  a r e a  f r o m  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  E x e c u t i v e ,  M a n a g e m e n t
A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  c o m m u n i t i e s .  M a n y  o f  o u r  m e m b e r s  w o r k  i n  
s u c h  c a p a c i t i e s  w i t h i n  i n d u s t r y  a n d  w o u l d  w h o l e h e a r t e d l y  s u p p o r t  y o u r  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s .
T h e  c h o i c e  o f  a  C h i e f  A c c o u n t i n g  O f f i c e r  a n d  h i s
a d h e r e n c e  t o  c o r p o r a t e  a n d  p r o f e s s i o n a l  c o d e s  o f  c o n d u c t  a r e  b o t h
i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r s  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  a n d  d e t e c t i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .  T h e  t o n e  s e t  b y  s u c h  a  C h i e f  O f f i c e r  a n d  t h e  e x a m p l e  h e  
s e t s  w i l l  f i l t e r  d o w n  a n d  b e  e m u l a t e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  F u n c t i o n  a n d  C h i e f  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t o r
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain an effective
internal audit function staffed with an adequate number of qualified 
personnel appropriate to the size and the nature of the company.
C h a p t e r  T w o :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  P u b l i c  C o m p a n y
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A u d i t o r s  i s  a  c r i t i c a l  l i n k  i n  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  a n y  c o m p a n y  o f  r e a s o n a b l e  
s i z e .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  o t h e r  t h a n  
t h o s e  w h o s e  s i z e  w o u l d  m a k e  it i m p r a c t i c a b l e .
Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that their internal
audit functions are objective.
I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  i n  v e r y  l a r g e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
a  c e n t r a l  o r  c o r p o r a t e  a u d i t  s t a f f  m a y  b e  u n a b l e  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e  
n e c e s s a r y  w o r k i n g  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  t o  b e  f u l l y  
o b j e c t i v e .  I n  s u c h  a  s i t u a t i o n ,  a  s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  c e n t r a l  
a n d  s u b s i d i a r y  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  g r o u p s  s h o u l d  b e  f o s t e r e d .  I t  m a y  a l s o  
b e  h e l p f u l  t o  t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  o b j e c t i v i t y ,  i f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  
a r e  a s s u r e d  o f  c a r e e r  p a t h  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t h r o u g h  a  m a n a g e m e n t  s u p p o r t e d  
p r o g r a m  t o  p l a c e  t h e m  i n  o p e r a t i o n s  m a n a g e m e n t  p o s i t i o n s  a t  a n  
a p p r o p r i a t e  p o i n t  i n  t h e i r  d e v e l o p m e n t .
Recommendation: Internal auditors should consider the implications
of their nonfinancial audit findings for the company's financial 
statements.
W e  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r ’s
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f t e n  g o  w e l l  b e y o n d  f i n a n c i a l  a u d i t i n g ,  a n d  a g r e e
t h a t  a l l  f i n d i n g s  m a y  h a v e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  
a n d  s h o u l d  b e  s o  c o n s i d e r e d .
Recommendation: Management and the audit committee should ensure
that the internal auditors' involvement in the audit of the entire
financial reporting process is appropriate and properly coordinated
with the independent public accountant.
W e  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  s h o u l d  b e  f u l l y  
i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  a u d i t  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h a t  h i s  
w o r k  s h o u l d  b e  c o o r d i n a t e d  w i t h  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r  t o  h e l p  p r e v e n t  
a n d  d e t e c t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  a v o i d
u n n e c e s s a r y  o v e r l a p  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
M a n d a t o r y  I n d e p e n d e n t  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e
Recommendation: The board of directors of all public companies
should be required by SEC rule to establish audit committees comprised
solely of independent directors.
W e  a g r e e  a n d  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t
c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  m u s t  h a v e  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  b e  k n o w l e d g e a b l e  i n
a u d i t i n g ,  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l ,  a n d / o r  c o r p o r a t e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  A  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e m  s h o u l d  b e  c e r t i f i e d  p u b l i c
a c c o u n t a n t s ,  i f  p r a c t i c a b l e .
A  s t r o n g  a n d  o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
w e l l  s u p e r v i s e d ,  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  a d h e r i n g  t o
p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  I n t e r n a l
3
E x c e l l e n t  p o t e n t i a l  s o u r c e s  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
m e m b e r s  a r e  C P A s  i n  i n d u s t r y ,  s u c h  a s  c h i e f  f i n a n c i a l  o f f i c e r s ,  a n d  
r e t i r e d  o r  o t h e r  C P A s .  H o w e v e r ,  s o m e  r e l i e f  f r o m  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k  i s  
r e q u i r e d  ( s e e  b e l o w ) .
Recommendation: Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and
effective overseers of the financial reporting process and the 
company's internal controls.
T o  i n s u r e  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ,  
t h e  c o m p a n y ’s  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  s h o u l d  r e q u i r e  a  s i g n e d  a f f i d a v i t  o f  
c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  C o d e  o f  P r o f e s s i o n a l  C o n d u c t  a n d  s t a n d a r d s  f o r
i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  t o  b e  f i l e d  b y  i t s  m e m b e r s .  I t s  p u r p o s e  w o u l d  b e
t o  a s s u r e  t h e  b o a r d  o f  e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r ’s
o b j e c t i v i t y .  T h e  b o a r d  s h o u l d  p e r i o d i c a l l y  p e r f o r m  a  r e v i e w  o f  t h e
s t a t e m e n t s .
I n  o r d e r  t o  a t t r a c t  q u a l i f i e d  i n d i v i d u a l s  w h o  a r e  
w i l l i n g  t o  m a k e  t h e  k i n d  o f  t i m e  a n d  e f f o r t  c o m m i t m e n t  r e q u i r e d ,  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s  s h o u l d  b e  a d e q u a t e l y  c o m p e n s a t e d ,  a n d  s h o u l d  
a l s o  b e  a s s u r e d  o f  r e a s o n a b l e  p r o t e c t i o n  f r o m  l i a b i l i t y  ( e x c e p t  f o r  
a c t s  o f  g r o s s  n e g l i g e n c e  o r  i n t e n t i o n a l  h a r m ) .  T h i s  m a y  r e q u i r e  b o t h  
f e d e r a l  a n d  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n ;  u n l e s s  s u c h  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  p r o v i d e d ,  t h e  
g o a l  o f  e f f e c t i v e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  m a y  n e v e r  b e  f u l l y  a c h i e v e d .
Recommendation: All public companies should develop a written
charter setting forth the duties and responsibilities of the audit
committee. The board of directors should approve the charter, review 
it at least annually, and modify it as necessary.
Recommendation: Audit committees should have adequate resources and
authority to discharge their responsibilities.
I n  o r d e r  t o  p r o p e r l y  d i s c h a r g e  i t s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m a y ,  a t  t i m e s ,  f i n d  i t  n e c e s s a r y
t o  h i r e  a t t o r n e y s ,  a c t u a r i e s ,  o r  o t h e r  c o n s u l t a n t s  o r  t o  e x p e n d
r e a s o n a b l e  s u m s  t o  a c h i e v e  i t s  g o a l s  a n d  o b j e c t i v e s .  A m o u n t s  e x p e n d e d  
a b o v e  a  c e r t a i n  m i n i m u m  l e v e l  s h o u l d  h a v e  t o  b e  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  b o a r d
o f  d i r e c t o r s  o r  i t s  c h a i r m a n .
Recommendation: The audit committee should review management's
evaluation of factors related to the independence of the company's 
public accountant. Both the audit committee and management should 
assist the public accountant in preserving his independence.
W e  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  b e  t o t a l l y  
f a m i l i a r  w i t h  a l l  f a c t s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  o u t s i d e  a u d i t o r ’s  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T o  h e l p  i n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t o r s  a r e  t o t a l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  i n  f a c t  a n d  i n  
a p p e a r a n c e ,  t h e i r  s e l e c t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .
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R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  audit committee should approve in a dvance the
types a n d  the extent o f  m a n a g e m e n t  advisory services that m a n a g e m e n t
plans to e n g a g e  the c o m p a n y ’s independent public accountant to perform.
W e  s t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  o f  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v i n g  e a c h  n o n - a u d i t  u s e  o f  t h e  a u d i t o r ’s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
s e r v i c e s .  T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i s  n o t  i n  t h e  b e s t  p o s i t i o n  t o  s e l e c t  a n
a p p r o p r i a t e  c o n s u l t i n g  f i r m  f o r  a  s p e c i f i c  n o n - a u d i t  t a s k .  F u r t h e r ,  
t h e r e  h a s  n e v e r  b e e n  a n y  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  n o n - a u d i t
s e r v i c e s  h a s  e f f e c t e d  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a n  o u t s i d e  a u d i t o r .  T o  t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  b r o a d e r  e x p o s u r e  m a y  b e  v e r y  b e n e f i c i a l  t o  t h e  a u d i t o r  i n  
p e r f o r m i n g  h i s  w o r k .
R e p o r t i n g  o n  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  t o  S t o c k h o l d e r s
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule
to include in their annual reports to stockholders management reports 
signed by the chief executive officer and chief accounting officer. 
The management report should acknowledge management’s responsibilities
for the financial statements and internal control, discuss how these 
responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide management’s assessment of 
the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule
to include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter signed by
the chairman of the audit committee describing the committee’s
responsibilities and activities during the year.
S e e k i n g  a  S e c o n d  O p i n i o n
Recommendation: Management should advise the audit committee when
it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
Recommendation: When a public company changes independent public
accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the
nature of any material accounting or auditing issues discussed with its
old and new auditors during the three-year period preceding the change.
W e  a g r e e  i n  g e n e r a l  w i t h  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  b u t  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  t h r e e  y e a r  r e q u i r e m e n t  b e  s h o r t e n e d  s o m e w h a t .  A s  a n  
o v e r a l l  c o m m e n t  r e l a t i n g  t o  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s ,  i t  m a y  b e  i m p r a c t i c a l  f o r  
s m a l l e r  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  t o  h a v e  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e
t o  d o  a l l  t h e  w o r k  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  o u t l i n e d .
Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g
Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight of
the quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include
approving financial results prior to public release.
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S e t t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  f o r  I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l
Recommendation: The Commission's sponsoring organizations should
establish a body to guide public companies on internal controls.
W e  a g r e e  t h a t  m u c h  e f f e c t i v e  r e s e a r c h  h a s  b e e n  d o n e  
o n  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  b y  a  v a r i e t y  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o v e r  
a n  e x t e n d e d  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e .  W e  a l s o  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  v a l i d  d i f f e r e n c e s  
o f  o p i n i o n  e x i s t  o v e r  w h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l .  A n  
i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  m a t t e r  m i g h t  h e l p  r e s o l v e  s u c h  
d i f f e r e n c e s ,  a n d  w e  c o n c u r  w i t h  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t
R e c o g n i z i n g  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  D e t e c t i n g  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise
standards to restate the independent public accountant's responsibility
for detection of fraudulent financial reporting, requiring the 
independent public accountant to (1) take affirmative steps in each 
audit to assess the potential for such reporting and (2) design tests
to provide reasonable assurance of detection. Revised standards should
include guidance for assessing risks and pursuing detection when risks 
are identified.
I m p r o v i n g  D e t e c t i o n  C a p a b i l i t i e s
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should establish
standards to require independent public accountants to perform
analytical review procedures in all audit engagements and should
provide improved guidance on the appropriate use of these procedures.
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public
accountants to review quarterly financial data of public companies
before release to the public.
I m p r o v i n g  A u d i t  Q u a l i t y
Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section should strengthen
its peer review program by increasing review of audit engagements
involving public company clients new to a firm. For each office
selected for peer review. the first audit of all such new clients
should be reviewed.
F i r s t y e a r a u d i t c l i e n t s a r e n o r m a l l y s u b j e c t  t o
t h e  m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e  q u a l i t y c o n t r o l r e v i e w b y a n y  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m .
T h e  p r o c e d u r e s  i n v o l v e d  v a r y  f r o m  f i r m  t o  f i r m  b u t  u s u a l l y  i n c l u d e
d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  p r i o r  a c c o u n t a n t s  a n d  r e v i e w  o f  t h e i r  w o r k p a p e r s ;
a c c e p t a n c e  o f  a  n e w  c l i e n t  b y  t h e  a u d i t  f i r m ' s  o w n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ,  
d i r e c t o r  o f  a u d i t ,  m a n a g i n g  p a r t n e r  o r  e q u i v a l e n t ;  a s  w e l l  a s  a  m o r e  
e x t e n s i v e  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  r e p o r t  a n d  w o r k p a p e r s  b y  t h e  e n g a g e m e n t
p a r t n e r  a n d  t h e  r e v i e w  _ p a r t n e r .  S i n c e  s u c h  p r o c e d u r e s  a r e  n o r m a l l y
i m p o s e d ,  w e  c a n n o t  u n d e r s t a n d  w h y  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  i n  t h e  
p e e r  r e v i e w  p r o g r a m  i n v o l v i n g  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  c l i e n t s  n e w  t o  a  f i r m ,  a l l  
s u c h  e n g a g e m e n t s  m u s t  u n d e r g o  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  p e e r  r e v i e w .  A s  a n  
a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  f i r s t  y e a r  a u d i t s  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  f r o m  w h i c h  a  s a m p l e  i s  s e l e c t e d  f o r  r e v i e w .
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Recommendation: The AICPA’s SEC Practice Section requirement for a
concurring, or second partner review of the audit report should be
revised as part of an ongoing process of review of this requirement.
Standards for the concurring review should, among other things, (1)
require concurring review partner involvement in the planning stage of 
the audit in addition to the final review stage, (2) specify
qualifications of the concurring review partner to require prior
experience with audits of SEC registrants and familiarity with the
client's industry, and (3) require the concurring review partner to
consider himself a peer of the engagement partner for purposes of the
review.
T h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  a  c o n c u r r i n g  o r  s e c o n d  p a r t n e r
r e v i e w  o f  t h e  a u d i t  r e p o r t  i s  c u m b e r s o m e  a n d  i n e f f i c i e n t .
A l t h o u g h  w e  d o  c o n c u r  w i t h  a  s e c o n d  p a r t n e r  r e v i e w ,  
w e  d o  n o t  f i n d  i t  b e n e f i c i a l  i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  s t a g e s .  T h e  e n g a g e m e n t
p a r t n e r  i s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  s t a g e  o f  t h e  a u d i t  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o
n u m e r o u s  o t h e r  q u a l i f i e d  C P A ’s  a t  t h e  m a n a g e r i a l  o r  s u p e r v i s o r y  l e v e l .
I n  l a r g e r  e n g a g e m e n t s ,  t h e r e  m a y  a l s o  b e  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  a u d i t  p a r t n e r
i n v o l v e d .  I f  a n y t h i n g ,  t h e  s e c o n d  p a r t n e r  s h o u l d  m e r e l y  r e v i e w  w h a t  
e l e m e n t s  w e n t  i n t o  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s .
B y  h a v i n g  t h e  r e v i e w  p a r t n e r  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  f i n a l
r e v i e w  s t a g e  o n l y ,  a n  o b j e c t i v e  i n d e p e n d e n t  v i e w  i s  b r o u g h t  t o  b e a r  o n  
t h e  a u d i t  p r o c e s s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i f  t h e  r e v i e w  p a r t n e r  w a s  i n v o l v e d  i n
t h e  p l a n n i n g  s t a g e s ,  n o t  o n l y  w o u l d  a d d i t i o n a l  t i m e  b u r d e n s  a n d  c o s t  b e  
c r e a t e d ,  b u t  t h e  p r o c e s s  w o u l d  b e  l e n g t h e n e d  a n d  c o m p l i c a t e d  w i t h o u t
n e c e s s a r i l y  e n h a n c i n g  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  e n g a g e m e n t .
M a n d a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  c o n c u r r i n g  r e v i e w  p a r t n e r  m u s t
h a v e  p r i o r  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  b o t h  t h e  a u d i t s  o f  S E C  r e g i s t r a n t s  a n d  a
p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r y  i s  c u m b e r s o m e  f o r  t h e  s m a l l  a n d  m e d i u m - s i z e d
a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m s .  T h e s e  f i r m s ,  a l t h o u g h  l i m i t e d  i n  n u m b e r  o f  p a r t n e r s ,  
m a y  h a v e  a  p a r t n e r  w i t h  a n  e x p e r t i s e  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r y  t h a t
w o u l d  p r o v e  i n v a l u a b l e  t o  t h e  a u d i t  p r o c e s s .  B e c a u s e  o f  f i r m  s i z e ,  
a n o t h e r  p a r t n e r  w i t h  i n d u s t r y  e x p e r t i s e  m a y  n o t  b e  a v a i l a b l e .  
N o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h e  p a r t n e r  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  p e r f o r m i n g  t h e  c o n c u r r i n g  r e v i e w
m a y  b e  a s  c o m p e t e n t  a n  a u d i t  p a r t n e r  o f  e q u a l  s t a t u r e  w h o  w o u l d  o f f e r
a n  o b j e c t i v e  i n s i g h t  a n d  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  e n g a g e m e n t .
W e  d o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  i n  s o m e  i n d u s t r i e s ,  c o m p l e x i t y
r e q u i r e s  s p e c i f i c  e x p e r t i s e .  I n  s u c h  c a s e s ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  a u d i t i n g
s t a n d a r d s  p r e c l u d e  a  f i r m  f r o m  u n d e r t a k i n g  t h e  e n g a g e m e n t .
Recommendation: Public accounting firms should recognize and
control the organizational and individual pressures that potentially
reduce audit quality.
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C o m m u n i c a t i n g  t h e  A u d i t o r ’s  R o l e
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the
auditor's standard report to state that the audit provides reasonable
but not absolute assurance that the audited financial statements are 
free from material misstatements as a result of fraud or error.
T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  r e c e n t l y  i s s u e d  a n  
e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  o f  a  r e v i s e d  a u d i t o r ’s  r e p o r t  w h i c h  a d d r e s s e s  t h i s
i s s u e .  T h e  p r o p o s e d  r e p o r t  c o n t a i n s  l a n g u a g e  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  a u d i t o r ’s 
r o l e  a s  i t  p e r t a i n s  t o  m a t e r i a l  m i s s t a t e m e n t s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  f r a u d  o r
e r r o r .
T h i s  r e v i s e d  r e p o r t  a d d r e s s e s  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s
c o n c e r n  i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  a n d  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  m o r e  i n f o r m a t i v e  f i n a n c i a l
s t a t e m e n t s  f o r  u s e r s ,  i f  a d o p t e d .
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the
auditor’s standard report to describe the extent to which the
independent public accountant has reviewed and evaluated the system of
internal accounting control. The Auditing Standards Board also should
provide explicit guidance to address the situation where, as a result 
of his knowledge of the company’s internal accounting controls, the
independent public accountant disagrees with management’s assessment as
stated in the proposed management’s report.
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a u d i t o r s  t o
i m p r o v e  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  r o l e  t o  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t  u s e r s .  
C u r r e n t l y ,  i n i t i a t i v e s  a r e  u n d e r w a y  b y  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  a n d  
o t h e r s  t o  h e l p  a c c o m p l i s h  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e .
H o w e v e r ,  w e  s t r o n g l y  o p p o s e  t h e  r e v i s i o n  o f  t h e
a u d i t o r ' s  s t a n d a r d  r e p o r t  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h e
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  h a s  r e v i e w e d  a n d  e v a l u a t e d  t h e  s y s t e m  o f
i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  s u c h  a  r e p o r t  p r e s e n t s  a n
i m p l i e d  o p i n i o n  o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s ,  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a t t e s t a t i o n
s t a n d a r d s ,  a n d  w i l l  b e  m i s u n d e r s t o o d  b y  t h e  r e a d e r s  o f  t h e  r e p o r t .
F u r t h e r ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  w i t h  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  c o n t r o l s  s h o u l d  n o t  o c c u r  w i t h i n  t h e  r e p o r t
i t s e l f ,  b u t  m u s t  b e  e l i m i n a t e d  p r i o r  t o  i t s  i s s u a n c e .
C u r r e n t  s t a n d a r d s  p r o v i d e  f o r  r e p o r t i n g  o n  i n t e r n a l  
a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l s  b y  m e a n s  o f  a  m a n a g e m e n t  l e t t e r .  I n  m a n y  
i n s t a n c e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  i n v o l v i n g  s m a l l  c o m p a n i e s ,  e f f e c t i v e  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  i s  a n  i m p r a c t i c a l  o b j e c t i v e  t o  m e e t .
R e v i s i o n  o f  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  r e p o r t  t o  a l l o w  f o r  a l l
o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o s s i b l e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  d e v i a t i o n s  w o u l d  b e
i n e f f e c t i v e  i n  d e s i g n  a n d  i m p r a c t i c a l  i n  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .
9
I n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  e n c o m p a s s e s  t o o  m a n y  f a c t o r s  t o  b e  
d i s c u s s e d  i n - d e p t h  i n  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  r e p o r t .  A  s u m m a r y  o f  i n t e r n a l
c o n t r o l  f i n d i n g s  w o u l d  n o t  p r o v i d e  t h e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o
m e e t  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .
A s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p r a c t i c e ,  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t  u s e r s  
m a y  c u r r e n t l y  r e q u e s t  a  c o p y  o f  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  l e t t e r  w h i c h  p r o v i d e s
t h e m  w i t h  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  f i n d i n g s  a n d  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
R e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d
Recommendation: The AICPA should reorganize the Auditing Standards
Board to afford a full participatory role in the standard-setting
process to knowledgeable persons who are affected by and interested in
auditing standards but who either are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in 
public practice.
I f  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  r e o r g a n i z e  t h e  A u d i t i n g  
S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  d o n e  i n  s u c h  a  w a y  a s  n o t  t o  d i s r u p t  a n  
a l r e a d y  s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n .  T o  t h i s  e n d ,  w e  r e c o m m e n d  t h a t  t h r e e  
p e r s o n s  w h o  a r e  e i t h e r  n o t  C P A s  o r  C P A s  n o  l o n g e r  i n  p u b l i c  p r a c t i c e  b e  
a d d e d  t o  t h e  B o a r d  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  d e s i r e d  v i e w p o i n t  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
c o n s i d e r s  l a c k i n g ,  t h u s  r a i s i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  B o a r d  m e m b e r s  t o  2 4 .
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C h a p t e r  F o u r :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  S E C  a n d  O t h e r s  t o  I m p r o v e
t h e  R e g u l a t o r y  a n d  L e g a l  E n v i r o n m e n t
A s  p r e v i o u s l y  m e n t i o n e d  i n  t h e  p r e f a c e  t o
t h i s  r e s p o n s e ,  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  a n d  l e g a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  i s  o u t  o f
o u r  s p h e r e  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .  F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  w e  d o  n o t  h a v e
a n y  c o m m e n t  o r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t o  m a k e  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .
A d d i t i o n a l  S E C  E n f o r c e m e n t  R e m e d i e s
Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to impose civil
money penalties in administrative proceedings [including Rule 2(e)
proceedings] and to seek civil money penalties from a court directly in
an injunctive proceeding.
Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to issue a cease
and desist order when a securities law violation or an unsound
financial reporting practice is found.
Recommendation: The SEC should seek explicit statutory authority to
bar or suspend corporate officers and directors involved in fraudulent
financial reporting from future service in that capacity in a public
company.
I n c r e a s e d  C r i m i n a l  P r o s e c u t i o n
Recommendation: Criminal prosecution of fraudulent financial
reporting cases should be made a higher priority. The SEC should 
conduct an affirmative program to promote increased criminal
prosecution of fraudulent financial reporting cases by educating and
assisting government officials with criminal prosecution powers.
I m p r o v e d  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t i n g  P r o f e s s i o n
Recommend ation: The SEC should require all public accounting firms
that audit public companies to be members of a professional
organization that has peer review and independent oversight functions
and is approved by the SEC, such as that specified by the SECPS of the 
AICPA's Division for CPA Firms.
Recommend ation: The SEC should take enforcement action when a
public accounting firm fails to remedy deficiencies cited in the public 
accounting profession's quality assurance program.
S E C  R e s o u r c e s
Recommendation: The SEC must be given adequate resources to perform
existing and additional functions that help prevent, detect, and deter 
fraudulent financial reporting.
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F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n  R e g u l a t o r y  A g e n c i e s
Recommendation: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (including the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation) should adopt measures patterned on the
Commission’s recommendations directed to the SEC to carry out their own 
regulatory responsibility relating to financial reporting under the
federal securities laws.
Recommendation: The financial institution regulatory agencies
should provide for the exchange of information between the regulatory 
examiner and the independent public accountant.
E n h a n c e d  E n f o r c e m e n t  b y  S t a t e  B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y
Recommendation: State boards of accountancy should implement
positive enforcement programs that periodically would review the
quality of services that the independent public accountants they
license render.
C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  L i a b i l i t y  o n  A u d i t  Q u a l i t y
Recommendation: Parties charged with responding to various tort
reform initiatives should consider the implications that the perceived
liability crisis holds for long-term audit quality and the independent
public accountant’s detection of fraudulent financial reporting.
R e c o n s i d e r i n g  C o r p o r a t e  I n d e m n i f i c a t i o n
Recommendation: The SEC should reconsider its long-standing
position that the corporate indemnification of directors for
liabilities that arise under the Securities Act of 1933 is against
public policy and therefore unenforceable.
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C h a p t e r  F i v e :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  E d u c a t i o n  
B u s i n e s s  a n d  A c c o u n t i n g  C u r r i c u l a
Recommendation: Throughout the business and accounting curricula,
educators should foster knowledge and understanding of the factors that
may cause fraudulent financial reporting and the strategies that can
lead to a reduction in its incidence.
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should
promote a better understanding of the function and the importance of 
internal controls, including the control environment, in preventing,
detecting, and deterring fraudulent financial reporting.
Recommendation: Business and accounting students should be well-
informed about the regulation and enforcement activities by which
government and private bodies safeguard the financial reporting system 
and thereby protect the public interest.
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should help
students develop stronger analytical, problem solving, and judgment
skills to help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial 
reporting when they become participants in the financial reporting
process.
Recommendation: The business and accounting curricula should
emphasize ethical values by integrating their development with the
acquisition of knowledge and skills to help prevent, detect, and deter 
fraudulent financial reporting.
Recommendation: Business schools should encourage business and
accounting faculty to develop their own personal competence as well as 
classroom materials for conveying information, skills, and ethical 
values that can help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent financial
reporting.
T a k e n  a s  a  w h o l e ,  w e  s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  e d u c a t i o n  w h i c h  w o u l d  i n t e g r a t e  i n  c o l l e g e
c u r r i c u l a  e t h i c s  a n d  s k i l l s  f o r  r e d u c i n g  t h e  i n s t a n c e s  o f  f r a u d u l e n t
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
A l t h o u g h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  d e c i d e d  t h a t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
d i d  n o t  f a l l  u n d e r  t h e  p u r v i e w  o f  i t s  s t u d y ,  w e  s t r o n g l y  a f f i r m  t h a t  
t h e  A I C P A  s h o u l d  a d o p t  t h e  1 5 0 - h o u r  p o s t b a c c a l a u r e a t e  e d u c a t i o n  
r e q u i r e m e n t  a s  a  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  m e m b e r s h i p  f o r  t h o s e  e n t e r i n g  t h e  
p r o f e s s i o n  a f t e r  t h e  y e a r  2 0 0 0 .
13
P r o f e s s i o n a l  C e r t i f i c a t i o n  E x a m i n a t i o n s
Recommendation: Professional certification examinations should test
students on the information, skills, and ethical values that further
the understanding of fraudulent financial reporting and that promote
its reduction.
C o n t i n u i n g  P r o f e s s i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n
Recommendation: As  part of their continuing professional education,
independent public accountants, internal auditors, and corporate 
accountants should study the forces and opportunities that contribute 
to fraudulent financial reporting, the risk factors that may indicate
its occurrence, and the relevant ethical and technical standards.
14
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KAN SAS CITY P O W E R  & LIGHT C O M PAN Y
1330 BALTIMORE AVENUE 
P. O. BOX 6 7 9
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64141
June 16, 1987
N E I L  R O A D M A N
C O N T R O L L E R
National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Commission:
The April 1987 Exposure Draft issued by this Commission has generated the 
need for a response from Kansas City Power & Light (KCPL). The Exposure Draft 
includes three points of interest that we believe we need to address. Those 
points of interest are as follows:
1. The audit committee should increase its oversight of the quarterly 
reporting process, including approval of financial results before 
their release to the public.
2. Independent accountants should be required by the SEC to review the 
quarterly financial data of public companies prior to its release to 
the public.
3. SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that corporate 
indemnification of directors for securities law liabilities is 
against public policy, and therefore unenforceable.
In regards to point one, this change would require incurring additional 
cost and hamper the timely release of quarterly financial results. One must 
keep in mind that financial statements normally receive a thorough review by 
various levels of management before release, which in our opinion is an 
adequate review. It is a fair assumption that only a very small percent of 
the total quarterly financial statements released to the public are ever 
presented in a fraudulent manner. Thus, it may be appropriate to implement 
these requirements only for quarterly financial statements that include 
unusual or extraordinary items (i.e., mergers, acquisitions, write-offs, etc). 
Furthermore, in most cases most audit committees review the annual report 
prior to release. This review should be made mandatory for all companies.
The second point listed above on the surface seems quite logical.
However, the expense and hardship associated with the procedure would be quite 
burdensome. Not only would companies be required to pay external auditors for
their review but may also be required to hire additional personnel in order to
prepare certain schedules for the external auditors quarterly review. These 
schedules would be required to be prepared when there is already significant 
time constraints on Company personnel to prepare the financial data. As we
mentioned in our discussion of point one, it may also be appropriate for this
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Commission to recommend implementing quarterly reviews, by independent 
accountants only if unusual or extraordinary items exists.
The third and final point of interest is concerned with corporate 
indemnification of directors. KCPL agrees with the Commission that the SEC 
should reconsider its long-standing position that corporate indemnification of 
directors for securities law liabilities is against public policy, and 
therefore unenforceable.
In conclusion, this Commission should not recommend unreasonable burdens 
on all public companies just because of the existence of a few fraudulent 
financial statements. Regardless of the new measures discussed in your 
exposure draft, the complete elimination of fraudulent financial statements 
will not occur.
Thank you for taking the time to consider our comments in this regard.
Sincerely,
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G E N E R A L  E LE C T R IC
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
3135 EASTON TURNPIKE 
FAIRFIELD. CONNECTICUT 06431
DENNIS D. DAMMERMAN 
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT-FINANCE
June 16, 1987
N a tio n a l C om m iss ion  on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P ennsy lvan ia  A ve . N .W .
W ash ing ton , D .C . 20006
G e n tle m e n :
GE a p p re c ia te s  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  c o m m e n t on th e  A p r i l  1987 E xposure  D r a f t  o f  
th e  C o m m iss io n ’s R e p o rt.
We b e lie ve  th e  C om m iss ion  has p e rfo rm e d  a v a lu a b le  p u b lic  s e rv ic e  in  its  
resea rch , conc lus ion s , and re co m m e n d a tio n s  as se t fo r th  in  th e  D r a f t .  A s th e
C om m iss ion  re co g n ize s , m any o f  th e  re co m m e n d a tio n s , p a r t ic u la r ly  those  p e r ta in in g  
to  p u b lic  com pan ies , w ou ld  co n s is t o f  e x te n d in g  good p ra c tic e s  c u r re n t ly  in  e f fe c t  
am ong m any f irm s .  N e ve rth e le ss , th e re  is co n s id e ra b le  m e r it  in  c a ta lo g in g , c o d ify in g , 
and p u b lic iz in g  such p ra c tic e s , and w e hope th a t  th e  C o m m iss io n ’s p ro m in e n ce , and 
th e  le ve ra g e  o f  i ts  sponsoring  o rg a n iz a tio n s , w i l l  re s u lt  in  a cce p ta n ce  o f  m ost o f  th e  
C o m m iss io n ’s re co m m e n d a tio n s .
G E ’s p h ilosop hy  and p ra c tic e s  a re  q u ite  c o n s is te n t w ith  m ost o f  th e
re co m m e n d a tio n s  o f  th e  se c tio n  o f  th e  Exposure D r a f t  d ire c te d  to  p u b lic  com pan ies . 
We w i l l ,  o f  course , re v ie w  th e  f in a l R e p o rt in  d e ta il and e v a lu a te  w h a t changes, i f  any, 
m ig h t be a p p ro p r ia te  and unde r o u r ow n c o n tro l.
B e fo re  issu ing  th e  f in a l re p o r t ,  h o w e ve r, th e re  is one a rea  to  w h ich  we suggest th e  
C om m iss ion  g ives  m o re  c o n s id e ra tio n , n a m e ly , sharpen ing  th e  d is t in c t io n  be tw een  th e  
A u d it  C o m m it te e ’s o v e rs ig h t ro le , w h ich  w e agree  w ith  th e  C om m iss ion  is  e x tre m e ly  
im p o r ta n t,  and th e  o p e ra tin g  ro le  o f  m anagem en t. The A u d it  C o m m itte e  Good
P ra c t ic e  G u id e lin e s  (A p p e n d ix  K  o f  th e  R e p o rt)  and m ost o f  th e  s p e c if ic
re co m m e n d a tio n s  re g a rd in g  A u d it  C o m m itte e s  appea r to  us to  be exp ress ive  o f  th e  
o v e rs ig h t fu n c t io n .  H o w e ve r, we a re  conce rned  abo u t th e  c h a ra c te r iz a t io n  o f  th e  
A u d it  C o m m itte e  as " th e  p r im a ry  (em phasis added) v e h ic le  th a t  th e  B oard o f  D ire c to rs  
uses to  d ischa rge  i ts  re s p o n s ib ility  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  co m p a n y ’s f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g ” . 
W hile  th e  A u d it  C o m m itte e  c e r ta in ly  has th e  im p o r ta n t ro le  o f  ove rsee ing  th e  
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  p rocess, i t  shou ld  n o t have th e  p r im a ry  re s p o n s ib ility  — th a t  is  and 
shou ld  be th e  re s p o n s ib ility  o f  a co m p a n y ’s m anagem en t, em ployees and indepe nden t 
p u b lic  a c c o u n ta n ts .
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
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A l s o ,  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v e  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  
r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e  b l u r s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  o v e r s i g h t  a n d  o p e r a t i o n s  
a n d  m a y  n o t  b e  p r a c t i c a l  i n  s o m e  c a s e s .  W e  e n d o r s e  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e  A u d i t  
C o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  e x e r c i s e  o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  O v e r s i g h t  o f  
t h e  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  b e  e n c o u r a g e d ,  c h i e f l y  b y  g o o d  o n g o i n g  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
m a n a g e m e n t ,  i n t e r n a l  a n d  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s ,  a n d  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s  o f  m o s t  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  a r e  r e v i e w e d  b y  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  p r i o r  t o  
r e l e a s e  e v e n  t h o u g h  a  f o r m a l  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  r e v i e w  m a y  n o t  b e  d i s c l o s e d .  A n y  c o n c e r n s  
a r i s i n g  f r o m  t h e s e  r e v i e w s  a r e  o r  c a n  b e  c o m m u n i c a t e d  t o  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e ,  a n d  
t h a t  C o m m i t t e e  c a n  o r  s h o u l d  s a t i s f y  i t s e l f  a s  t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h o s e  r e v i e w s .  G o o d  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  a l s o  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  a n d  t h e  B o a r d  a r e  n o t  
" s u r p r i s e d ”  e i t h e r  a s  t o  a m o u n t  o r  c a u s e s  o f  i n t e r i m  r e s u l t s .  H o w e v e r ,  d e p e n d i n g  o n  
o p e r a t i n g  s c h e d u l e s ,  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  a n  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g  t o  r e v i e w  a c t u a l  
r e s u l t s  a n d  a  p r e s s  r e l e a s e  d r a f t  p r i o r  t o  i s s u a n c e  m a y  n o t  b e  f e a s i b l e  w i t h o u t  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d e l a y i n g  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e  o f  d a t a .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  c a n  
f u l f i l l  i t s  o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  w i t h o u t  h a v i n g  t o  a c t  f o r m a l l y  
o n  s p e c i f i c  i n t e r i m  p r e s s  r e l e a s e s .
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  w e  r e i t e r a t e  o u r  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  a n d  l o o k  f o r w a r d  t o  
e a r l y  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  i t s  f i n a l  R e p o r t  a n d  t h e  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  o n  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
w h i c h  w e  b e l i e v e  t h e  R e p o r t  w i l l  h a v e .
V e r y  t r u l y  y o u r s .
D .  D .  D a m m e r m a n
a l s
c c :  J .  F .  W e l c h  
L .  A .  B o s s i d y
E .  E .  H o o d
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  
G E  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s
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M e l v i n  L .  H i r s c h
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
60 EAST 42nd STREET 
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10165
TELEPHONE (212) 697-4885
J u n e  1 8 ,  1 9 8 7
T h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m iss io n  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e , N.W .
W a s h in g to n ,  DC 2 0 0 0 6
G e n tle m e n :
I  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  f r o m  E r n s t  & W h in n ey  t h e i r  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  -  A p r i l  198 7  o f  
y o u r  R e p o r t .
I  am a  d i r e c t o r  o f  tw o  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  a n d  a  p r a c t i c i n g  a t t o r n e y  f o r  o v e r  
t h i r t y - f i v e  y e a r s .
I  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  SEC s h o u l d  r e c o n s i d e r  i t s  p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  o f  d i r e c t o r s  f o r  l i a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  a r i s e  u n d e r  t h e  
S e c u r i t i e s  A c t  o f  1 9 3 3  i s  a g a i n s t  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  u n e n f o r c e a b l e .  I t  
i s  my e x p e r i e n c e  t h a t  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  o f  t h e  la w  a c t s  a s  a  d e t e r r e n t  t o  c o r p o r a t e  
w r o n g d o in g .  T h e  o n l y  d i r e c t o r s  t h a t  w o u ld  b e  o p p o s e d  t o  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
p r o v i s i o n  a r e  t h o s e  w ho a r e  n o t  w i l l i n g  t o  t a k e  t h e  t im e  a n d  e f f o r t  t o  r e v i e w  
m a n a g e m e n t a n d  c o r p o r a t e  p r o p o s a l s .
V e ry  t r u l y  y o u r s
 M e lv in  L . H i r s c h
HLH: j b
MAILING ADDRESS:
P.O. BOX 2500
SMITHTOWN. NY 11787
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UNITED RESEARCH 
GUARDIAN CHEMICAL 
EASTERN CHEMICAL 
CONSOLIDATED ASTRONAUTICS, INC.
CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS 
AND MAIN PLANT:
230 MARCUS BLVD. 
HAUPPAUGE. NY 11788
TEL: (516)273-0900
TWX: 510-227-6230
J u n e  1 8 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l a n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n ia  A v e ,N W  
W a s h in g t o n ,  DC 2 0 0 0 6
G e n t le m e n :
W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  
F r a u d u l a n t  R e p o r t i n g  e x p o s u r e  d r a f t  o f  A p r i l ,  1 9 8 7 ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  
q u e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  s t u d y  i s  c o m p le t e  a n d  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  
w o r t h w h i l e .  T h e r e  i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  n o  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  c o s t  i n v o l v e d .
F o r  m a n y  s m a l l  a n d  s t a r t u p  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s ,  w i t h  t h i n  b u d g e t s  
a n d  m a n a g e m e n ts ,  t h e  n e e d  t o  c o m p ly  w i t h  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  w i l l  
b e  r e l a t i v e l y  e x p e n s iv e  a n d  m o s t  b u r d e n s o m e .
I  w o u ld  s t r o n g l y  re c o m m e n d  t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n ,  ( a )  p r o v i d e  
som e e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  c o s t  o f  c o m p l i a n c e ;  ( b )  e x a m in e  t h e  c o n c e p t  
o f  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  b y  s i z e  o r  n u m b e r  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o r  a g e  o f  t h e  
b u s in e s s  t o  p e r m i t  a  p h a s in g  i n  o f  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
a  f i r m ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  b e a r  t h e  i n c r e m e n t a l  f i n a n c i a l  b u r d e n .
S i n c e r e l y ,
U N IT E D  G U A R D IA N , I n c
S t a n l e y  S . F in e  
S e n i o r  V i c e  P r e s i d e n t
S S F ;b w
S IN C E  1 9 4 2
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13 1 3  Dolley Madison   
M cLean, Virginia 2 2 101 -3385  
(703) 3 5 6 -0 4 8 0
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I have read with interest the exposure draft of the 
Commission's report. Overall, I commend the Commission for 
essentially accomplishing its goals and objectives. On 
balance, I found the recommendations to be refreshingly 
practical and reasonable.
I would like to comment on one specific recommendation, 
despite the Commission's warning that it is inappropriate to 
single out one recommendation from the totality. My concern 
is that, under existing procedures, the requirement for 
independent public accountants to review quarterly financial 
data before release to the public will result in additional 
costs which exceed the benefits to be derived. I believe it 
is preferable that involvement of independent public 
accountants with quarterly financial data be left to the 
discretion of the audit committee. However, if the 
Commission believes that this recommendation is essential as 
an integral part of the whole, then I respectfully request 
that the Commission consider a related recommendation which 
would require the AICPA to revise its professional standards 
with respect to the review of interim financial information 
to permit more flexibility and allow the independent public 
accountant to apply procedures which are specifically 
appropriate for a company being reviewed.
The following points present my arguments in support 
of the preceding request.
1. The Commission has recommended that independent 
audit committees approve quarterly financial data 
prior to release. In describing the duties and 
responsibilities of an effective audit committee, 
the Commission has published guidelines, 
establishing an overall framework as opposed to a 
series of specific requirements. It would be 
within the spirit of this approach to leave it to
Telex: Western Union 89-2730 TWX: 710-833-0972 FAX: [703] 790-279
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the discretion of an audit committee as to 
whether the independent public accountants should 
be engaged to review quarterly financial data 
and, if so, to specify the extent of the desired 
review.
2. As mentioned, the Commission has refrained from 
requiring detailed procedures but rather has 
attempted to establish frameworks. However, a 
requirement for the involvement of independent 
public accountants with quarterly financial data 
is, under existing accounting literature, a 
departure from this approach. Despite the fact 
that a review of interim financial information 
produces a disclaimer of an opinion and only 
"negative assurance," the accountant essentially 
is required to perform at least the specific 
procedures spelled out by the AICPA. In a 
company which has demonstrated good controls over 
interim financial reporting, much of the work 
performed quarterly by the independent public 
accountants under their obligatory procedures 
could be to satisfy form, with little substantive 
value.
3. The Commission has recommended that the auditor 
assess the risks of fraudulent financial 
reporting and consider such assessment in 
establishing the audit plan. It would seem that 
this recommendation should apply if the 
independent public accountants are to be required 
to review quarterly financial data. Under 
present literature, as applied by the profession, 
I question whether there is sufficient 
flexibility to adapt the procedures to the 
assessed risks, and particularly whether there is 
leeway to omit some of the specified procedures 
when the assessment is that there is no related 
risk.
4. If the SEC adopts the Commission's 
recommendation, it is a virtual certainty that 
registrants will be required to include reports
National Commission on
Fraudulent Reporting
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from their independent public accountants in 
quarterly 10-Q filings. The need for a report, 
even though no opinion is expressed, in effect 
forces the public accountant to perform the 
procedures stipulated in the professional 
literature.
5. An auditor with continuing client involvement is 
aware of the substantive financial reporting 
issues. Absent the need to apply universal 
standard procedures and absent the need to issue 
a quarterly "nonopinion" to the public, the 
auditor can work with the audit committee to 
apply audit procedures which truly are 
appropriate in the circumstances, thereby helping 
to improve the quality of interim financial 
reporting at a reasonable cost.
6. It is recognized that the Commission has 
recommended that the Auditing Standards Board 
(”ASB") be reorganized to broaden its 
representation. It may be that the Commission 
believes that a reorganized ASB can deal 
effectively with the concern expressed herein. 
However, as a practical matter, it is possible 
that the SEC will adopt the Commission's 
recommendation in the near term but that the 
AICPA will be slower to react. Also, it may be 
years before a reorganized ASB gets to the issue 
of interim financial reporting. Accordingly, 
several years could pass with required 
independent public accountant review of quarterly 
financial data under existing inflexible 
professional standards.
I appreciate this opportunity to comment on the Commission's 
report.
Very truly yours,
Robert G. Wilson 
Vice President and 
General Auditor
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P a l m  D e s e r t  N a t i o n a l  B a n k
June 18, 1987
The N a tiona l Commission on Fraudu len t F in a n c ia l Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
W ashington, D. C. 20006
Gentl emen:
I have ju s t  f in is h e d  a review  o f the Exposure D ra ft fo r  the Report 
o f the N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting pre ­
sented by E rnst & Whinney.
The document appears to  cover a l l  o f the s a l ie n t  p o in ts  needed fo r  
a p u b lic  company to  e s ta b lis h  the necessary a u d it and c o n tro l 
measures.
My question  and /o r recommendation is  o f a d i f fe r e n t  na ture  and is  
exp la ined  as such. Small banks, such as mine, and o th e r companies 
small in na ture  g e n e ra lly  do not have the necessary tim e , general 
w r it in g  s k i l l  o r in te rn a l d is c ip l in e s  to  prepare the needed wri t te n  
p o lic ie s  and procedures to  fo llo w  fo r  com pliance.
I t  would seem to  me th a t the very people who w r ite  these re g u la t io n s , 
g u id e lin e s  and recommendations would do w e ll fo r  our small companies, 
by in c lu d in g  a gene ric  set o f  w r it te n  p o lic ie s  and procedures fo r  us 
to  implement and fo llo w .
Thank you fo r  your tim e and c o n s id e ra tio n  o f my suggestion .
Wil l i am  T. Powers 
P res iden t and
C h ie f Executive  O ff ic e r  
WTP: dk
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June 18, 1987
2121 San Jacinto Street • Suite 2500 
P.O. BOX 660164 • Dallas, Texas 75266
214-754-1248
Central and South West Services, Inc.
PHILLIP J. KASTER 
Director of Audits
National Commission on Fradulent
Financial Reporting
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I have read with interest your draft report and would like to make the 
following comments:
The recommendation that audit committees approve quarterly financial results 
prior to their release poses several difficulties. The logistics required of 
our outside directors to meet and review these statements would prove to be 
extremely difficult to accomplish. Our outside directors are very busy 
businessmen and finding a mutually agreeable time to meet in addition to 
regular board meetings could prove to be very onerous. I would like to 
believe that the internal controls in existence at our company would prevent 
any "surprises" or mistatements from publication and release. There has not 
been a change required in our quarterly financial statements due to omission, 
error or mistatement in my memory. In addition this requirement would most 
likely cause a substantial delay in the issuance of quarterly statements which 
could prove to be unaceptable to the financial community who rely on our 
accurate and timely reporting.
The recommendation that approval in advance, with the types and extent of 
management advisory services to be performed by the independent public 
accountants is a resurrection of an SEC requirement which has been rescinded. 
Again, I firmly believe that the outside accountants annual report to our 
board and audit committee of all services rendered permits them the overview 
necessary to determine whether their independence has been compromised. We 
have had no occasion to limit our outside accountants' involment in MAS 
projects due to any potential independence issue. In fact the knowledge of 
our outside accountants of our industry and business allows them to perform 
very valuable services which would most likely cost more if performed by 
others.
I thank you for the opportunity for commenting on your substantial effort in 
providing the investing public with more accurate financial data.
Sincerely,
A Member of the Central and South West System
Central Power and Light Company • Public Service Company of Oklahoma • Southwestern Electric Power Company • West Texas Utilities Company
Transok, Inc. • Central and South West Fuels, Inc.
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NOVA NATURAL RESOURCES CORPORATION
June 18, 1987
The National Commission on FraudulentFinancial Reporting1701 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sirs:
I  h a v e  j u s t  f i n i s h e d  r e a d i n g  a n  o v e r v i e w  o f  y o u r  
re c o m m e n d a tio n s  on f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  I t  a p p e a r s  
t h a t ,  as p e r  u s u a l ,  yo u  f a i l  t o  ta k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  th e  num erous  
s m a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s t r u g g l i n g  t o  s ta y  in  e x is t e n c e .  Many o f  
th e s e  c o m p a n ie s  have  a v e r y  s m a l l  a c c o u n t in g  s t a f f .  As you  w e l l  
kn o w , i t  i s  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  have  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  
when th e  e n t i r e  a c c o u n t in g  s t a f f  c o n s is t s  o f  tw o  o r  t h r e e  p e o p le .I see nothing in you recommendation concerning this problem.
I t  a ls o  a p p e a rs  t o  me t h a t  you  a re  a ls o  g o in g  t o  p u sh  th e  
c o s t  o f  a u d i t s  o f  s m a l l  c o m p a n ie s  c o m p le te ly  o u t  o f  s i g h t .  F i r s t  
you  w o u ld  r e q u i r e  r e v ie w  o f  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  b e fo r e  
t h e y  c o u ld  be r e le a s e d  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .  N e x t  y o u  a d v o c a t e  
i n c r e a s in g  th e  s c o p e  o f  th e  a u d i t  t o  in c lu d e  t e s t s  f o r  f r a u d .  
You w o u ld  have  th e  in d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r  r e v i s e  t h e i r  r e p o r t  t o  
in c lu d e  la n g u a g e  c l a r i f y i n g  th e  a u d i t o r s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  f r a u d  
d e t e c t io n .  I f  I  am n o t  m is ta k e n ,  t h i s  o p e n s  th e  a u d i t o r  up t o  
p o t e n t i a l  la w s u i t s  f o r  n o n d e te c t io n  o f  f r a u d .  T h is  w i l l  p r o b a b ly  
in c r e a s e  th e  c o s t  o f  h i s  m a lp r a c t ic e  in s u r a n c e .  The l a s t  t im e  I  
l o o k e d ,  a u d i t o r s  d i d  n o t  w o rk  f o r  f r e e .  You w o u ld  have  th e  
c l i e n t  pay  f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  r e v ie w  s e r v ic e s ,  in c re a s e d  a u d i t  s c o p e , 
a n d  f o r  t h e  in c r e a s e  i n  t h e  a u d i t o r s  m a lp r a c t i c e  in s u r a n c e .  
S p e a k in g  f r o m  a s m a l l  c o m p a n y 's  v i e w p o i n t ,  I  d o n ' t  s e e  th e  
b e n e f i t .  I  w o u ld  much r a t h e r  p u t  o u r  l i m i t e d  fu n d s  t o  w o rk  f o r  
th e  s h a r e h o ld e r  r a t h e r  t h a n  h a v e  th e m  g o  t o  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  
a u d i t o r .  We c u r r e n t l y  use  a " B ig  E ig h t "  a c c o u n t in g  f i r m .  I f  
y o u r  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  go i n t o  e f f e c t ,  we w i l l  no lo n g e r  be a b le  t o  
a f f o r d  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s .  We w i l l  t h e n  h a v e  t o  g o  t o  a le s s  
d e s i r a b le ,  f ro m  o u r  v ie w p o in t ,  f i r m  in  o r d e r  t o  be a b le  t o  c o m p ly  
w i t h  a l l  o f  y o u r  re c o m m e n d a t io n s .  T h is  does  n o t  soun d  l i k e  a 
p o l i c y  t h a t  w i l l  b e n e f i t  o u r  s h a r e h o ld e r s .
1560 UNIVERSITY CLUB BUILDING • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8411 • 801-359-8348 • Mailing Address: P.O. BOX 11630 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84147
I would ask that you reconsider your recommendation and take 
into account that not every public company has a large accounting 
staff, internal audit staff, or significant sums of money to pay 
independent auditors. I recognize that there is a problem with 
fraudulent reporting. I do not believe however, that throwing 
money at the problem will make it go away. It appears to me that 
you have not acted, you have over-reacted.
Yours truly,
NOVA NATURAL RESOURCES CORPORATION
James E. Taets
Vice President/Finance
JET/rfs
2700 S a n d e rs Road 3  2
HOUSEHOLD_________________
INTERNATIONAL
J u n e  1 8 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N . W .  
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C .  2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  S i r s :
O n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  o f  H o u s e h o l d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  I a m  
p l e a s e d  t o  r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  A p r i l ,  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e p o r t  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g .  O u r  m e m b e r s  i n c l u d e  M a r y  J o h n s t o n  E v a n s ,  D e n n i s
C .  F i l l ,  a n d  G o r d o n  P .  O s i e r .  O u r  p r i n c i p a l  o c c u p a t i o n s  a n d  b u s i n e s s  a s s o c i a t i o n s  
a r e  s u m m a r i z e d  i n  E x h i b i t  1 .
A s  D i r e c t o r s  a n d  m e m b e r s  o f  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ,  w e  s h a r e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
c o n c e r n s .  W e  a r e  p l e a s e d  t h a t  y o u  h a v e  u n d e r t a k e n  t h i s  e f f o r t  t o  i d e n t i f y  c a u s a l  
f a c t o r s  t h a t  c a n  l e a d  t o  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d ,  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t o  
i d e n t i f y  s t e p s  t h a t  c a n  h e l p  r e d u c e  t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  s u c h  r e p o r t i n g .  Y o u r  d r a f t  i s  
a n  e x c e l l e n t  s t e p  i n  t h e  r i g h t  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  w e  b r o a d l y  s u p p o r t  m o s t  o f  y o u r  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .
I n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  o u r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a t  H o u s e h o l d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  w e  b e l i e v e  w e  
c o n f o r m  i n  a l l  m a t e r i a l  r e s p e c t s  w i t h  t h e  g u i d e l i n e s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  s e t  f o r t h  i n  
C h a p t e r  2  a n d  A p p e n d i x  K .  C e r t a i n  o f  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  r e q u i r e  r e s p o n s e  i n  
v i e w  o f  o u r  c o n c e r n  t h a t  l i t e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s  m a y  u n n e c e s s a r i l y  b u r d e n  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  d o  l i t t l e  t o  f u r t h e r  y o u r  b a s i c  o b j e c t i v e  o f  p r e v e n t i o n  a n d  d e t e c t i o n  
o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
A d v a n c e  A p p r o v a l  o f  M A S  S e r v i c e s
W e  a r e  q u i t e  a w a r e  o f  t h e  d e b a t e  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  
a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  o f f e r e d  b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  m i g h t  i m p a i r  t h e i r  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  b u t ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  h a v e  s e e n  n o  e v i d e n c e  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e s e  c o n c e r n s .  W e  
b e l i e v e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  f i n a l  r e p o r t  s h o u l d  c l e a r l y  a c c e p t  p r a c t i c e s  w h e r e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  e s t a b l i s h  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p o l i c y  t h e  t y p e s  a n d  g e n e r a l  o r d e r  o f  
m a g n i t u d e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  c a n  b e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  i n d e p e n d e n t  
a u d i t o r s  w i t h o u t  a d v a n c e  a p p r o v a l  a n d  t h e  t y p e s  o f  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  a r e  p r o s c r i b e d  
u n l e s s  a d v a n c e  a p p r o v a l  i s  o b t a i n e d .  W e  b e l i e v e  a d v a n c e  a p p r o v a l  s h o u l d  b e
Financia l  Serv ices, M e rc h a n d is in g ,  M a n u fa c tu r in g  Tra n s p o r ta t io n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g - 2 - J u n e  1 8 ,  1 9 8 7
r e q u i r e d  f o r  s p e c i f i c  s e r v i c e s  o n l y  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  s u c h  
s e r v i c e s  e x c e e d  g u i d e l i n e s  s e t  b y  o u r  c o m m i t t e e  o r  i n c l u d e  t h e  t y p e  o f  s e r v i c e s  
w h i c h  a r e  p r o s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v e d  p o l i c y .  W e  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  
t h a t ,  w i t h  t h i s  t y p e  o f  p o l i c y  i n  e f f e c t ,  a f t e r - t h e - f a c t  r e p o r t i n g  o f  M A S  s e r v i c e s  i s  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e n a b l e  u s  t o  c o n f i r m  t h a t  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  r e m a i n  i n d e p e n d e n t .
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  C h a i r m a n ' s  L e t t e r
W e  s t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  o f  i n c l u d i n g  i n  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s  a  
l e t t e r  f r o m  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  c o m m i t t e e ' s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s .  H o u s e h o l d ' s  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  i n c l u d e s  r e p o r t s  b y  o u r  
e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  a n d  o u r  m a n a g e m e n t .  O u r  c o m m i t t e e ' s  r o l e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h a t  o f  
o t h e r  c o m m i t t e e s  o f  t h e  B o a r d ,  i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  H o u s e h o l d ' s  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  i n  
s u m m a r y  f a s h i o n  ( S e e  E x h i b i t s  2  a n d  3 ) .  T o  e x p a n d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  o u r  r o l e  r a i s e s  
s e r i o u s  i s s u e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  
u n r e a s o n a b l y  h i g h l i g h t s  o u r  r o l e  a b o v e  t h a t  o f  o t h e r  c o m m i t t e e s  a n d  t h e  B o a r d  a s  a  
w h o l e ,  a n d  a d d s  m o r e  v e r b a g e  t o  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  w i t h o u t  s u b s t a n t i v e l y  i n c r e a s i n g  
e f f o r t s  t o  p r e v e n t  a n d  d e t e c t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g  P r o c e s s
A  r e c e n t  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t  c o m p l e t e d  b y  S R I ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  f o r  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  
E x e c u t i v e s  R e s e a r c h  F o u n d a t i o n  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  i n  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  r e l y  
o n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s o u r c e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  ( l i s t e d  i n  o r d e r  o f  i m p o r t a n c e ) :
A n n u a l  r e p o r t s
N e w s p a p e r s  i n c l u d i n g  W a l l  S t r e e t  J o u r n a l  
B r o k e r s
G e n e r a l  b u s i n e s s  p u b l i c a t i o n s  
P e r s o n a l  c o n t a c t s  
Q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t s  
S E C  f i l i n g s  a n d  p r o s p e c t u s  
I n v e s t m e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e r v i c e s  
B r o k e r a g e  f i r m  a n a l y s e s  a n d  r e p o r t s
Q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t s  i s s u e d  b y  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  i n d e e d  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  b u t  a r e  o n l y  o n e  
o f  s e v e r a l  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  A s k i n g  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  t o  
g e t  i n  f r o n t  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  p r o c e s s  b y  r e v i e w i n g  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s  
p r i o r  t o  r e l e a s i n g  d a t a  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  i s ,  i n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  c l e a r l y  i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  W e  
c a n n o t  a d e q u a t e l y  r e v i e w  i n t e r i m  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  b e f o r e  t h e y  a r e  i s s u e d  w i t h o u t  
s l o w i n g  u p  r e l e a s e  o f  t h e s e  d a t a .  O u r  r o l e  i n  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  s h o u l d  
c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  o v e r s i g h t .  W e  u r g e ,  i n s t e a d ,  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o c u s  
o n  a n  e f f i c i e n t  p r o c e s s  t h a t  i n v o l v e s  s e n i o r  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t  m a n a g e m e n t  i n  t i m e l y  
r e v i e w s  o f  i n t e r i m  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  a n d  l i m i t s  t h e  r o l e  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  t o  
r e c e i p t  o f  w r i t t e n  r e p o r t s  f r o m  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e i r  r o l e s  a n d  
c o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  a n  a n n u a l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  s c o p e  a n d  g e n e r a l  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e l a t i n g  
t o  a d e q u a c y  a n d  p r o p r i e t y  o f  i n t e r i m  d i s c l o s u r e s  a n d  r e l a t e d  c o n t r o l  p r o c e s s e s .
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g -  3  - J u n e  1 8 ,  1 9 8 7
C o r p o r a t e  I n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  o f  D i r e c t o r s  
f o r  S e c u r i t i e s  L a w  V i o l a t i o n s
W e  s t r o n g l y  c o n c u r  w i t h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’s  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  S E C  r e c o n s i d e r  i t s  
l o n g - s t a n d i n g  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  o f  d i r e c t o r s  f o r  s e c u r i t i e s  l a w  
l i a b i l i t i e s  i s  a g a i n s t  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  u n e n f o r c e a b l e .  W e  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  
t h e  S E C ’s  p o s i t i o n  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  o f  o f f i c e r s  a n d  
d i r e c t o r s  f o r  l i a b i l i t i e s  u n d e r  t h e  1 9 3 3  A c t  w o u l d  b e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  d e t e r r e n t  
p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  L a w s .  T h e  S E C  p o l i c y ,  h o w e v e r ,  s e e m s  t o  b e  d i r e c t e d  a t  
t h o s e  w h o  c o m m i t t e d  s i n s  g r a v e r  t h a n  o r d i n a r y  n e g l i g e n c e .  T o  i l l u s t r a t e ,  i n  G l o b u s  
v .  L a w  R e s e a r c h  S e r v i c e s ,  I n c . , t h e  S e c o n d  C i r c u i t  a f f i r m e d  t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t ' s  
f i n d i n g s  t h a t  a n  u n d e r w r i t e r  w h o  h a d  a c t u a l  k n o w l e d g e  o f  m a t e r i a l  m i s s t a t e m e n t s  
i n  a  r e g i s t r a t i o n  s t a t e m e n t  c o u l d  n o t  r e c o v e r  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  f r o m  t h e  i s s u e r .  W e  
a l s o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  S E C  c h a n g e s  i n  t h i s  a r e a  g e n e r a l l y  w o u l d  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
r e c e n t  D e l a w a r e  l e g i s l a t i o n  w h i c h  p e r m i t s  c o r p o r a t i o n s  t o  i n d e m n i f y  d i r e c t o r s  i f  
t h e y  a r e  n o t  g u i l t y  o f  g r o s s  n e g l i g e n c e .  I f  w e  a r e  t o  h a v e  s t r o n g ,  e f f e c t i v e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s ,  w e  n e e d  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t  t h a t  d o e s  n o t  d i s c o u r a g e  q u a l i f i e d  c a n d i d a t e s  
f r o m  a c c e p t i n g  s u c h  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  T h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  i f  w e  a r e  t o  
e x p a n d  u s e  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  t o  t h e  m a n y  b u s i n e s s  e n t e r p r i s e s  t h a t  
p r e s e n t l y  d o  n o t  h a v e  s u c h  f u n c t i o n s  o r  c a n n o t  r e c r u i t  q u a l i f i e d  i n d e p e n d e n t  
d i r e c t o r s  f o r  s u c h  r o l e s .
S i n c e r e l y ,
J .  C .  B i e g l e r
F o r  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  o f  
H o u s e h o l d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l
G N L - 0 8 6 7  
c c :  M .  J .  E v a n s
D .  C .  F i l l  
G .  P .  O s i e r
D .  C .  C l a r k  
G .  N .  L a r s o n
E x h i b i t  I
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  o f  H o u s e h o l d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l
B u s i n e s s  A s s o c i a t i o n s
J o h n  C .  B i e g l e r
M r .  B i e g l e r  r e t i r e d  a s  C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m  o f  P r i c e  W a t e r h o u s e  
i n  1 9 8 2 ,  h a v i n g  b e e n  w i t h  t h e  f i r m  s i n c e  1 9 4 6 .
M a r y  J o h n s t o n  E v a n s
M r s .  E v a n s  i s  a  d i r e c t o r  o f  C e r t a i n T e e d  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  D e l t a  A i r  L i n e s ,  I n c . ,  B a x t e r  
T r a v e n o l  L a b o r a t o r i e s ,  a n d  S u n  C o m p a n y ,  I n c .  S h e  i s  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  A d v i s o r y  
B o a r d  o f  M o r g a n  S t a n l e y  &  C o . ,  I n c .  a n d  a  t r u s t e e  o f  s e v e r a l  i n v e s t m e n t  t r u s t s  o f  
t h e  A m e r i c a n  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  R e t i r e d  P e r s o n s .  S h e  s e r v e d  a s  V i c e  C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  
B o a r d  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  R a i l r o a d  P a s s e n g e r  C o r p o r a t i o n  ( A M T R A K )  f r o m  1 9 7 4  t o  
1 9 7 9 .
D e n n i s  C .  F i l l
M r .  F i l l  i s  C h a i r m a n  a n d  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  O f f i c e r  o f  W e s t m a r k  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  I n c .  
( m e d i c a l  e l e c t r o n i c s  e q u i p m e n t ) .  M r .  F i l l  w a s  a p p o i n t e d  t o  h i s  p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n  
f o l l o w i n g  W e s t m a r k ' s  s p i n - o f f  f r o m  S q u i b b  C o r p o r a t i o n  i n  1 9 8 6 .  M r .  F i l l  h a d  b e e n  
P r e s i d e n t  a n d  C h i e f  O p e r a t i n g  O f f i c e r  o f  S q u i b b  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  a  m a k e r  o f  
p h a r m a c e u t i c a l s ,  m e d i c a l ,  a n d  p e r s o n a l  h e a l t h  c a r e  p r o d u c t s .  H e  a l s o  i s  a  d i r e c t o r  
o f  M o r t o n - T h i o k o l ,  I n c .
G o r d o n  P .  O s i e r
M r .  O s i e r  i s  C h a i r m a n  o f  T r a n s C a n a d a  P i p e l i n e s  L i m i t e d .  H e  s e r v e d  a s  C h a i r m a n  
o f  S t a n t o n  P i p e s  L i m i t e d  f r o m  1 9 7 9  t o  1 9 8 6 .  M r .  O s i e r  a l s o  i s  C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  
B o a r d  o f  t h e  N o r t h  A m e r i c a n  L i f e  A s s u r a n c e  C o m p a n y  a n d  a  d i r e c t o r  o f  T o r o n t o  
D o m i n i o n  B a n k  a n d  M a c l e a n - H u n t e r  L i m i t e d .
A r t h u r  E .  R a s m u s s e n
M r .  R a s m u s s e n ,  a s  C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e ,  i s  a n  e x  o f f i c i o  m e m b e r  
o f  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .  H e  r e t i r e d  i n  1 9 7 4  a s  H o u s e h o l d ' s  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  O f f i c e r  
a n d  C h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  B o a r d .  H e  a l s o  i s  a  d i r e c t o r  o f  C e n t r a l  a n d  S o u t h  W e s t  C o r p . ,  
A m o c o  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  a n d  A b b o t t  L a b o r a t o r i e s .
To the Shareholders of Household International, Inc.
M a n a g e m e n t  is responsible tor the preparation, integrity a n d  objectivity of the c o m p a n y ’s financial statements. S u c h  
statements are prepared f r o m  the c o m p a n y ’s b o o k s  a n d  records of transactions recorded in the ordinary course of 
business a n d  include a m o u n t s  that are based u p o n  m a n a g e m e n t ’s best estimates a n d  judgments, all in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles. Financial information included elsewhere in the annual report is 
consistent with that in the financial statements.
T h e  c o m p a n y  maintains systems of internal accounting controls a n d  procedures w h i c h  m a n a g e m e n t  believes 
provide reasonable assurance that financial records are reliable for preparing financial statements a n d  maintaining 
accountability for assets. Internal auditors evaluate the a d e q u a c y  of a n d  investigate a d her enc e to these controls a n d  
procedures. I n d e p e n d e n t  auditors also study a n d  evaluate the c o m p a n y ’s accounting systems a n d  related controls 
a n d  perform tests of transactions a n d  account balances in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
This permits t h e m  to render a n  opinion as to the fairness of the c o m p a n y ’s financial statements.
T h e  Audit C o m m i t t e e  of the B o a r d  of Directors is c o m p o s e d  solely of outside directors. It meets periodically 
with independent auditors, internal auditors a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  to discuss auditing a n d  financial reporting matters.
B o t h  internal a n d  independent auditors have unrestricted access to the Audit C o m m i t t e e  without presence of 
c o m p a n y  m a n a g e m e n t  to discuss results of their audit w o r k  a n d  their opinions as to the adeq u a c y  of internal 
accounting controls a n d  quality of financial reporting.
M a n a g e m e n t  has long recognized its responsibility for conducting the C o m p a n y ’s affairs in a m a n n e r  w h i c h  is 
responsive to the interests of employees, shareholders, investors a n d  society in general. This responsibility is included 
in ou r statement of policy o n  ethical standards w h i c h  provides that the c o m p a n y  will fully c o m p l y  with laws, rules a n d  
regulations of every c o m m u n i t y  in w h i c h  it operates a n d  adhere to the highest ethical standards. Officers, employees 
a n d  agents of the c o m p a n y  are expected a n d  directed to m a n a g e  the business of the c o m p a n y  with complete honesty, 
c a n d o r  a n d  integrity.
   
D.C. Clark E. A. W i e g n e r
C h a i r m a n  o f  the Board, S e nio r Vice President a n d  C h i e f  Financial Officer
President a n d  C hief Executive Officer
Exhibit 2 32d
Management s Report
C. N. L ar s on
G r o u p  Vice President.
Controller a n d  Chief A c c o u n t i n g  Officer
Independent Auditors’ Report
To the Shareholders of Household International, Inc.
W e  have e x a m i n e d  the balance sheets of H o u s e h o l d  International, Inc. (a Delaware corporation) a n d  subsidiaries 
as of D e c e m b e r  31, 1 9 8 6  a n d  19 85 a n d  the related statements of income, changes in other shareholders’ equity a n d  
ch ang es in financial position for the years then ended. O u r  examinations we re m a d e  in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, included s u c h  tests of the accounting records a n d  s u c h  other auditing 
procedures as w e  considered necessary in the circumstances. T h e  statements of income, ch anges in other share­
holders' equity a n d  c hanges in financial position for year e n d e d  D e c e m b e r  31, 1 9 8 4  w e r e  e x a m i n e d  by other auditors 
w h o s e  report thereon dated February 7, 1 9 8 5  expressed a n  unqualified opinion o n  those statements.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the financial position of H o u s e h o l d  
International. Inc. a n d  subsidiaries at D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  1986 a n d  1985 a n d  the results of their operations a n d  the 
cha n g e s  in their financial position for the years then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles which, except for the change, with w h i c h  w e  concur, in the m e t h o d  of accounting tor pensions as 
described in note 15 to the financial statements, were applied on a consistent basis.
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Committees of the Board
Audit Committee
T h e  Audit C o m m i t t e e  reviews the corporation’s interna 
controls, financial reporting practices, annual financial 
statements a n d  the examinations m a d e  by internal a n d  
in dependent auditors. This c o m m i t t e e  consists entirely
of n o n - m a n a g e m e n t  directors.
J o h n  C. Biegler, C h a i r m a n  
M a r y  Johnston E v a n s  
D ennis C. Fill 
G o r d o n  P. O s ler
Finance Committee
T h e  Fi nan ce C o m m i t t e e  approves the issuance of 
securities by the corporation a n d  its major subsidiaries 
a n d  reviews dividend policy.
G o r d o n  P. Osier, C h a i r m a n
J o h n  C. Biegler
D o n a l d  C. Clark
G a r y  G. Dillon
Joseph W. J a m e s
Lewis W. L e h r
G e o r g e  W. R a u c h
Compensation Committee
T h e  C o m p e n s a t i o n  C o m m i t t e e  determines the salaries, 
b onuses a n d  stock options for senior m a n a g e m e n t .  
This c o m m i t t e e  consists entirely of n o n - m a n a g e m e n t  
directors.  
Miller Upton, C h a i r m a n  
M a r y  Johnston E v a n s  
D e n n i s  C. Fill 
Lewis W. L e h r  
R a y m o n d  C. T o w e r
Nominating Committee
T h e  N o m i n a t i n g  C o m m i t t e e  r e c o m m e n d s  candidates for 
board m e m b e r s h i p ,  reviews board size a n d  composition, 
r e c o m m e n d s  changes in bo ard compensation, a n d  
reviews m a n a g e m e n t  succession a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  plans.
R a y m o n d  C. Tower, C h a i r m a n  
D o n a l d  C. Clark 
Miller U p t o n
Executive Committee
D u r i n g  intervals b e t w e e n  board meetings, the Executive 
C o mmi tte e, with s o m e  exceptions, m a y  act for the board.
Arthur E. R a s m u s s e n ,  C h a i r m a n
D o n a l d  C. Clark
G o r d o n  P. O s ler
G e o r g e  W.  R a u c h
Miller U p t o n
Arthur E. R a s m u s s e n ,  as C h a i r m a n  of the Executive 
Co m m i t t e e ,  is also a n  ex officio m e m b e r  of the Audit. 
C o mpe nsa tio n, Finance a n d  N o m i n a t i n g  Committees.
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UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA
School of Accountancy
312 Middlebush
Columbia, Missouri 65211 
Telephone (314) 882-4463
June 19, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I am writing on behalf of the Accounting and Auditing Committee of the 
Missouri Society of Certified Public Accountants. We would like to comment 
on three aspects of the Exposure Draft of your findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations.
Role of the Audit Committee
We are concerned about your recommendations to expand the role of audit 
committees in the financial reporting process. Specifically, we are 
concerned that your recommendation to have audit committees approve interim 
financial reports prior to their public release would result in much more 
costly and less timely interim reporting. The related recommendation of 
requiring independent auditors to review interim financial reports would 
appear to be a sufficient expansion of procedures designed to assure the 
reliability of such financial data.
Effect on Small Companies
We are concerned about the extraordinary burden many of your 
recommendations may have on smaller companies. On the one hand, we agree 
with the sentiment that if companies, large or small, accept public funds, 
they must also accept public obligations. However, it should also be 
recognized that there will be much less impact on larger companies that 
already have implemented many of your recommendations than on smaller 
companies that have not. Consideration should be given to this reality, 
perhaps in the form of a transition period.
an equal opportunity institution
Recommendations fo r  Education
We agree  th a t  educa tion  can have an im portan t in flu en c e  on the  
f in a n c ia l  re p o r tin g  system , and w ith  your re la te d  recommendations fo r 
continued  emphasis on l i b e r a l  a r t s  and fo r  a d d it io n a l  p re p a ra tio n  or course 
work in  accounting  and system s, and in  developing a n a ly t ic a l  reason ing  
s k i l l s  and good e th ic a l  judgment; y e t , you f a i l  to  recommend f iv e -y e a r  or 
g raduate  education  programs in  accoun ting . This i s  an in co n sis ten cy  th a t  
c a l l s  in to  q u estio n  v i r t u a l ly  a l l  of your recommendations in  th e  a rea  of 
ed u ca tio n . I f  indeed you mean wha t  you say reg ard in g  th e  ed u ca tio n a l 
p re p a ra tio n  req u ired  in  to d a y 's  f in a n c ia l  re p o r tin g  environm ent, then you 
must a lso  recommend f iv e -y e a r  or g raduate  education  programs in  accoun ting .
We a p p re c ia te  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  comment on th e  Exposure D raft of your 
Report and, of co u rse , hope th a t  you w il l  s e r io u s ly  co n sid er our th o u g h ts .
S in c e re ly ,
Raymond C. Dockweiler
Other Committee Members:
M ichael J .  G rojean, Chairman 
(Anders, M inkler & D ieh l, S t. Louis)
W illiam  D. S tou t 
(Monsanto, S t. Louis)
J e r ry  D. Myers
(D onnelly , M einers & Jo rdan ,
W arrensburg)
Gregg W. Givens
(P ric e  W aterhouse, Kansas C ity )
H I L L E N B R A N D  I N D U S T R I E S
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June 19, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P e n n sy lva n ia  Avenue, NW 
W ash ing ton , DC 20006
Gentlem en:
We s u p p o rt th e  s p i r i t  o f  y o u r A p r i l ,  1987 exposure d r a f t  and b e lie v e  most o f  
th e  concep ts  and im p le m e n ta tio n  g u id e lin e s  a re  re a so n a b le . We o f f e r  th e  
fo l lo w in g  comments.
•  We have a co nce p tu a l p rob lem  w ith  w he the r th e  a c t iv e  in vo lve m e n t o f  
th e  a u d it  com m ittee  in  th e  re p o r t in g  p rocess is  a p p ro p r ia te  o r  
d e s ira b le .  R e cogn iz ing  th a t  th e  a u d it  com m ittee  shou ld  have an 
o v e rs ig h t  fu n c t io n  in  r e p o r t in g ,  i t  seems th e  recom m endation to  have 
th e  a u d it  com m ittee  re v ie w  q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts  on a 
p re - re le a s e  b a s is  take s  th e  board members o u t o f  th e  d i r e c t io n  s e t t in g  
and p o l ic y  making r o le  and p u ts  them in to  d a i ly  o p e ra t io n s .  We 
unde rs tand  th e  re a so n in g  f o r  t h is  recommendation b u t fe e l i t  is  an 
in a p p ro p r ia te  in vo lve m e n t o f  board members in  o p e ra t in g  a c t i v i t i e s .
•  The o th e r  comment is  a re q u e s t f o r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n .  You recommend the  
management r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  th e  f in a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts  re p o r t  in  the  
annual re p o r t  be s igned  by th e  c h ie f  e x e c u tiv e  o f f i c e r  and th e  c h ie f  
a c c o u n tin g  o f f i c e r .  Our comment is  th a t  th e  f in a n c ia l  s ig n a tu re  
shou ld  be e i t h e r  th e  c h ie f  f in a n c ia l  o f f i c e r ' s  o r  th e  c h ie f  f in a n c ia l  
o f f i c e r  and th e  c h ie f  a c c o u n tin g  o f f i c e r .  The c h ie f  f in a n c ia l  o f f i c e r  
is  th e  f in a n c ia l  member o f  management who has u lt im a te  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
f o r  th e  a ccu racy  and fa irn e s s  o f  th e  f in a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts . An 
argum ent co u ld  be made to  have th e  c h ie f  a c c o u n tin g  o f f i c e r  a ls o  s ig n  
th e  re p o r t  b u t o u r b a s ic  fe e l in g  is  t h is  second f in a n c ia l  s ig n a tu re  is  
re d u n d a n t.
O v e r a l l ,  we app laud  th e  d r a f t  recom m endations. We fe e l th e y  w i l l  have l i t t l e  
im pac t on o u r company because we im plem ented most o f  th e  concep ts  some tim e  
ago.
I f  you have any q u e s t io n s , do no h e s i ta te  to  c o n ta c t me.
S in c e re ly  y o u rs ,
HILLENBRAND INDUSTRIES
Tom B . B r ewe r
Se n io r  V ic e  P re s id e n t & C h ie f  F in a n c ia l O f f ic e r
TEB:l j f  
610 BATESVILLE, INDIANA 47006-9166/(812) 934-7000
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N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  A c c o u n t a n t s
10 Paragon Drive • Montvale, New Jersey 07645-1760 (2 0 1 )5 7 3 -9 0 0 0  •  Telex 181-162
June 19, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sirs:
This letter is written by me in my personal capacity and does 
not represent the views of the National Association of 
Accountants.
The following comments refer to Chapter V on Education. 
Your recommendation on Continuing Professional Education 
could be strengthened by a recommendation that management 
accountants responsible for the preparation of corporate 
financial statements should be required to have some minimum 
amount of continuing professional education, say 30 or 40 
hours each year. This education is presently widely 
available by a number of providers. I believe that NAA 
would be in a position to monitor the accumulation of those 
hours inasmuch as we have an existing computer program to 
maintain such records for current NAA members.
Your recommendation No. VI on Educational Initiatives by 
Public Companies is equally apt. NAA through its 
Accountants Television Network (ATV) provides approximately 
100 firms today with video taped educational material. Each 
tape comes complete with a discussion leader outline. 
Current experience suggests that those companies using this 
type of material are able to focus the discussion of their 
professional accounting staff on topics of interest to that 
company, utilizing the professionally prepared educational 
material supplied by the Accountants Television Network. 
Obviously you cannot recommend a specific program, such as 
ATV, but you should encourage formal company sponsored 
programs.
I would recommend that the Commission in its final report 
reprint the Codes of Ethics of organizations such as the 
AICPA, FEI and NAA. This would be of help to readers, now 
and in the future —  if for nothing else than a handy 
reference source.
Finally, there seems to be an imbalance in the report. A 
lot of time is spent on the background and role of the Audit 
Committee, the Internal Auditors and the External Auditors. 
It is true the Chapter II deals with the responsibility of 
the public company for financial reporting. You do discuss 
the tone at the top, but you have less than one page on the 
Accounting Function and Chief Accounting Officer. I urge 
the Commission to expand the section under IIIA in Chapter
II (currently page 32) to recommend that the background and 
training of the corporate financial staff meet certain 
minimum requirements. Additionally I think that it would be 
desirable for professional members of each company's 
accounting staff to belong to one of the major professional 
organizations, for example: AICPA, FEI, IIA or NAA. 
Organizations with a code of conduct can remove somebody 
from membership. Thus there would be at least some degree 
of private sector initiative in the process of providing 
discipline.
Whether you could go so far as to say that the financial 
officers signing the SEC reports must have some sort of 
certification, such as a CMA or CPA certificate, is an issue 
which may be too controversial. I personally would favor 
such a requirement because of the ability for the 
corresponding organization to withdraw the certification if 
the individual did not abide by the standards of ethical 
conduct and the mandatory continuing professional education 
requirements. Certainly some discussion of these issues 
should appear in your final report.
Since you are arguing that non-accountants should be on the 
Auditing Standards Board and the role of the internal 
auditor should be formalized it seems only appropriate to 
formalize the background requirements for those with the
National Association of Accountants• 10 Paragon Drive«P.O. Box 433• Montvale, New Jersey 07645*(201) 573-9000 Telex 181-162
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primary responsibility for financial reporting, corporate 
financial officers and staff.
If you have questions on these points I would be very 
pleased to elaborate upon them, either in writing or in 
person.
Very truly yours,
Alfred m . King 
Managing Director 
Professional Services
AMK:vw
National Association of Accountants• 10 Paragon Drive• P.O. Box 433• Montvale, New Jersey 07645• (201) 573-9000 Telex 181-162
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Public Se r v i c e  
Electric a n d  G a s  
C o m p a n y
Parker C. Peterman 80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101 201-430-6161 Mailing Address: P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101
V i c e  President a n d  C o m p t r o l l e r
June 19, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue 
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sirs:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) is pleased 
to submit comments on the Commission's Exposure Draft 
entitled "Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting". PSE&G is an operating public utility 
company in New Jersey providing electric and gas service to 
approximately 1.8 million electric customers and 1.4 million 
gas customers throughout the state. In 1986, our net income 
exceeded $428 million on operating revenues of approximately 
$4.5 billion.
PSE&G commends the efforts of the Commission, and supports 
the overall conclusion of the report that the responsibility 
for reliable financial reporting rests principally with top 
management, in that management sets the tone and establishes 
the reporting environment within which financial reporting 
occurs. Our Company has established and historically 
maintained practices and procedures which mirror many of the 
Commission's recommendations.
There are, however, a few recommendations with which we 
have some reservations.
PSE&G's specific comments on the Exposure Draft are as 
follows:
Mandatory Independent Audit Committees
We agree with the spirit of the recommendations, namely, 
that Audit Committee members be informed overseers of the 
financial reporting process. PSE&G's Audit Committee has 
historically functioned in much the same fashion as 
recommended by the Commission. We are concerned, however,
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that the Commission's recommendations will be construed as 
elevating the Audit Committee to a level of responsibility 
higher than management, other committees of the Board of 
Directors, or the entire Board of Directors.
Seeking a Second Opinion
The recommendation that management advise the Audit 
Committee when it seeks a second opinion on a significant 
accounting issue should be restricted to written, formal 
opinions, as distinguished from a casual professional inter­
action.
The recommendation for disclosure of a change of independent 
auditors is a broader application of existing SEC regula­
tions. We feel this recommendation should be limited to 
situations where a disagreement or difference of opinion 
exists between the new and old auditors. In general 
practice at our Company, the Audit Committee recommends 
appointment of independent auditors to the full Board of 
Directors and such appointment is approved by a vote of 
stockholders.
Quarterly Reporting
Approval of financial results by the Audit Committee would 
be redundant for companies such as ours where the financial 
results are presented monthly to the entire Board of 
Directors.
Additional SEC Enforcement Remedies
While it is true that any increase in fraud penalties and 
sanctions may appear to increase the deterrent effect on 
fraudulent activities, highly visible prosecution or 
enforcement activity under existing law would also achieve 
the desired deterrent effect.
With regard to the proposed "cease and desist orders", while 
initially such "remedy" may appear justified, it raises 
significant questions of:
(1) Due process and procedural safeguards.
(2) Whether there is any significant difference between the 
"likelihood of further violation" standard of the 
proposed cease and desist order and the existing 
injunctive power of the SEC.
3 6b
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(3) Whether it is more reasonable for the standard-setting 
body (e.g. Financial Accounting Standards Board) to 
continuously review and revise its own standards to 
eliminate the "cute accounting” violations referred to 
on page 61 of the ED based on perceived ambiguities in 
the accounting standard, or to give authority to the 
SEC not only to interpret what the written standard 
says, but also what it ought to mean.
PSE&G appreciates the opportunity to present our views to 
the Commission, and to demonstrate our support of its 
efforts to reduce fraudulent financial reporting.
• 3 7
TEi tele-communications, inc.GENERAL OFFICES 54 DENVER TECHNOLOGICAL CENTER CALL BOX 22595® WELLSHIRE STATION DENVER. COLORADO 00222 (303) 771-8200
J u n e  2 2 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e ,  N . W .  
W a s h i n g t o n  D . C .  2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  S i r s :
  R E :  A p r i l ,  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t
T h i s  l e t t e r  p r e s e n t s  o u r  v i e w s  o n  t h e  " R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  P u b l i c
C o m p a n y "  s e t  f o r t h  i n  C h a p t e r  T w o  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  ( A p r i l ,  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t ) .
W h i l e  w e  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  s u p p o r t i v e  o f  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m ­
m i s s i o n ,  w e  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  t h a t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  c a p t i o n  Q u a r t e r l y  
R e p o r t i n g ,  w h i c h  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  ( p r e s u m a b l y  c o m p r i s e d  s o l e l y  o f  
o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s )  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  a p p r o v e  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e ,  m a y  
h a v e  a n  a d v e r s e  e f f e c t  o n  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y ’s  a b i l i t y  t o  r e p o r t  i t s  r e s u l t s  w i t h  t h e  
r e q u i r e d  4 5 - d a y  p e r i o d .  I n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  t h e  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s  m a y  n o t  b e  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  
t o  j u d g e  t h e  r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  a n d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  p u t  i n  
s u c h  a  p o s i t i o n .  T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  b e  m o r e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  
c o n t r o l s  S c  p r o c e d u r e s  t h a t  p r o t e c t  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  t h a n  w i t h  t h e  
a c t u a l  o u t p u t  ( i . e . ,  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s )  o f  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  s y s t e m .
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  d u e  t o  r e c e n t  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  m a r k e t  f o r  d i r e c t o r s '  l i a b i l i t y
i n s u r a n c e ,  i t  i s  b e c o m i n g  i n c r e a s i n g  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  &  r e t a i n  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s .  
T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  a l m o s t  c e r t a i n l y  b e  a g g r e v a t e d  b y  p l a c i n g  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
" u n d e r w r i t i n g "  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  u p o n  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s .  I f  o u t s i d e  
d i r e c t o r s  w e r e  p u t  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  h a v i n g  t o  a p p r o v e  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s ,  i t  w o u l d  o n l y  
b e  p r u d e n t  f o r  t h e m  t o  p e r f o r m  s o m e  m e a s u r e  o f  d u e  d i l i g e n c e .  T h i s  w o u l d  t a k e  t i m e  
a n d  m a y  c a u s e  a  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  4 5 - d a y  f i l i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t .  T h e  r e s u l t  w o u l d  b e  
e i t h e r  t h a t  t h e  d u e  d i l i g e n c e  i s  r e d u c e d  ( o r  e l i m i n a t e d )  a n d  t h e  d i r e c t o r ' s  a p p r o v a l  i s  
h o l l o w  o r  t h e  f i l i n g  i s  n o t  m a d e  o n  a  t i m e l y  b a s i s .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  e i t h e r  r e s u l t  i s  n o t  
i n  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t .
W e  r e s p e c t f u l l y  s u b m i t  t h a t  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  o f  y o u r  c o m m i s s i o n  s h o u l d
r e t a i n  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t  o f  
t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  b u t  s h o u l d  d r o p  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m ­
m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .
V e r y  t r u l y  y o u r s ,  
T E L E - C O M M U N I C A T I O N S ,  I N C .
G a r y  K .  B r a c k e n ,  C P A  
V i c e  P r e s i d e n t  &  C o n t r o l l e r
D a v i d  R .  H u m p h r e y ,  C P A  
D i r e c t o r  o f  C o r p o r a t e  R e p o r t i n g
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EDM UND W. L ITTL EFIEL D
550 CALIFORNIA STREET 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104
J u n e  2 2 ,  1987
N a t i o n a l  C o m m iss io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1701  P e n n s y l v a n i a  A v e n u e , N. W.
W a s h in g to n ,  D. C.
G e n tle m e n :
My a t t e n t i o n  h a s  b e e n  d ra w n  t o  t h e  i n i t i a l  
s e n t e n c e s  i n  A p p e n d ix  K r e g a r d i n g  " A u d i t  C o m m itte e  
Good P r a c t i c e  G u i d e l i n e s . "
I  t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  i s  c h a r g i n g  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  
w i t h  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  n o  p o s i t i o n  t o  
h a n d l e  w i t h o u t  i n c u r r i n g  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  c h a n g e  i n  
t h e  way i t  f u n c t i o n s .  I t  w o u ld  h a v e  t o  arm  i t s e l f  
w i t h  f u l l - t i m e  s k i l l e d  s t a f f  a n d  t im e  d em an d s u p o n  
t h e  o u t s i d e  d i r e c t o r s  w o u ld  b e  s o  o n e r o u s  t h a t  t h e  
b e s t  o f  th em  w o u ld  b e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  s e r v e .
I t  h a s  b e e n  my e x p e r i e n c e  t h a t  A u d i t  C o m m itte e s  a s  
now c o n s i t u t e d ,  c o u p le d  w i t h  a  s t r o n g  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t  g r o u p  a n d  c o m p e te n t  i n d e p e n d e n t  c e r t i f i e d  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  a r e  d o in g  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  jo b  
i n  a lm o s t  e v e r y  i n s t a n c e .  T he im p ro v e m e n t i n  
o v e r a l l  r e s u l t s  t h a t  w o u ld  b e  a c h i e v e d  b y  y o u r  
p r o p o s a l s  w o u ld  com e a t  t o o  h ig h  a  c o s t  t o  j u s t i f y  
t h e  a c t i o n s .
V e ry  t r u l y  y o u r s .
EW L/nf
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STERLING DRUG INC.
NINETY PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 1016
 JOHN M. PIETRUSKI 
chairman of the board 
andCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFICER
June 23, 1987
National Commission on FraudulentFinancial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Commission Members:
I have recently become aware of the preliminary report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.Generally, the report is comprehensive and well done.
I would like to call your attention to one section, however, that should be corrected. The first two sentences contained in Appendix K on page 183 under the heading "Audit Committee Good Practice Guidelines," read as follows: "An audit committee consisting of independent directors is the primary vehicle which boards of directors use to discharge their responsibility with respect to the company's financial reporting. An informed and vigilant audit committee represents one of the most effective influences for minimizing fraudulent financial reporting."
These two sentences overstate considerably the role played by audit committees — first of all, very few audit committees meet more than three or four times a year and they rely almost solely on what is reported to them by management, internal audit repre­sentatives, and independent certified public accountants, all of whom spend full time performing their jobs and responsibilities.To state that audit committees represent the primary vehicle with regard to the company's financial reporting is illogical and would expose such committees to an unfair burden in litigation resulting from any fraudulent activities which might take place far down in the company's organization structure.
If these statements are not changed and put in proper perspective, those persons serving on audit committees will have the following options, either change the role of the committee by hiring its own full-time staff to fulfill the role as described above or refuse to serve on the audit committee. I don't believe that any knowledgeable individual would want to serve on an audit committee and bear the
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resp o n sib ility  as outlined  by those two sentences w ithout having  
a fu ll time s ta ff  to actu a lly  perform  those functions . F u r th e r ,  
i f  s ta ffs  w ere h ired  by  th e  committee, it would p rec ip ita te  a chaotic  
situation  and d iv id e  responsib ilities  at a trem endous expense to 
th e  com pany. I f  these statem ents a re  not c o rrec te d , I believe  
companies w ill have a v e ry  d iff ic u lt  time in g e ttin g  q u a lified  people 
to serve  on au d it committees because o f th e  u n w arran ted  additional 
lia b ility  th ey  would be assum ing.
I u rg e  you to address th is  m atter so th a t ap p ro p ria te  and  
reasonable responsib ilities  a re  placed on au d it committees.
S in cere ly ,
JMP/sm
G e n e r a l
 R e
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General Re Corporation
Financial Centre 
P.O. Box 10351
Stamford, Connecticut 06904-2351 
203 328-5557
Ronald G. Anderson
Vice President
June 23, 1987
N a tio n a l C om m iss ion  on F ra u d u le n t 
F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P ennsy lvan ia  A venue, N .W .
W ashington, D .C . 20006
G e n tle m e n :
Th is  le t te r  is in  response to  th e  Exposure D r a f t  o f  the  R e p o rt o f  the  
N a tio n a l C om m iss ion  on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g . As C h ie f 
F in a n c ia l O f f ic e r  o f  a m a jo r p u b lic  c o rp o ra tio n  th e  to p ic s  co ve red  in  
you r re p o r t  a re  o f  s ig n if ic a n t in te re s t to  m e. Y ou r Exposure D ra f t  
is a th o u g h tfu l,  com prehen s ive , and a t  tim e s , p ro v o c a tiv e  docum en t. 
I com m end you fo r  th e  e f f o r t  re q u ire d  to  p roduce  a docum en t w h ich  
is l ik e ly  to  becom e a la n d m a rk .
We a t G enera l Re concu r w ith  the  o v e ra ll in te n t  and th ru s t  o f  the  
R e p o rt, and w ith  a m a jo r ity  o f  the  C om m iss ion ’s fin d in g s , 
conc lus ions and re co m m e n d a tio n s . H ow eve r, we have concerns 
re g a rd in g  th e  p ra c t ic a l im p lic a tio n s  o f  tw o  o f  the  re com m enda tio ns .
The D r a f t  (C h a p te r 2, S ec tion  V, Page 41) recom m ends th a t  " A l l  
p u b lic  com pan ies should be re q u ire d  by  SEC ru le  to  in c lu d e  in  th e ir  
A nnua l R e p o rt to  S tockho lde rs  a le t te r  s igned by  the  C h a irm a n  o f  
th e  A u d it  C o m m itte e  d e sc rib in g  the  C o m m itte e 's  re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  
and a c t iv i t ie s  d u rin g  th e  y e a r" . We b e lie ve  th a t  such a le t te r  w ou ld  
se rve  l i t t l e  purpose. I t  w ou ld  la rg e ly  d u p lic a te  the  recom m ended  
M anagem ent R e p o rt (w ith  w h ich  we concu r) discussed on Page 39 o f  
the  Exposure D r a f t  and th e  A u d ito r 's  O p in ion  (w h ich  is a lre a d y  
re q u ire d  by  the  SEC). Indeed the  co n te n ts  o f  such a le t te r  cou ld  
co n ce iva b ly  be m is lead ing . F o r exam p le , a r e la t iv e ly  in a c t iv e  a u d it 
c o m m itte e  co u ld  e ith e r  m ean th a t  the  c o m m itte e  i t s e l f  is w eak and 
in a t te n t iv e ,  o r i t  co u ld  m ean th a t th e  com pany has s tro n g  
m anagem ent, adequate  f in a n c ia l c o n tro ls , an a c t iv e  in te rn a l a u d it 
g roup , and an e f fe c t iv e  independen t a u d ito r , so an a c tiv e  a u d it 
c o m m itte e  is n o t re q u ire d .
A member of General Re Group
General
 R e
N a t i o n a l  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
J u n e  2 3 ,  1 9 8 7  
P a g e  T w o
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  a l s o  r e c o m m e n d s  ( C h a p t e r  2 ,  S e c t i o n  V I ,  P a g e  4 2 )  
t h a t  " A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  
q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  o v e r s i g h t  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  a p p r o v i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e " .  W h i l e  c o n c e p t u a l l y  
a p p e a l i n g ,  I b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  c o s t s  f a r  o u t w e i g h  t h e  
p o t e n t i a l  b e n e f i t s .  F i r s t ,  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  s c h e d u l e s  t e n d  t o  b e  
v e r y  t i g h t ,  s o  t h a t  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  l a y e r  o f  r e v i e w  w i l l  d e l a y  r e l e a s e  o f  
r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  S e c o n d ,  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  
m e m b e r s  a r e  v e r y  b u s y  i n d i v i d u a l s  -  p r i o r  r e v i e w  o f  q u a r t e r l y  
f i n a n c i a l s  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  f o u r  a d d i t i o n a l  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g s  
a n d  m a y  p l a c e  a  u n d u e  b u r d e n  o n  m a n y  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e m b e r s .  
T h i r d ,  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m u s t  r e l y  o n  t h e  c o m p a n y ’s  
m a n a g e m e n t ,  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  a n d  t h e  p u b l i c  a u d i t  f i r m  f o r  
i n f o r m a t i o n .  T h o s e  g r o u p s  a r e  f r e e  t o  a c c e s s  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
a t  a n y  p o i n t  i n  t i m e .  I f  a n y  i n d i v i d u a l  h a s  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  t h e  
a c c u r a c y  o r  v a l i d i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r i o r  t o  r e l e a s e  o f  
q u a r t e r l y  e a r n i n g s ,  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i s  c u r r e n t l y  e m p o w e r e d  t o  
a c t  a p p r o p r i a t e l y .  R e q u i r i n g  a  f o r m a l  r e v i e w  w i l l  n o t  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
a b i l i t y  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  t o  a c t .
I w a n t  t o  t h a n k  y o u  f o r  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o m m e n t  o n  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t .
S i n c e r e l y,
R o n a l d  G .  A n d e r s o n
R G A : m r
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OFICE OF THE DEAN SCHOL OF ACCOUNTING (213) 743-2426
June 23, 1987
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr., Chairman Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 2006
Dear Jim:
As a member of the Advisory Council to the Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting and as an educator, I'm pleased to respond to the exposure draft of the Commission.
On balance, I believe the Commission has set an attractive and challenging agenda for all parties involved in financial reporting. I support the posture taken by the Commission with the expectation of the recommendations on edu­cation. In this regard, I offer the following observations and suggestions with respect to Chapter 5.
1. I fully support the Commission's recommendations for additional liberal arts coverage as well as expansion of the business and accounting curriculum. However, it is inconsistent for the Commission to recognize the need for more educational preparation and to acknowledge that there has been an ex­plosion of information related to accounting, systems, and related fields without specifically recommending that a minimum of five years of education be required. Further, the Commission emphasizes the importance of ethical inquiry, sound judgment, and analytical and problem solving skills, and observes that they take more time to develop than the simpler cognitive skills. I would add that the higher standards of a graduate-level program enable one to more fully develop these skills, and are more likely to pro­duce graduates with the higher ethical standards and the professional commit­ment so essential to maintaining the public trust.
I strongly urge that the Commission explicitly state what is implicit in its observations throughout the chapter — that the accounting curriculum can no longer be adequately covered in four years and should be increased to at least five years. I respectfully suggest that it do so by changing the word "may" to "must" in the second bullet under Section III on page 80, and by specifically stating in the Sumary of Recommendations on page 12 that it recomends a minimum of five years of accounting education. Likewise, the discussion of four years versus five years on page 80 should be deleted.
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 9089-1421
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Mr. James C. Treadway, J r .
June 23, 1987 
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2. I  concur w ith  the Commission th a t the development o f fa c u lty  through a c tu a l 
work experience and the p re p a ra tio n  o f more re le v a n t classroom  m a te r ia ls  
are necessary to  improve the le a rn in g  process. However, un less the fa c u lty  
reward system is  m o d ifie d  to  g ive  g re a te r re c o g n it io n  to  these a c t iv i t ie s  
which improve teach ing  e ffe c tiv e n e s s  and encourage in te ra c t io n  w ith  the 
p ro fe s s io n , the re  is  l i t t l e  l ik e l ih o o d  th a t the Commission’ s recommendation 
w i l l  be accom plished. I  r e s p e c t fu lly  suggest th a t the Commission s p e c i f ic a l ly  
address the need fo r  g re a te r f l e x i b i l i t y  in  the academic reward system in  
o rde r to  achieve the s ta te d  b e n e fits  and to  a t t r a c t  experienced people in to  
the classroom .
Again , I  commend the  Commission fo r  acknowledging the ro le  o f the e d u ca tio n a l 
process in  h e lp in g  to  p reven t and d e te c t fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  
and agree w ith  the goa ls th a t have been o u t lin e d .  I  fe e l th a t more s p e c if ic  
guidance as to  the im p lem enta tion  o f se ve ra l o f  i t s  recommendations would 
make them more e f fe c t iv e  in  d ire c t in g  changes in  the c u rr ic u lu m .
S in ce re ly
D o y l e  Z .  W i l l ia m s
D e a n
DZW:vhb
se r f c o
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S E R V IC E  F R A C T U R IN G  C O M P A N Y
P. O. BOX 1741 • PHONE 506 665-7221 - PAMPA, TEXAS 79065
June 23, 1987
Honor a b le  James C. Tr eadway, Jr .
N a tio n a l Commis s io n  on Fr audulent  
F in a n c ia l Repor t i ng 
1701 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Honorable Commission Tr eadway:
Our Company name i s S e rv ice  Fr a c tu r i ng Company, t ic k e r  symbol:
SERF, OTC: NASDAQ.
We do agr ee th a t  pr oper  over s i g h t on p u b l ic ly  he ld  companies 
f in a n c ia l  r epor t ing shou ld  be adequate to  p reven t and d e te c t f r a u d u le n t 
f in a n c ia l  r epor t i ng and r e s p e c t fu lly  subm it th e  fo llo w in g  comments 
concern ing th e  Exposure Draft  dated May 1, 1987 which we have re c e iv e d  
fr om th e  N a tio n a l Commission on Fr aud u le n t F in a n c ia l Repor t i n g .
Review of  th e  Exposur e Dra f t  r eveals t h a t  many of  th e  r ecommendati ons 
we n o t o n ly  agr ee w ith  b u t have a l r eady vo lun ta r i l y i mplemented 
as cor por a te  p o l ic y ,  sever a l  of  th e  r ecommendati ons can be s a t is f i ed 
by mer e ly  s ta t in g  p u b l ic ly  what i s  being done.
The r ecommendati ons th a t  r e la te  to  m a in ta in in g  an i n te r n a l 
a u d it  f unc t i on, adequate ly  s ta f f e d, would cause gr e a t har dshi p on 
a company th e  s iz e  of  Ser vi ce Fr a c tu r i ng. To o b ta in  competent co n su lta n ts  
to  per fo r m th e  In te r n a l a u d it  f unc ti on on a par t  tim e  basis would  
a lso  i ncur  pr opor t lo n a l l y  hi gher  c o s t for a  company ou r s iz e . The 
added bur den on A u d it  Committees makes th a t  c o s t fu s e  as w e ll  as 
causing di r ec to r  l i a b i l i t y  i nsurance c o s t to  i ncr ease when i t  i s  
a l r eady ver y di f f i c u l t  to  o b ta in  and pay fo r . The a b i l i t y  to  o b ta in  
competent o u ts id e  di r ectors  becomes even mor e di f f i c u l t .
The c o s t o f  i mplementing these  r ecommendati ons w i l l  be oner ous 
fo r  a s m a ll company a lr eady s t ru g g lin g  to  compete. The pr opor t i ona l 
c o s t to  a s m a ll company w i l l  c re a te  a ver y heavy bur den. Is  i t  
p o s s ib le  to  lower  th e  r equi r ements f or  th e  i n te r n a l a u d it  f u n c tio n  
and a u d it  committee o v e rs ig h t r esponsi bi l i t y  f o r  companies w ith  
lower  volume sa les  or  sm a lle r  balance shee t values?
Respectf u l l y  your s ,
SERVICE FRACTURING COMPANY
JHG/es
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GTE Corporation
One Stamford ForumStephen E. Frank Stamford, CT 06904Vice President-Controller 203 965-200
June 23, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
GTE Corporation appreciates the opportunity to comment on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
GTE fully supports the efforts of the Commission and we are in agreement with the thrust of the Commission's report. GTE shares the Commission's view that the integrity of financial reporting is the most critical element of the full and fair disclosure system in the United States. We also believe that the vast majority of public companies recognize the importance of this process, and consequently have implemented policies and practices which substantially comply with the Commission's recommendations.
We believe that the Commission's recommendations will contribute significantly to the ongoing efforts to reduce fraudulent financial reporting. However, as the Commission recognizes, since there are limits to the ability to prevent or detect fraud and since no study of the issue can ever be complete or final, we must carefully consider the costs and benefits associated with implementation of each of these recommendations and those of other organizations which will carry on this effort after the Commission is dissolved.
Specifically, there are several recommendations addressed to the public company for which we believe the benefits are minimal and would be outweighed by the inherent impracticalities. In addition, while we generally support the recommendations to strengthen the SEC's enforcement authority, we believe that certain of the recommendations may shift too much authority to the SEC, thus creating a potential for abuses.
June 23, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
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Our comments regarding these specific recommendations are set forth below:
Recommendation 6: Public companies should ensure that their internal
audit functions are objective.
While we agree with the intent of this recommendation, we believe that the 
supporting discussion should be modified in two areas. First, we disagree 
with the emphasis which the Commission has placed on an organizational 
structure in which the internal audit function reports directly to the CEO.
We believe (as the Commission acknowledges) that such a reporting 
relationship is neither practical nor the most effective in a larger 
corporation. Rather, in our opinion, it is more practical for the 
internal audit function to report directly to the individual within the 
organization who has the primary responsibility for the financial 
statements and can take the authoritative action to correct them. We 
recognize, however, that with such an organizational structure it is 
imperative that the chief internal auditor have the authority to bypass 
this reporting relationship and to report directly to higher levels of 
management and the audit committee if circumstances warrant.
Accordingly, we recommend that the Commission de-emphasize the importance 
of a relationship with the CEO, and rather, place greater emphasis on a 
reporting relationship which is appropriate and practical for the 
particular company.
Secondly, regarding the discussion of the chief internal auditor's 
background and experience, in our view, the criteria identified by the 
Commission are too narrow. We believe that there are instances in which 
individuals possessing qualifications other than prior audit training 
could equally fulfill the responsibilities of this position.
Recommendation 14: The audit committee should approve in advance the
types and the extent of management advisory services 
that management plans to engage the company's 
independent public accountant to perform.
While we agree with the spirit of this recommendation, we believe that 
with respect to large multinational corporations prior approval of the 
types and extent of management advisory services is impractical. Rather, 
we believe it would be desirable for audit committees to establish broad 
guidelines identifying the types of services for which it would be 
acceptable to engage the independent public accountants. These guidelines 
together with periodic review and annual approval by the audit committee 
of the extent of these services should be adequate to enable committee 
members to assess this factor in their evaluation of the independence of 
the company's public accountants.
June 23, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
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Recommendation 16: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to
include in their annual reports to stockholders a 
letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee 
describing the committee's responsibilities and 
activities during the year.
We agree with the Commission's view that the oversight function of an audit 
committee is critical to the integrity of the financial reporting process. 
However, we can envision little benefit in requiring an additional report to 
be included in annual reports to shareholders, particularly at a time when 
companies are searching for ways to simplify financial reports in a effort 
to make these reports more understandable and useful.
The Commission indicates that such a letter would more effectively 
communicate to the investing public the role of the audit committee, and 
would reinforce audit committee members' awareness and acceptance of the 
importance of their responsibilities.
We believe that in view of the audit committee's critical role in ensuring 
the integrity of financial statements, a brief discussion of their role and 
activities should be included in the existing management report. In our 
opinion, this discussion together with the existing proxy statement 
disclosures would be more than adequate to effectively communicate the role 
of the audit committee.
Regarding the committee's awareness, we believe that for the most part 
members of audit committees are highly qualified professionals who are 
cognizant of the responsibilities they undertake on behalf of the board of 
directors. In our opinion, the inclusion of a letter in annual reports will 
not serve in any meaningful way to heighten their awareness.
Recommendation 18: When a public company changes independent public
accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to 
disclose publicly the nature of any material accounting 
or auditing issues discussed with its old and new 
auditors during the three-year period preceding the 
change.
We fully support the Commission's initiative in dealing with the opinion 
shopping issue. However, we believe that this recommendation is overly 
burdensome and implies that the underlying motivation for changing auditors 
is merely to improve financial results. We believe that the Commission 
should recognize that there are valid reasons for changing auditors just as 
there are legitimate reasons for discussing accounting and auditing matters 
with other accountants.
June 23, 1987
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Given the ever increasing complexities of business transactions and 
accounting standards, companies are finding it more and more difficult to 
determine the proper accounting and reporting for their business 
transactions. No accounting rules exist in some instances and the answers 
to many other problems are unclear.
While we fully recognize that abuses of the consultation process have and do 
occur, we do not believe that the problem is rampant nor that it is 
jeopardizing the quality of financial reporting to any significant degree. 
Accordingly, we believe that the existing Form 8-K requirements to disclose 
changes in and disagreements with auditors, supplemented by the Commission's 
recommendation that the audit committee review all consultations with other 
auditors on significant accounting issues should represent adequate 
deterence against opinion shopping.
Recommendation 19: Audit committees should increase their oversight of the
quarterly reporting process. This oversight should 
include approving financial results prior to public 
release.
We believe that the degree of participation in the quarterly reporting 
process should be assessed by the audit committee, rather than mandated by a 
Commission recommendation.
Audit committee members, through their participation on the full board, 
generally receive reports of financial results on a regular basis. In 
addition, to the extent that the audit committee is informed on a timely 
basis of any changes in accounting or financial reporting practices that may 
have a significant financial statement impact, and their ongoing evaluation 
of internal controls reveals no material weaknesses in the system, the 
benefit derived from pre-clearance of quarterly financial results would be 
minimal at best —  especially where public accountants are performing 
similar reviews.
Recommendation 31: The SEC should have the authority to issue a cease and
desist order when a securities law violation or an 
unsound financial reporting practice is found.
Since it is reasonable to assume that two individuals can differ as to the 
soundness or propriety of a financial reporting practice, we believe that 
this recommendation may shift too much authority to the SEC. We believe 
that the SEC should be granted the authority to issue a cease and desist 
order only after a practice has been found to be fraudulent through full 
legal proceedings.
June 23, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
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Recommendation 32: The SEC should seek explicit statutory authority to bar
or suspend corporate officers and directors involved in 
fraudulent financial reporting from future service in 
that capacity in a public company.
Similar to the preceding recommendation, we believe that the SEC should be 
granted this authority only after the officer or director has been 
criminally convicted of participation in a fraudulent activity.
* * * * *
In summary, we would again like to express our support to the Commission in 
the accomplishment of its stated objectives and compliment it on the clarity 
and manner in which the report is presented. We appreciate the opportunity 
to express our views on this critical matter and we would be pleased to 
discuss further with the Commission the matters contained in this response.
Very truly yours,
S. E. Frank
G. G. MICHELSON
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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R. H. MACY &  Co., Inc.
HERALD SQUARE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10001
J u n e  2 3 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h in g t o n ,  D . C . 2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  S i r s :
 
A t  t h e  o u t s e t ,  I  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  c o m p l im e n t  y o u  o n  y o u r  
p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  o n  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .  O v e r a l l  I  t h i n k  i t  i s  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  a n d  
a p p r o p r i a t e .  As a m e m b e r o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it t e e  i n  a n u m b e r  
o f  C o r p o r a t i o n s  I  t a k e  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  f i r s t  tw o  s e n te n c e s  
c o n t a in e d  i n  a p p e n d ix  " K "  o n  P a g e  183  u n d e r  t h e  h e a d in g  
" A u d i t  C o m m it te e  G ood  P r a c t i c e  G u i d e l i n e s " .
I  t h i n k  i t  i s  a n  u n r e a l i s t i c  o v e r s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  r o l e  
p la y e d  b y  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it t e e  t o  d e s c r i b e  i t  as  t h e  " p r i m a r y  
v e h i c l e  w h ic h  b o a r d s  o f  d i r e c t o r s  u s e  t o  d i s c h a r g e  t h e i r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .  An i n f o r m e d  a n d  v i g i l a n t  a u d i t  c o m m it t e e  r e ­
p r e s e n t s  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  i n f l u e n c e s  f o r  m i n i m i z i n g  
f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g " .  As p r e s e n t l y  c o n s t i t u t e d ,  
a u d i t  c o m m it t e e s  m u s t  r e l y  o n  m a n a g e m e n t r e p o r t s ,  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ,  a n d  in d e p e n d e n t  c e r t i f i e d  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t s  w h o s e  f u l l - t i m e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n v o l v e  r e ­
p o r t i n g  o f  f i n a n c i a l  m a t t e r s .  To h o ld  a u d i t  c o m m it t e e s  
p r i m a r i l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  w h e n  t h e y  m e e t p e r h a p s  q u a r t e r l y  a n d  
r e l y  o n  o t h e r s  i s  n o t  r e a l i s t i c .  S u ch  a s t a n d a r d  w i l l  d i s ­
c o u r a g e  m e m b e r s h ip  o n  a u d i t  c o m m it t e e s  b y  r e s p o n s i b l e  a n d  
c o n s c i e n t i o u s  d i r e c t o r s  w ho  w i l l  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  i n h e r e n t  
l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  a s s u m in g  s u c h  p r im a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a n d  w i l l  
r e s i s t  t h e  a d d e d  e x p o s u r e  f o r  l i a b i l i t y .
I  s t r o n g l y  u r g e  t h e  r e t h i n k i n g  a n d  r e s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h i s  
s t a n d a r d .
S i n c e r e l y
( M r s . ) G .  G. M ic h e ls o n
GGM:mg
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Route 1, Box 110 
Hanover, VA 23069
June 23, 1987
The N a tio n a l Commission on
F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R epo rting  
1701 Pennsylvan ia  Avenue, N. W. 
W ashington, D. C. 20006
Dear S irs :
As a s to c k h o ld e r and as an employee o f  a re g u la to ry  agency,
I  applaud th e  concepts embodied in  you r exposure d r a f t .
The c o s t /b e n e f its  issu e  must be cons ide red  b u t co s t shou ld  
be g ive n  th e  back seat t o  p ro v id e  increased  p u b lic  
con fidence  in  th e  q u a lity /a c c u ra c y  o f  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .
I  hope you w i l l  r e s is t  any e f f o r t s  t o  weaken you r p ro p o sa ls .
Very t r u l y  y o u rs ,
J  John M. C ro cke tt
JMC/dc
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AM ER IC AN SOCIETY OF CORPORATE SECRETARIES, INC.
1270 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS • NEW YORK 10020 • TELEPHONE: 212-765-2620
June 23, 1987
Mr. G. Dewey A rn o ld  
E xe cu tive  D ire c to r  
N a tio n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t 
F in a n c ia l R e po rting  
1701 P ennsylvan ia  Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. A rn o ld :
The S e c u r it ie s  Law Committee o f  th e  American S o c ie ty  o f  C orpo ra te  
S e c re ta r ie s  ( th e  “ S o c ie ty " )  is  p leased to  have th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  
comment upon the  A p r i l  1987 Exposure D ra f t  o f  th e  Report o f  th e  N a tio n a l 
Commission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g . In  1986 a subcomm ittee 
c h a ire d  by R obert L. Robinson commenced s tu d y  o f  th e  then  deve lop ing  
le g is la t iv e  i n i t i a t i v e s  seeking  to  address f in a n c ia l  fra u d  d e te c t io n .
That subcom m ittee, now c h a ire d  by G e o ffre y  C. Shepard, has review ed the  
Exposure D ra f t  o f  the  Commission and prepared th e  enclosed summary o f  
comments.
The S o c ie ty  is  a p ro fe s s io n a l a s s o c ia t io n  whose membership is  composed 
p r in c ip a l ly  o f  c o rp o ra te  s e c re ta r ie s ,  a s s is ta n t  s e c re ta r ie s  and o th e r 
persons in v o lv e d  in  the  d u t ie s  n o rm a lly  a sso c ia te d  w ith  the  co rp o ra te  
s e c r e ta r ia l  fu n c t io n .  The S o c ie ty 's  3,000 members, re p re s e n tin g  
a p p ro x im a te ly  2,300 c o rp o ra t io n s  in  the  U n ite d  S ta tes  and Canada, a re  
r e g u la r ly  in v o lv e d  in  such m a tte rs  as c o rp o ra te  governance, the  
re g u la t io n  and t ra d in g  o f s e c u r i t ie s ,  p roxy  s o l ic i t a t io n  and o th e r 
sha re h o ld e r a c t i v i t i e s ,  and the  a d m in is t ra t io n  o f th e  o f f i c e  o f the  
c o rp o ra te  s e c re ta ry .
We b e lie v e  th e  need f o r  th e  Com m ission's work rem ains c le a r ,  th a t  i t s  
a n a ly s is  o f  th e  f ra u d u le n t  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  problem  has been tho rough , 
and th a t  p o s i t iv e  b e n e f its  w i l l  r e s u l t  from  i t s  w ork. We a ls o  b e lie v e  
the  o p p o r tu n ity  f o r  comment on th e  Exposure D ra f t  by in te re s te d  p a r t ie s  
w i l l  s tre n g th e n  th e  p ro d u c t and make i t  more e f fe c t iv e .
W hile  we agree w ith  th e  Com m ission's v iew  th a t  i t s  recommendations shou ld  
be taken as a w ho le , we do have comments on in d iv id u a l recommendations 
w hich we b e lie v e  would be h e lp fu l to  the  Commission. We have co n fin e d  
these comments to  recommendations con ta ined  in  Chapter Two: Recommendations 
fo r  the  P u b lic  Company and to  two recommendations made in  Chapter Four: 
Recommendations fo r  th e  SEC and O thers to  Improve th e  R e g u la to ry  and 
Lega l Environm ent. These are  a tta ched  in  a fo rm a t w h ich se ts  f o r t h  th e  
Com m ission's recommendation in  f u l l  fo llo w e d  by our comment. Where we 
b e lie v e  th e  recommendation m igh t be s treng thened  by s p e c i f ic  w ord ing  
changes, the  suggested d e le t io n  has been bracke ted  and s u b s t itu te  w ord ing  
has been u n d e r lin e d .
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Fin a l l y ,  and perhaps most im p o r ta n t ly ,  th e re  are  th re e  o v e ra l l  themes 
runn ing  th rough  our s p e c if ic  comments w hich we b e lie v e  deserve s p e c ia l 
emphasis:
*  F i r s t ,  we remain s tro n g ly  s u p p o rtiv e  o f  the  tw in  concepts o f s e l f -  
re g u la t io n  and the  prim acy o f s ta te  ju r is d ic t io n  over co rpo ra te  
governance issu es . We do n o t b e lie v e  th e  case has been made fo r  
increased re g u la to ry  invo lvem ent by the  S e c u r it ie s  and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to  th e  degree con ta ined  in  th e  Exposure D ra f t .
We a lso  con tin ue  to  oppose c re a t io n  o f  a fe d e ra l c o rp o ra tio n  law , 
e i th e r  d i r e c t ly  by new le g is la t io n  o r in d i r e c t ly  by increased 
fe d e ra l re g u la t io n ,  o r  in  c re a t io n  o f  a fe d e ra l standard  fo r  
co rp o ra te  governance. The Commission's approach seems to  f in e s s e  
these issu e s , which we b e lie v e  are  too  im p o rta n t n o t to  be addressed 
f o r t h r ig h t l y  and d i r e c t ly .
* Second, we b e lie v e  a number o f  the  Commission's recommendations, 
w h ile  s a lu ta ry  as g o a ls , may n o t be co s t e f fe c t iv e  - -  p a r t ic u la r ly  
f o r  s m a lle r companies. To a cons id e ra b le  e x te n t,  t h is  is  why th e re  
a p p ro p r ia te ly  a re  d i f f e r e n t  l i s t i n g  requ irem ents among the  
exchanges. We b e lie v e  i t  would be pruden t f o r  the  Commission to  
cons ide r a more thorough co s t b e n e f it  a n a ly s is  o f  some o f i t s  
recommendations to  te s t  whether a s tro n g  enough case can be made to  
j u s t i f y  the  im pact those recommendations may have on our m id- and 
s m a ll-s iz e d  companies. Perhaps in  these in s ta n ce s , the  Commission's 
recommendations ought to  be in  th e  n a tu re  o f  goa ls ra th e r  than mandates.
*  F in a l ly ,  we b e lie v e  a few o f  the  Commission's recommendations may 
e le v a te  form  over substance. Upon r e f le c t io n ,  th e  Commission may 
decide th a t  t h e i r  in c lu s io n  o n ly  undercu ts i t s  more im p o rtan t 
recommendations and p rov id es  un in tended o p p o r tu n it ie s  f o r  the  
com m ission's c r i t i c s .
We aga in  w ish  to  emphasize th a t  we a p p re c ia te  the  o p p o r tu n ity  to  comment 
upon th e  exposure d r a f t  and would be p leased to  meet w ith  members o f  the  
Commission o r i t s  s t a f f  to  fu r th e r  e xp lo re  our response.
R e s p e c tfu lly  subm itted ,
R ichard  H. T roy, Chairman 
S e c u r it ie s  Law Committee
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CHAPTER TWO
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY
TONE AT THE TOP
For the top management of a public company to 
discharge its obligation to oversee the financial 
reporting process, it [must] should take steps 
designed to identify, understand, and assess the 
factors that may cause the company’s financial 
statements to be fraudulently misstated.
Comment: This recommendation might better be stated as a goal
rather than a mandate to avoid the implication that top 
management must undertake a documentation effort similar to 
that required by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in order to 
avoid liability.
Public companies should maintain internal controls 
that are [adequate] designed to prevent and detect 
fraudulent financial reporting.
Comment: This recommendation also might better be stated as a
goal rather than a mandate. Adequacy ought not be susceptible 
to being construed to mean "guaranteed to prevent fraudulent 
reporting". In addition, the concept of adequacy ought to be 
subject to cost-benefit considerations.
Public companies should develop and enforce written 
codes of corporate conduct. Codes of conduct should 
foster a strong ethical climate and open channels of 
communication to help protect against fraudulent 
financial reporting. A company's audit committee 
should review compliance with the code annually, 
including compliance by top management, and report 
thereon to the board of directors.
Comment: It is important to recognize that existence of a code
of conduct does not in itself prevent improper conduct.
However, some may consider a code of conduct is important to 
the establishment of the desired climate within the company.
As such, we believe the Commission's recommendation could 
better be modified to encourage but not require that the 
company adopt such a code and to permit companies flexibility 
in determining the appropriate committee to monitor compliance.
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If creation of the desired climate is the Commission's goal, 
the Commission's comment perhaps ought to stress that the 
purpose of a code of conduct is to discourage substantive 
misconduct and to encourage compliance. The comment also 
should make clear that such codes of conduct should be specific 
as to prohibited practices (which go far beyond fraudulent 
reporting) and not merely recite general principles; and that 
such codes should not be considered evidence.
We also believe it important for the Commission's comment to 
make the point that in cases involving fraudulent financial 
reporting, the absence of a code of conduct should not be 
considered evidence as to liability.
TWO KEY FUNCTIONS; ACCOUNTING AND INTERNAL AUDIT
Public companies should maintain accounting functions 
that are designed to [can effectively] meet their 
financial reporting obligations.
Comment; The recommendation as proposed by the Commission 
might well be read to imply that "effectively" means 
"guaranteed to prevent fraudulent reporting". We believe that 
the indicated modifications are appropriate to clarify the 
intent.
Public companies should maintain an [effective] 
internal audit function [staffed with an adequate 
number of qualified personnel] appropriate to the size 
and the nature of the company.
Comment: The suggested changes are designed to avoid the
implication that an "effective" internal audit function 
guarantees the prevention of fraudulent reporting and also the 
implication that the number of internal auditors is 
determinative of the appropriateness of the internal audit 
function.
Public companies should [ensure] take steps designed 
to maintain the objectivity of their internal audit 
functions [are objective].
Comment: The suggested modifications are intended to afford
companies appropriate latitude in the achievement of this goal.
Internal auditors should consider the implications of 
their non-financial audit findings for the company's 
financial statements.
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Comment: We support the recommendation without additional 
comment.
Management and the audit committee should take steps 
to provide for [ensure that] the internal auditors' 
involvement in the audit of the entire financial 
reporting process [is appropriate] and for [properly] 
coordinat[ed]ion with the independent public 
accountant.
Comment: We believe that the modifications indicated are
appropriate to avoid creating the implication that 
"appropriate" and "properly" mean "guaranteed to prevent 
fraudulent reporting". In addition, we are concerned that this 
recommendation without clarification may well lead to a 
duplication of effort within the company and raise cost-benefit 
concerns.
AUDIT COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The board of directors of all public companies should 
be required by SEC rule to establish audit committees 
comprised solely of independent directors.
Comment: We suggest this recommendation be eliminated. The
need for, practicality, appropriateness, and the effectiveness 
of an SEC rule as proposed is questionable. Although 
compliance with the recommendation is already a fact for 
NYSE-listed companies, many smaller companies do not have 
outside directors in sufficient numbers to comply with the 
recommendation. While the explanation of the Commission's 
recommendation suggests the SEC should be able to grant 
exceptions on a case-by-case basis, we do not believe this is 
an effective approach and might well be counter-productive.
If not eliminated, the recommendation might best be modified 
substantially to read as follows:
The board of directors of [all] public companies should 
[be required by SEC rule to] establish audit committees 
of which [comprised solely of] a majority of members 
would be independent directors.
If these modifications are incorporated, implementation of the 
modified recommendation would vary with the size of the 
company. Large companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
would have audit committees comprised solely of independent 
directors. The NASD does not yet have any rule on this point 
but has proposals before the SEC to require a minimum number of 
independent directors on audit committees.
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Audit committees should [be informed, vigilant, and 
effective] oversee[rs of] the financial reporting 
process and the company's internal controls.
Comment: We believe any standard expressed in this draft
recommendation could well become the standard applied in 
litigation. Such application would be inappropriate but 
nevertheless result in adverse decisions because the 
recommendation implies that fraudulent financial reporting 
could occur only if the members of the audit committee were not 
"informed, vigilant, and effective." While the audit committee 
can take reasonable steps to ensure that appropriate reviews 
and controls are in place, the existence of the audit committee 
cannot guarantee the elimination of fraudulent reporting —  as 
evidenced by the fact that 69% of the companies involved in SEC 
enforcement actions for fraudulent financial reporting had 
audit committees. We believe the Commission's emphasis might 
better be placed on encouraging the audit committee to take the 
steps as outlined in the Audit Committee Good Practice 
Guidelines.
All public companies should develop a written charter 
setting forth the duties and responsibilities of the 
audit committee. The board of directors should 
approve the charter[, review it at least annually,] 
and modify it as necessary.
Comment: We support the concept of such a charter but question
whether it is necessary to dictate the manner of 
implementation. Some companies annually adopt resolutions 
setting forth the responsibilities of each board committee. 
Other companies define committee responsibilities in by-laws. 
Further, there is no need to specify annual review if the 
recommendation makes clear that the charter should be modified 
as necessary.
Audit committees should have adequate resources and 
authority to discharge their responsibilities.
Comment: We support the recommendation. We believe the
Commission's comment should emphasize that, while a separate 
staff for the audit committee should not be necessary, the 
audit committee should have standing authority to retain 
special counsel or experts. If the need arises for the audit 
committee to investigate suspicious occurrences, this standing 
authority should facilitate the investigation.
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The audit committee should review management's 
evaluation of factors related to the independence of 
the company's public accountant. Both the audit 
committee and management should assist the public 
accountant in preserving his independence.
Comment: We support the recommendation without additional
comment.
The audit committee should approve in advance the 
types and extent of management advisory services that 
management plans to engage the company's independent 
public accountant to perform.
Comment: We believe the Commission's explanation ought to be
modified to make clear that the recommendation permits the 
advance approval of criteria for use of management advisory or 
other categories of services without requiring advance approval 
for a specific consultation. This change is particularly 
important to multinational companies which utilize accounting 
firms for tax advice in foreign locations and would be unable 
to function effectively if approval of the audit committee was 
required before making routine tax inquiries of accounting 
firms.
REPORTING TO THE PUBLIC ON MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT COMMITTEE 
RESPONSIBILITIES
All public companies should be encouraged [required 
by SEC rule] to include in their annual reports to 
stockholders management reports signed by the chief 
executive officer and chief accounting officer. The 
management report should acknowledge management's 
responsibilities for the financial statements and 
internal control, discuss how these responsibilities 
were fulfilled, and provide management's assessment 
of the effectiveness of the company's internal 
controls.
Comment: This recommendation might better be modified as
indicated to encourage companies to draft and include such 
statements if they determine that they are relevant.
In 1979, the SEC proposed amendments to Form 10-K, Regulation 
14A and Regulation S-K requiring inclusion of a statement of 
management on internal accounting control in annual reports 
filed with the Commission on Form 10-K and in annual reports to 
the shareholders. The Commission also proposed that this 
statement be examined and reported on by an independent public 
accountant. We believe the criticisms that caused the SEC to 
withdraw its proposal in 1980 remain valid. Some generally
5
apply to the Commission's current draft recommendation for 
obligatory reports. In 1979, the American Society of Corporate 
Secretaries commented that companies should consider including 
in their financial reports a voluntary statement setting forth 
management's responsibility for the preparation and 
representation of financial statements and in the area of 
internal control. Even though the SEC proposal was withdrawn, 
companies have begun to experiment with such statements, 
seeking forms and language appropriate to their individual 
circumstances. We believe that such experimentation should be 
encouraged to continue.
All public companies should be required by the SEC to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders a 
letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee 
describing the committee's responsibilities and 
activities during the year.
Comment: We believe this requirement might best be eliminated
as it would not substantially further the goals of the 
Commission. The function of the audit committee —  oversight 
—  is already required to be described in the proxy statement 
of registered companies.
TWO ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Management should advise the audit committee when it 
seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting 
issue.
Comment: We suggest reconsideration of this recommendation. A
decision to seek a second opinion is one of many types of 
information which would normally be provided by management to 
the audit committee. Elevation of this particular item of 
information appears to give it undue emphasis. In addition, 
the recommendation as drafted raises a definitional issue: What 
would be considered to be a "significant issue".
When a public company changes independent public 
accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to 
disclose publicly the nature of any material 
  accounting or auditing issues discussed with its old 
and new auditors during the three-year period 
preceding the change.
Comment: We believe this recommendation is unnecessary and may
actually be harmful. During the course on an audit, companies 
and their auditors discuss material accounting and auditing 
issues, including taxation questions, in the normal course of 
business. The proposed disclosure requirement could well 
inhibit this necessary and free exchange.
6
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Further, this recommendation could discourage companies from 
changing auditors for legitimate reasons other than 
disagreement on an accounting or auditing issue. The existing 
SEC disclosure requirements which cover "...any disagreement 
with the former accountant on any matter of accounting 
principles or practices, financial statement disclosure, or 
auditing scope or procedure, which disagreements if not 
resolved to the satisfaction of the former accountant would 
have caused him to make reference in connection with his report 
to the subject matter of the disagreement..." appear to be 
quite adequate.
Audit committees should increase their oversight of 
the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to 
public release.
Comment: We do not believe that, as a general rule, the audit
committee should be required to review or approve quarterly 
financial results prior to their release. We take this 
position for several reasons. First, pre-publication clearance 
is unnecessary if controls are adequate and the process for 
preparing quarterly reports is understood by the audit 
committee. Second, to require pre-publication clearance would 
greatly increase the burden upon audit committees and 
corporations (exposing the committee to litigation) and would 
unnecessarily delay release of quarterly results without 
increasing the protection afforded to shareholders. In 
addition, compliance with this recommendation would prove 
difficult for companies trying to comply with the NYSE rules 
regarding the reporting of earnings. Third, this 
recommendation blurs the distinction between what is clearly 
the audit committee's oversight responsibility and management's 
responsibility for financial reporting.
SETTING STANDARDS FOR INTERNAL CONTROL
The Commission's sponsoring organizations should 
establish a body to guide public companies on 
internal controls.
Comment: The goal of the recommended body is unclear. If the
goal would be to provide small companies with assistance in 
interpreting and suggestions for implementing the various 
recommendations, it might be helpful. If the goal is to create 
a new accounting authority to pass on work done by other such 
authorities, its existence would be of questionable value.
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In addition to comments on Chapter Two, we are pleased to bring 
to your attention our comments on two other recommendations.
CHAPTER FOUR
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEC AND OTHERS 
TO IMPROVE THE REGULATORY AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
The SEC should seek explicit statutory authority to 
bar or suspend corporate officers and directors 
involved in fraudulent financial reporting from 
future service in that capacity in a public company.
Comment: We have difficulty with the effectiveness of such a 
recommendation. It raises many questions of state corporate 
law (e .g . would such authority preempt current state authority 
to pass on the boards of companies regulated or licensed in the 
various states) and might well be difficult to implement on a 
national basis.
The SEC should reconsider its long-standing position 
that the corporate indemnification of directors for 
liabilities that arise under the Securities Act of 
1933 is against public policy and therefore 
unenforceable.
Comment: We believe this recommendation is appropriate
especially in light of the difficulties in attracting and 
retaining independent directors being experienced by companies 
of all sizes.
1732c
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G e o r g e  M . G i b s o n  
Vice President and Comptroller
P . 0 . B O X  5 9 9  
Cin c in n a t i, Oh io  45201
June 24, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D .C . 20006
Gentlemen:
The Procter & Gamble Company has carefully reviewed the 
Commission's April 1987 Exposure Draft Report. We note that 
some of the suggestions we made in January, when we responded 
to your invitation to comment on your "initial conclusions", 
are incorporated in the current text, and we commend the 
Commission for its willingness to consider the views of other 
interested parties. We hope our additional comments, and the 
reiteration of some of our earlier ones, will contribute to a 
further improvement in the Commission's final product.
While there are a number of recommended changes —  largely on 
aspects of the regulatory and legal environment —  where we do 
not have sufficient expertise to take a position, the Company 
can unequivocally endorse most of the Commission's recommenda­
tions. With one exception, our concerns center not on the 
recommendations per se, but on the additional exhortations that 
surface only in the discussion material.
The exception is the recommendation for a letter in the annual 
report signed by the Chairman of the Audit Committee describing 
the Committee's responsibilities and activities during the 
year. We strongly oppose such a letter. It would not only be 
inappropriate in the annual report, but duplicates both 
existing proxy requirements and the widespread practice of 
including descriptions of the Committee's role in statements of 
management responsibility.
The discussions of the recommendations for the public company 
in Chapter Two of the Report contain a number of organizational 
arrangements and functional responsibilities and duties that 
the Commission has prescribed, prefaced "must" or "should", the 
same admonition utilized consistently in the formal recommenda­
tions. It may be that the discussion material was intended to 
be only explanatory and advisory, but unless the tone is changed
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
June 24, 1987 
Page Two
to reflect that the Commission only "suggests", "encourages", 
or "endorses" these arrangements and practices, they will 
certainly be quoted with the same authority as the recommenda­
tions. If, on the other hand, these prescriptions are intended 
to have equal authority, they should be identified as recom­
mendations and listed in summaries —  such as Appendix A —  
which may be all many readers will review. The two examples 
that concern us most seriously are:
1. The code (of corporate conduct) "must provide an accessible 
internal complaint and appeal mechanism." While we 
acknowledge that such a mechanism does facilitate internal 
disclosures, it seems to be absolute overkill to mandate 
that an otherwise effective code of conduct could be judged 
deficient because it does not incorporate such an 
arrangement.
2. "The chief internal auditor should report administratively 
to a senior officer who is not directly responsible for 
preparing the company's financial statements." We strongly 
disagree with this recommendation. The chief internal 
auditor should administratively report to the officer to 
whom responsibility for establishing and maintaining 
internal accounting controls has been delegated, whether or 
not that officer's responsibilities include financial 
reporting. The internal audit function is essential to 
insuring that adequate controls are in place and are 
effective.
Sincerely,
GMG:jp 
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Robert E. Mercer 
Chairman of the Board
June 24, 1987
Mr James Treadway, Chairman 
N a tiona l Commission on
Fraudu len t F in a n c ia l Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20006
Dear Mr Treadway:
I am aware o f  the p re lim in a ry  re p o r t o f  The N a tiona l Commission on 
F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting . For the most p a r t ,  i t  rep resen ts  
a good summary o f  the th in g s  th a t  are a lready  being done by the 
companies w ith  whom you are assoc ia ted .
There is  one s e c tio n , however, th a t  should be co rre c te d . The f i r s t  
two sentences con ta ined  in  Appendix K on page 183 under the heading 
"A u d it Committee Good P ra c tic e  G u id e lin e s " read as fo llo w s : "An a u d it
committee c o n s is t in g  o f  independent d ire c to rs  is  the p rim ary  v e h ic le  
which boards o f  d ire c to rs  use to  d ischarge th e ir  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  w ith  
respect to  the company's f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g . An in form ed and v ig i la n t  
a u d it  committee represen ts  one o f the most e f fe c t iv e  in flu e n ce s  fo r  
m in im iz ing  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l r e p o r t in g ."
These two sentences o v e rs ta te  co n s id e ra b ly  the ro le  played by a u d it 
com mittees. F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  very  few a u d it  committees meet more than 
th re e  o r fo u r  tim es a year and they re ly  alm ost s o le ly  on what is  
repo rted  to  them by management, in te rn a l a u d it  re p re s e n ta tiv e s , and 
independent c e r t i f ie d  p u b lic  accountants, a l l  o f  whom spend f u l l  tim e 
perfo rm ing t h e ir  jobs and r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .  To s ta te  th a t  a u d it  
com m ittees, which cos t the company "pea nu ts ", rep resen t the p rim ary 
v e h ic le  w ith  regard to  the company's f in a n c ia l re p o r tin g  is  a b s o lu te ly  
r id ic u lo u s  and would expose such committees to  an u n fa ir  burden in  
l i t i g a t io n  re s u lt in g  from any fra u d u le n t a c t iv i t ie s  which m ight take 
p lace in  the bowels o f the company.
I f  these statem ents are no t changed and pu t in  proper p e rs p e c tiv e , 
those persons se rv ing  on a u d it  committees w i l l  have the fo llo w in g  
o p tio n s . E ith e r  change the ro le  o f the committee by h ir in g  i t s  own 
f u l l - t im e  s t a f f  to  f u l f i l l  the ro le  as described above, o r ge t o f f  
the a u d it  com mittee.
Mr James Treadway 
June 23, 1987 
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I don't believe that any knowledgeable individual would want to 
serve on an audit committee and bear the responsibility as outlined 
by those two sentences without have a full-time staff to actually 
perform those functions. Further, if staffs were hired by the committee, 
it would precipitate a chaotic situation and divide responsibilities 
at a tremendous expense to the company. If these statements are not 
corrected, I believe companies will have a very difficult time in 
getting qualified people to serve on audit committees because of the 
unwarranted additional liability they would be assuming.
I therefore request that this correction by made on behalf of audit 
committees everywhere.
Very truly yours,
REM/ps
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June 25, 1987
Mr. G. Dewey A rno ld  
Executive  D ire c to r  
N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. A rno ld :
We are pleased to  o f fe r  our comments on c e r ta in  aspects o f  the  A p r i l ,  1987 
Exposure D ra ft  t i t l e d  “ Report o f  the  N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g ". In  re le a s in g  the Exposure D ra ft  fo r  p u b lic  comment, the 
N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  ("Com m ission") in d ic a te d  
i t  hoped to  generate re a c t io n s , suggestions and op in ions  from those concerned 
w ith  o r a ffe c te d  by fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g .  As a m ajor pub lic ly -ow ned  
c o rp o ra t io n , our company and the  A u d it Committee o f  our Board o f  D ire c to rs  is  
extrem e ly in te re s te d  in  the  su b je c t o f  e x te rn a l f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g .  As such, 
we commend the  Commission in  i t s  work to  date and i t s  p rim ary  goal o f 
id e n t i f y in g  the m ajor fa c to rs  c o n tr ib u t in g  to  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  
p ra c t ic e s  and the  e x te n t to  which they can be prevented and a t le a s t de tec ted .
We b e lie v e  f o r  the  most p a r t  the  Exposure D ra ft  rep resen ts  a good summary 
o f  the  steps p u b lic  companies should cons ide r im plem enting in  o rde r to  
m in im ize the  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g .  However, we a lso  
b e lie v e  th a t  c e r ta in  comments/suggestions conta ined in  the Exposure D ra ft  are 
o ve rs ta te d  and u n r e a l is t ic  such th a t  t h e i r  im p lem entation cou ld  r e s u lt  in  a 
s u b s ta n tia l burden on the  company and i t s  A u d it Committee w ith o u t c le a r  
b e n e fit  to  the  company o r i t s  sha reho lde rs .
The s p e c if ic  statem ents to  which we re fe r  and which rep resen t the focus o f 
our comments are as fo llo w s :
•  C h a ra c te r iz a tio n  o f  the  A u d it Committee as being the  p rim ary  v e h ic le  
used by Board o f D ire c to rs  to  d ischarge th e i r  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  w ith  
respec t to  the  company's f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g ;  and 
•  The c h ie f  in te rn a l a u d ito r  should re p o r t a d m in is t ra t iv e ly  to  a se n io r 
o f f i c e r  who is  no t d i r e c t ly  respon s ib le  f o r  p repa ring  the company's 
f in a n c ia l s ta tem en ts.
A u d it Committee R e s p o n s ib il it ie s
Anheuser-Busch s tro n g ly  supports the  A u d it Committee concept and we 
support the general g u id e lin e s  o u t lin e d  in  the Exposure D ra ft  (Appendix K, 
page 184) on the s tru c tu re  and fu n c t io n  o f the A u d it Committee. However, we 
b e lie v e  the statem ents in  the  Exposure D ra ft  (on pages 35 and 183) th a t  (a)
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the Audit Committee is the "primary vehicle that the Board of Directors uses 
to discharge its responsibility with respect to the company's financial 
reporting" and (b) the Audit Committee "represents one of the most effective 
influences for minimizing fraudulent financial reporting" are unrealistic and 
misleading. We believe these statements considerably overstate the role 
played by the Audit Committee.
Audit Committees generally meet no more than three or four times a year. 
As such, Audit Committees necessarily must rely on the company's system of 
internal control and information supplied to them by senior management, 
internal audit representatives and independent certified public accountants 
... all of whom spend full time performing their duties and responsibilities. 
These factors (internal control, management, internal auditors and external 
auditors) all overseen by the Audit Committee, constitute the primary vehicles 
used by the Board of Directors to discharge their responsibility with respect 
to the company's financial reporting. To state that the Audit Committee 
itself is the primary control vehicle with regard to the integrity of the 
company's financial reporting is incorrect and would expose such Committees 
to an unfair burden from litigation due to any fraudulent activities which 
might take place at lower levels within a company.
Finally, if the Audit Committee is truly designed to be the primary 
vehicle for monitoring financial reporting, persons serving on such Committees 
will be required to hire their own full-time staff to fulfill their role or 
resign from the Committee. No knowledgeable individual would want to serve on 
an Audit Committee and bear the responsibility of primary control without 
having full-time staff to perform the necessary control functions. Such a 
situation would precipitate a chaotic environment of divided responsibilities 
at a considerable cost to the company, as well as make it very difficult to 
attract qualified individuals to serve on Audit Committees.
The solution to this problem would be simply for the Commission to revise 
the wording on pages 35 and 183 of the Exposure Draft to more accurately and 
realistically describe the role of the Audit Committee and its relationship 
with the true primary vehicles used to control the company's financial 
reporting process.
Internal Audit Function Reporting Relationship
The Exposure Draft recommends that the chief internal auditor report 
directly to a senior official who is not directly responsible for preparing 
the company's financial statements ... preferably the Chief Executive Officer. 
However, the Exposure Draft acknowledges that such an organizational structure 
(i.e. direct day to day reporting to the Chief Executive Officer) may be 
impractical in larger corporations. We agree and suggest that the Exposure 
Draft place less emphasis on the organizational structure/reporting 
relationship of the chief internal auditor and devote more attention to the 
internal audit function. We believe a reporting relationship of the internal 
audit function to the chief accounting officer in many cases is well justified 
and effective due to the intimate knowledge the chief accounting officer has 
of the company's operations and accounting/reporting functions. The chief
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accounting officer is the management official in the best position to 
effectively direct the internal audit function to those areas most meaningful 
and important to the integrity of the financial reporting process.
Numerous other controls/procedures are available to ensure the integrity 
of the internal audit function other than organizational reporting 
relationships. These controls/procedures include direct and unrestricted 
access to the Chief Executive Officer and Audit Committee, as well as periodic 
and private meetings with such persons. To restrict and eliminate a sound and 
meaningful reporting relationship simply for appearance sake is short-sighted 
and in the long term would be detrimental to the internal audit function and 
financial reporting process.
* * * * *
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on these issues and would be 
pleased to elaborate on any of the foregoing should you desire us to do so.
Sincerely,
J. E. Ritter
Vice President and Group Executive 
(Chief Financial Officer)
JER:cp
T h e  R i g g s  N a t i o n a l  B a n k
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Washington, D.C. 2 0 0 7 4
(202) 835-5 500
JOE L. ALLBRITTON 
chairman o f  the board and 
chief executive officer May 5, 1987
Mr. Thomas I. Storrs 
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Tom:
Thank you for sending a draft of the Report of the National 
Commissicn on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. You are absolutely 
right in saying that although the material sounds technical it is a 
a subject crucial to all in business today. One only has to mention 
to fellow bankers such names as Penn Square, E.S.M., and Drysdale to 
emphasize the point.
Your observations and recommendations on the importance of the 
independent audit committee and internal audit departments are right 
on target. As chairman of the Riggs, a publicly owned national 
bank, I can easily vouch for the added value of these functions.
But, in addition, with my experience with privately held companies,
I wish to point out that so many of your recommendations easily make  
the transition to the private company. Accurate financial 
statements and sound internal controls are valuable to any prudent 
investor —  public or private.
I commend your and the Commission's efforts and look forward to 
seeing the final paper.
Sincerely yours,
M c D e r m o t t , W i l l  &  E m e r y
A  P A R T N E R S H I P  I N C L U D I N G  P R O F E S S I O N A L  C O R P O R A T I O N S
O N E  P O S T  O F F I C E  S Q U A R E  
B O S T O N ,  M A S S A C H U S E T T S  0 2 1 0 9  
6 1 7 / 3 5 7 - 0 2 0 0
111 W E S T  M O N R O E  S T R E E T  
C H IC A G O , IL L IN O IS  6 0 6 0 3 - 4 0 6 7
3 1 2 / 3 7 2 - 2 0 0 0
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2 0 4 9  C E N T U R Y  P A R K  E A S T  
L O S  A N G E L E S ,  C A L I F O R N I A  9 0 0 6 7  
2 1 3 / 2 7 7 - 4 1 1 0
7 0 0  B R I C K E L L  A V E N U E  
M I A M I ,  F L O R I D A  3 3 1 3 1  
3 0 5 / 3 5 8 - 3 5 0 0
F A C S I M I L E  3 1 2 / 9 8 4 - 7 7 0 0  
T E L E X  2 5 - 3 5 6 5 , 2 1 0 0 7 9  
C A B L E  M I L A M
1 0 1  N O R T H  M O N R O E  S T R E E T  
T A L L A H A S S E E ,  F L O R I D A  3 2 3 0 1  
9 0 4 / 2 2 2 - 2 3 1 2
1 8 9 0  K  S T R E E T ,  N .  W .  
W A S H I N G T O N ,  D . C .  2 0 0 0 6  
2 0 2 / 8 8 7 - 8 0 0 0
F I R S T  N A T I O N A L  B A N K  B U I L D I N G
S P R I N G F I E L D ,  I L L I N O I S  6 2 7 0 1
2 1 7 / 5 2 2 - 7 2 0 0
May 26, 1987
JO SE PH  KEIG, JR., P.C. 
3 1 2 / 9 8 4 - 7 7 3 0
Mr. Thomas I. Storrs 
One NCNB Plaza
Charlotte, North Carolina 28255
Re: National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 
Draft Report of
Dear Tom:
I have read the subject draft report, and in my opin­
ion it is excellent. Congratulations to you and the other mem­
bers of the Commission.
I was particularly impressed with the emphasis on the 
vital role to be played by top management, including the board 
of directors. In the same vein, I think the Commission exer­
cised good judgment in emphasizing the importance of able, 
active and independent audit committees and internal audit 
groups.
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft
report.
Sincerely,
 
Joseph Keig, Jr.
J K : h h
5 2 -
JUN 1 6 1987
Royal
 
Insurance
United States
George W. Ansbro 
Chairman. President and 
Chief Executive Officer
9300 Arrowpoint Boulevard 
Charlotte, N. C. 28210
June 12, 1987
Mr. Thomas I. Storrs 
#1 NCNB Plaza 
Charlotte, NC 28255
Dear Tom:
Thank you for your letter and the Report of 
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting Exposure Draft. Since we are not under 
the requirement of reporting to the SEC, we thought
it might be more appropriate if we address our
comments to you rather than directly to the 
commission.
We are basically in agreement with the
Commission's findings and believe they have handled 
a difficult subject very well through their
multi-faceted approach. While all of the elements 
identified are important, we believe the tone set 
by top management and its conveyance to the staff 
is probably the most critical ingredient. Of the 
various roles identified for fraud
avoidance/detection, we believe the Internal Audit 
function is equipped with the best "eyes and ears" 
and should be the primary focus, fully supported 
by the other recommended elements identified.
There are two recommendations in the draft that 
we take issue with as a matter of practicality. The 
first is Audit Committee approval before release 
of quarterly financial statements. We believe this 
would unreasonably delay the release of the financial 
statements and to some extent crosses the line from 
board responsibilities for the Audit Committee to 
operating responsibilities. The second area of 
disagreement is the recommendation that the Audit 
Committee approve in advance the types and the extent 
of management advisory services that management plans 
to engage the company's independent public accountant 
to perform. We understand the Commission's position 
and we are generally sympathetic with it, and for 
this reason have made only very limited use of our 
auditors consulting services. However, we believe
2this should be covered after the fact by the Audit 
Committee when they hold their annual review of the 
audit program and fees. They can review auditor 
consulting utilization and then exert influence if 
they believe an unreasonable use or buildup is 
starting to occur.
Tom, we are pleased to note that we have most 
of the recommended "building blocks” in place, such 
as, an informed, vigilant and effective Audit Com­
mittee; a strong internal audit function; a strong 
independent public accountant relationship which 
includes coordination with internal audit; good 
internal controls and, we believe top management is 
setting the proper tone. Our review of the exposure 
draft has proven to be quite useful as it has provided 
us with some ideas on areas that we might modify to 
further strengthen the conduct of our operation to 
minimize our exposure.
Again, thanks for bringing this to our attention 
and if you like we will be pleased to discuss it with 
you further.
Sincerely,
589 Fifth Avenue  (212 ) 759-6646
New York, New York 10017
JUN 2 2 1987
S t e v e n  H . R i c e
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June 16, 1987
Mr. Thomas I. Storrs One NCNB PlazaCharlotte, North Carolina 28255 
Dear Tom,
Thank you for passing along to me the draft report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting for comment.
The need for study and action in this area is indeed critical and I applaud the work and recommendations of your commission.
I do have some comments concerning the draft report.
The commission's definition of public company, as set forth on page 2 of the draft, includes mutual thrift institutions but excludes mutual insurance companies on the theory that abuses do not exist in that industry. Furthermore, private companies are excluded altogether notwithstanding the fact that abuses have surfaced in a number of these companies.
It would seem difficult to justify excluding any company these days from a discussion of fraudulent financial reporting be it private or public, mutual or stock, or federally regulated or state regulated. The impact fraudulent financial reporting can have on the investors, customers, regulators, employees, suppliers and others associated with any company argues for as broad a definition as possible of those institutions intended to be within the purview of this Report.
While suggesting that the Report could have been broader in it's scope, it also could have provided more detail as to (1) the abuses prevalent in the mutual thrift industry and (2) recommended corrective and preventive action in this specific area.
Steven H. Rice 
June 16, 1987 
Page Two
With respect to financial institution regulatory agencies and the 
Commission's recommendation on page 69, that the various bank 
regulatory agencies "should adopt measures patterned on the 
Commission's recommendations directed to the SEC to carry out 
their own regulatory responsibility relating to financial 
reporting under federal security laws", it also would seem 
appropriate to include the various state regulatory agencies 
here, particularly since mutual thrifts are, in many instances, 
state chartered institutions.
Tom, I do very much appreciate the opportunity to review the fine 
work of the Commission and look forward to the implementation of 
its' recommendations in the years ahead.
Sincerely,
SHR/ndj
JUN 2 4 1987
 5 4
M U L T I M E D I A ,  I N C .
8 0 3 - 2 9 8 - 4 3 6 4  
P. O. B O X  1 6 8 8
G R E E N V IL LE . S O U T H  C A R O L IN A  
2 9 6 0 2
WILSON C. WEARN  
Chairman
June 22, 1987
Mr. Thomas I. Storrs 
Retired Chairman of the Board 
NCNB Corporation 
One NCNB Plaza 
Charlotte, NC 28255
Dear Tom:
Finally, I have completed my review of your 
"Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting." In general, I subscribe to 
your recommendations and commend you for your 
willingness to take a leadership position in this 
worthwhile endeavor.
One of your Commission's recommendations, 
however, might well be worth further consideration.
I refer specifically to the recommendation that the 
Board of Directors of all public companies should be 
required by SEC rule to establish audit committees 
comprised solely of independent directors. While on 
the face of it this recommendation may seem logical, 
I do not believe it is possible that it can be imple­
mented in the near future.
For several years I have been a member of the 
Board of Governors of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers. As you undoubtedly know, NASD 
is an SRO for the over-the-counter market and it also 
operates NASDAQ. About two years ago, in response to 
a recommendation of the Corporate Advisory Board (of 
which I am Chairman), NASD adopted a number of rules 
regarding corporate governance that have established 
requirements for NMS companies trading on NASDAQ.
NASD rules now require that all NMS companies have 
independent directors and that the majority membership 
of all audit committees must be comprised of independent 
directors. Frankly, I think the "majority" requirement 
is entirely adequate. Furthermore, to attempt to impose 
even this standard on the hundreds and hundreds of small
Mr. Thomas I. Storrs 
June 22, 1987 
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Tier II companies on NASDAQ would be looked upon in 
many quarters as radical. I wonder also if the 
recommendations in your report are to be applied to 
the thousands of "non-listed" companies.
Tom, I would like the opportunity of discussing 
this matter with you in the near future. Perhaps we 
can have an initial conversation at the Board meeting 
on Wednesday of this week.
With best regards.
Wilson C. Wearn
WCW/js
5 5 "
John F. Burlingame 
P. O . B o x  8 3 0 0  
2 6 0  L o n g  R i d g e  R o a d  
S t a m f o r d ,  C o n n e c t i c u t  0 6 9 0 4  
( 2 0 3 )  3 7 3 - 2 5 2 0
June 22, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Gentlemen:
I have had the opportunity to read your preliminary report 
and would like to take issue with two points - first, that "an 
audit committee is the primary vehicle boards of directors use 
to discharge their responsibility with respect to the company's 
financial reporting" and second, that "an informed and vigilant 
audit committee represents one of the most effective influences 
for minimizing fraudulent financial reporting."
My objections are on several levels. First, this is simply 
not the fact and never has been. The audit committees have not 
had this responsibility, have not had the financial or physical 
resources to discharge such a responsibility and should not 
have them. Second, the responsibility has been and should be 
with the public accountants which are both paid the fees and 
have the resources to this job. Third, the audit committee's 
function, and it is an important one, is (1) to assure that the 
public accountants are doing a reasonable job, (2) that they 
have a communications path to the Board of Directors separate 
from their management communications linkage and (3) that those 
deficiencies uncovered by the public accountants in 
organization, personnel, systems or procedures are adquately 
corrected by the management.
If the responsibilities stated by the report should become 
the norm, it would require a separate activity duplicating most 
of the functions now accomplished by the public accountants. 
This would increase the costs for no other reason than shifting 
a responsibility now properly placed to another activity not 
equipped to discharge it.
I would hope the Commission would give further thought to 
this issue. Rather than solving the accountants' liability 
problem, it will, in my view, seriously weaken their role in 
and relationship with corporate America.
Sincerely
 
J
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C h a r l o t t e  
J u n e  2 3 ,  1987
M r . S t o r r s
C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g
Y ou  w i l l  u n d o u b te d ly  r e c e iv e  m o re  k n o w le d g e a b le  a n d  t h o u g h t f u l  
com m ents  r e g a r d in g  t h i s  d r a f t  r e p o r t ,  b u t  I  h a v e  o u t l i n e d  some 
r e a c t io n s  a s  y o u  r e q u e s te d .
1 .  R a th e r  t h a n  r e q u i r i n g  p r e - a p p r o v a l  b y  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  
f o r  e n g a g e m e n t o f  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t  f o r  
m anagem en t a d v is o r y  s e r v ic e s ,  i t  w o u ld  seem p r e f e r a b le
t o  a l l o w  a f t e r - t h e - f a c t  r e p o r t i n g  o f  a n y  s u c h  e n g a g e m e n t. 
A l th o u g h  i n  o u r  own e x p e r ie n c e  we r a r e l y  s e l e c t  P r ic e  
W a te rh o u s e  f o r  s u c h  p r o j e c t s ,  t h e y  o f t e n  c o m p e te  f o r  t h e  
b u s in e s s .  U n t i l  we h a v e  re v ie w e d  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  c o s t ,  e t c .  o f  t h e  s e v e r a l  f i r m s  b e in g  
c o n s id e r e d ,  we a r e  n o t  a b le  t o  g a u g e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  
n e e d in g  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  a p p r o v a l .  S u ch  a r e q u i r e m e n t  w o u ld  
e i t h e r  d e la y  t h e  p r o c e s s  so m e w h a t, o r  m o re  l i k e l y ,  
e f f e c t i v e l y  p r e c lu d e  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  t h e  f i r m  d o in g  t h e  
a u d i t  e n g a g e m e n t.
2 .  The  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  a  l e t t e r  f r o m  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  
c h a irm a n  i n  t h e  a n n u a l r e p o r t  t o  s t o c k h o ld e r s  seem ed 
e x c e s s iv e ;  i n c l u d i n g  s u c h  a  l e t t e r  i n  some SEC f i l i n g  
o r  t h e  p r o x y  s ta te m e n t  w o u ld  seem  s u f f i c i e n t .
3 .  The  r e p o r t  i n  s e v e r a l  p la c e s  c o n te n d s  t h a t  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  
re s p o n s e s  h a v e  b e e n  o f  p a ra m o u n t c o n s id e r a t io n  a n d  t h a t  
t h e  c o s t s  a r e  j u s t i f i e d  b y  t h e  b e n e f i t s .  I  am u n a b le  t o  
a s s e s s  t h e  c o s t  a n d  b u rd e n  o f  th e s e  p r o p o s a ls ,  b u t  I  am 
e q u a l l y  u n a b le  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  a s s e r t io n  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t
a  p r o b le m .  T h e re  i s  p r o b a b ly  n o  e f f e c t i v e  m eans o f  
r e m o v in g  t h i s  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  a n d  i t  w i l l  l i k e l y  becom e a 
p o i n t  o f  d e b a te .
O v e r a l l ,  t h e  r e p o r t  seem ed v e r y  w e l l  d on e  a n d  w o u ld  m ake 
s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to w a r d  m in im iz in g  t h e  p ro b le m s  b e in g  
a d d re s s e d .
F r a n c i s  B . Kemp -  P r e s id e n t ,  NCNB C o r p o r a t io n
T23 - 5  E x t .  5678
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H o n e y w e l l
WILLIAM H. MACKEY
Vice President and Controller
J u n e  2 3 ,  1 9 8 7
N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  
1 7 0 1  P e n n s y l v a n ia  A v e n u e ,  N .W .
W a s h in g t o n ,  DC 2 0 0 0 6
D e a r  S i r :
We a p p r e c ia t e  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  com m ent on th e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t  on 
f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  On an o v e r a l l  b a s is ,  we b e l ie v e  
t h a t  th e  f i n d i n g s ,  c o n c lu s io n s ,  and  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  in c lu d e d  i n  t h e  
e x p o s u re  d r a f t  a r e  a p p r o p r ia t e .  The N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  i s  t o  be 
commended f o r  i t s  e x c e l l e n t  w o rk .
F o l lo w in g  a re  o u r  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  ch a n g e  i n  C h a p te r  Tw o, 
R e c o m m e n d a tio n s  f o r  th e  P u b l i c  C om pany:
1 .  R e c o m m e n d a t io n : P u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  m a i n t a i n  a c c o u n t i n g
f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  c a n  e f f e c t i v e l y  m e e t  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
o b l i g a t i o n s .
The e x p o s u re  d r a f t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  th e  c h ie f  a c c o u n t in g  o f f i c e r  
i s  d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts ,  ca n  ta k e  
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  a c t io n  t o  c o r r e c t  th e m , and  s h o u ld  be h e ld  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
We b e l ie v e  t h a t  t h e  e x p o s u re  d r a f t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  o v e r s t a t e s  t h e  
c h ie f  a c c o u n t in g  o f f i c e r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s ta te m e n ts .  The c h ie f  e x e c u t iv e  o f f i c e r  and t h e  c h i e f  f i n a n c i a l  
o f f i c e r  h a v e  as m uch r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  
as  th e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t in g  o f f i c e r .  We v ie w  t h i s  as a " s h a r e d "  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  We b e l ie v e  t h a t  th e  la n g u a g e  i n  th e  e x p o s u re  
d r a f t  s h o u ld  be m o d i f ie d  t o  in c o r p o r a t e  t h i s  c o n c e p t .
2 .  R e c o m m e n d a t io n : P u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  s h o u ld  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e i r
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  o b j e c t i v e .
The e x p o s u re  d r a f t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  th e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  
s h o u ld  n o t  r e p o r t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  t o  a s e n io r  o f f i c e r  who i s  
r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  p r e p a r in g  th e  co m p a n y ' s f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts .
The e x p o s u re  d r a f t  recom m ends t h a t  th e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  
r e p o r t  t o  th e  CEO, b u t  a c k n o w le d g e s  t h a t  t h i s  may be im p r a c t i c a l  
i n  l a r g e r  c o r p o r a t io n s .  The e x p o s u re  d r a f t  recom m ends t h a t ,  a t  
a m in im u m , th e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  h a v e  d i r e c t  and  
u n r e s t r i c t e d  a c c e s s  t o  th e  CEO and  m e e t w i t h  th e  CEO a t  l e a s t  
e v e r y  q u a r t e r .
Honeywell lncv Honeywell Plaza, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55408,Telephone 612/870-6245
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For a multinational company that has decentralized operations 
and records, we believe that the chief internal auditor should 
report administratively to the corporate vice president and 
controller. We believe that this relationship on balance 
enhances the control environment and is the most practical in 
the circumstances.
We believe that it would be more appropriate for the Commission 
to emphasize the importance of internal audit having 
unrestricted access to records, the audit committee, and the 
CEO, rather than the reporting relationship.
Also, we recommend that the CEO and audit committee review 
periodically the objectivity and independence of the internal 
audit function, including possible changes in reporting 
relationships if there is, in fact, a possibility that the 
financial reporting process could be compromised by the 
reporting relationship.
Although we have no objections to the chief internal auditor 
meeting with the CEO, we strongly object to any recommendation 
specifying the frequency of such meetings. The important 
concept that should be emphasized is that the chief internal 
auditor should have unrestricted access to the CEO.
3. Recommendation: Management and the audit committee should
insure that the internal auditors' involvement in the audit of 
the entire financial reporting process is appropriate and 
properly coordinated with the independent public accountant.
The exposure draft indicates that many internal audit groups 
concentrate their audit activities at the division level. The 
independent public accountant is often responsible for the audit 
at the corporate level. The exposure draft indicates that the 
internal auditors should be more involved at the corporate 
level.
We believe that the independent public accountants and internal 
auditors are in the best position to determine how the overall 
audit should be coordinated to achieve appropriate audit 
coverage without duplicating audit effort. Accordingly, we do 
not believe that it is appropriate for the Commission to single 
out particular areas where internal auditors or independent 
public accountants should concentrate their audit efforts.
4. Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC
rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders a 
letter, signed by the chairman of the audit committee, 
describing the committee's responsibilities and activities 
during the year.
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We question whether inclusion of such a letter in the annual 
report will add value to the financial reporting process. We do 
not believe that inclusion of a separate letter will benefit the 
users of financial statements. As an alternative, we believe 
that m a n a g e m e n t 's report on responsibility for financial 
reporting is an appropriate vehicle for management to comment on 
internal controls, the financial reporting process, internal 
auditors and independent public accountants, and the role of the 
audit committee.
To add another separate report commenting on the financial 
reporting process from the chairman of the audit committee seems 
unnecessary, potentially redundant, and could be confusing to 
users of the financial statements. We also believe that the 
addition of another separate report would be inconsistent with 
the SEC's objective of simpifying annual reports.
5. Recommendation: The audit committee should approve, in advance,
the types and the extent of management advisory services that 
management plans to engage the company's independent public 
accountant to perform.
We believe that all audit and non-audit services should be 
reviewed by audit committees. However, we believe that audit 
committees should make the determination when it is appropriate 
to review such services. As indicated in the exposure draft, 
there has never been a case where an independent public 
accountant performed management advisory services and 
compromised his independence. Accordingly, we believe that 
audit committees should have the option of reviewing non-audit 
services after-the-fact.
6. Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to public 
release.
We agree that audit committees should oversee the quarterly 
reporting process. However, we believe that audit committees 
should make the determination whether reviewing quarterly 
financial results prior to public release is necessary. When 
internal controls are strong, we do not believe that such a 
review is necessary. Requiring approval of financial results 
prior to public release is impractical, unnecessary, and will 
likely result in a delay in the release of information to the 
public for the vast majority of public companies.
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Following is a recommendation for change in Chapter Three, 
Recommendation for the Independent Public Accountant:
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public
accountants to review quarterly financial data of public 
companies before release to the public.
We do not believe that a timely review of quarterly financial 
information by independent public accountants is necessary for 
all public companies. Our independent public accountants 
formally review the quarterly information at the time that they 
perform the annual audit. We believe that our current practice 
is appropriate for the following reasons:
o We have strong internal controls.
o We maintain a continuous dialogue with our independent public 
accountants on all important financial matters. We make sure 
that any important financial matters are discussed prior to 
releasing the quarterly financial information.
o We have never had to make an adjustment to our quarterly 
financial information.
o A timely review would require that the independent public 
accountants visit outlying locations more frequently. As a 
result, we would incur additional costs.
o A timely review would delay our release of the information to 
the public.
Very truly yours,
W.H. Mackey/th
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June 23, 1987
Edward R. Book 
Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer 
717/534-3300
N a tio n a l C om m iss ion  on 
F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P ennsy lvan ia  A venue , NW 
W ashington , D C  20006
G e n tlem en :
C o n g ra tu la tio n s  on yo u r re p o r t w h ich  has been c irc u la te d  to  m e by b o th  A r th u r  
A ndersen and E rn s t &  W hinney. The re p o r t rep resen ts  a good sum m ary  o f  th e  k in d  o f  w o rk  
th a t  is  a lre a d y  be ing  done by th e  com pan ies  w ith  w h ich  I 'm assoc ia ted . I  w ou ld  l ik e  to  c a ll 
to  yo u r a t te n t io n ,  h o w e ve r, th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  s ta te m e n ts  co n ta in e d  in  th e  se c tio n  headed 
A u d it  C o m m itte e  Good P ra c t ic e  G u id e lin e s  th a t  reads as fo llo w s : "A n  a u d it c o m m itte e  
co n s is tin g  o f  indepe nden t d ire c to rs  is  th e  p r im a ry  v e h ic le  w h ich  boards o f  d ire c to rs  use 
to  d ischa rge  th e ir  re s p o n s ib ility  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  com pany ’s f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g . A n 
in fo rm e d  and v ig i la n t  a u d it c o m m itte e  re p re se n ts  one o f  th e  m ost e f fe c t iv e  in flu e n c e s  fo r  
m in im iz in g  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g ."
In  m y o p in io n , these  tw o  sentences co n s id e ra b ly  o v e rs ta te  th e  ro le  p layed  by 
a u d it c o m m itte e s . A n  a u d it  c o m m itte e  w h ich  m ee ts  th re e  o r fo u r  t im e s  a ye a r and re lie s  
on w h a t is  re p o rte d  to  th e m  by m anagem en t, in te rn a l a u d it s ta f f  and independen t c e r t i f ie d  
p u b lic  a cco u n ta n ts , w ou ld  be an u n re a lis t ic  and im p ra c t ic a l re p la c e m e n t fo r  those  who spend 
th e ir  f u l l  t im e  p e r fo rm in g  va rio u s  a u d it c o n tro l fu n c tio n s  as a p a r t  o f  th e ir  fu l l - t im e  jo b  
re s p o n s ib ilit ie s . The a u d it c o m m itte e  is  n o t th e  p r im a ry  v e h ic le  w ith  re g a rd  to  th e  com pany ’s 
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g . T h is  k in d  o f  s ta te m e n t, in  m y o p in io n , w ou ld  expose a u d it  c o m m itte e s  
to  an u n fa ir  bu rden  and w ou ld , in  fa c t ,  have th e m  te r r ib ly  v u ln e ra b le  fo r  l i t ig a t io n  th a t  m ay 
a rise  fro m  any fra u d u le n t a c t iv i t ie s  w h ich  co u ld  ta ke  p la ce  in  th e  depths o f  a com pany o r 
o rg a n iz a tio n .
These s ta te m e n ts  need to  be changed to  r e f le c t  m ore  p ro p e r ly  th e  o v e rs ig h t 
and p ro p r ie ty  and a p p rop ria teness  o f  c o n tro ls  and a c t iv i t ie s  o f  th e  m anagem en t, in te rn a l 
a u d it and e x tra  a u d it in g  fu n c tio n s  o f  a c o rp o ra tio n . I f  these  s ta te m e n ts  a re  n o t c o rre c te d , 
com pan ies w i l l  have a v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  t im e  in  g e tt in g  q u a lif ie d  peop le  to  se rve  on a u d it 
c o m m itte e s  because o f  th e  u n w a rra n te d  a d d it io n a l l ia b i l i t y  th e y  w ou ld  be assum ing.
I do hope you w i l l  g ive  these  th o u g h ts  yo u r c o n s id e ra tio n  as you p re p a re  yo u r 
f in a l  re p o r t .
ERB:nsh
June 24 , 1987
T H E  IN S T IT U T E  O F  IN T E R N A L  A U D IT O R S
CALGARY CHAPTER
ADDRESS REPLY TO:
D a v id  Townsend,
8818 MacLeod T r a i l ,  S.E., 
C a lg a ry ,  A lb e r ta ,
T2H 0M5.
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D ear S i r ,
We r e c e n t ly  h e ld  an I n v e s t ig a t iv e  A u d i t in g  s e m in a r g e a re d  to w a rd  I n t e r n a l  
A u d i to r s .  The in t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  t o p ic  was v e ry  h ig h  and a l l  a t te n d e e s  
w ere  v e r y  p o s i t i v e  a b o u t th e  in fo r m a t io n  th e y  g a in e d .
The se m in a r was d e s ig n e d  t o  o b ta in  in p u t  fro m  a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  
d i s c ip l i n e s ,  i . e .  le g a l ,  s e c u r i t y ,  f o r e n s ic  a c c o u n t in g ,  c r im in a l  
i n v e s t ig a t in g .  From th e  fe e d b a c k  t h a t  we r e c e iv e d ,  we f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  
a p p ro a ch  was v e r y  e f f e c t i v e  i n  m e e tin g  y o u r  "R ecom m endations f o r  E d u c a t io n "  
i n  y o u r E xposu re  D r a f t  o f  A p r i l , 1987.
F o r y o u r in fo r m a t io n ,  p le a s e  f i n d  e n c lo s e d  a copy  o f  o u r  c o u rs e  o u t l i n e .
I f  we can be o f  any  f u r t h e r  a s s is ta n c e ,  p le a s e  f e e l  f r e e  t o  c o n ta c t  u s .
Y ou rs  t r u l y ,
D a v id  Townsend 
E d u c a tio n  G o ve rn o r
D T /jm
E n c lo s u re
c c :  T . Leech -  S e c re ta ry  -  C a lg a ry  C h a p te r
Mano R a s ia h  -  P r e s id e n t  -  C a lg a ry  C h a p te r
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CROWE
CHIZEK
&  COMPANY
Certified Public Accountants
June 24, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sirs:
We are pleased to respond to the "Report of the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting" Exposure Draft issued April, 1987. We 
believe the Exposure Draft is generally a very good and practical document. 
We have considered the recommendations as a whole and agree that they form 
a balanced response to fraudulent financial reporting. Our observations 
and comments focus mainly on the need for clarification of certain points 
although we do disagree with your approach to restructuring the Auditing 
Standards Board. Furthermore, since we are a CPA firm, our response 
primarily covers recommendations in Chapter 3 of the draft.
Chapter 2: Item VI - Changing Independent Public Accountants
The Commission recommends that a public company disclose the nature of any 
material accounting or auditing issues discussed with its old and new 
auditors during the three years preceding the change.
To make this an effective recommendation, we believe two issues must be 
addressed as part of the recommendation.
• Guidance should be provided as to the types of issues such a
report should consider, and
• A specific procedure should be established as to how the
independent public accountants are to respond to the issues 
raised or omitted by the company.
Chapter 3: Item III - Analytical Review Procedures
The Commission has recommended that auditing standards be revised to 
require the use of analytical review procedures On all audit engagements 
including the planning phase of audits. We recognize that the use of 
analytical review procedures are very helpful in the planning phase and 
overall review of an audit. However, in some circumstances, an effective 
audit can be performed without performing analytical review procedures in 
the planning stages and as an overall review of financial information.
This is especially true in auditing a smaller business.
Elkhart Grand Rapids Indianapolis Michigan City South Bend 
Associated world-wide with Dearden Farrow International
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We suggest that the absolute requirement recommended in the Exposure Draft 
be replaced with wording that strongly urges the use of analytical review 
procedures, but does not require such procedures in each and every audit 
and in both the planning and overall review phases of each audit.
Chapter 3: Item III - Timely Review of Quarterly Financial Data
We realize that this is a somewhat technical comment, but the 
recommendation that the SEC should require independent public accountants 
to review quarterly financial data of public companies before release to 
the public should be moved from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, "Recommendations 
for the SEC and Others to Improve the Regulatory and Legal Environment."
The CPA does not have the ability to force this review of the quarterly 
financial data. Only through the directive of a regulatory authority will 
this recommendation be able to be implemented.
Chapter 3: Item VI - Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board
The Committee recommended that the AICPA reduce the number of members on 
the Auditing Standards Board from 21 to 8 or 12 members, half of which 
would not be CPA's in public practice. In addition, the Committee 
recommended a strengthening of the senior staff.
We agree that an increase in the number of technically qualified senior 
staff to assist in drafting technical standards would be beneficial to the 
ASB and provide a more efficient avenue for the writing, review and passage 
of technical standards.
We strongly oppose, however, the proposed restructuring as presented. The 
current format provides the ASB a broad based representation of the body 
which it regulates, the AICPA. Limiting the percentage of practicing CPA's 
will detract significantly from the strong feeling of representative 
regulation that is a foundation of the profession. Limiting the number of 
members to 8 or 12 would restrict the Board's ability to receive a variety 
of views on a given subject. The AICPA only this year increasd the size of 
the Board from 15 to 21 to increase participation by those most affected 
by its decision. We believe the Board would benefit from increased 
involvement from nonpublic accounting professionals. However, we recommend 
keeping the total members approximately at the current 21 member level with 
approximately one-third of the members not being CPA's in public practice.
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In closing, we commend the efforts of the Commission in providing a broad 
foundation for the various groups that are concerned with the effect of 
fraudulent financial reporting. By working from this foundation, the 
individual groups may now structure their own specific response to this 
fundamental problem.
Very truly yours,
CROWE, CHIZEK AND COMPANY
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National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
Public Service Indiana is pleased to submit comments in response to your 
exposure draft, Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting. Public Service Indiana is an investor owned electric utility 
serving 560,000 customers in central and southern Indiana. In 1986 our 
revenues exceeded $1 billion and our utility plant was approximately $1.6 
billion.
We support this private-sector initiative to improve the integrity of the 
financial reporting process. We are constantly reminded of the growing 
problem of fraud through news media accounts. Public opinion polls 
reflect that the reputation of the entire business community is at risk.
With respect to your recommendations for public companies, we find the 
majority to be reasonable. Without question, the primary responsibility 
for financial statements and related disclosures belongs to management.
We are in agreement the audit committee serves an important oversight role 
with respect to financial reporting. However, we believe certain 
recommendations pertaining to the audit committee should be reconsidered. 
Certain of your recommendations circumscribe management's discretion 
unnecessarily by requiring prior audit committee approval. For example, 
contrary to your recommendation we do not believe it appropriate for the 
audit committee to approve, in advance, the engagement of the company's 
independent public accountant to perform management advisory services. 
Evaluation of the public accounting firm's independence is an important 
duty of the audit committee. However, just as there is an absence of 
evidence to suggest that the independence of public accounting firms has 
been compromised as a result of providing non-audit services, there is no 
reason to believe the audit committee's oversight role is inadequate in 
evaluating the independence of the accountant/client relationship.
1000 East Main Street, Plainfield, Indiana 46168 317 .. 838 . 1242
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Likewise, we do not believe it necessary for the audit committee to 
approve, in advance, the release of interim financial statements. We 
believe the audit committee can fulfill its financial reporting oversight 
role without prior approval authority. There is no reason to believe 
management would provide more credible financial statements if the audit 
committee reviewed them prior to release rather than on an ongoing basis, 
even retrospectively. In addition, we find this requirement undesirable 
as it dictates a minimum frequency (4) and the timing of audit committee 
meetings. Considering scheduling implications, requiring reviews of 
interim data prior to publication without adversely affecting the 
timeliness of its release is difficult, at best.
The activities and responsibilities of audit committees have increased 
significantly in the last decade. Requiring more than can reasonably be 
accomplished within the time these individuals can commit to such 
activities indeed risks dilution of their primary, essential functions. 
Inserting the audit committee in the routine approval process contributes 
to this risk.
Unarguably, reviews of the public accountant's independence and of 
important financial data fall within the scope of the audit committee's 
oversight role. However, the needs and circumstances of each company will 
differ. For this reason, your recommendations should emphasize the audit 
committee's scope of responsibility, leaving discretion to delineate the 
means to accomplish specific responsibilities with management and audit 
committee members.
With respect to your recommendation requiring, by SEC rule, a letter 
signed by the chairman of the audit committee describing the committee's 
responsibilities and activities during the year be included in annual 
reports to stockholders, we believe current proxy statement disclosure is 
adequate. We foresee no real benefit to the investing public by adoption 
of this recommendation.
We appreciate this opportunity to provide our comments on this critical 
matter. Given the current mood of Congress, the business community must 
demonstrate its ability to self-regulate its financial reporting conduct 
or undesirable consequences seem inevitable.
s l v
Very truly yours
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Clayton, Missouri  63105
June 24, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.Washington, D. C.
Gentlemen:
My attention is called to the preliminary report of your Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Appendix K on page 183 states, "An audit committee consisting of independent directors is the primary vehicle which boards of directors use to discharge their responsibility with respect to the company’s financial reporting."
Having served on audit committee of four major corporations, I strongly object to your exact language used in those first two sentences. While audit committees have stepped up the level of the depth of their inquiry into the details of procedure and personnel involved in the company's financial reporting, I must submit that the Audit Committee's principal function is to carefully cross-examine the Independent Certified Public Accountants, the Internal Audit executives, and top management itself; and I would suggest that your comittee by its present wording, not shift responsibility away from those three key areas.
I applaud your efforts toward elimination of fraudulent financial reporting. However, I believe you would be best served by developing a full set of questions and examination procedures for Audit Committees, laying proper responsibility on top management and particularly, Independent Certified Public Accountants.
Sincerely,
Persons
U S X  C o r p o r a t i o n  
6 0 0  G r a n t  Street 
Pittsburgh, P A  1 5 2 3 0  
4 1 2  4 3 3  1 1 3 9
R. M .  H e r n a n d e z  
Senior V ice President 
&  C o m p t r o l l e r
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Washington, D. C. 20006
June 24, 1987
Subject: Comments to Exposure Draft - Report of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting_______
Gentlemen:
We appreciate the opportunity to comment to the subject exposure 
draft. We are in general agreement with the conclusions set 
forth therein, including the Commission's comments that:
... The responsibility for reliable financial reporting resides 
first and foremost at the corporate level;
... Public confidence in the extensive financial reporting by 
public companies must be maintained to ensure effective 
functioning of the capital and credit markets in the United 
States; and
... A realistic potential exists for reducing the risk of
fraudulent financial reporting, provided the problem is con­
sidered and addressed as multidimensional, i.e., there are 
roles for the company and its management, the independent 
public accountant, regulatory and law enforcement agencies, 
educators, etc.
However, we are concerned that some of the specific recommen­
dations may be a deterrent to the public markets if they become 
rigid requirements. Extreme care must be exercised so that the 
costs and complexities of participating in these markets do not 
become so onerous to smaller companies as to effectively exclude 
them. The areas that offer the greatest potential for overkill 
would be legislatively-mandated expansion of oversight and en­
forcement tools for the SEC and other regulatory agencies and the 
significantly expanded role of the independent public accountant.
The following paragraphs present our comments on certain of the 
Commission's recommendations for public companies, independent 
public accountants and the SEC.
M a r a t h o n  Oil C o m p a n y  
U S S
U .S. Diversified G r o u p  
T e x a s  Oil &  G a s  C o r p .
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY
USX
In this area, we are in general agreement with the recommen­
dations; however, we are not convinced that all recommendations 
dealing with audit committees are appropriate.
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee - We generally agree that 
an effective committee comprised solely of independent directors 
is an important component in the board of directors carrying out 
its responsibilities for financial reporting. Accordingly, the 
establishment of audit committees should be encouraged but not 
mandated. The principal objective is for the board of directors 
to provide adequate oversight without specifying the exact form 
of the oversight. As the Commission notes, many smaller com­
panies may have difficulty meeting this requirement due to their 
inability to attract outside directors; therefore, any SEC 
requirements in this area should provide for exception to 
recognize alternative procedures and controls that are func­
tionally equivalent to an audit committee.
Reporting on Responsibilities in the Annual Report to 
Stockholders - We do not agree that the SEC should require com­
panies to include a letter signed by the chairman of the audit 
committee describing the committee's responsibilities and activi­
ties. Such a letter would only add boilerplate to the annual 
report that would serve little purpose, particularly if the com­
mittee's responsibilities are described in management's reports 
to the stockholders.
Seeking a Second Opinion - We do not agree that the SEC should 
require a company that changes independent public accountants to 
disclose the nature of any material accounting or auditing issues 
discussed with its old and new auditors during the three-year 
period preceding the changes. The proposed recommendation is too 
broad and ambiguous. In any given year, we would expect to hold 
discussions on any number of accounting or auditing issues which 
are properly resolved to both parties' satisfaction. Disclosure 
of such discussions would not be helpful to financial statement 
users, particularly if the company is incorrectly perceived to be 
receptive to questionable accounting practices. We believe pre­
sent disclosure requirements of SEC Regulation S-K, Item 304, and 
Form 8-K, Item 4 are adequate, as they require specific disclo­
sures, including a letter from the former auditors, pertaining to 
disagreements between the company and former auditor in connection 
with audits of the two most recent fiscal years and interim 
period(s) preceding the change.
Quarterly Reporting - With respect to the quarterly reporting 
process, we believe there would be little or no benefit resulting 
from requiring audit committee approval prior to public release.
It is our belief that most companies operate similar to ours, in 
which the board of directors reviews quarterly results prior to 
release; therefore, a separate audit committee review would 
essentially duplicate the board of directors' review.
2-45-1
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
U S X The enhanced role of the public accountant, as recommended by 
the Commission, naturally leads to a concern about increased 
audit fees. The recommendations requiring the auditor's report 
to provide reasonable but not absolute assurance that the audited 
statements are free from material misstatements is a positive 
step. However, certain of the remaining recommendations, such as 
reviewing quarterly financial data and evaluating internal 
accounting controls, may not be cost effective.
Improving Detection Capabilities - We do not believe the SEC 
should require independent public accountants to review quarterly 
financial data of public companies prior to release. We are con­
cerned that mandating a quarterly review prior to release of finan­
cial data would lead to more comprehensive audit procedures which 
would increase fees as well as delay the release of financial data.
Communicating the Auditor's Role - We do not agree with the 
recommendation to revise the auditor's standard report to describe 
the extent to which he has reviewed and evaluated the system of 
internal accounting control, and for the Auditing Standards Board 
to provide explicit guidance for the auditor's report to address 
any disagreement with management's assessments, as stated in 
management's report. We believe the current auditing standards, 
which require the independent public accountant to make a preli­
minary review of the system of internal accounting control and 
decide upon the extent of reliance thereon and the tests and 
evaluations to be made, are adequate. We are convinced that the 
recommended change would result in expanded auditing procedures 
and resultant increased fees with no real benefit to the public.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEC AND OTHERS 
TO IMPROVE THE REGULATORY AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
The thrust of the recommendations is to provide additional enforce­
ment remedies, i.e., civil money penalties, cease and desist orders 
barring or suspending corporate officers and directors, etc. We 
agree that the SEC must have adequate enforcement remedies to 
carry out its charge; however, we believe that adequate enforce­
ment remedies already exist. The SEC has the authority to suspend 
trading in stock and seek injunctions against fraudulent activity 
and manipulations of stock prices. We have a serious concern 
that giving nonjudicial enforcement tools to regulatory agencies 
has proven in some cases to be detrimental to due process because 
of overzealous enforcement practices.
Robert M. Hernandez 
Senior Vice President & 
Comptroller
Sincerely
2-45-2
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N a t io n a l  C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W .
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
D ear C o m m iss io n e rs :
The members o f  the  A ccounting  and A u d it in g  Procedures Committee o f the  
V ir g in ia  S o c ie ty  o f C e r t i f ie d  P u b lic  Accountants subm it the  fo llo w in g  comments 
on the  exposure d r a f t  o f  the  "R eport o f  the  N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g ."  The comments address the  com plete se t o f
recom m enda tio ns  as  p re s e n te d  i n  A p p e n d ix  A t o  th e  e xp o s u re  d r a f t .
The Committee supports  the  recommendations f o r  the  p u b lic  companies, 
except we f e e l  these recommendations should n o t app ly  to  sm a ll p u b l ic ly  he ld  
companies, however you d e fin e  s m a ll. We fe e l  the  la c k  o f resources and 
manpower o f many sm a ll p u b l ic ly  he ld  companies would make the  im p lem enta tion  
o f  these recommendations ve ry  burdensome and p o s s ib ly  im p o ss ib le .
The C o m m itte e 's  v ie w s  on th e  recom m enda tions  f o r  th e  in d e p e n d e n t p u b l ic  
a c c o u n ta n ts  a re  as  f o l lo w s :
R e c o g n iz in g  R e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  D e te c t in g  F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l
R e p o r t in g :
The C om m ittee  s u p p o r ts  t h i s  recom m enda tio n .
Im p ro v in g  D e te c t io n  C a p a b i l i t i e s :
The C om m ittee  s u p p o r ts  th e s e  re co m m e n d a tio n s .
Certified Public Accountants •  700 E. Main Building •  Richmond, Virginia 23219 •  804-649-0351 
MEMBERS: The American Group of CPA Firms •  AICPA Division for CPA Firms
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Improving Audit Quality:
In connection with the first recommendation in this section 
regarding mandatory peer review of audit engagements of all public 
company clients new to a firm, we do not believe "all" such 
engagements should be required to be examined. We feel this could 
potentially force the peer review team to examine very few 
engagements other than the first audits of new clients. This 
requirement could also force the peer review engagement time to be 
unnecessary lengthened. We feel the peer review team should be 
allowed to use their professional judgement in selecting certain 
first audits of new clients, but not be forced to examine all 
first audits.
Regarding the second recommendation in this section concerning 
second partner review, we feel the third point requiring the 
concurring review partner to consider himself a peer of the 
engagement partner be eliminated. If not eliminated, we feel the 
accounting firm should be responsible for assigning a proper 
concurring review partner, and not make this the responsibility of 
the concurring partner.
We feel the third recommendation in this section which reads that 
public accounting firms should recognize and control the 
organizational and individual pressures that potentially reduce 
audit quality should be addressed to the public companies. We 
believe these pressures are caused by forces outside the 
accounting firms control. Accounting firms should seek help from 
their clients, the SEC, educators and the financial community 
because all of these groups are responsible for these pressures. 
We feel the requirement to handle these pressures should not rest 
with the accounting firms alone but in unison with the audit 
committee of the public company clients.
Communicating the Auditor's Role:
The Committee supports the first recommendation in this section.
In connection with the second recommendation regarding the review 
of internal control, we feel the first sentence in this paragraph 
should be eliminated. It is our opinion that the communication of 
the extent to which a public accounting firm has reviewed and 
evaluated internal accounting controls could not possibly be 
understood by the average investor. We feel this requirement 
would only widen the "Expectation Gap."
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Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board:
The Committee feels the Board's current size should be retained, 
but membership should be allowed to four certified public 
accountants outside of public practice. Due to the magnitude and 
complexity of the issues to be handled by the Board, we believe 
the current size should not be reduced. We also do not understand 
how individuals who are not certified public accountants can deal 
with the setting of standards for auditing procedures to be 
carried out by certified public accountants. This is like having 
accountants determining the surgical procedures to be performed by 
surgeons. We would feel more comfortable with surgeons directing 
surgeons and certified public accountants directing certified 
public accountants.
The Committee supports the recommendations for the SEC, and the education 
recommendations.
The comments expressed above are based on the views of the individual 
members of the Accounting and Auditing Procedures Committee of the Virginia 
Society of Certified Public Accountants. These comments do not represent an 
official position of the Society as a whole.
Respectfully submitted,
 
W. Barclay Bradshaw, CPA
Member, Accounting and Auditing 
Procedures Committee of the Virginia 
Society of Certified Public 
Accountants
WBB/rlz
cc: Mr. Dale H. Strickler, Chairman
Accounting and Auditing 
Procedures Committee of the 
Virginia Society of Certified 
Public Accountants
J u n e  2 4 , 1987
M r. Jam es C. T re a d w a y , C h a irm a n  
The N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on F r a d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia ,  N.W .
W a s h in g to n ,  D .C .
D e a r M r. T re a d w a y :
H a v in g  r e v ie w e d  th e  p r e l im in a r y  r e p o r t  o f  The N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  on 
F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g ,  I  f e e l  t h a t ,  f o r  th e  m o s t p a r t ,  i t  
r e p r e s e n t s  a good  sum m ary o f  th e  t h in g s  t h a t  a re  a l r e a d y  b e in g  done  
b y  th e  c o m p a n ie s  w i t h  whom I  am a s s o c ia t e d .
I  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  c a l l  y o u r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  one s e c t io n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  
s h o u ld  be c o r r e c t e d .  The  f i r s t  tw o  s e n te n c e s  c o n ta in e d  i n  A p p e n d ix  
K on page  183 u n d e r  th e  h e a d in g  " A u d i t  C o m m itte e  Good P r a c t i c e  
G u id e l i n e s , "  re a d  as f o l l o w s :  "A n  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  c o n s i s t i n g  o f
in d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  i s  th e  p r im a r y  v e h i c le  w h ic h  b o a rd s  o f  
d i r e c t o r s  u se  t o  d is c h a r g e  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  th e  
c o m p a n y 's  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  An in fo r m e d  and  v i g i l a n t  a u d i t  
c o m m it te e  r e p r e s e n t s  one  o f  th e  m o s t e f f e c t i v e  in f l u e n c e s  f o r  
m in im iz in g  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g . "
T h e se  tw o  s e n te n c e s  o v e r s t a t e  c o n s id e r a b ly  th e  r o l e  p la y e d  by  a u d i t  
c o m m it te e s  —  f i r s t  o f  a l l ,  v e r y  fe w  a u d i t  c o m m it te e s  m ee t m ore  th a n  
t h r e e  o r  f o u r  t im e s  a y e a r  and  th e y  r e l y  a lm o s t  s o l e l y  on w h a t i s  
r e p o r t e d  t o  them  by  m an a g e m e n t, i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  and  
in d e p e n d e n t  c e r t i f i e d  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t s ,  a l l  o f  whom sp e n d  f u l l  
t im e  p e r f o r m in g  t h e i r  jo b s  and  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  To s t a t e  t h a t  
a u d i t  c o m m m itte e s , w h ic h  c o s t  th e  com pany " p e a n u t s , "  r e p r e s e n t  th e  
p r im a r y  v e h i c le  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  th e  c o m p a n y 's  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  i s  
a b s o lu t e l y  r i d i c u l o u s  and  w o u ld  e x p o s e  s u c h  c o m m it te e s  t o  an u n f a i r  
b u rd e n  i n  l i t i g a t i o n  r e s u l t i n g  f ro m  a n y  f r a u d u le n t  a c t i v i t i e s  w h ic h  
m ig h t  t a k e  p la c e  in  th e  b o w e ls  o f  th e  co m p a n y .
I f  th e s e  s ta te m e n ts  a re  n o t  ch a n g e d  and  p u t  i n  p r o p e r  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  
th o s e  p e ro n s  s e r v in g  on a u d i t  c o m m it te e s  w i l l  h a v e  th e  f o l l o w in g  
o p t io n s ,  e i t h e r  ch a n g e  th e  r o le  o f  th e  c o m m it te e  by  h i r i n g  i t s  own 
f u l l - t i m e  s t a f f  t o  f u l f i l l  th e  r o l e  as d e s c r ib e d  a b o v e  o r  g e t  o f f  
t h e  a u d i t  c o m m it te e .  I  d o n ' t  b e l ie v e  t h a t  a n y  k n o w le d g e a b le  
i n d i v i d u a l  w o u ld  w a n t t o  s e r v e  on an a u d i t  c o m m it te e  and  b e a r  th e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  as o u t l i n e d  by  th o s e  tw o  s e n te n c e s  w i t h o u t  h a v in g  a 
f u l l  t im e  s t a f f  t o  a c t u a l l y  p e r fo r m  th o s e  f u n c t i o n s .  F u r t h e r ,  i f  
s t a f f s  w e re  h i r e d  b y  th e  c o m m it te e ,  i t  w o u ld  p r e c i p i t a t e  a c h a o t i c
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situation and divide responsibilities at a tremendous expense to the 
company. If these statements are not corrected, I believe companies 
will have a very difficult time in getting qualified people to serve 
on audit committees because of the unwarranted additional liability 
they would be assuming.
Thank you, in advance, for your giving serious consideration to my 
letter and my concern.
Very truly yours,
Francine I. Neff
1509 Sagebrush Trail, S.E.
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87123
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RICHARD A. BACHMANN
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
T h e  L o u is ia n a  L a n d  a n d  Ex p l o r a t io n  Co m p a n y
909 POYDRAS STREET 
P. O. BOX 60350
Ne w  Or l e a n s , La .  70160
(504) 566-6500
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N a tio n a l C om m iss ion  on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  
1701 P ennsy lvan ia  A venue , N . W.
W ash ing ton , D . C . 20006
G e n tle m e n :
We have re v ie w e d  th e  p re lim in a ry  re p o r t o f  th e  N a tio n a l 
C om m iss ion  on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g  and re s p e c tfu lly  
co m m e n t on tw o  sentences c o n ta in e d  in  A pp e n d ix  K  on page 183. 
U nder th e  head ing  "A u d it  C o m m itte e  Good P ra c t ic e  G u id e lin e s ," 
read  as fo llo w s : "A n  A u d it  C o m m itte e  co n s is tin g  o f  independen t 
d ire c to rs  is th e  p r im a ry  v e h ic le  w h ich  boards o f  d ire c to rs  use to  
d ischa rge  th e ir  re s p o n s ib ility  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  com pany 's  f in a n c ia l 
re p o rt in g . A n  in fo rm e d  and v ig i la n t  a u d it c o m m itte e  rep resen ts  
one o f  th e  m ost e f fe c t iv e  in flu e n ce s  fo r  m in im iz in g  fra u d u le n t 
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g ."
We w ou ld  observe  th a t  these  tw o  sentences o v e rs ta te  th e  
ro le  p layed  by independen t a u d it c o m m itte e s  o f  boards o f  d ire c to rs  
and co u ld  under adverse  c ircu m s ta n ce s  expose th e  c o m m itte e  to  
unreasonable  l ia b i l i t y .  We w o u ld  ag ree  th a t  an independen t a u d it 
c o m m itte e  co n s is tin g  o f  o u ts ide  d ire c to rs  is one o f  th e  ve h ic le s  
when com b ined  w ith  a s tro n g  m anagem ent te a m , an independen t 
in te rn a l a u d it fu n c t io n  and independen t c e r t i f ie d  p u b lic  a c c o u n ta n tin g  
te a m  w o u ld  p ro v id e  an e f fe c t iv e  co m b in a tio n  o f  ve h ic le s  to  m in im iz e  
fra u d  in  f in a n c ia l re p o rt in g .
As you  a re  undou b ted ly  a w a re , a u d it c o m m itte e s  do n o t 
m ee t fre q u e n tly  d u rin g  th e  ca le n d a r yea r and m ust, by th e ir  v e ry  
n a tu re , re ly  upon th e  in te g r ity  and f u l l  d isc losu re  o f  th e  a fo re s ta te d  
bodies to  d ischa rge  th e ir  re s p o n s ib ilit ie s .
O u r co nce rn  in  h ig h lig h tin g  th is  s p e c if ic  w o rd in g , "p r im a ry
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veh icle", is in the potential impact that this wording w ill have 
in future shareholder litigation  and its attendant fa llou t on a company's 
ab ility  to a ttract and retain qualified outside members to the audit 
com m ittees o f  boards o f directors.
Thank you for your consideration of these points.
Sincer ely,
RAB:ls
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S t. L o u is C o u n t y  C o u n cil
E N G E L B E R T  G .  K N A U S ,  C  P  A. 
County Auditor
COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER 
ADMINISTRATION BUILDING 
7900 FORSYTH BOULEVARD 
CLAYTON, MISSOURI 63105 
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Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr., Chairman 
and Commission Members
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Chairman Treadway:
We have been asked by the Local Auditors Sub-Committee of the 
National Intergovernmental Audit Forum to respond to the May 1, 1987, 
Exposure Draft of the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting.
Our group was briefed on May 4, 1987, by Mr. Joseph Donlon of your 
staff and our consensus was the Report should be expanded to include the 
government sector as well. We were also able to attend a May 7, 1987, 
meeting at which Mr. Jack L. Krogstad presented the Disctech, Inc.
study. We were surprised at the manner in which we government auditors 
arrived at much the same conclusions as public/private sector auditors 
did. It was very apparent the two sectors had a commonality and 
interdependency of professional interests.
In the last month, we have reviewed the Report as well as the
summary article in the June, 1987, Journal of Accountancy and feel the 
inclusion of some form of public oversight for the governmental sector 
should be included in the same fashion as your outside Board Members 
Audit Committee. In many cases, the elected officials do not realize the 
political impact of their actions on the financial statements and
internal control of an organization. In several instances, they believe 
the auditor has been remiss, when in fact, the prime reason the
fraudulent event was uncovered was due to a participant informing an 
outside authority of the fraud. This was particularly true when it was 
the top management official responsible for the fraud.
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We agree there is a need to better educate the auditor in detecting 
fraud and inclucating an ethic frame of mind in business and governmental 
leaders. We believe it is essential that all parties must share more 
than merely a legal requirement to our fellow man; there is also a moral 
responsibility not to deceive. In this way, we will eventually remove 
this cancer of fraud from our business and governmental bodies.
We have not been able to meet to ratify these suggestions, however, 
we will meet in November in Washington, D. C. and will be available to 
present your response to the Sub-Committee.
Respectfully,
E. G. Knaus, C.P.A.
Chairman, Task Force 
Local Auditor Representatives 
to the National Forum
EC:mhs
cc: Mr. Joseph D. Comtois
Mr. Harvey J. Beth 
Mr. Norman R. Hawkes 
Mr. Roland Malan
The University of Chicago 68
Graduate School of Business Institute of Professional Accounting 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637 3121702-7261
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Dr. Jack Krogstad Research Director National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Ave.Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Jack:
Congratulations on successfully completing the Exposure Draft! I have read it cover to cover; it is an impressive piece of work. I am pleased to have contributed to your effort.
Also, thanks for mentioning my name to people who have inquired about ongoing research in this area (e.g., Baruch Lev). I appreciate the exposure and the opportunity to discuss financial fraud. I have written a paper that compares the financial characteristics of FFR companies with a control group of industry peers for five years preceding the first fraud. Most of the FFR group look like their industry peers five years before the fraud, but they perform worse than their peers three years before the fraud, using profit margin, return on assets and similar measures of performance. A puzzling result is that they look more like their industry peers again in the year before the fraud. I'm still trying to understand this phenomenon. Any suggestions? This paper is still premature for public disclosure, but I 'l l send you a copy after we perform additional data verification and analysis.
As to commenting on the exposure draft, I believe that the key factor in dealing with fraudulent financial reporting is top management. This is not a novel insight, but I do believe that top management's incentives to be concerned with fraud are based on intrinsic values, not extrinsic penalties. I have studied 159 cases brought by the SEC since 1980, and I have not found the penalties imposed on top management to be particularly harsh, in most cases. (There are exceptions, of course.)
In this vein, I hope the report will discuss at greater length the conflicting incentives faced by top management for whom achieving financial targets results in a favorable impression among financial analysts. In an environment that so strongly emphasizes firm's financial performance, can one really expect top management to make financial fraud a top priority concern? Have you seen Ken Merchant's videotape (for FERF) of the roundtable discussion that we attended?
I saw it recently, and was reminded about the attitude "a little manipulation 
of accounting numbers is a good thing (for shareholders).” It was believed to 
be better to manipulate accounting numbers than to play games with actual 
activities, such as eliminating R&D or deferring maintenance.
The unspoken assumption was that achieving quarterly and annual earnings 
targets was critical. An alternative view was proposed by Joe Green to run the 
company as well as possible and let the numbers take care of themselves. That 
view was not subscribed to by the other practitioners. Can financial fraud be 
substantially reduced in an environment in which top managers are expected to 
make the financial numbers look good? I don't think so. Although I believe 
top management is the key factor in dealing with financial fraud, I believe the 
problem is rooted in an environment having such a strong emphasis on short-term 
financial performance. This point is not overlooked in the draft, but I hope 
it is emphasized more.
During my summary of the roundtable discussion taped for FERF, I found four 
factors affecting fraud coming from the discussions:
1. Environment conducive to fraud;
2. Incentives to commit fraud;
3. Opportunities to commit fraud (or controls to prevent fraud); and
4. Type of people employed.
A weakness on one dimension can be compensated by strengths on other 
dimensions. High incentives to manipulate accounting numbers, for example, 
require more controls, a better environment, and care assessment of the type of 
people employed.
I have taken the committee's recommendations to educators to heart and begun to 
write descriptive cases about fraud. I plan to start with my files on SEC 
actions and court cases, and perhaps expand to public sector cases. Some will 
be multiple-company descriptions written around a theme such as "the effect of 
divisional performance incentives on financial fraud;" others will describe 
single company episodes. I think students, new auditors, financial managers, 
and executives could learn a great deal about fraud from such cases. I would 
value any suggestions you have about particular cases, topics, funding sources, 
etc. (Do you think any of the CPA firms would fund something like this, or is 
it too sensitive?)
Jack, congratulations on a job well done and a successful two-year stint with 
the Commission. Are you returning to Creighton? When? As you may know, I am 
moving to the University of California at Davis (Davis, Cal. 95616) at the end 
of July.
Sincerely,
Michael W. Maher 
Visiting Professor of Accounting 
University of Chicago 
Professor of Accounting 
University of Michigan
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M E R C K  &  C O . ,  I n c .
P. O. BOX 2000 
RAHWAY, NEW JERSEY 07065
THOMAS L. OSTERBRINK June 25, 1987
CONTROLLER
Mr. G. Dewey A rn o ld , Executive  D ire c to r  
N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting  
1701 Pennsylvan ia  Avenue, NW 
W ashington, DC 20006
Dear Mr. A rn o ld :
We a p p re c ia te  the  o p p o r tu n ity  to  express our views on the  Exposure D ra ft  o f  
the  Report o f  the  N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R e po rting .
Merck & C o ., In c . ("M erck" o r  the  "Company") is  a New Jersey c o rp o ra tio n  w ith  
i t s  p r in c ip a l p lace  o f  business a t 126 E. L in c o ln  Avenue (P. O. Box 2000), 
Rahway, New Jersey 07065. Merck is  engaged p r im a r i ly  in  the  business o f  
d is c o v e r in g , d e ve lop ing , p roducing and m arke ting  products  and se rv ice s  fo r  the 
maintenance o r re s to ra t io n  o f  h e a lth .
We g e n e ra lly  support the  Commission's recommendations as a r e a l i s t i c  approach 
to  reduc ing  the  r is k  o f  f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  and endorse the  o v e ra ll 
conc lus ion  th a t  e f fo r t s  to  d e te c t and d e te r f in a n c ia l s tatem ent fra u d  should 
be made by a l l  p a r t ie s  in vo lve d  in  the  f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  process. M erck's 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  the  in t e g r i t y  and accuracy o f  i t s  f in a n c ia l statem ents is  
evidenced by our c u r re n t p ra c t ic e s  which s u b s ta n t ia l ly  are in  accordance w ith  
the  Commission's recommendations. A d d it io n a lly ,  our independent p u b lic  
accou n ta n ts ' p ra c t ic e s  g e n e ra lly  comply w ith  the  recommendations. We would 
l i k e  to  express ou r concern, however, on a few s p e c if ic  recommendations, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  in  regard to  those which would may change the  t r a d i t io n a l  ro le  o f  
the  a u d it  com m ittee.
The a u d it  com m ittee 's  o v e rs ig h t o f  management r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  is  a c r i t i c a l  
element o f  the  o v e ra ll c o n tro l environm ent and is  one o f  the  p rim a ry  means o f  
p re v e n tin g  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g .  In  o rd e r to  p ro v id e  e f fe c t iv e  
o v e rs ig h t ,  i t  is  c r i t i c a l  th a t  the a u d it  committee remain independent. 
T h e re fo re , the  a u d it  committee should no t have d i r e c t  invo lvem ent in  o p e ra tin g  
fu n c t io n s  o r  assume d ir e c t  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the  p re p a ra tio n  o f  f in a n c ia l 
s ta tem en ts . C e rta in  o f  the  Commission's recommendations may be perce ived as 
s h i f t in g  these r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  from management to  the  a u d it  com m ittee. As a 
r e s u l t ,  the  a u d it  com m ittee 's  ro le  as an overseer o f  the  f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  
process may no t be p reserved.
Mr. G. Dewey Arnold, Executive Director 
Washington, DC 20006
June 25, 1987 
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Particularly, we do not agree with the Commission's recommendation for audit 
committee approval of quarterly financial results. This required approval 
would encompass responsibility which currently clearly rests with management 
and would be at odds with the committee's oversight role. The nature and 
extent of review of quarterly results should be left to the discretion of the 
audit committee based on its evaluation of financial reporting controls and 
particular circumstances. Audit committee involvement in the quarterly 
financial reporting process may be appropriate only when they have determined 
that a significant risk may exist for irregularity or error or when unusual 
circumstances occur.
The recommendation to include a separate, signed letter from the audit 
committee chairman in the annual report is not necessary. The audit 
committee's reporting requirements are to the board of directors which is in 
turn responsible for ensuring that they are meeting their responsibilities. A 
comprehensive letter in the annual report would not enhance the audit 
committee's role or improve the public's understanding of their relationship 
to the financial reporting process. On the contrary, such a letter may create 
the perception that the audit committee is accountable for the financial 
statements and, likewise, result in a shift in focus away from management's 
responsibility. The delineation of activities in a letter as suggested by the 
Commission may result in risk of additional legal liability for the individual 
audit committee members. In light of the potential increase in liability 
along with the perceived expanded role of the audit committee, it may become 
increasingly difficult to attract qualified individuals to serve as committee 
members.
We commend the Commission on its research and documentation and would be glad 
to further discuss our comments with you.
Sincerely,
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TH E UPJO H N  COM PANY
KALAMAZOO, MICHIGAN 49001, U.S.A.
June 25, 1987
WILLIAM U. PARFET
Vice President a n d  Treasurer
TELEPHONE: (616) 3 2 3 - 4 1 3 3
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20006
Gentlemen:
The Upjohn Company appreciates the opportunity to present our 
views on the April 1987 Exposure Draft entitled, "Report of the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting". We 
applaud the Commission's efforts and acknowledge the
comprehensive nature of its recommendations. We agree with the 
Commission that public companies, their independent public 
accountants, the SEC, educators and others should take steps to 
enhance the integrity and reliability of financial reporting.
Generally, we agree with the Commission's recommendations. 
Furthermore, The Upjohn Company is presently conducting many of 
its financial reporting activities in concert with the
Commission's recommendations for public companies. In the 
remainder of this letter we have identified six of the 
Commission's recommendations that, based on our experiences and 
circumstances, we believe should be changed or modified. While 
we understand that the Commission views this report as a package, 
we do not believe our suggested changes would reduce the Report's 
effectiveness.
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal 
controls that are adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent 
financial reporting.
We agree that our objective should be to prevent and detect 
fraudulent financial reporting. However, we believe that any 
system of internal controls is only capable of providing 
reasonable assurance that fraudulent financial reporting will be 
prevented from occurring or be detected when it does occur. As 
the Commission points out, fraudulent financial reporting will 
continue to exist, hopefully to a lesser degree, even if all of 
its recommendations are followed. For these reasons, we suggest 
that the Commission incorporate the concept of "reasonable 
assurance" in this recommendation.
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Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that their 
internal audit functions are objective.
We do not believe that the chief internal auditor needs to report 
to the CEO as long as he has free access to the CEO. As the 
Commission acknowledges, reporting to the CEO may not be 
practical in a large organization. Furthermore, we do not 
believe that the chief internal auditor must be an experienced 
audit professional if his staff has this training. We believe 
that his skills in terms of communication with others, management 
of people and conflict resolution are more important than audit 
training, if his staff can compensate for this prerequisite.
Recommendation: All public companies should develop a written 
charter setting forth the duties and responsibilities of the 
audit committee. The board of directors should approve the 
charter, review it at least annually, and modify it as necessary.
We believe periodic review is adequate, especially if the charter 
is to be modified as necessary. Absent unusual circumstances it 
would seem that less frequent review would be appropriate.
Recommendation: The audit committee should approve in advance 
the types and the extent of management advisory services that 
management plans to engage the company's independent public 
accountant to perform.
We believe that the audit committee should review all services 
after-the-fact, but only approve major engagements in advance.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC 
rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter 
signed by the chairman of the audit committee describing the 
committee's responsibilities and activities during the year.
We disagree with the nature of this recommendation, especially 
since the duties of the audit committee are described in existing 
proxy statement disclosures and are usually included in 
"management's report on responsibility for financial reporting" 
contained in the annual report to shareholders. We do not object 
to a voluntary initiative by the audit committee chairman in this 
regard or the inclusion of the audit committee's duties in 
management's report. However, we do not see the value of 
requiring another signed statement in the annual report to 
shareholders - in addition to the statements signed by the CEO, 
CAO and independent public accountants.
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Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight
of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight should
include approving financial results prior to public release.
We strongly disagree that the audit committee should approve 
quarterly financial results prior to public release. We do
comply with this recommendation at year-end, but we do not 
believe it is practical or necessary at the three unaudited 
quarters.
It is our opinion that the Commission's recommendation for 
independent public accountant involvement prior to the quarterly 
public release of data is an adequate and appropriate procedure. 
The independent public accountant has access to the audit 
committee and can bring quarterly matters to their attention on 
an exception basis. Therefore, approval of quarterly financial 
results by the audit committee prior to public release is, in our 
opinion, unnecessary. The audit committee should be able to 
adopt those procedures they believe appropriate in light of their 
individual circumstances.
Conclusion:
We commend the Commission on an excellent report and fully 
support their objectives in the pursuit of improved financial 
reporting. Hopefully our comments will be useful to you. They 
have been offered in a cooperative spirit with the intention of 
enhancing private sector initiatives in financial reporting.
Very truly yours,
W.U. Parfet
Corporate Vice President 
and Treasurer
WUP:rem
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Howard Hughes Medical Institute
G r a h a m  O .  H a r r i s o nVice President &  C hief I n v e s t m e n t  Officer
6701 R o c k l e d g e  Drive 
Bethesda, M D  2 08 1 7  
(301) 571-0210
June 25, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D .C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I have recently read the summary of your Exposure Draft and 
intend to read the complete document. As the Audit Committee Chairman of 
two publicly listed companies, General Re and Property Capital Trust, the 
material is of intense personal interest. As the Chief Investment 
Officer of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute portfolio, it is obviously 
of concern in our own investment policies.
The basic thrust of your extensive review and the 
recommendations are laudable and display significant staff and Commission 
member effort. However, the goal of "practical, reasonable in the 
circumstances, justified by the benefits" does not seem applicable to the 
proposed requirement of formal Audit Committee approval of quarterly 
financial statements.
As an investor, I recognize the focus by many on such quarterly 
reports and the impact they may have on security price movements or 
creditor attitudes. However, the staging of an Audit Committee meeting 
prior to each quarterly financial filing is not a practical or necessary 
activity for any corporation whose Board meetings, Board attendance, and 
already scheduled Audit Committee meetings display active knowledge and 
understanding of current financial data. As the accountants know, the 
quarterly data is based on internal procedures, whose substance has to 
have been reviewed and approved by both the external auditors and the 
Audit Committee.
Directors, if meetings are held at least quarterly (and in my 
case a minimum of 6-8 times annually) have available details that would 
lead to exploration of any unusual trends vs forecast as well as the kind 
of inquiry that any Director brings to such meetings from his external 
world contacts. I see no likelihood that any Audit Committee which has 
established the proper link with the internal audit group would not be 
aware of significant departures from standard or of failure to recognize 
and reflect major income or balance sheet changes that may be impending.
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On ba lance , D ire c to r  l i a b i l i t y  and, p a r t ic u la r ly  f o r  those on 
the  A u d it Committee, suggests th a t  i t  is  s a fe ly  l e f t  to  the  d is c re t io n  o f  
such a Committee to  determ ine the frequency and t im in g  o f  t h e ir  m eeting, 
ra th e r  than  meet to  observe a p e r fu n c to ry  p re -re le a s e  requ irem en t. I t  is  
n o t now easy to  f in d  the  persons w i l l in g  to  g ive  Board tim e in  the 
c u rre n t c lim a te  and I  b e lie v e  you would f in d  even fewer w i l l in g  to  t r a v e l 
and change schedule to  accomodate a ta s k  most would p e rce ive  as needless 
and, indeed, fa ls e  com fo rt.
I  a lso  f in d  th a t  the  concept o f  a separa te  d e s c r ip t iv e  le t t e r  
in  the  Annual R eport from  the A u d it  Committee Chairman seems needless 
d u p lic a t io n  i f  the  Annual Report in c lu d e s  a s tandard  account o f  the 
com pos ition  and scope o f  a c t iv i t y .  My re s p o n s ib i lty  is  no le s s e r  nor 
g re a te r  by hav ing  my s ig n a tu re  w ith  an Annual Report page when I  am 
re q u ire d  to  have s igned the  10K f i l i n g .
Thank you fo r  the  e f fo r t s  you have expended in  a w o rld  where 
the c h a rla ta n s  and cheats s t i l l  abound.
S in c e re ly ,
G aham  O. H a rr is o n
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INTERNATIONAL
HOUSEHOLD___________
Gaylen N. LarsonGroup Vice President and Controller
June 25, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sirs:
We are pleased to respond to the April, 1987 Exposure Draft of the Commission's 
report on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. By way of background, Household 
International has financial services and manufacturing businesses with assets in 
excess of $13 billion. Our stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. We 
operate primarily in the United States, Canada, England, Italy, and Australia. Our organizational structure is decentralized with the exception that internal audit and 
legal functions report on a straight line basis directly to senior corporate 
management.
Household commends the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
for the excellent work that has been done in considering the issues and developing the Exposure Draft. We believe this subject should be addressed by the private sector, as you are doing, and that constructive steps should be taken to further 
strengthen the integrity of the financial reporting process. While we recognize that 
your recommendations are intended to be considered in their totality, we believe 
that each should be reasonable and achievable if your efforts are to be broadly 
accepted and implemented. We are concerned with recommendations that may be 
unreasonably difficult or impossible to implement or that do not address the basic 
issue of honest, credible financial reporting. We do not want our directors, 
management, or employees to be in a position of defending themselves in a court of law or any other forum for failure to implement one or more recommendations 
where we have concluded they would not appear to further the basic objective of 
prevention and early detection of fraudulent financial reporting. To that end, 
therefore, our comments are meant to be constructive and to help your final 
product become broadly accepted and implemented. Absence of a comment on 
specific Commission recommendations should be read as indicative of our support.
Our comments are noted in the attached document. Please feel free to call upon us if we can be of further assistance in completion and issuance of your report.
GNL-0854
Attachments
Financial Services, Manufacturing, Transportation
H o u s e h o l d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l J u n e  2 5 ,  1 9 8 7
R e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  A p r i l ,  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  o f  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ’s  R e p o r t  o n  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
Recommendations for the Public Company
I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l s
E x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  u t i l i z e ,  d u r i n g  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  c l i e n t s ' f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  
a  f o c u s e d  " i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l "  c o n c e p t .  T h e y  c a n  c h o o s e  t o  t e s t  
c o m p l i a n c e  s o  a s  t o  r e l y  o n  s u c h  c o n t r o l s  o r  t o  i g n o r e  t h e m  a n d  o p i n e  b a s e d  o n  
s u b s t a n t i v e  t e s t i n g .  M a n a g e m e n t s  a l s o  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  o p i n e  i n  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  o n  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  d e f i n e d  m u c h  m o r e  b r o a d l y ,  a n d  t o  h a v e  a  s o u n d  a n d  a d e q u a t e  
b a s i s  f o r  s u c h  o p i n i o n s .  C E O 's  a r e  e x p e c t e d ,  b a s e d  o n  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  t o  
g a i n  a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  c o n t r o l s  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r  p l a n s  t o  r e l y  o n  a n d  t h e  
b a s i s  f o r  a n y  d e c i s i o n  n o t  t o  r e l y  o n  s o m e  o r  a l l  o f  t h o s e  c o n t r o l s .  C E O ' s  a l s o  a r e  
e x p e c t e d  t o  d e c i d e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t o  a s k  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  t o  e v a l u a t e  i n t e r n a l  
a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l s  m o r e  e x t e n s i v e l y  a s  a  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s .  F u r t h e r ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  C E O ' s  m a y  w a n t  t o  p e r i o d i c a l l y  e n g a g e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s  t o  e x a m i n e  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l s  o n  a n  e v e n  b r o a d e r  
b a s i s  a n d  a s k  t h a t  t h e y  p u b l i c l y  o p i n e  o n  a d e q u a c y  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l s .
M a n a g e m e n t s  s h o u l d  h a v e  t h e  c o m f o r t  o f  k n o w i n g  t h a t  t h e i r  p u b l i c  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  
r e g a r d i n g  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  a r e  r o u t i n e l y  b a c k e d  u p  b y  r e v i e w s  a n d  c o m p l i a n c e  
t e s t i n g  b y  b o t h  i n t e r n a l  a n d  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s .  M a n a g e m e n t s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  p l a c e d  
i n  a  p o s i t i o n  w h e r e  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  e x a m i n e  o n l y  t h o s e  c o n t r o l s  w h i c h  m e e t  t h e  
n a r r o w e r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l s  a n d ,  t h r o u g h  c o m p l i a n c e  t e s t i n g ,  a r e  
s e l e c t e d  t o  h e l p  t h e m  c o m p l e t e  f i e l d  w o r k  i n  f e w e r  h o u r s .  M a n a g e m e n t s  a n d  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  a l s o  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  s e c o n d  g u e s s  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  
a u d i t o r  t e s t i n g  a n d  r e l i a n c e  o n  c o n t r o l s .  M o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  b u r d e n s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  
p l a c e d  o n  u s e r s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  b y  r e q u i r i n g  t h a t  t h e y  u n d e r s t a n d  v a r i o u s  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  d i s t i n c t i o n s  a n d  e v a l u a t e  a d e q u a c y  o f  t e s t i n g  a n d  r e p o r t i n g  o n  
c o n t r o l s  b y  m a n a g e m e n t s  a n d  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s .
F o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t s  a n d  o p i n i o n s  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t s ,  w e  t h e r e f o r e  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  i d e n t i c a l  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  
s h o u l d  b e  u t i l i z e d .  W h i l e  s y s t e m s  t o  m i n i m i z e  r i s k s  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  a s  w e l l  a s  m o r e  c l a s s i c a l l y  d e f i n e d  s y s t e m s  o f  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l  
s h o u l d  b e  r o l l e d  i n t o  s u c h  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  e x p l i c i t  p u b l i c  r e p o r t i n g  b y  a l l  p a r t i e s  s h o u l d  
f o c u s  o n  c o n t r o l s  t h a t  a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  o v e r a l l  f a i r  p r e s e n t a t i o n s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s .
A c c o u n t i n g  F u n c t i o n s
P a g e  3 2  c o n t a i n s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  f u n c t i o n s  
i n  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  c a n  e f f e c t i v e l y  m e e t  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
o b l i g a t i o n s .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  y o u r  r e p o r t  c o u l d  b e  s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  a d d r e s s i n g  
r e p o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  o p e r a t i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t s  
a n d  b y  e n c o u r a g i n g  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  t o  r e v i e w  a p p o i n t m e n t  a n d  d i s m i s s a l ,
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q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  a n d  c o m p e n s a t i o n  o f  t h e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r .  W h i l e  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r  i s  m e n t i o n e d  o n  p a g e  3 7 ,  w e  
e n c o u r a g e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  t o  b e  m o r e  s p e c i f i c  b y  r e c o m m e n d i n g  t h a t  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  m e e t  p r i v a t e l y  w i t h  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r s  a t  l e a s t  o n c e  e a c h  y e a r  
t o  d i s c u s s  h i s  o r  h e r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  c o n t r o l  e n v i r o n m e n t .
E x t e r n a l  V o l u n t a r y  M e m b e r s h i p  O r g a n i z a t i o n s
P a g e  3 3  i n c l u d e s  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  e n c o u r a g e  t h e i r  
a c c o u n t i n g  e m p l o y e e s  t o  s u p p o r t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s u c h  a s  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  E x e c u t i v e s  
I n s t i t u t e  ( " F E I " )  a n d  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  A c c o u n t a n t s  a n d  t o  a d h e r e  t o  t h e i r  
c o d e s  o f  c o n d u c t .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h i s  i s  a  t o o t h l e s s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  W h i l e  t h e  i d e a  
h a s  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  a t  h i g h  p r o f e s s i o n a l  a n d  r e g u l a t o r y  l e v e l s ,  t h e  t h o u g h t  t h a t  w h e n  
c o n f l i c t s  d e v e l o p  a n  e m p l o y e e  w o u l d  r e s i g n  f r o m  h i s  p r e s e n t  j o b  t o  a v o i d  c o n f l i c t  
w i t h  a n  e x t e r n a l  v o l u n t a r y  m e m b e r s h i p  o r g a n i z a t i o n ’s  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t  o r  d r o p  
m e m b e r s h i p  i n  s u c h  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  b e  u n r e a l i s t i c .
I A A  S t a n d a r d s
P a g e  3 3  i n c l u d e s  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  c o n s i d e r  a d o p t i n g  
I n s t i t u t e  o f  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t o r s  (’’I I A " )  s t a n d a r d s .  O b j e c t i v e s  o f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a r e  n o t ,  a n d  w e  t h i n k  n e e d  n o t  b e ,  e n t i r e l y  c o n s i s t e n t  a m o n g  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n i e s .  W e  h a v e  c o n c e r n  w i t h  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  d u e  p r o c e s s  w h i c h  t h e  I I A  h a s  
f o l l o w e d  i n  a d o p t i n g  p r e s e n t  s t a n d a r d s .  I f  t h e y  a r e  t o  b e  e l e v a t e d  i n  s t a t u s ,  w e  
s u g g e s t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o c u s  m o r e  o n  h o w  t h o s e  s t a n d a r d s  h a v e  b e e n  a n d  w i l l  b e  
e s t a b l i s h e d .  M a n a g e m e n t s  a n d  o t h e r  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  s h o u l d  h a v e  a n  i m p o r t a n t ,  
f o r m a l i z e d  d u e  p r o c e s s  r o l e  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e s e  s t a n d a r d s  i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  a g r e e  w i t h  
t h e  r e s u l t i n g  c o s t  a n d  s c o p e  o f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .
P e e r  R e v i e w  o f  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  F u n c t i o n s
P a g e  3 3  i n c l u d e s  a n  e n d o r s e m e n t  o f  p e r i o d i c  e x t e r n a l  p e e r  r e v i e w s  a s  a  w a y  t o  
e n h a n c e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n s .  W e  q u e s t i o n  t h e  v a l u e  a n d  c o s t  
o f  s u c h  r e v i e w s .  W e  p r e f e r  t h a t  i n d e p e n d e n t  c e r t i f i e d  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  b e  
r e q u i r e d  t o  a n n u a l l y  i s s u e  t o  t h e i r  c l i e n t s  l e t t e r s  c o n t a i n i n g  i d e a s  a n d  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o n  h o w  t o  i m p r o v e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n d  
t o  d i s c u s s  s u c h  l e t t e r s  w i t h  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s .  S i n c e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s  a l r e a d y  
a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e v i e w  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  b e f o r e  t h e y  c a n  p l a c e  r e l i a n c e  
o n  t h e i r  w o r k ,  t h i s  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  b e  a  m u c h  m o r e  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  a n d  e f f i c i e n t  
a l t e r n a t i v e .
A u d i t o r  R e p o r t i n g  R e l a t i o n s h i p
O n  p a g e  3 4 ,  t h e  r e p o r t  g i v e s  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  a  r e p o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h e  
c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  t o  s o m e o n e  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r  i s  s e c o n d  
b e s t .  W e  b e l i e v e  o b j e c t i v i t y  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  a r e  
a c h i e v e d  n o t  s o  m u c h  i n  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e p o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a s  i n  e n s u r i n g  
t h e r e  i s  o p e n  a n d  u n r e s t r i c t e d  a c c e s s  o f  t h e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  t o  t h e  C E O  a n d  
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  t h a t  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t o r s  h a v e  u n r e s t r i c t e d  a c c e s s  t o  a l l  o p e r a t i o n s ,  r e c o r d s ,  a n d  p e r s o n n e l  t h a t  a r e
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relevant to their work. We believe the Commission should not attempt to prescribe 
the reporting relationship for the chief internal auditor, but rather should require 
that informed managements and audit committees assume responsibility for 
reviewing and endorsing reporting relationships.
Internal Audit at Corporate Level
Page 35 contains a recommendation fo r appropriate involvement by the internal 
auditors at the corporate level. This recommendation is vague and likely to result 
in inconsistent compliance. The Commission, or perhaps the IIA, should more 
clearly define the corporate level role of internal audit functions and provide 
recommendations that can be broadly accepted and implemented by public 
companies.
Letter by Chairman of Audit Committee
Page 37 contains a recommendation that chairmen of audit committees write 
letters fo r inclusion in annual reports to stockholders describing committee 
activities and responsibilities. We do not support this recommendation. Annual 
reports already include reports by independent certified public accountants and are 
to include reports by management. We see inclusion of a third report as serving 
lit t le  or no useful purpose in preventing fraudulent financial reporting. We believe 
the requirement would lead to inclusion of defensive language in annual reports 
developed by attorneys to protect audit committees from assumption of 
unnecessary legal risks. Our company’s annual report already includes a page (copy 
attached as Exhibit 1) which describes the role of various committees of the 
Board. We also discuss the audit committee’s role in our Management Report (copy 
attached as Exhibit 2). We believe these disclosures adequately communicate the 
Audit Committee role to our shareholders and see no reason to add a further le tte r 
dealing with the subject.
Management Advisory Services
Page 38 includes a recommendation that audit committees approve management 
advisory services in advance. We believe that quick access to such knowledgeable 
and skilled resources can be an invaluable resource fo r managements. We know of 
no situation where such services have affected external auditors’ independence. We 
suggest, therefore, that language in the Commission’s fina l report clearly accept 
practices where audit committees establish as a matter of policy the types and 
general order of magnitude of management services that could be obtained from 
independent auditors without advance approval and the types of services that are 
proscribed unless advance approval is obtained. We believe that after-the-fact 
reporting of such services is sufficient to enable audit committees to confirm their 
belief that the external auditors remain independent. We would require advance 
approval of specific services only in situations where the magnitude of such 
services exceeds guidelines set by audit committees or include the type of services 
that are proscribed in the audit committee approved policy.
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S e c o n d  O p i n i o n s
P a g e  4 2  i n c l u d e s  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s e  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
w h e n  i t  s e e k s  a  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n  o n  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  i s s u e .  T h i s  a r e a  i s  m o r e  
t h a n  a d e q u a t e l y  a d d r e s s e d  b y  S t a t e m e n t  o n  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  ( " S A S " )  N o .  5 0 .  T h e  
F i n a n c i a l  A c c o u n t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d ' s  E m e r g i n g  I s s u e s  T a s k  F o r c e  ( ' ' E I T F " )  i s  
p r o v i d i n g  t i m e l y  g u i d a n c e  o n  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  r e p o r t i n g  i s s u e s .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  s u c h  i s s u e s  g e n e r a l l y  i s  a n  o v e r r e a c t i o n  a n d  u n r e a s o n a b l e  
b u r d e n  o n  t h e m  a s  w e l l  a s  m a n a g e m e n t .  B a s e d  e s p e c i a l l y  o n  o u r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
t h e  E I T F  p r o c e s s ,  i t  o f t e n  i s  p r u d e n t  f o r  m a n a g e m e n t s  t o  s e e k  c o u n s e l  o f  m o r e  t h a n  
o n e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r  w h e n  i s s u e s  a r e  m a t e r i a l  a n d  a n s w e r s  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  o r  
p r a c t i c e  a r e  u n c l e a r .  W e  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  i n f o r m  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  o f  s u c h  
c o n s u l t a t i o n s  o n l y  w h e r e  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r  w h o  i s  r e p o r t i n g  o n  a  c o m p a n y ' s  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  d i s a g r e e s  o r  i s  u n c o m f o r t a b l e  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  c o n c l u s i o n  
o n  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  o r  r e p o r t i n g  i s s u e .
A u d i t o r  C h a n g e s
P a g e  4 2  c o n t a i n s  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s ,  w h e n  t h e y  c h a n g e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  d i s c l o s e  p u b l i c l y  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a n y  m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t i n g  o r  a u d i t i n g  i s s u e s  d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  o l d  a n d  n e w  
a u d i t o r s  d u r i n g  t h e  t h r e e - y e a r  p e r i o d  p r e c e d i n g  c h a n g e .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a l l  
m a t e r i a l ,  o r  p o t e n t i a l l y  m a t e r i a l ,  a c c o u n t i n g  i s s u e s  a r e  o r  c e r t a i n l y  s h o u l d  b e  
r o u t i n e l y  d i s c u s s e d  b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s  w i t h  t h e i r  c l i e n t s  b u t  b e l i e v e  v e r y  f e w  
o f  t h e s e  d i s c u s s i o n s  a r e  w o r t h y  o f  s e p a r a t e  s h a r e h o l d e r  r e p o r t i n g .  P u b l i c  
d i s c l o s u r e s  s h o u l d  m o r e  n a r r o w l y  f o c u s  o n  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i s p u t e s  o v e r  t h e  f a c t s  o r  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  m a t e r i a l  o r  p o t e n t i a l l y  m a t e r i a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a n d  
e v e n t s .
Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g
P a g e  4 2  a l s o  i n c l u d e s  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  
o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  i n c l u d i n g  a p p r o v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  
p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .  W e  s t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  I t  i s  
i m p r a c t i c a l  t o  s c h e d u l e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  m e e t i n g s  i n  t h e  s m a l l  t i m e  w i n d o w  w h e n  
q u a r t e r l y  d a t a  i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s e n i o r  m a n a g e m e n t  r e v i e w  b u t  n o t  y e t  r e l e a s e d  t o  
t h e  p u b l i c .  R e l e a s e  o f  r e s u l t s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  h e l d  u p  t o  o b t a i n  B o a r d  o r  A u d i t  
C o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v a l .  W e  a l s o  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  u n r e a s o n a b l e  a n d  u n f a i r  t o  e x p e c t ,  a s  
M r .  T r e a d w a y  h a s  s u g g e s t e d  i n  p u b l i c  r e s p o n s e s  o n  t h i s  i s s u e ,  a n  i n t e l l i g e n t  
t e l e p h o n e  r e v i e w  b y  c h a i r m e n  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e  o f  
q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n s w e r  i s  t o  e n c o u r a g e  
t i m e l y  q u a r t e r l y  r e v i e w s  b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  c e r t i f i e d  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  a n d  i s s u a n c e  
o f  w r i t t e n  r e p o r t s  t o  m a n a g e m e n t s  a n d  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  d i s c u s s i o n s  
o f  t h e i r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  a n d  c o n c l u s i o n s  a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  l e v e l s  o n  a n  a f t e r - t h e - f a c t  
b a s i s  a t  l e a s t  o n c e  e a c h  y e a r .  O n l y  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i s p u t e s ,  
c o n t i n g e n c i e s ,  o r  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  a r e  e n c o u n t e r e d  w o u l d  d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e  o f  q u a r t e r l y  r e s u l t s  a p p e a r  a p p r o p r i a t e .
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W e  a l s o  p o i n t  o u t ,  b a s e d  o n  a  r e c e n t  d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  c o m p a n i e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  o n  
t h e  F E I ' s  C o m m i t t e e  o n  C o r p o r a t e  R e p o r t i n g ,  t h a t  t i m e l y  r e v i e w s  a p p a r e n t l y  a r e  
r o u t i n e l y  p e r f o r m e d  a t  m a n y  l a r g e r  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  b u t  t h a t  t h e  s c o p e  o f  s u c h  
r e v i e w s  o f t e n  i s  l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o m p l y  w i t h  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  a u d i t i n g  
s t a n d a r d s  f o r  R e v i e w  o f  I n t e r i m  F i n a n c i a l  I n f o r m a t i o n .  I f  t i m e l y  q u a r t e r l y  r e v i e w s  
a r e  t o  b e  m a n d a t e d ,  w e  b e l i e v e  s c o p e  o f  s u c h  r e v i e w s  s h o u l d  b e  r e c o n s i d e r e d  t o  
a s s u r e  t h a t  s u c h  s e r v i c e s  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  f o c u s e d  s o  a s  t o  b e  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e .
N e w  B o d y  o n  I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l  G u i d a n c e
P a g e  4 3  i n c l u d e s  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’s  s p o n s o r i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
e s t a b l i s h  a  b o d y  t o  g u i d e  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  I f  y o u  a c c e p t  o u r  
e a r l i e r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  o n l y  o n e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  
a n d  i f  t h e  A I C P A  a c c e p t s  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  o n  p a g e  5 5  t h a t  t h e  A u d i t i n g  
S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  ( ” A S B ” ) b e  r e c o n s t i t u t e d ,  t h e n  w e  r e c o m m e n d  t h e  A S B  a c c e p t  t h i s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  W h i l e  w e  d o  n o t  s t r o n g l y  o b j e c t  t o  y o u r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  f o r  a  
s e p a r a t e  b o d y ,  w e  b e l i e v e  t h e  m a t t e r  c o u l d  b e  d e a l t  w i t h  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t l y  a n d  
e f f e c t i v e l y  a n d  o n  a  c o n t i n u i n g  b a s i s  b y  a  r e c o n s t i t u t e d  A S B .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t
T i g h t  R e p o r t i n g  D e a d l i n e s
P a g e  5 1  i n c l u d e s  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m s  r e c o g n i z e  a n d  
c o n t r o l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e s s u r e s  t h a t  p o t e n t i a l l y  r e d u c e  a u d i t  q u a l i t y  
a n d  m a k e s  s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t i g h t  r e p o r t i n g  d e a d l i n e s .  W h i l e  w e  d o  n o t  h a v e  a  
c l e a r  a n s w e r  t o  t h i s  p r o b l e m ,  w e  t h i n k  i t  i s  i n  p a r t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a u d i t  p r o c e s s e s  
t h a t  t e n d  t o  b e  b o t t o m s  u p .  C l e a r l y  a  w e l l - m a n a g e d  p r o c e s s  t h a t  i n v o l v e s  s e n i o r  
p a r t n e r s  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t i n g  f i r m s  i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  k e y  i s s u e s  o n  a  t i m e l y  b a s i s  
i s  c r i t i c a l .  W e  h a v e  s e e n  s o m e  t e n d e n c y  f o r  a u d i t  p a r t n e r s  t o  d e l a y  g e t t i n g  i n t o  k e y  
i s s u e s  u n t i l  t h e i r  s t a f f  h a s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  c o m p l e t e d  a n d  d o c u m e n t e d  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  
a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  r e s u l t s  o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  t e s t s .  W e  b e l i e v e  y o u r
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o n  a n a l y t i c a l  r e v i e w  a n d  t i m e l y  q u a r t e r l y  r e v i e w s  c a n  h e l p  b u t  
a r e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  t r e n d  t o w a r d s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  d e t a i l e d  a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  t h a t  
i n c r e a s e  s u c h  p r e s s u r e .  W e  s u g g e s t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  m o r e  f o c u s  b e  p l a c e d  o n  a u d i t  
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  c l i e n t  p l a n n i n g  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  
d i s c o v e r  a n d  r e s o l v e  m o r e  i s s u e s  s o o n e r .  W o r k  d o n e  a t  l o w e r  a u d i t  s t a f f  l e v e l s  
s h o u l d  b e  u t i l i z e d  p r i m a r i l y  a s  a  w a y  o f  c o r r o b o r a t i n g  p r e l i m i n a r y  a u d i t  
m a n a g e m e n t  c o n c l u s i o n s .
S t a n d a r d  A u d i t o r  R e p o r t
P a g e  5 3  i n c l u d e s  a  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  a u d i t o r s '  r e p o r t s  e x p l a i n  t h a t  a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  
r e q u i r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  t o  c o m m u n i c a t e  t o  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  b o a r d s  
o f  d i r e c t o r s ,  o r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s ,  r e g a r d i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  m a t e r i a l  w e a k n e s s e s  t h a t  
c o m e  t o  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s '  a t t e n t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  a u d i t .  W e  s e e  n o  r e a s o n  t o  
e x p l a i n  s u c h  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t o  s h a r e h o l d e r s ;  t h e  s t a n d a r d  r e p o r t  c a n n o t  a d e q u a t e l y  
e d u c a t e  r e a d e r s  o n  a l l  i m p o r t a n t  a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  a n d  w e  b e l i e v e  t h i s  d i s c l o s u r e  
w i l l  n o t  a d d  s u b s t a n t i v e  v a l u e  t o  s u c h  r e p o r t s .  W e  a l s o  t a k e  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  
" s i g n i f i c a n t  m a t e r i a l "  c r i t e r i a .  I t  i s  f a i r  f o r  m a n a g e m e n t s  t o  e x p e c t  i n d e p e n d e n t
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a u d i t o r s  t o  s t u d y  a n d  t a k e  a  p o s i t i o n  o n  a d e q u a c y  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  [ n o t e  a b s e n c e  
o f  t h e  w o r d  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  r e f e r  t o  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  s u b j e c t  o n  p a g e s  1  a n d  2  
o f  t h i s  l e t t e r ]  a n d  c o m p l i a n c e  t h e r e w i t h .  W e  w o u l d  s t r i k e  t h e  " s i g n i f i c a n t  m a t e r i a l  
w e a k n e s s "  c r i t e r i a  a n d  r e c o m m e n d  u s e  o f  a  l o w e r  l e v e l  c r i t e r i a  s u c h  a s  
" s u b s t a n t i v e "  o r  " i m p o r t a n t " .  W h i l e  s e n i o r  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  
s h o u l d  n o t  b e  i n u n d a t e d  w i t h  t r i v i a ,  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  c o n t r o l  p r o b l e m s  a t  s e n i o r  
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  l e v e l s  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  a v o i d e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  a u d i t o r  
t h i n k s  b e t t e r  c o n t r o l s  m i g h t  n o t  b e  c o s t  j u s t i f i e d  o r  b e c a u s e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  a r e  n o t  
y e t  " s i g n i f i c a n t l y  m a t e r i a l " ,  w h a t e v e r  t h a t  i s .
A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d
P a g e s  5 5  a n d  5 6  c o n t a i n  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  A u d i t i n g  
S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  t o  a f f o r d  a  f u l l  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  r o l e  i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  s e t t i n g  p r o c e s s  t o  
k n o w l e d g e a b l e  p e r s o n s  w h o  a r e  a f f e c t e d  b y  a n d  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a u d i t i n g  s t a n d a r d s  b u t  
w h o  e i t h e r  a r e  n o t  C P A s  o r  a r e  C P A s  n o  l o n g e r  i n  p u b l i c  p r a c t i c e .  W e  r e c o g n i z e  
t h e  c u r r e n t  c h a i r m a n ’s  ( J e r r y  S u l l i v a n )  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  a d o p t i n g  
t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  W e  o b s e r v e d  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  a c c e p t  t h i r d  p a r t y  i n p u t  w h e n  
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  a s  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  f o r m e r  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  A d v i s o r y  C o u n c i l  a n d  
b e l i e v e  M r .  S u l l i v a n ' s  p u b l i c l y  e x p r e s s e d  i d e a  t h a t  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  m i g h t  b e  
d e a l t  w i t h  b y  p l a c i n g  s o m e  i n t e r e s t e d  o u t s i d e r s  o n  t h e  P l a n n i n g  S u b c o m m i t t e e  a l s o  
w o u l d  n o t  w o r k .  W h i l e  w e  b e l i e v e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  m a y  b e  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  i m p l e m e n t ,  w e  b e l i e v e  y o u  a r e  o n  t h e  r i g h t  t r a c k  a n d  s u p p o r t  r e t e n t i o n  
o f  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i n  y o u r  f i n a l  r e p o r t .
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S E C  R e g u l a t o r y  A c t i v i t i e s
W e  a g r e e  t h a t  a  s t r o n g  a n d  e f f e c t i v e  r e g u l a t o r y  a n d  l e g a l  e n v i r o n m e n t  p l a y s  a  
c r i t i c a l  r o l e  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  a n d  d e t e r r i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  T h e  
S e c u r i t i e s  a n d  E x c h a n g e  C o m m i s s i o n  ( " S E C " )  h a s ,  o n  b a l a n c e ,  d o n e  a n  e x c e l l e n t  j o b  
i n  t h i s  a r e a  a n d  s h o u l d  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  t h e  f o c a l  p o i n t .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n  R e g u l a t o r y  A g e n c i e s  s h o u l d  g o  
f a r t h e r  b y  m a k i n g  s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o n  h o w  t o  e x p a n d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  
S E C ’s  r e g u l a t o r y  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  d i r e c t l y  d e a l  w i t h  a l l  b u s i n e s s  e n t e r p r i s e s  t h a t  c a n  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  p u b l i c  s e c u r i t i e s  m a r k e t s .  O u r  c o n c e r n  i s  t h a t  t h e  S E C  d o e s  n o t  
h a v e  a d e q u a t e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  d i s c l o s u r e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  ( a )  c e r t a i n  
p u b l i c l y  o w n e d  b a n k s ,  s a v i n g s  a n d  l o a n  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  a n d  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t h a t  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  d i s c l o s u r e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  f e d e r a l  s e c u r i t i e s  l a w s  b u t  r e p o r t  t o  o n e  
o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s ,  ( b )  c e r t a i n  m u t u a l  t h r i f t  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  a n d  ( c )  o t h e r  e n t e r p r i s e s  s u c h  a s  E S M .
C o r p o r a t e  I n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  o f  D i r e c t o r s
H o u s e h o l d  s t r o n g l y  c o n c u r s  w i t h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h e  S E C  s h o u l d  
r e c o n s i d e r  i t s  l o n g - s t a n d i n g  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  c o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  o f  d i r e c t o r s  f o r  
s e c u r i t i e s  l a w  l i a b i l i t i e s  i s  a g a i n s t  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  u n e n f o r c e a b l e .  I f  w e  
a r e  t o  h a v e  s t r o n g ,  e f f e c t i v e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s ,  w e  n e e d  a n  e n v i r o n m e n t  t h a t  d o e s
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n o t  d i s c o u r a g e  q u a l i f i e d  c a n d i d a t e s  f r o m  a c c e p t i n g  s u c h  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  W e  
b e l i e v e  t h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  i f  w e  a r e  t o  e x p a n d  u s e  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  t o  t h e  m a n y  b u s i n e s s  e n t e r p r i s e s  t h a t  p r e s e n t l y  d o  n o t  h a v e  s u c h  
f u n c t i o n s  o r  c a n n o t  r e c r u i t  q u a l i f i e d  i n d e p e n d e n t  p e r s o n s  f o r  s u c h  r o l e s .
S t a t e  B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y
P a g e  7 0  i n c l u d e s  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  s t a t e  b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  s h o u l d  
i m p l e m e n t  p o s i t i v e  e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  t h a t  p e r i o d i c a l l y  i n c l u d e  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  
q u a l i t y  o f  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  r e n d e r .  W i t h  5 0  s t a t e s  a n d  
f o u r  o t h e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  l a w s  g o v e r n i n g  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n ,  w e  s e r i o u s l y  d o u b t  t h a t  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w i l l  b e  
a d e q u a t e l y  r e s p o n d e d  t o .  W e  s u g g e s t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  s o m e  t y p e  o f  n a t i o n a l i z e d  
a p p r o a c h  b e  t a k e n  t h a t  m o r e  l i k e l y  w i l l  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  o n  a  t i m e l y ,  c o n s i s t e n t  
b a s i s .
S t a n d a r d s  f o r  t h e  P r o f e s s i o n a l  P r a c t i c e  o f  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t i n g
E a r l i e r  i n  o u r  l e t t e r ,  w e  e x p r e s s e d  c o n c e r n  t h a t  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  p r o f e s s i o n a l  p r a c t i c e  
o f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  p r o m u l g a t e d  b y  t h e  I I A  n o t  b e  a d o p t e d  u n l e s s  t h e y  a r e  s u b j e c t e d  
t o  a p p r o p r i a t e  d u e  p r o c e s s  p r o c e d u r e s .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  b l i n d l y  a d o p t i n g  I I A  
s t a n d a r d s  c o u l d  i m p o s e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  c h a n g e s  o n  m a n y  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  
a n d  e x p o s e  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  d o  n o t  a d o p t  s u c h  s t a n d a r d s  t o  u n n e c e s s a r y  l i t i g a t i o n  
r i s k s .  W e  a l s o  b e l i e v e  s o m e  o f  t h e s e  s t a n d a r d s  h a v e  l i t t l e  o r  n o  r e l e v a n c e  t o  t h e  
s u b j e c t  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A n  e x a m p l e  o f  s t a n d a r d s  w h i c h  w e  
b e l i e v e  m a y  b e  u n r e a l i s t i c  f o r  m a n y  e m p l o y e r s  t o  a d o p t  a r e :
2 2 0 . 0 2  -  T h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t  s h o u l d  h a v e  e m p l o y e e s  o r  u s e  
c o n s u l t a n t s  w h o  a r e  q u a l i f i e d  i n  s u c h  d i s c i p l i n e s  a s  a c c o u n t i n g ,  
e c o n o m i c s ,  f i n a n c e ,  s t a t i s t i c s ,  e l e c t r o n i c  d a t a  p r o c e s s i n g ,  e n g i n e e r i n g ,  
t a x a t i o n ,  a n d  l a w  a s  n e e d e d  t o  m e e t  a u d i t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
3 4 0  -  I n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  s h o u l d  a p p r a i s e  t h e  e c o n o m y  a n d  e f f i c i e n c y  w i t h  
w h i c h  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  e m p l o y e d .
3 4 0 . 0 2  -  A u d i t s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c a l  a n d  e f f i c i e n t  u s e  o f  r e s o u r c e s  
s h o u l d  i d e n t i f y  c o n d i t i o n s  s u c h  a s  u n d e r u t i l i z e d  f a c i l i t i e s ,  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  
w o r k ,  p r o c e d u r e s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  c o s t  j u s t i f i e d ,  a n d  o v e r s t a f f i n g  a n d  
u n d e r s t a f f i n g .
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  G o o d  P r a c t i c e  G u i d e l i n e s
I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l s
W e  b e l i e v e  o n e  o f  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  q u a l i t y  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  i s  t o  
r e v i e w  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  T h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  m i s s i n g  f r o m  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  g u i d e l i n e s .
H o u s e h o l d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l - 8 -
7
J u n e  2 5 ,  1 9 8 7
M a n a g e m e n t  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  L e t t e r s
T h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  r e v i e w  l e t t e r s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  b e  a  w a s t e  o f  t i m e  i n  m o s t  c a s e s .  W e  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  
m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  r e q u i r e  m a n a g e m e n t  o r  t h e  a u d i t o r  t o  d i s c u s s  w i t h  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  a n y  u n u s u a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  o r  d i s p u t e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  
r e q u e s t e d  b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s .
F e d e r a l  I n c o m e  T a x  A c c r u a l s
P o s t - a u d i t  r e v i e w  o f  i t e m s  r e l a t e d  t o  f e d e r a l  i n c o m e  t a x  a c c r u a l s  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  b e  
a d e q u a t e l y  c o v e r e d  u n d e r  t h e  t h i r d  b u l l e t  o n  p a g e  1 8 5  i n  y o u r  d r a f t  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
e x i s t e n c e  a n d  s u b s t a n c e  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  a c c r u a l s ,  r e s e r v e s ,  a n d  
e s t i m a t e s .  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e c o r d s  o f t e n  a r e  r e v i e w e d  b y  t a x  e x a m i n e r s  a n d  w e  
b e l i e v e  m a n y  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  w o u l d  b e  e s p e c i a l l y  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  d o c u m e n t i n g  
c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  a  s p e c i f i c  t a x  l i a b i l i t y  g u i d e l i n e .
A u d i t o r  A s s o c i a t i o n  W i t h  M D & A
W e  r e c o g n i z e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  D i s c u s s i o n  a n d  A n a l y s i s  s e c t i o n s  i n  a n n u a l  
a n d  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t s  a n d  b e l i e v e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s  s h o u l d  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s u c h  d i s c l o s u r e s  b u t  s h o u l d  n o t  b e c o m e  i n v o l v e d  i n  e x p r e s s i n g  
o p i n i o n s  t h e r e o n .  W e  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  b o t h  a b o u t  t h e  c o s t  a n d  r i s k  o f  r e d u c i n g  r a t h e r  
t h a n  i m p r o v i n g  q u a l i t y  o f  d i s c l o s u r e s  w h e n  t h e y  a r e  s u b j e c t e d  t o  d e t a i l e d  r u l e s  t h a t  
w o u l d  b e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a l l o w  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s  t o  b e c o m e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
c o m f o r t a b l e  a n d  b e  a b l e  t o  r e n d e r  p o s i t i v e ,  f o r m a l  o p i n i o n s  o n  s u c h  d i s c l o s u r e s .  W e  
b e l i e v e  a  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  d i s c u s s  w i t h  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s  t h e i r  i m p r e s s i o n s  o f  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  
t h e s e  d i s c l o s u r e s  a n d  s e e k  o u t  t h e i r  i d e a s  o n  h o w  s u c h  d i s c l o s u r e s  c o u l d  b e  
i m p r o v e d .  W e  v i e w  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  a s  a  c o n s t r u c t i v e  s e r v i c e  e f f o r t ,  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  a  
f o r m a l  a t t e s t a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  a n d  b e l i e v e  m a n y  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s  a l r e a d y  p e r f o r m  
s u c h  p r o c e d u r e s .  Y o u r  g u i d e l i n e  o n  t h e  t o p  o f  p a g e  1 8 6  c o u l d  e a s i l y  b e  m o d i f i e d  t o  
i n c o r p o r a t e  t h i s  c o n c e p t .
G o o d  P r a c t i c e  G u i d e l i n e s  f o r  M a n a g e m e n t 's  R e p o r t
N o t  M i s s t a t e d  D u e  t o  M a t e r i a l  F r a u d  o r  E r r o r
W e  o b j e c t  t o  s t a t i n g  t h e  c o n c e p t  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  p r e p a r i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  a r e  " n o t  m i s s t a t e d  d u e  t o  m a t e r i a l  f r a u d  o r  e r r o r " .  W e  
f i n d  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  t o  b e  n e g a t i v e  a n d  a r e  c o n c e r n e d  t h a t  i t  m a y  l e a d  t o  t h e  
p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  i m m a t e r i a l  f r a u d  a n d  e r r o r  i s  a c c e p t a b l e .  I n  t h e  s a m e  s e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  w e  s e e  a  b l a n k e t  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  o t h e r  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  a n n u a l  r e p o r t  " i s  c o r r e c t " .  T h e  h i s t o r i c a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  w o r d i n g  
" f a i r l y  p r e s e n t s  i n  a l l  m a t e r i a l  a s p e c t s "  r e m a i n s  t h e  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  w a y  t o  
c o m m u n i c a t e  s u c h  a s s u r a n c e s .
H o u s e h o l d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l -  9  - J u n e  2 5 ,  1 9 8 7
M i s c e l l a n e o u s  C o n t e n t s
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s u g g e s t s  o n  t h e  b o t t o m  o f  p a g e  1 8 7  a n d  t o p  o f  p a g e  1 8 8  s e v e r a l  
t o p i c s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  m a y  w i s h  t o  d i s c u s s  i n  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t s  i n c l u d i n g :
• D a t a  t h a t  w e r e  m a d e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,
• V a l i d i t y  a n d  a c c u r a c y  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  m a d e  t o  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t s ,
• R e p o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o m p a n y ,
• U n c e r t a i n t i e s  w h o s e  r e s o l u t i o n  c o u l d  h a v e  a  m a t e r i a l  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s .
W e  b e l i e v e  l i t t l e  o r  n o  v a l u e  w o u l d  b e  a d d e d  b y  i n c l u d i n g  s u c h  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  o u r  
m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t .  A s  t o  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  w e  c a n n o t  i m a g i n e  u s e r s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  l o o k i n g  t o  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t s  f o r  s u c h  d i s c l o s u r e s .  T h e  m o s t  
a p p r o p r i a t e  p l a c e  f o r  m a t e r i a l  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  t o  b e  d i s c u s s e d  i s  i n  f o o t n o t e s  t o  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  M D & A ' s .
S i g n a t u r e
W e  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  i l l u s t r a t i v e  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t  e x c l u d e s  s i g n a t u r e  o f  t h e  c h i e f  
a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r  a s  r e c o m m e n d e d  o n  p a g e  3 9  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a n d  p r e s u m e  t h a t  t h i s  m e r e l y  i s  a n  o v e r s i g h t  i n  p r e p a r i n g  t h e  
e x p o s u r e  d r a f t .
S u p p o r t i n g  P r o c e s s e s
I t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  e a s y  t o  p u b l i s h  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t s  b u t  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t o  
e n c o u r a g e  p r e p a r e r s  t o  p u t  s y s t e m s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  p l a c e  w h i c h  a s s u r e  t h a t  
c o n c e p t s  e m b o d i e d  t h e r e i n  a r e  w o r k i n g  a n d  b e i n g  m o n i t o r e d .  T h i s  c o n c e p t  i s  
e m b o d i e d  i n  t h e  l a s t  p a r a g r a p h  o f  t h e  i l l u s t r a t i v e  r e p o r t  w h e r e  i t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t  " i s  p u b l i c i z e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n "  a n d  t h a t  
" t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n  m a i n t a i n s  a  s y s t e m a t i c  p r o g r a m  t o  a s s e s s  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e s e  
p o l i c i e s " .  W e  s u g g e s t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f o c u s  n o t  j u s t  o n  p u b l i s h i n g  
s u c h  r e p o r t s  b u t  o n  p r o c e s s e s  w h i c h  s h o u l d  b e  i n  p l a c e  t o  s u p p o r t  p u b l i s h i n g  s u c h  
r e p o r t s .
* * * * * *
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Exhibit 1
Committees of the Board
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e
T h e  Audit C o m m i t t e e  reviews the corporation’s internal 
controls, financial reporting practices, a nnual financial 
statements a n d  the examinations m a d e  by  internal a n d  
independent auditors. This c o m m i t t e e  consists entirely
F i n a n c e  C o m m i t t e e
T h e  F inance C o m m i t t e e  approves the issuance of 
securities by the corporation a n d  its m a j o r  subsidiaries 
a n d  reviews dividend policy.
of n o n - m a n a g e m e n t  directors.
J o h n  C. Biegler, C h a i r m a n  
M a r y  Johnston E v a n s  
De n n i s  C. Fill 
G o r d o n  P. Osier
G o r d o n  P. O s ler, C h a i r m a n  
J o h n  C. Biegler 
D o n a l d  C. Clark 
G a r y  G. Dillon 
Joseph W.  J a m e s  
Lewis W. L e h r  
G e o r g e  W.  R a u c h
C o m p e n s a t i o n  C o m m i t t e e
T h e  C o m p e n s a t i o n  C o m m i t t e e  determines the salaries, 
b o n u s e s  a n d  stock options for senior m a n a g e m e n t .  
This c o m m i t t e e  consists entirely of n o n - m a n a g e m e n t  
directors.
N o m i n a t i n g  C o m m i t t e e
T h e  N o m i n a t i n g  C o m m i t t e e  r e c o m m e n d s  candidates for 
b o a r d  m e m b e r s h i p ,  reviews b o a r d  size a n d  composition, 
r e c o m m e n d s  cha n g e s  in bo ard compensation, a n d  
reviews m a n a g e m e n t  succession a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t  plans.
Miller Upton, C h a i r m a n  
M a r y  Johnston E v a n s  
D e n n i s  C. Fill 
Lewis W.  L e h r  
R a y m o n d  C .  T o w e r
R a y m o n d  C. Tower, C h a i r m a n  
D o n a l d  C. Clark 
Miller U p t o n
E x e c u t i v e  C o m m i t t e e
D u r i n g  intervals b e t w e e n  board meetings, the Executive 
C o m m i t t e e ,  with s o m e  exceptions, m a y  act for the board.
Arthur E. R a s m u s s e n ,  C h a i r m a n
D o n a l d  C. Clark
G o r d o n  P. O s ler
G e o r g e  W. R a u c h
Miller U p t o n
Arthur E. R a s m u s s e n ,  as C h a i r m a n  of the Executive 
C o m m i t t e e ,  is also a n  ex officio m e m b e r  of the Audit. 
C o m p e n s a t i o n ,  Finance a n d  N o m i n a t i n g  Committees.
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Exhibit 2
Management’s Report
72k
Management is responsible for the preparation, integrity and objectivity of the company’s financial statements. Such 
statements are prepared from the company’s books and records of transactions recorded in the ordinary course of 
business and include amounts that are based upon management’s best estimates and judgments, all in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles. Financial information included elsewhere in the annual report is 
consistent with that in the financial statements.
The company maintains systems of internal accounting controls and procedures which management believes 
provide reasonable assurance that financial records are reliable for preparing financial statements and maintaining 
accountability for assets. Internal auditors evaluate the adequacy of and investigate adherence to these controls and 
procedures. Independent auditors also study and evaluate the company’s accounting systems and related controls 
and perform tests of transactions and account balances in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 
This permits them to render an opinion as to the fairness of the company’s financial statements.
The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors is composed solely of outside directors. It meets periodically 
with independent auditors, internal auditors and management to discuss auditing and financial reporting matters. 
Both internal and independent auditors have unrestricted access to the Audit Committee without presence of 
company management to discuss results of their audit work and their opinions as to the adequacy of internal 
accounting controls and quality of financial reporting.
Management has long recognized its responsibility for conducting the Company’s affairs in a manner which is 
responsive to the interests of employees, shareholders, investors and society in general. This responsibility is included 
in our statement of policy on ethical standards which provides that the company will fully comply with laws, rules and 
regulations of every community in which it operates and adhere to the highest ethical standards. Officers, employees 
and agents of the company are expected and directed to manage the business of the company with complete honesty, 
candor and integrity.
To the Shareholders of Household International, Inc.
D.C. Clark
C hairm an o f the Board,
President an d  C h ief Executive Officer
E. A. Wiegner
Sen io r Vice President an d  C h ief F in an c ia l Officer
G.N. Larson
Group Vice President.
Controller an d  C h ief Accounting Officer
Independent Auditors’ Report
To the Shareholders of Household International, Inc.
We have examined the balance sheets of Household International, Inc. (a Delaware corporation) and subsidiaries 
as of December 31, 1986 and 1985 and the related statements of income, changes in other shareholders’ equity and 
changes in financial position for the years then ended. Our examinations were made in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing 
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.The statements of income, changes in other share­
holders equity and changes in financial position for year ended December 31, 1984 were examined by other auditors 
whose report thereon dated February 7, 1985 expressed an unqualified opinion on those statements.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the financial position of Household 
International. Inc. and subsidiaries at December 31, 1986 and 1985 and the results of their operations and the 
changes in their financial position for the years then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles which, except for the change, with which we concur, in the method of accounting for pensions as 
described in note 15 to the financial statements, were applied on a consistent basis.
Chicago, Illinois. 
F ebruary 10, 1987
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GENERAL MILLS, INC. • EXECUTIVE OFFICES • 9200 Wayzata Boulevard • Minneapolis, Minnesota
June 26, 1987 JAMES D. SMITH Vice PresidentDirector of Accounting and AnalysisMr. James C. Treadway, Jr.National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sir:
We have reviewed your Commission's Exposure D ra ft on F raudu len t 
F in a n c ia l R eporting  and g e n e ra lly  support your recommendations. 
F o llow in g  are comments on some s p e c if ic  recommendations which we 
th in k  m e r it  c o n s id e ra tio n .
• Recommendation (For the Public Company):
The a u d it  committee should approve in  advance the types and the 
e x te n t o f management adv iso ry  se rv ice s  th a t management p lans to 
engage the company's independent p u b lic  accountant to  perfo rm .
Comment:
We do not th in k  advance approva l o f  each s p e c if ic  engagement 
a c t iv i t y  is  necessary. In s te a d , we th in k  i t  would be more 
a p p ro p ria te  fo r  the a u d it  committee to  g ive  advance approval fo r  
a budgeted le v e l o f e xp e n d itu re . This budget c o n tro l would 
accom plish the des ired  impact w ith o u t the a d m in is tra tiv e  burden 
o f  in d iv id u a l engagement app rova ls .
• Recommendation (For the Public Company):
When a p u b lic  company changes independent p u b lic  accoun tan ts , i t  
should be re q u ire d  by SEC ru le  to  d is c lo s e  p u b lic ly  the na tu re  o f 
any m a te r ia l accounting  o r a u d it in g  issues discussed w ith  i t s  o ld  
and new a u d ito rs  du rin g  the th ree  year pe rio d  preceding the 
change.
Comment:
W hile agree ing w ith  the in te n t ,  th is  may be a d m in is t ra t iv e ly  
d i f f i c u l t  to  ach ieve . We have numerous and co n tin u in g  
d iscuss ions  (many o f which are u n c o n tro v e rs ia l) w ith  our p u b lic  
a u d ito r  in  the course o f research ing  accounting  and a u d it in g  
is s u e s . A more p ra c t ic a l approach would be to re q u ire  d is c lo s u re  
o f  o n ly  those issues where you proceeded w ith o u t agreement o f 
your c u rre n t a u d ito r  and those issues where you obta ined a second 
o p in io n  which d if fe re d  w ith  your c u rre n t p u b lic  a u d ito r .
Mailing Address P. O. Box 113, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr. 
June 26, 1987 
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• Recommendation (For the Public Company):
Audit committees should increase their oversight of the quarterly 
reporting process. This oversight should include approving 
financial results prior to public release.
Comment:
We agree that management should keep the audit committee or full 
board informed and up-to-date on significant matters affecting 
the company's quarterly financial statements. And, we agree with 
the audit committee or full Board approving the annual financial 
statements before they are issued. However, we don't think 
advance audit committee approval of press releases of quarterly 
or annual financial results is warranted. The financial 
community requires timely publication of financial information.
We think that if the quarterly or annual financial information is 
consistent with continuing information which the audit committee 
has been regularly receiving, advance approval of press releases 
is unnecessary.
Thank you for this opportunity to comment on this Exposure Draft.
JDS:ly
7 4
311 Harrison Avenue 
Massapequa, NY 11758 
(516) 799-9290 
June 26, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Re: Comments With Respect to April 1987 Exposure Draft
Gentlemen:
These comments pertain to Chapter Five, Recommendations for 
Education.
Fraud is essentially a legal issue. When it relates to 
financial reporting, it impacts upon CPAs and others in the 
business environment. Thus your recommendations as to 
weaving this subject matter into management, finance, cost 
and managerial, systems and auditing courses are valid, 
appropriate and well-received.
However, why are you ignoring Business Law courses? This is 
the obvious place where fraud will be thoroughly explored 
and this course is required for all business students at 
institutions which are accredited by the American Assembly 
of Collegiate Schools of Business.
Candidates on a CPA track frequently take more Business Law 
courses than other students because Business Law is a 
required segment of the Uniform CPA Examination. It has 
been this way since June 1917 and, despite 70 years of 
opposition, will no doubt continue long into the future. As 
a matter of fact, your excellent report provides strong 
reassurance that Business Law is a vital subject for CPAs as 
well as all persons pursuing a career in commerce.
Incidentally, on page 76 where you state that you sampled 
accounting and auditing textbooks and found little to no 
discussion of fraudulent financial reporting, this should be 
no surprise considering your observation on page 80 that 
professional eaminations influence accounting education. 
Obviously, the discussion you are looking for is 
appropriately found in the Business Law textbooks which 
mirror the coverage on the Uniform CPA Examination. Also, 
please be advised that the CPA Examination is a professional 
licensing examination whereas the CIA and CMA examinations 
are merely certification examinations.
1
If the omission of references to Business Law is 
unintentional, it should be easily correctable. If, on the 
other hand, you are attempting to downgrade the importance 
of Business Law in academia or on the Uniform CPA 
Examination, you are being intellectually dishonest by not 
so stating. You are also maligning authors of accounting 
and auditing textbooks by innocently pretending to observe 
an unexplained lack of coverage of fraudulent financial 
reporting.
I hope you will not detract from the credibility of this 
fine report by getting involved in unrelated issues.
Very truly yours,
MITCHELL ROTHKOPF
MR:ps
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JAMES ERMERSenior Vice President- Finance
One James CenterRichmond, Virginia 23219(804) 782-1427CSXCorp
June 26, 1987
The National Commission onFraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentleman:
CSX Corporation (CSX) is  pleased to respond to the exposure dra ft en titled  "The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting."
CSX a n d  i t s  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  w i t h  t o t a l  a s s e ts  i n  e x c e s s  o f  13 b i l l i o n  
d o l l a r s ,  o p e r a te s  i n  f o u r  s t r a t e g i c  a re a s  -  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  e n e rg y ,  
p r o p e r t i e s  a n d  t e c h n o lo g y .  T he  common s t o c k  o f  CSX i s  l i s t e d  on  t h e  
New Y o r k ,  L o n d o n  a n d  S w is s  s t o c k  e x c h a n g e s  a n d  t r a d e s  w i t h  u n l i s t e d  
t r a d i n g  p r i v i l e g e s  o n  t h e  M id w e s t ,  B o s to n ,  C i n c i n n a t i ,  P a c i f i c  a nd  
P h i la d e lp h ia  S to c k  E x c h a n g e s .
CSX a p p la u d s  t h e  N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  
R e p o r t in g  (C o m m is s io n )  f o r  a v e r y  c o m p re h e n s iv e  r e p o r t  a n d  s e t  o f  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  We 
r e c o g n iz e  t h e  e x h a u s t iv e  r e s e a r c h  w h ic h  h a s  ta k e n  p la c e  a n d  commend 
t h e  C o m m is s io n  on  a jo b  w e l l  d o n e .
As a v e r y  la r g e  com pany w i t h  m any a re a s  o f  p u b l i c  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g ,  we f e e l  q u a l i f i e d  t o  a d d re s s  m any o f  t h e  is s u e s  d is c u s s e d  
i n  t h e  r e p o r t .  T he  Company h a s  an  a u d i t  c o m m it te e  c o m p r is e d  s o l e l y  
o f  o u t s id e  d i r e c t o r s ,  a la r g e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  s t a f f  a n d  r e p r e s e n t s  an  
e x t e n s iv e  e n g a g e m e n t f o r  o u r  in d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r s .  We d e a l  w i t h  t h e  
SEC a n d  o t h e r  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c ie s ,  e . g . ,  t h e  I n t e r s t a t e  Commerce 
C o m m is s io n , t h e  F e d e r a l  E n e rg y  R e g u la to r y  C o m m is s io n  a n d  t h e  F e d e r a l 
M a r i t im e  C o m m is s io n , on  m any r e p o r t i n g  is s u e s .
We f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a rg u e  a g a in s t  m any o f  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
c o n c e p ts  d is c u s s e d  a s  e v e ry o n e  w o u ld  l i k e  t o  s e e  f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  d im in is h e d  o r  e r a d ic a t e d .  We a r e  d e e p ly  
c o n c e rn e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  w i t h  t h e  c o s t s  w h ic h  m u s t b e  in c u r r e d  i f  a l l  o f  
t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w e re  im p le m e n te d .  T he  p o t e n t i a l  c o s t s  w h ic h  a l l  
c o m p a n ie s  w o u ld  b e a r  seem s t o t a l l y  o u t  o f  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  l i m i t e d  
n u m b e r o f  c a s e s  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  t h e  C o m m is s io n  
a c k n o w le d g e s  h a v in g  b e e n  fo u n d .
CSX b e l ie v e s  C o r p o r a te  A m e r ic a  m u s t s h o u ld e r  m uch o f  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a n d  c o s t  f o r  a s s u r in g  t h a t  c o n t r o l s  a r e  a d e q u a te  t o  
r e a s o n a b ly  g u a rd  a g a in s t  f r a u d u le n t  r e p o r t i n g ,  a n d  t h e  e m p h a s is  m u s t 
come f ro m  w i t h i n  i n d u s t r y  and  n o t  f r o m  e x t e r n a l  s o u r c e s .  T h is
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belief coincides with much of the Commission's impetus, however, we 
envision a much lesser and costly role for the independent public 
auditor and the SEC. Management, and to a lesser degree the audit 
committee, are in the best position to prevent fraudulent reporting 
because of their intimate knowledge of the business and its internal 
control systems, and they must exhibit the self-discipline to ensure 
that the job is done. What must be avoided is the additional 
regulatory bureaucracy which would result if all of the Commission's 
recommendations are implemented.
The specific recommendations with which CSX disagrees in concept, 
and our comments, are as follows:
1. The Commission's sponsoring organizations should establish a 
body to guide public companies on internal controls.
CSX believes there are already enough regulatory or 
quasi-regulatory bodies in existence and that, if such guides 
are necessary, the task can be performed by one of the 
present groups.
2. The SEC should require independent public accountants to 
review quarterly financial data of public companies before 
release to the public.
3. Audit committees should increase their oversight of the 
quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include 
approving financial results prior to public release.
The SEC, in Accounting Series Release 177, recommends, but 
does not require, the timely review of quarterly data by the 
independent public accountant. We agree that a timely review 
seems most appropriate and have followed that policy since 
CSX's inception in 1980. Whether companies follow that 
policy or not, however, it is clear that all publicly 
reported companies must have their quarterly data reviewed 
prior to year-end. For this reason, we feel that it is 
unnecessary to recommend that not only the public accountant, 
but the audit committee, review and approve quarterly 
earnings prior to release.
From a more practical standpoint, CSX releases quarterly 
earnings on the first work day after the close of a quarter. 
It is therefore impossible for our public accountant and/or 
audit committee to review and approve earnings by the time of 
release. Because of the early release, every effort is made 
to ensure that the earnings are correct. In over 30 years of 
such reporting by CSX and a predecessor company, earnings as
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released have not been changed because of post-release audit 
findings.
4. The audit committee should approve in advance the types and 
the extent of management advisory services that management 
plans to engage the company's independent public accountant 
to perform.
CSX has consistently followed the policy of having the audit 
committee annually review the company's use of such services. 
We believe that management should have the prerogative to 
utilize the services of the independent accountant when the 
necessity arises. We certainly agree that the audit 
committee should be advised of this usage of the public 
accountant's services, but do not believe that "approval" 
should be granted in advance. Management alone is involved 
in the day to day activities of the company and is in the 
best position to know when the services are needed.
5. All public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders management 
reports signed by the chief executive officer and chief 
accounting officer. The management report should acknowledge 
management's responsibilities for the financial statements 
and internal control, discuss how these responsibilities were 
fulfilled, and provide management's assessment of the 
effectiveness of the company's internal controls.
CSX does not include such a statement in its annual report 
because we feel this is inherent in management's 
responsibility and does not require a written representation. 
Moreover, many of the management reports we have noted in 
other companies' annual reports tend to use very general 
boiler plate language. We believe non-disclosure is superior 
to this type of report, and doubt if many investors put much 
credence in such statements.
6. All public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter 
signed by the chairman of the audit committee describing the 
committee's responsibilities and activities during the year.
CSX believes this recommendation would produce additional 
boiler plate language which would only serve to increase the 
amount of information in annual reports, but add no value.
The primary responsibilities of the audit committee are 
stated each year in our proxy statement and we see no reason 
to have a signed statement in the annual report repeating
3
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this disclosure. The audit committee is responsible to the 
full board of directors and we do not see any more of a 
necessity for a separate report from this committee than from 
any other committee of the board.
7. The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's 
standard report to describe the extent to which the 
independent public accountant has reviewed and evaluated the 
system of internal accounting control. The Auditing 
Standards Board also should provide explicit guidance to 
address the situation where, as a result of his knowledge of 
the company's internal accounting controls, the independent 
public accountant disagrees with management's assessment as 
stated in the proposed management's report.
CSX has no problem with the Commission's recommendation to 
revise the auditor's report to describe the extent of review 
of the accounting controls. Since we disagree with the 
recommendation that annual reports contain management's 
reports, we certainly disagree with the auditor's report 
challenging such a disclosure. Public auditors are paid to 
opine on the historical financial statements, not on 
management's assessment of the internal controls. If the 
audit cannot be completed to the satisfaction of the auditor 
because of the controls, his report should be qualified. The 
auditor should not be asked or forced to opine on a 
management representation.
8. Chapter four contains several recommendations with regard to 
additional SEC enforcement remedies, increased criminal 
prosecution and SEC resources. The following response 
addresses our concerns on that group of recommendations.
CSX believes that these recommendations go too far, 
particularly since the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1981 
has never been fully tested to determine its outer-most 
limits. Traditional SEC enforcement mechanisms have been 
fruitful in regulating the financial markets and the SEC has 
had great success in recent months in indicting and settling 
insider trading cases. In short, we have no reason to 
believe that the SEC has less than adequate enforcement 
authority. There is thus no need for Congress to expand the 
current enforcement structure of the SEC.
We agree that the SEC should have adequate resources to 
enforce regulations that help prevent, detect and deter 
fraudulent financial reporting. Indeed, it seems to us that 
Congress should seek to solve the problem with additional
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resources rather than with an unnecessary expansion of the 
current regulatory framework. To that end, CSX supports the 
addition of new personnel to prevent fraudulent financial 
reporting. We also believe that increased SEC cooperation 
with the Department of Justice and the several United States 
attorneys should be sought. Increased intra-agency 
efficiency, such as joint SEC/Department of Justice 
taskforces, would greatly enhance current enforcement. With 
more personnel and resources, the SEC could precisely target 
those exact areas which require increased monitoring.
In conclusion, CSX disagrees conceptually with only a relative few 
of the recommendations and supports an increased resource base for 
the policing of the financial markets by the SEC. We do not, 
however, agree that Congress ought to expand the current enforcement 
system and we fear the cost of the Commission's entire package will 
be exceedingly high. Our impression from the Commission's own 
statistics is that the vast majority of the fraudulent financial 
reporting cases have involved smaller companies and/or companies not 
utilizing national public accounting firms. The vast majority of 
the costs to be borne if all the recommendations are adopted, 
however, will be borne by the larger companies which already have 
many of the proposed items in place, either voluntarily or because 
their securities are listed on a national exchange. This hardly 
seems fair. We strongly urge the Commission to revisit the 
recommendations not only from a cost/benefit standpoint, but also 
from the standpoint of preventing the unnecessary expansion of the 
current regulatory framework.
Very truly yours,
5
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MANAGEMENT SERVICES
A Business Unit of Clark Equipment Company
June 26, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Commissioners:
First of all, I would like to thank the members of the Commission for the opportunity to 
comment on this extremely important Exposure Draft. In addition, I would like to 
applaud the members of the Commission on their efforts to date and state that in general I 
feel this is an excellent product. Having been in internal auditing for fifteen years and 
an active participant with the Institute of Internal Auditors on the international level for 
sometime now, it is very gratifying to see the Commission recognizing the profession of 
internal auditing as an integral part of the recommended solution to the problem of 
fraudulent financial reporting.
The purpose of my letter is to address an issue related to the composition of the internal 
audit function as described in the Exposure Draft. More specifically, the Pre-Exposure 
of the Commission's Exposure Draft, a speech given by Chairman Treadway in Houston, 
Texas on November 18, 1986, included the following statement under Section 9, 
Mandatory Internal Audit Function: "The Commission believes that the function is key. It 
does not have to be a separate department and could even be done by the independent 
auditor." However, in reviewing the Exposure Draft, I do not find any wording similar 
to the second sentence shown above. Even though I do not feel the words "independent 
auditor" are necessarily the best, I do feel the concept that the responsibilities of the 
internal audit function may be completely or partially performed by a qualified 
professional from the outside is very important and should be clearly expressed in the 
Report. Let me give you some examples which will illustrate my point.
In Section III, on Page 20 there Is the statement that "Opportunities for fraudulent 
financial reporting are present when the fraud is easier to commit and when detection is 
less likely. Frequently these opportunities arise from ineffective internal audit staffs. 
This situation may result from inadequate staff size and severely limited audit scope." 
This certainly addresses a very important point; however, the reality of the situation is 
that there may be legitimate reasons why a internal audit function may occasionally end 
up in this dilemma. Since it is quite common for internal auditing to be used as a 
management training ground, there is regular turnover of the staff resulting in a 
temporary shortage of personnel to complete the audit plan. Also, sometimes the 
solution to a company's financial stress is a freeze on hiring or more seriously a 
reduction in permanent headcount. These actions do not necessarily mean that the 
company desires any less monitoring of internal controls by the internal audit function. 
In any of these situations, the audit director may feel that in order to fulfill his 
responsibilities to management and the audit committee that the use of outside 
professional services, functioning under his direction, is the appropriate solution. If 
the Commission finds this solution to be acceptable, it should be clearly stated in the
Report.
The Commerce Center-Suite 401 
401 East Colfax 
South Bend, IN 46617
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Another example to illustrate my point will address the qualifications of the internal 
audit staff. In the Exposure Draft on Page 33, the Commission has recommended,
"Public companies should maintain an effective internal audit function staffed with an 
adequate number of qualified personnel appropriate to the size and the nature of the 
company." Excellent recommendation; however, I contend that to some extent the 
smaller publicly held companies may have a hard time satisfying this requirement. The 
smaller the staff size, the more limited will be the variety of experience and expertise 
among the group. Yes it's true these companies may be less sophisticated; however, 
there is a minimum level of sophistication in such areas as inventory control, 
management reporting, accounting and electronic data processing which are necessary 
just to stay with the competition. What the audit director may need in order to 
adequately complete the audit plan is only a limited amount of auditing each year in 
certain specialty areas. He may decide to establish a core group of auditors and fulfill 
his specialty requirements by using the services of a qualified professional from outside 
the company who has the expertise needed. If the Commission considers the audit 
director's action to be acceptable in fulfilling the internal audit function's 
responsibilities, it should be clearly stated in the Report.
These are a couple of examples of when it may be appropriate for an audit director to use 
qualified professionals outside his company to more effectively fulfill his 
responsibilities to management and the audit committee.
My assumptions so far have assumed that some form of an internal audit function 
currently exists in the company. There will also be those companies who do not have an 
internal audit function and are faced with establishing the function for the first time.
This may seem like an overwhelming and expensive task to some companies due to their 
lack of experience in this area. This may cause a reluctance or delay on management's 
part to comply with the Commission's recommendations. Management's best reaction 
may be to bring in a qualified professional outside the company to assist them in defining 
their internal audit needs and identify the various alternative approaches available to 
them to establish an effective internal audit function. The best alternative may be to 
establish their own internal function immediately, go through a phase-in period for 
establishing their own function with temporary assistance from the outside qualified 
professional or just to use the outside qualified professional to provide the audit function 
for them. If the Commission considers these approaches acceptable methods of 
establishing an effective audit function, this should be clearly stated in the Report.
In summary I would like to say that if the Commission wishes to encourage companies to 
establish or expand their internal audit function for more effective monitoring of 
internal controls and financial reporting, the Commission should modify the Report to 
clearly identify the primary acceptable avenues available to the company for compliance 
with the Commission's recommendations.
Therefore, I would recommend that a statement be added to Chapter Two, Subsection lll-B, 
Internal Audit Function and Chief Internal Auditor, as follows: "The function can be 
provided completely or in part by a qualified professional auditor outside the company who 
meets the same qualifications as defined for the internal audit function." The statement 
includes "a qualified professional auditor" instead of independent auditor because there are 
many individuals qualified to perform this service who are not in public accounting. In 
addition, use of these professionals may in fact be preferred since many of them are not 
chartered to certify the company's financial statements and therefore may represent a 
more independent opinion. A related issue was addressed by the Commission on Page 39 of
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the Exposure Draft in discussing the results of two recent studies, a Harris survey 
sponsored by the AICPA and a research report prepared for the AlCPA's Public Oversight 
Board. The studies "showed that a substantial percentage of members of the key public 
groups involved in the financial reporting process believe that performing certain 
management advisory services can impair a public auditor's objectivity and 
independence."
Let me express that my comments in this letter are based upon my personal experiences 
in the profession of internal auditing. The firm with whom I'm employed, Clark 
Management Services Company, provides the internal audit function for Clark Equipment 
Company, a Fortune 500 company. In addition, we provide our services to other 
companies on a contractual basis. Our support to their audit efforts has included such 
specialties as providing professional auditors with foreign language capability and EDP 
technical expertise; qualifications which these companies could not afford (nor did they 
need) to retain on their permanent staffs. I feel we have provided highly qualified 
professional services to these companies which has allowed them to accomplish a much 
more effective internal audit program and provide their management and audit 
committees with a more comprehensive coverage of the financial reporting; something 
we in the profession and you on the Commission are striving for.
Once again, I thank the Commission for the opportunity to comment on this Exposure 
Draft. I hope that you find my comments to be valuable input as you progress towards a 
final Report. If you should desire any further discussion of this matter, please contact 
me at your convenience. I can be reached at (219) 282-3985.
Best regards,
Donald E. Zerfas 
Vice President
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David N. McCammon 
Vice President-Controller
Ford Motor Company 
The American Road 
P.O. Box 1899
Dearborn, Michigan 48121-1899
June 26, 1987
Mr. James C. Treadway, Chairman
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. Treadway:
We are pleased to have this opportunity to respond to 
the Commission's Exposure Draft on the Report of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Ford Motor 
Company promotes an operating philosophy that stresses the 
importance of a strong financial control environment, and long 
before the Commission's Report we initiated many of the specific 
actions that the Commission proposes. Consequently, we are very 
interested in this project and we share the Commission's concern 
that fraudulent financial reporting, although infrequent, could 
have widespread consequences.
We endorse many of the recommendations in the Exposure 
Draft and specifically support the Commission's conclusion that 
improvement can be made in all areas involved in the financial 
reporting process. We also agree that the recommendations for 
improvement must be cost-effective. Finally, we favor recommen­
dations that will result in measurable improvement in financial 
reporting as compared with those that may be adopted as a matter 
of protocol.
Although we support the overall thrust of the 
Commission's Report, there are several recommendations in the 
Exposure Draft that we are not convinced will contribute to 
reducing the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. There 
also are specific features of several recommendations that 
would, in our view, impose an undue burden in compliance. We 
have addressed these items in the following comments.
Mr. James C. Treadway 2 June 26, 1987
Recommendations for Public Companies
Comments on specific recommendations for public 
companies follow.
Applicability of Recommendations
The Exposure Draft is unclear as to whether a wholly- 
owned subsidiary would be subject to the recommendations if it 
had publicly traded debt securities and therefore filed periodic 
reports with the SEC (or other federal regulatory agencies). We 
do not support application of the recommendations to wholly- 
owned subsidiaries because they are subject to control by the 
parent company. This requires clarification in the final report.
Maintenance of Adequate Internal Controls
We believe that maintaining an adequate system of 
internal controls should be a fundamental objective for all 
companies. It is possible, however, that "adequate internal 
controls" could be interpreted as providing 100 percent preven­
tion, which clearly is cost-prohibitive. We recommend that the 
concept of "reasonable assurance" be incorporated specifically 
into the wording of this recommendation.
Code of Corporate Conduct
We support the intent of the recommendation for all 
companies to adopt a corporate code of conduct. We do not 
believe, however, that employees at all levels need to participate 
in development of the code to assure understanding of and 
adherence to it. In addition, although we do not oppose 
automatic distribution of the code throughout a company, we 
favor an alternative that would rely upon management's judgement 
to distribute the code to employees in positions exposed to 
situations in which improper conduct could result in a violation 
of the public trust.
Written Charter for the Audit Committee
We agree that the Audit Committee should have a 
written charter setting forth its duties and responsibilities 
and that companies should provide for modification of the 
charter as necessary. We question the need for an annual review 
of the charter by the Board of Directors, however, because the 
duties of the Audit Committee are generic and not subject to 
frequent change. The recommendation establishes an unnecessary 
requirement in this regard.
Mr. James C. Treadway 3 June 26, 1987
Audit Committee Prior Approval of Management Advisory Services
We believe management advisory services to be rendered 
by a company's independent public accountants should be approved 
in advance by the Audit Committee to the extent possible and 
practical. We suspect, however, that the recommendation in its 
present form could be unnecessarily restrictive and inhibit 
management flexibility in cases where quick action is needed.
We propose the addition of wording that recognizes instances in 
which delegation of approval authority is appropriate (small 
dollar value engagements, for example) with after-the-fact review 
with the Audit Committee.
Management Report in the Annual Report
We support the provision for a management report in the 
annual report to stockholders. Ford Motor Company has included 
a statement concerning management's responsibility for the 
financial statements in its annual reports since 1977.
We believe, however, that the present voluntary system 
should be continued and that issuers should have flexibility to 
tailor the statement to fit individual company circumstances.
We are concerned that establishment of strict rules for the 
statement, including a requirement that it be filed with the 
SEC, would of necessity require the active participation of the 
company's lawyers in the drafting of the statement, possibly 
resulting in a rigid and "defensive" format and ultimately 
diminish the statement's value.
We do not support signing of the report by the chief 
executive officer and the chief accounting officer. The 
"Message to Stockholders" currently is signed by the senior-most 
executives in the company in most annual reports. Separate 
signing of the management statement is redundant and may imply a 
different level of representation if signed by different parties.
We do not favor including an evaluation of the company's 
internal control system in the management report. We believe 
that it is adequate for a company to make the assertion that 
management maintains a system of internal control designed to 
provide reasonable assurance as to the integrity and reliability 
of financial statements. If an evaluation of the internal 
control system is required, we believe it would have more 
credibility if rendered by the independent public accountant.
We expect, however, that this could result in a considerable 
increase in auditing effort and fees -- that would not be 
justified by the benefits derived. Consequently, we do not 
support this recommendation. Further, requiring a statement on 
the effectiveness of the internal control system at a point in 
time may imply that the system is not effective at other times.
We suggest that the reference to a point in time be excluded.
Mr. James C. Treadway A June 26, 1987
We also do not support including a statement that 
management has considered recommendations made by the auditors 
concerning the system of internal control, and has responded 
appropriately. We believe that reacting to identified internal 
control deficiencies, regardless of who identifies them, is 
inherent in maintaining an internal control system. If lack of 
management's responsiveness became a serious issue, we believe 
that it is within the auditor's regular responsibilities to 
bring it to the attention of the Audit Committee and stock­
holders.
Audit Committee Chairman's Letter
We do not support the requirement for a letter from 
the Chairman of the Audit Committee describing the committee's 
responsibilities and activities in the annual report. The 
recommendation duplicates much of the existing proxy statement 
disclosures without, in our view, a perceived benefit.
Change in Independent Public Accountants
We agree that a change in public accountants should be 
disclosed -- but it is unclear how this recommendation differs 
from existing Form 8-K disclosure requirements concerning 
changes in auditors. If this recommendation is not fundamentally 
different than existing requirements, we would favor retaining 
the present form.
Audit Committee Oversight of Quarterly Financial Reporting
We believe that other provisions of the Commission's 
Report provide sufficient oversight capabilities for the Audit 
Committee without imposing a requirement of the review of 
quarterly results prior to release to the public. A system of 
ongoing communication with the Audit Committee covering financial 
results and an "open door" policy between the independent 
accountants and the Audit Committee provide better means for the 
Committee's members to discharge their responsibilities.
Further, we are concerned that this requirement would blur the 
distinction between the Audit Committee's oversight of and 
participation in the financial reporting process.
We agree with the Commission that financial statement 
users rely heavily on quarterly financial statements. Scheduling 
Audit Committee meetings to coincide with the release of 
quarterly results is unduly restrictive, however, and we would 
not support holding separate meetings solely for this purpose. 
Instead, we believe the results of the independent public 
accountant's quarterly reviews can be communicated to Audit 
Committees after the fact. We cannot support a measure that 
could delay release to the public without appreciable gain.
Mr. James C. Treadway 5 June 26, 1987
Setting Standards for Internal Control
We believe that existing authoritative bodies, the 
ASB, IIA, AICPA, and FEI, are sufficient and do not support the 
establishment of another governing body.
Recommendations for Independent Public Accountants
We support revisions to auditing standards and 
practices that improve audit and financial reporting quality.
At the same time, revisions to auditing standards should be 
justified by the benefits received. They should not impose 
undue burden to the accounting profession or audited companies.
We believe that the ASB has responded to key issues raised in 
the Commission's report through the ten proposed auditing 
standards that were recently released. We are interested and 
will follow the responses received by the ASB to the proposed 
standards and the reaction of the Commission to those comments.
We support self governance of the accounting profession. 
To the extent that the recommended restructuring of the ASB 
strengthens self governance and auditing quality, we support it 
as well. We believe that if the ASB is reorganized as recom­
mended, care should be taken to ensure appropriate representation 
by all interested parties -- industry, government, and education 
-- rather than just one interest group.
Recommendations for Education
We support the proposals that ensure that business 
students will receive sufficient instruction on fraudulent 
financial reporting. It is imperative, however, that financial 
reporting issues be presented with a balanced perspective. 
Business students should acquire an understanding of fraudulent 
financial reporting causes, its widespread impact, and cost- 
effective controls in the financial reporting system, but should 
not be left with the impression that fraudulent reporting is 
pervasive. Care also should be taken to ensure that the 
integration of fraudulent reporting issues into the curriculum 
is accomplished without sacrificing coverage of other equally 
critical subject areas.
* * * * *
Mr. James C. Treadway June 26, 19876
To summarize, we endorse many of the recommendations 
made by the Commission. We believe that the recommendations 
adopted must be cost effective, avoid duplication with existing 
standards, and result in measurable improvement in the financial 
reporting process. Further, it should be kept in mind that the 
vast majority of American business practice is highly principled. 
Care must be taken in adopting corrective actions to not impose 
unduly restrictive or specific measures to solve isolated 
deficiencies.
We are pleased to have this opportunity to share our 
comments with the Commission.
Sincerely,
D. N. McCammon
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P H I L I P  M O R R I S
COMPANIES INC.
120 PARK AVENUE. NEW YORK. N Y. 10017 • TELEPHONE (212) 880-5000
June 26, 1987
Mr. James C. Treadway, Chairman 
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. Treadway:
We have reviewed the exposure draft which presents the findings, 
conclusions and recommendations of the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
We are impressed with the organization and thoroughness of the 
study, as well as with the involvement of a broad segment of the 
public and private sector, who assisted the Commission in their 
study and whose comments were utilized by the Commission in 
formulating their recommendations. The Commission is to be 
commended for its fine effort in reviewing a very difficult and 
complex subject and for its achievements as represented by this 
exposure draft.
The recommendations by the Commission are, for the most part, 
acceptable to us. However, we do have some concerns which we 
wish to express:
♦ We do not agree with the recommendation that Audit Committees 
should approve financial results prior to public release (page 
42).
Management is responsible for the financial statements. This 
statement is reiterated in your exposure draft. To involve 
the Audit Committee in the approval process connotes a shared 
responsibility which is incorrect and sends the wrong message 
to the public. The difference between management's 
responsibility and the Audit Committee's oversight 
responsibility should remain clear and distinct. The 
Commission's recommendations would confuse and blur this 
distinction.
James C. Treadway 
Page 2
June 24, 1987
We also foresee implementation problems with this 
recommendation. Additional Audit Committee meetings will be 
required, and scheduling difficulties can arise in having 
Audit Committee meetings timed precisely prior to public 
release of financial results.
Quarterly financial results are highly confidential and known 
to very few members of management before public release. We 
have complete confidence in the confidentiality and 
discreetness of Audit Committee members. However, as more 
individuals are involved in the process, the greater the risk 
of inadvertent disclosure of information.
We suggest that the Audit Committee review the quarterly 
financial results after public disclosure. This would fulfill 
the oversight responsibilities of the Audit Committee and 
accomplish the goals of the Commission.
♦ The Commission recommends that public companies include in 
their reports to stockholders a letter signed by the Chairman 
of the Audit Committee describing the Committee's 
responsibilities and activities during the year (page 41). We 
disagree with this recommendation.
The annual report is management's report to the stockholders. 
We are in agreement with your recommendation that the annual 
report should include a management report signed by the Chief 
Executive and the Chief Accounting Officer. To include an 
additional report signed by the Chairman of the Audit 
Committee serves no real purpose. It confuses the reader as 
to who is responsible for the report and is redundant. It is 
merely symbolic and is boilerplate, which is what we should 
try to eliminate.
♦ Our final comments concern the Commission's endorsement of 
periodic external (peer) reviews of the internal audit 
function (page 33). We support the Commission's desire to 
enhance the effectiveness of the internal audit function; 
however, we believe the recommendation is impractical and 
would be ineffective.
James C. Treadway 
June 24, 1987 
Page 3
We firmly endorse the efforts of the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) to enhance the professionalism of internal 
auditors. Our audit organization has adopted the IIA 
standards. We also believe in quality assurance and have an 
ongoing quality assurance program within our corporate 
internal audit organization.
External (peer) reviews of the internal audit function are in 
the embryonic stage of development. There are three 
approaches that can be utilized to comply with your 
recommendation. We believe that none of these are acceptable 
for the reasons stated:
1. External consulting firms expert in quality assurance 
reviews are either non-existent or are "one man" shops 
whose capabilities vary considerably.
2. The Institute of Internal Auditors sponsors a quality 
assurance program conducted by internal audit 
professionals. These professionals are General Auditors or 
Managers from the public or private sector who volunteer 
their services. Although sponsored by the Institute of 
Internal Auditors, these individuals are employed by 
specific companies. Utilizing individuals from one or more 
legal entities to review quality assurance programs of 
another legal entity is cause for serious concern. This 
approach raises possible legal and confidentiality 
questions and problems.
3. Independent public accountants have provided this review as 
a specialized consulting service. There has been much 
discussion, pro and con, as to whether or not independent 
public accountants can or should provide this service.
Many internal audit professionals believe that independent 
public accountants are biased toward their own audit 
objectives and cannot evaluate an internal audit function. 
In any event, public accountants tend to use their own 
quality assurance standards and are not familiar with or 
apt to accept the IIA's quality assurance standard.
There are no easy solutions to this problem. For this 
reason, we believe it is impractical to implement an 
effective external (peer) review of the internal audit 
function.
7 8 c
James C. Treadway 
June 24, 1987 
Page 4
We o ffe r  an a lte r n a tiv e  which is  p r a c tic a l and e ff e c t iv e :
1 . I n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n s  s h o u ld  be  r e q u i r e d  t o  c o m p ly  
w i t h  tw o  e le m e n ts  o f  th e  I I A  q u a l i t y  a s s u ra n c e  s ta n d a r d s  
-----  s u p e r v i s io n  and  i n t e r n a l  r e v ie w s .
2 . In d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n ts  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  e v a lu a te  
th e  c o m p e te n c e  a nd  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  as 
p a r t  o f  t h e i r  a s s e s s m e n t o f  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t in g
c o n t r o l s .  P le a s e  r e f e r  t o  S ta te m e n t  o n  A u d i t in g  
S ta n d a rd s  (SAS ) AU S e c t io n  3 2 2 , p a ra g ra p h s  5 ,  6 a nd  7 .
The  C o m m is s io n 's  d r a f t  r e p o r t  i n d i r e c t l y  s u p p o r ts  th e  
in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t 's  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  
p r o v id e  t h i s  e v a lu a t io n .  E x h ib i t  K o f  th e  d r a f t  r e p o r t  
u n d e r  t h e  h e a d in g  " P o s t - A u d i t  R e v ie w "  recom m ends t h a t  
t h e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  s h o u ld  m e e t p r i v a t e l y  w i t h  th e  
in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t  t o  r e q u e s t  h i s  o p in io n  o n  
v a r io u s  m a t t e r s ,  i n c lu d in g  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a nd  
a c c o u n t in g  p e r s o n n e l and  th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  s t a f f .  T h is  
re c o m m e n d a t io n  s h o u ld  be  r e s t r u c t u r e d  t o  encom pass a 
m o re  c o m p re h e n s iv e  e x t e r n a l  r e v ie w  o f  th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
f u n c t i o n  t o  be  p r o v id e d  b y  th e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n ta n t  t o  m anagem ent a nd  t o  th e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e .
We e x p re s s  o u r  a p p r e c ia t i o n  f o r  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o n v e y  o u r  
th o u g h ts  and  c o n c e rn s  o n  t h i s  e x t r e m e ly  im p o r t a n t  s u b je c t .  We 
b e l ie v e  th e  C o m m is s io n  h a s  c o n d u c te d  a n  e x c e l l e n t  s t u d y ,  
c o m p re h e n s iv e  i n  a l l  r e s p e c t s ,  w h ic h  s h o u ld  h a v e  a d e f i n i t e  
im p a c t  o n  r e d u c in g  th e  in c id e n c e  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .
Hans G . Storr
Senior Vice President & 
Chief F in an cial O ffic e r
Becton Dickinson and Company
O n e  B e c t o n  Drive
Franklin L a k e s ,  N e w  J e r s e y  0 7 4 1 7 - 1 8 8 0  
( 2 0 1 ) 8 4 8 - 6 8 0 0
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BECTON
DICKINSON
June 26, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Gentlemen:
This letter is written in response to the Exposure Draft dated 
April 1987 of the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting. In general, our Company applauds the 
efforts of the Commission on this topic and agrees with most of 
the recommendations set forth in the Exposure Draft. In 
particular, we concur that the "Tone at the Top" is the most 
important element in creating an environment which reduces the 
potential for fraudulent financial reporting. Also, as your 
draft report notes in the Summary of Recommendations, some 
companies presently employ many of the techniques recommended. 
We believe Becton Dickinson and Company is such an organization 
and there will be little change in our current practices. 
However, the Commission has made certain recommendations for 
public companies which we request be reconsidered.
These recommendations place the Audit Committee in a role which, 
we believe, is very similar to that of line management. This 
type of capacity diminishes the independence and objectivity of 
the Committee. It is our view that the line management of a 
company is the appropriate level of responsibility to assure fair 
financial reporting with the appropriate oversight by the 
independent public accountants. The Committee's role in our 
opinion is more properly a continuing review to ensure that there 
has been sufficient involvement in the financial reporting 
process by the independent public accountants.
We also question the necessity of the Chairman of the Audit 
Committee providing a separate letter to be included in the 
annual report to shareholders describing the Committee's 
activities during the year. We concur that the Audit Committee 
should be "informed, vigilant, and effective overseers of the 
financial reporting process and the company's internal controls." 
However, we believe requiring a letter from the Chairman of the 
Audit Committee would hold the members of the Audit Committee to 
a higher level of. accountability and suggest that the Audit 
Committee's role in the governance of our Company is greater than
7 9 a
other Board members and Board Committees. In our opinion, there 
should be uniform responsibility among our Board members and 
Committees in providing the necessary oversight of and direction 
to our organization.
The Commission has also proposed a recommendation with respect to 
management advisory services provided by independent auditors 
which, we believe, is overly restrictive on management. We agree 
that Audit Committees should monitor the potential impairment of 
independence relating to independent auditors performing such 
services, although it is our contention that advance approval of 
routine nonaudit services such as tax consulting and tax return 
preparation is not practical. Our Company has implemented a 
procedure whereby nonaudit services for a specific project with 
estimated fees in excess of $100,000 requires advance approval 
from the Audit Committee which, with a recurring audit fee in 
excess of $1,000,000, we believe is a reasonable threshold for 
the Audit Committee to consider the impact on the auditors' 
independence.
Lastly, we believe the Commission's recommendation regarding the 
Audit Committee's involvement in quarterly reporting is not 
consistent with our view as to the appropriate role of the Audit 
Committee. We currently review quarterly results with our 
independent public accountants and, although they do not issue a 
formal review report, we discuss with them any unusual or complex 
transactions occurring in the quarter and obtain their guidance 
before releasing earnings information. We believe this process 
enables them to adequately evaluate the integrity and reliability 
of interim financial information without delaying the release of 
information to the financial markets. The Committee's role in 
our opinion is more properly a continuing review to ensure that 
there has been sufficient involvement in the quarterly reporting 
process by the independent public accountants.
In addition to the foregoing, we believe the effort required to 
coordinate an Audit Committee clearance of quarterly results 
prior to public release would present severe logistical problems 
for us since the four directors who comprise the Audit Committee 
are out-of-state residents. The dates for the regular Audit 
Committee meetings are established at least a year in advance in 
order to accommodate the busy schedules of these individuals. 
The uncertainty of the exact dates that quarterly financial 
statements will be ready for review would preclude this type of 
scheduling and, therefore, a delay of several days in the 
issuance of financial statements could be the result. We do not 
believe this delay is acceptable, and quick phone calls to the 
directors would not be a meaningful solution. Furthermore, we do 
not wish to amend the qualifications necessary for Board 
membership so as to require geographic proximity to our offices.
- 2 -
We are pleased to have th is  opportunity to provide our comments 
on such important issu es and congratulate the Commission on i t s  
e ffo r ts .
R esp ectfu lly  submitted,
Robert A. Reyno ld s 
Vice P resid en t a nd C o n tro ller
-3 -
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P E N N S Y L V A N IA  IN S T IT U T E  O F C E R T IF IE D  P U B LIC  A C C O U N T A N T S
1608 Walnut Street, Third Floor • Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 • (215) 735-2635
June 26, 1987
N a tio n a l Commission on F ra u d u le n t
F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g
1701 P ennsy lvan ia  Avenue, N.W.
W ash ington, D.C. 20006
RE: May 1, 1987 Exposure D ra f t
Gentlem en:
The Pennsylvania I n s t i t u te  o f  CPAs' Committee on A u d it in g  
and Accounting Procedures app re c ia tes  the  o p p o rtu n ity  to  comment on 
the  "exposure d r a f t . "  The s iz e  o f  the  task  fa c in g  the Commission was 
no t lo s t  on our members. We commend the  comprehensive na tu re  o f  the 
recommendations made.
We are concerned th a t  the Commission l im ite d  the  scope o f  
i t s  s tudy to  p u b lic  companies. The om ission o f  p r iv a te  companies cou ld  
lead to  some e ros io n  o f  the  Commission's m iss ion  o f  id e n t i f y in g  causal 
fa c to rs .  P r iv a te  o rg a n iz a tio n s  cou ld  have fra u d u le n t re p o r t in g  causal 
fa c to rs  d i f f e r e n t  from  and in  a d d it io n  to  those o f  p u b lic  companies.
To ove rlo o k  th is  source would be to  ove rlo o k  p o te n t ia l steps to  reduce 
the  inc idence  o f  f ra u d u le n t re p o r t in g .
We are s k e p tic a l o f  the  p o te n t ia l im pact educa tion  can have 
on the e th ic s  o f  p e rp e tra to rs  o f  fra u d . E th ic a l values may no t be 
g re a t ly  in flu e n c e d  by the  expansion o f  business and accounting  c u r r ic u la .
A d d it io n a lly ,  one o f  our members, W illia m  H. L un dqu is t, has 
severa l s p e c if ic  comments we w ish you to  co n s id e r. A copy o f  h is  May 27, 
1987 le t t e r  to  me is  enclosed.
Thank you f o r  y o u r c o n s id e ra t io n .
S in c e re ly ,
John T. C ra w fo rd , Chairman 
A u d it in g  and A cco u n tin g  
P rocedures Committee
JTC :slm
E nc losu re
W il l ia m  H . L u n d q u is t
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
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1569 EDGE HILL ROAD — P. O. BOX 272 
ABINGTON. PA. 19001 
218 - 886-4195
May 2 7 , 1987
M r. John T . C ra w fo rd , C ha irm an
PICPA A u d i t in g  & A c c o u n t in g  P ro c e d u re s  C om m ittee  
Pa. P u b l ic  U t i l i t y  C om m iss ion  
N o r th  O f f ic e  B u i ld in g  
H a r r is b u r g ,  PA 17120
D ear J a c k :
Re: E xp o su re  D r a f t :  "R e p o r t  o f  th e  N a t io n a l
______ C om m iss ion  on F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g "
T h is  C om m ission t r e a t s  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  e x te r n a l  a u d i t o r s '  e x p a n s io n  o f  n o n a u d it  
s e r v ic e s  p u r e ly  fro m  th e  p o in t  o f  v ie w  o f  a u d i t o r  in d e p e n d e n c e , as d id  th e  C om m ission 
on  A u d i t o r s '  R e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  n in e  y e a rs  a g o .
I n  my o p in io n ,  e xp a n d in g  i n t o  c l i e n t  s e r v ic e s  t h a t  r e q u i r e  n o n -a c c o u n t in g  s p e c ia l i s t s  
(s u c h  as  a c tu a r ie s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  e n g in e e rs ,  p s y c h o lo g is ts ,  o r  m a rk e t in g  p e o p le )  poses 
a much g r e a te r  d a n g e r to  a  p ro p e r  a u d i t  e n v iro n m e n t w i t h i n  th e  a u d i t  f i r m  th a n  to  
i t s  in d e p e n d e n c e . Such s p e c ia l i s t s  m us t be  g iv e n  r e c o g n i t io n  i n  th e  management o f  
th e  a u d i t  f i r m .  Even th o u g h  th e y  may n o t  be d e s ig n a te d  p a r t n e r s ,  many o f  them  m ust 
be  c l a s s i f i e d  as th e  e q u iv a le n t  o f  p a r tn e r s ,  and some o f  th e s e  w i l l  n a t u r a l l y  g r a v i t a t e  
to  to p  management l e v e l s .  The d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t r a i n i n g ,  e x p e r ie n c e  and i n s t i l l e d  
e t h i c a l  o u t lo o k  w i l l  have  t h e i r  e f f e c t  and change th e  f i r m  e n v iro n m e n t i n  g e n e ra l 
and w i t h  re s p e c t  to  a u d i t in g  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .
A u d i t in g  i s ,  o f  c o u rs e ,  a  m a t te r  o f  te c h n iq u e s  and p ro c e d u re s , b u t  i t  i s  a ls o  a 
m a t te r  o f  a t t i t u d e s  and ju d g m e n t. The e f f e c t  o f  f i r m  e n v iro n m e n t upon a t t i t u d e s  and 
ju d g m e n t i s  a p t  t o  be  s i g n i f i c a n t .
N o t t r e a t in g  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  e f f e c t  on f i r m  e n v iro n m e n t o f  " n o n -a c c o u n t in g "  
s e r v ic e s  o f  a u d i t  f i r m s  i s  a s e r io u s  f la w  o f  t h i s  e x p o s u re  d r a f t .
I  w o u ld  a p p r e c ia te  i t  i f  my l e t t e r  w e re  in c lu d e d  i n  th e  C o m m itte e 's  re s p o n s e  to  th e  
e x p o s u re  d r a f t ,  e i t h e r  by  in c o r p o r a t in g  th e  g i s t  o f  i t  i n  th e  re s p o n s e  o r  by  a t t a c h ­
in g  a co p y  to  th e  re s p o n s e .
S in c e r e ly ,
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N O R T H E A S T  U T I L I T I E S
THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY 
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY 
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY 
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY 
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
P.O. BOX 270
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 
(203) 721-2313
GEORGE D. UHL
VICE PRESIDENT AND CONTROLLER
June 26 , 1987
N a t io n a l  C om m ission on 
F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue, N.W.
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
G en tlem en :
N o r th e a s t  U t i l i t i e s  (NU o r  th e  Com pany), th e  p a re n t  company o f  th e  
N o r th e a s t  U t i l i t i e s  sy s te m , a p p re c ia te s  th e  o p p o r tu n i t y  to  p ro v id e  
comments on th e  recom m enda tio ns  p ro p o se d  b y  th e  N a t io n a l  C om m ission on 
F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  (C o m m iss io n ). NU, th ro u g h  i t s  o p e ra t in g  
s u b s id ia r ie s ,  p ro v id e s  e l e c t r i c  and gas s e r v ic e  i n  C o n n e c t ic u t  and 
e l e c t r i c  s e r v ic e  i n  w e s te rn  M a s s a c h u s e tts . NU has d e a l t  w i t h  th e  is s u e  o f  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  and th e  c u l t i v a t i o n  o f  a p ro p e r  c o n t r o l  e n v iro n m e n t f o r  a 
num ber o f  y e a rs  now. The f o l lo w in g  i s  a b r i e f  s y n o p s is  o f  th e  in t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l  e n v iro n m e n t a t  NU and some s p e c i f i c  comments and recom m enda tions  
based upon o u r  e x p e r ie n c e .
In  1979, NU c re a te d  a C om m ittee  on I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l  (NU C om m ittee ) w h ic h  
c o n s is ts  o f  s e v e r a l to p  management p e rs o n n e l and r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f  an 
o u ts id e  la w  f i r m  and an in d e p e n d e n t p u b l ic  a c c o u n t in g  f i r m .  The NU 
C om m ittee was c re a te d  to  h e lp  a d d re s s  th e  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  th e  F o re ig n  
C o r ru p t  P r a c t ic e s  A c t o f  1977. The g u id e l in e s  sum m arized i n  th e  AICPA' s 
" T e n ta t iv e  R e p o rt o f  The S p e c ia l A d v is o ry  C om m ittee on I n t e r n a l  A c c o u n tin g  
C o n t r o l"  ( th e  M inahan C om m ittee  r e p o r t )  w e re  a d o p te d  b y  th e  NU C o m m itte e . 
The NU C om m ittee  o v e rs e e s  s e v e r a l a n n u a l p ro g ra m s : C o n f l i c t  o f  I n t e r e s t
P ro g ra m , I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l  Aw areness P ro g ra m , C om puter System  C o n tro l 
R e v ie w s , and a f o l lo w - u p  on a u d i t  f in d in g s .
I n  a d d i t io n  t o  th e  p rog ram s o u t l in e d  a b o ve , th e  NU C om m ittee  p e r io d ic a l l y  
re v ie w s  o p e r a t io n a l  a re a s  to  a sse ss  th e  e x te n t  o f  t h e i r  aw areness and 
s e n s i t i v i t y  to  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o ls .  The NU C om m ittee  e f f o r t s  a re  f u l l y  
s u p p o rte d  by  s e n io r  management and th e  B oa rd  o f  T ru s te e s .  I n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o ls  a re  d is c u s s e d  a t  p e r io d ic  management s t a f f  m e e tin g s  and a re  
in c lu d e d  i n  s e v e r a l in -h o u s e  fo rm a l t r a in in g  p ro g ra m s , such as o u r  
t r a i n i n g  c o u rs e  f o r  new s u p e r v is o r s  and o u r  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  te c h n iq u e s  
c o u rs e .
The w o rk  o f  th e  NU C om m ittee  e n a b le s  i t  to  p u b l is h  an A n n u a l R e p o rt to  th e  
C ha irm an , c o p ie s  o f  w h ic h  a re  p ro v id e d  to  th e  A u d it  C om m ittee  o f  th e  Board 
o f  T ru s te e s .  T h is  A n n u a l R e p o rt i s  a ls o  th e  b a s is  f o r  in c lu s io n  i n  o u r
- 2 -
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Annual Report to Shareholders of NU's "Company Report" which is an 
assessment of our internal control environment and cites the company's, as 
opposed to the independent auditor's responsibility for the financial 
statements.
The Company h a s  a ls o  e s t a b l is h e d  a n  A u d it  C o m m itte e  c o m p ris e d  s o l e l y  o f  
o u t s id e  t r u s t e e s .  T he  p o s i t i o n  o f  D i r e c t o r - I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  (D IA )  r e p o r t s  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  t o  th e  S e n io r  V ic e  P r e s id e n t - F in a n c e  and f u n c t i o n a l l y  t o  
th e  C h a ir m a n /C h ie f  E x e c u t iv e  O f f i c e r .  The D IA  a ls o  h a s  u n r e s t r i c t e d  
a c c e s s  to  N U 's  in d e p e n d e n t  A u d i t  C o m m itte e .
T h ro u g h  th e  e f f o r t s  o f  o u r  e x t e r n a l  a d v is o r s ,  we h a v e  b e e n  a w a re  o f  th e  
C o m m is s io n 's  e f f o r t s ,  a s  w e l l  as  l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o p o s a ls ,  on f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  m a t t e r s ,  su ch  as  th e  Wyden and P r o x m ir e  b i l l s .  The NU C o m m itte e  
s u p p o r ts  m o s t o f  t h e  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  made b y  th e  C o m m is s io n , and  f e e l s  
t h a t  m anagem ent in v o lv e m e n t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h a t  o f  s e n io r  m an ag em en t, i s  th e  
m o st c r i t i c a l  e le m e n t  i n  p r e v e n t in g  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
B ased  u po n  o u r  e x p e r ie n c e s  o f  t h e  p a s t  e i g h t  y e a r s ,  NU o f f e r s  th e  
f o l l o w i n g  com m ents and s u g g e s t io n s :
o In c lu d e d  i n  th e  " to n e  a t  th e  to p "  t h e r e  s h o u ld  b e  an  i n t e r n a l  
e d u c a t io n a l  p ro g ra m  f o r  a l l  m anagem ent p e r s o n n e l t h a t  r e l a t e s  
th e  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  e n v iro n m e n t t o  t h e i r  a r e a s  o f  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on a  d a i l y  b a s is .
o U n d e r th e  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  f u n c t i o n ,  i t  s h o u ld  b e  e m p h a s iz e d  t h a t  
fe w ,  i f  a n y , l i m i t a t i o n s  s h o u ld  b e  p la c e d  on  th e  w o rk  o f  th e  
I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  D e p a r tm e n t .
o U n d e r th e  m a n d a to ry  in d e p e n d e n t  A u d i t  C o m m itte e , i t  was
recom m ended t h a t  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  d e v e lo p  a  w r i t t e n  c h a r t e r .  
O u r c o n c e r n , b a s e d  upo n  t h e  is s u e s  we d e a l t  w i t h  d u r in g  th e  
f o r m a t io n  o f  o u r  in d e p e n d e n t  A u d i t  C o m m it te e , i s  t h a t  a  w r i t t e n  
c h a r t e r  may b e  r e s t r i c t i v e  o r  p r o s c r i p t i v e  a n d , t h e r e f o r e ,  th e  
A u d it  C o m m itte e  may n o t  i n v e s t i g a t e  c e r t a i n  a r e a s  n o t  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  s p e l l e d  o u t  i n  th e  c h a r t e r  o r  c o n t in u e  to  e x a m in e  
i t e m s  t h a t  a r e  no lo n g e r  r e l e v a n t .  NU b e l i e v e s  t h a t  i t  i s  m ore  
im p o r t a n t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  s o m e th in g  s i m i l a r  t o  th e  " to n e  a t  th e  
t o p . "  T h e r e f o r e ,  we recom m end t h a t  in d e p e n d e n t  A u d i t  C o m m itte e s  
b e  g iv e n  th e  same " c a r t e  b la n c h e "  recom m ended a b o v e  f o r  th e  
I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  D e p a r tm e n t .
o U n d e r th e  s e c t i o n  e n t i t l e d ,  " R e p o r t in g  on R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  i n  
th e  A n n u a l R e p o r t  t o  S t o c k h o ld e r s ,"  i t  was recom m ended t h a t  th e  
C h ie f  E x e c u t iv e  O f f i c e r  an d  C h ie f  A c c o u n t in g  O f f i c e r  s ig n  th e  
M anagem ent R e p o r t .  O ur c o n c e rn  i s  t h a t  s p e c i f y i n g  th e s e  tw o  
s ig n a t u r e s  m ig h t  im p ly  t h a t  th e s e  a r e  th e  o n ly  o f f i c e r s  who h a v e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  c o m p a n y 's  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  e n v ir o n m e n t .
I t  w o u ld  b e  m o re  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h i s  r e p o r t  i s  
e n d o rs e d  b y  th e  co m p any . We a g r e e  w i t h  th e  v ie w s  o f  th e  
A m e ric a n  B a r  A s s o c i a t io n 's  ad  h o c  c o m m itte e  on r e p o r t s  b y  
m an ag em en t, as  e x p re s s e d  i n  t h e i r  1981  d is c u s s io n  p a p e r ,  w h ic h
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recommended that reports of this type be entitled "company 
report" rather than "management report" for the reasons stated 
in their discussion paper.
o In the Quarterly Reporting section it was recommended that the 
Audit Committee approve financial results. NU recommends that 
the word "approved" not be used, but indicate that the Audit 
Committee has "reviewed and accepted" the financial statements 
as prepared by management.
In addition to these specific recommendations, the NU Committee also 
considered the recommendations for the public company in general and 
concluded that there were too many specific recommendations, especially as 
they pertain to the Audit Committee. Some NU Committee members felt that 
the time demands on the Audit Committee created by the specific 
recommendations could be onerous and, therefore, may limit the potential 
candidates available to public companies. We would like to reemphasize 
our position that the most important element in preventing fraudulent 
financial reporting is the environment established by senior management.
It might be more appropriate to require companies to establish and 
maintain a sound internal control environment, ensure that internal 
control objectives are properly documented, transmit that message to all 
members of the management team, and require that the accounting/internal 
audit functions assess the operation of the internal control environment 
on a periodic basis. NU concurs with the requirement to include that 
assessment in the Annual Report to Shareholders. In addition, we concur 
with the idea that each public company should have an Audit Committee 
comprised solely of independent directors or trustees.
The independent Audit Committee should be required to review periodically 
the company's financial results and at a minimum, conduct, on an annual 
basis, an overview of the internal control environment. The independent 
Audit Committee should be able to meet with the company's management 
personnel, internal auditors, and the independent public accountants 
collectively and individually to enable them to assess the internal 
control environment. However, how this should be carried out should be 
left to the discretion of each company as it is impossible to develop a 
"laundry list" of specific recommendations that may or may not be 
applicable in all cases. We suggest that there be certain minimum 
standards, and that companies be required to assess whether those minimum 
standards are adequate to their operations.
We have not commented specifically on the other areas as they are not 
within our area of expertise. However, we do concur with many of the 
items listed, especially the recommendations for improvement in the area 
of education.
The NU Committee feels it is in a unique position to comment on this 
report because of the actions we have taken since 1979 to assure a proper 
internal control environment at NU. NU has endeavored to establish an 
internal control environment which encourages the maintenance of high 
standards of conduct in all of its business activities. The Commission
-4-
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R e p o r t  i s  an  e n d o rs e m e n t o f  th o s e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and  o u r  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  
a n d /o r  s u g g e s t io n s  a r e  in te n d e d  t o  p r o v id e  you  w i t h  some p r a c t i c a l  
a p p l ic a t io n s  i n  d e v e lo p in g  and a d m in is t e r in g  an  a p p r o p r ia t e  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l  e n v ir o n m e n t .   
S in c e r e l y  y o u r s ,
Geo r g e  D .  U h l  
Vi c e P r e s id e n t  
an d C o n t r o l l e r
G D U /je m /t
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DAYTON HUDSON CORPORATION
777 Nicollet Mall 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 
612/370-6948
June 26, 1987
Commissioners
N a tiona l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania A ve ., N. W.
W ashington, D.C. 20006
Dear S irs :
Dayton Hudson C o rp o ra tio n , a d iv e r s i f ie d  n a tio n a l r e t a i le r  and a s trong  sup­
p o r te r  o f good Corporate governance, is  pleased to  respond to  the Commission's 
request fo r  comments on i t s  Exposure D ra ft Report o f the  N a tiona l Commission 
on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g .
We s tro n g ly  support the  Commission's o b je c t iv e  o f reducing  the  r is k  o f fra u d u ­
le n t  f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g .  Dayton Hudson has t r a d i t io n a l ly  emphasized the 
im portance o f s trong  and e f fe c t iv e  c o n tro ls .  Our management a lready  has 
implemented most o f the  recommendations in  the R eport. We b e lie v e  good c o n tro l 
and p o lic ie s  are necessary to  ensure the  in te g r i t y  o f our f in a n c ia l s ta tem ents, 
in  support o f our f id u c ia r y  ro le  to  our sha reho lde rs .
We are p a r t ic u la r ly  s u p p o rtive  o f the Commission's view o f the need fo r  a c o s t-  
b e n e fit  approach. As the Commission f in a l iz e s  i t s  recommendations, we urge you 
to  con tinue  to  re ta in  th is  p ra c t ic a l approach fo r  deve lop ing c o n tro ls  to  m in i­
mize fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  w h ile  emphasizing c o s t-e ffe c t iv e n e s s .
We app rec ia te  the o p p o rtu n ity  to  p rov ide  our comments on t h is  im po rtan t issu e .
S in c e re ly ,
Susan S. Boren
Vice P re s id e n t, C ontro l
SSB: t l s
C4.3: 0615SSB
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R u b b e rm a id
June 26, 1987
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr. 
Chairman
National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
RE Comments on the Exposure Draft of the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Dear M r . Treadway
This letter is Rubbermaid's response to the request for comments 
on the Commission's recommendations for reducing the risk of 
fraudulent financial reporting by a public company.
We feel that the Commission has done a commendable job in 
emphasizing the importance of the financial reporting system and 
the attention that needs to be placed upon safeguarding its 
integrity. However, the benefits expected to be derived from 
the recommendations need to be weighed against the additional 
costs which affect the competitiveness of U. S. companies. In 
addition, the effectiveness of some of the suggestions needs to 
be evaluated.
For the most part the recommendations of the Committee are a 
summary of the philosophy and procedures regarding financial 
reporting that are presently followed by most public companies 
including Rubbermaid. There are, however, several 
recommendations which we encourage the Commission to reconsider 
as follows:
We agree with the recommendation that "The board of directors of 
all public companies should be required by SEC rule to establish 
audit committees comprised solely of independent directors." 
However, the sentence following this recommendation states that
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"An audit committee consisting of independent directors is the 
primary vehicle a board of directors uses to discharge its 
responsibility with respect to the company's financial 
reporting." We believe that this is an unreasonable expectation 
of the function of audit committees. First of all, very few 
audit committees meet more than three or four times a year and 
only for a limited length of time. They must, therefore, rely 
to a great extent upon information furnished by management and 
outside auditors. Also, the members cannot devote substantial 
time to the investigation that such a burden would require. To 
imply that the audit committee represents the primary vehicle in 
insuring the integrity of a company's financial reporting would 
expose the committee to an unfair burden and may result in their 
being subject to litigation. We also believe that the 
Commission's recommendations and guidelines would intensify 
difficulties in recruiting qualified directors because of 
concerns over increased director's liability. I believe the 
directors' primary vehicle is strict accountability for the 
management in proper preparation of financial data, as monitored 
by the directors' oversight by internal auditors and public 
accountants.
Recommendation —  "All public companies should be required by 
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders 
management reports signed by the Chief Executive Officer and 
Chief Accounting Officer. The management report should 
acknowledge management's responsibilities for the financial 
statements and internal control, discuss how these 
responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide management's 
assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal 
controls." This requirement is redundant because management 
clearly has these responsibilities already, and a statement 
saying we have them is just a use of more space in the annual 
report. I believe the SEC has an obligation to recognize the 
cost impact of lengthening the report.
Recommendation —  "All public companies should be required by 
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders a 
letter signed by the Chairman of Audit Committee describing the 
Committee's responsibilities and activities during the year."
We believe as stated in the previous comment that such a 
requirement would increase the length of the annual report 
without adding to the comprehension of the financial results.
The added verbiage would increase the cost of the report and be 
unnecessary since the disclosure would likely be similar between 
companies. Much of the information is currently required to be 
included in the proxy statement.
Recommendation —  "When a public company changes independent 
public accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to 
disclose publicly the nature of any material accounting or
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auditing issues discussed with its old or new auditors during 
the three year period preceding the change." Companies 
frequently discuss accounting issues with their public 
accountants and publication of these can be confusing and 
misleading. I believe the present SEC rule covers this 
adequately, and the concept should only be applied when a 
material dispute leads to a change in public accountants. This 
recommendation also tends to lock a company in with an 
accountant, whereas I believe the accountants should be subject 
to the normal marketplace obligations to provide effective 
service at a competitive fee.
Recommendation —  "Audit Committees should increase their 
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to public 
release." Having the Audit Committee review and approve the 
financial results prior to public release would slow down the 
release process which would increase the possibility of the 
improper use of the information prior to its being made public 
and would deprive the public and investors of timely access' to 
the data. Rubbermaid's quarterly information is currently 
reviewed by our management and by our public accounting firm 
prior to the release, and we believe this is sufficient to 
insure its objectivity and accuracy. This recommendation 
implies that the members of the audit committee are accountants, 
or have available to them accounting expertise in addition to 
management accountants and the firm's public accountant.
Recommendation —  "The Auditing Standards Board should revise 
the auditor's standard report to describe the extent to which 
the independent public accountant has reviewed and evaluated the 
system of internal accounting control." We do not believe that 
it would be of significant assistance to the readers of a 
financial report for the auditor to describe the extent to which 
they have reviewed and evaluated the system of internal 
accounting control. Here again, there would be a costly 
addition to every company's annual report. Also, the 
requirement to state that the audit does not provide absolute 
assurance that the audited financial statements are free from 
material misstatements as a result of fraud or error seems 
unnecessary for all but the most naive readers of financial 
reports. These statements might be issued by each public 
accounting firm, but they do not belong in every report.
In summary, we believe that the financial reporting and control 
procedures and safeguards currently practiced by companies which 
are necessitated by good business requirements, together with 
the current governmental regulations and existing efforts of the 
public accountants, are sufficient to insure a reasonable level 
of accuracy and financial reporting for public manufacturing
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companies. Additional regulations would add substantially to 
costs and not significantly increase the reliability of 
financial reporting.
Very truly yours
•Joseph G . Meehan 
Senior Vice President & 
Chief Financial Officer
np 
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AUDITING  STANDARDS COMMITTEE 
MARYLAND ASSOCIATION OF CER TIF IED  PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS 
1-300 YORK ROAD, SUITE 10 
P. O. BOX 484
LUTHERVILLE, MARYLANND 21093
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUNE 2 6 , 1987
FRAUDULENT F IN A N C IA L REPORTING 
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W. 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 200 06
THE MACPA'S AUDITING  STANDARDS COMMITTEE HAS REVIEWED THE 
COMMISSION'S EXPOSURE DRAFT. WE COMMEND THE COMMISSION ON THEIR 
EFFORTS TO ADDRESS AND DEAL WITH MEASURES WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO 
PREVENT OR DETECT FRAUDULENT F IN A N C IA L REPORTING. GENERALLY, WE 
REACHED AGREEMENT W ITH, OR D ID  NOT STRONGLY DISAGREE W ITH, ALL OF 
THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS, EXCEPT ONE.
WE WERE NOT CONVINCED THAT IT  WAS EITHER NECESSARY OR 
APPROPRIATE FOR THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE A IC P A 'S  AUDITING  STANDARDS 
BOARD TO BE OPENED TO NO N-CPA'S . WE BELEIVE THAT THE ASB CAN 
CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE WITHOUT HAVING NON-CPA'S AS MEMBERS.
SOME OF OUR MEMBERS WERE CONCERNED THAT THE 60 DAY COMMENT 
PERIOD MAY BE TOO SHORT A TIME FOR THE PUBLIC TO STUDY AND RESPOND 
TO THE EXPOSURE DRAFT.
VERY TRULY YOURS
DAVID A. COVINGTON 
CHAIRMAN,
MACPA'S AUDITING STANDARDS COMMITTEE
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San D iego Gas &  E le c tric
FRANK H. AULT June 29, 1987
C O N T R O L L E R FILE NO.
National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Commissioners:
The purpose of this letter is to provide our response to 
your recent Exposure Draft. SDG&E already practices many of 
the recommended actions such as having internal controls, an 
audit committee and internal auditors. Some of the recommenda­
tions are apple pie, such as maintaining accounting functions 
that are effective, internal audit functions that are objective 
and audit committees that are informed, vigilant and effective 
overseers. Accordingly, we agree with most of the recommenda­
tions.
There are two recommendations that we strongly disagree 
with. One is:
"When a public company changes independent 
public accountants, it should be required by 
SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature of 
any material accounting or auditing issues 
discussed with its old and new auditors 
during the three-year period preceding the 
change."
We discuss many sensitive accounting and auditing issues, 
including contingencies, with our auditors. These discussions 
have always ended in consensus. Important events and accounting 
treatments related to such issues are disclosed in the financial 
statements. Current SEC rules require disclosure of any dis­
putes over accounting or auditing issues if a company changes 
auditors. We believe the additional disclosure proposed by the 
commission would be unnecessary and sometimes even detrimental 
to shareholder interests. The three-year rule would discourage 
companies from changing auditors even when they legitimately are 
dissatisfied with their auditor's performance. This rule would 
serve the financial interests of CPA firms more than it would 
the shareholders.
The other recommendation we strongly disagree with is:
"All public companies should be required by 
SEC rule to include in their annual reports 
to stockholders a letter signed by the 
chairman of the audit committee describing 
the committee's responsibilities and activi­
ties during the year."
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National Commission on -2-
Fradulent Financial Reporting
June 29, 1987
In addition, you recommend a separate letter from the 
Controller. Our annual report already includes a letter from 
the Controller briefly covering the audit committee. That 
letter, plus the one you recommend, plus the auditors' opinion, 
makes three letters covering what is, for the most part, the 
same subject. We believe that is unnecessary. Surveys of the 
investing public have clearly indicated a need for less boiler­
plate in the annual report. They have also clearly indicated 
that the investor does not read such material.
For the past ten years, Congress (currently the Dingell 
Committee) and the SEC have shown particular interest in 
reducing fraudulent financial reporting. Their attention has 
largely focused on the failures of CPA firms to detect material 
fraud or deficiencies in financial reporting. We share their 
belief that the purpose of an audit is to detect material errors 
or deficiencies in the financial statements, whether caused by 
fraud or other reasons. We also believe, however, that a 
company should not rely wholly on its auditors.
We believe your exposure draft adequately covers what a 
company can do to prevent fraud. We are not confident, however, 
that your recommendations adequately address poor audit quality. 
One of your recommendations is:
"Public accounting firms should recognize and 
control the organization and individual 
pressures that potentially reduce audit 
quality."
You have recognized the problem, but you have not made a con­
crete recommendation. Are you going to leave that to Congress?
Frank H. Ault
FHA/KCG:pap
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June 29, 1987
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20006
RE: Exposure Draft dated April 1987
T he  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  b y  t h e  C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  
R e p o r t in g  in c lu d e s  m any re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w h ic h  a r e  v e r y  b e n e f i c i a l  
f o r  t h e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  b y  a l l  m em bers o f  t h e  b u s in e s s  c o m m u n ity  as  
w e l l  a s  t h e  p u b l i c .  T he  f o l l o w i n g  a d d re s s e s  e a c h  o f  t h e  m a jo r  
t o p i c s  o f  t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .It appears in reviewing this report, a great deal of effort and time has been expended in developing these recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY:
The Tone at the Top: These recommendations should be developed
i n  c o m p a n ie s  who d o  n o t  a l r e a d y  h a v e  t h i s  u n d e r s ta n d in g .  I t  i s  
o u r  im p r e s s io n  m o s t p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  h a v e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e  m anagem en t a r e a  who a r e  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  t h e r e  i s  a  c o d e  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n d u c t .
T he  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t  i n  w r i t t e n  fo rm  w i l l  s e r v e  
t o  c o m m u n ic a te  m o re  c l e a r l y  t h e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  
o f  t h e  com pany r e g a r d in g  r e p o r t i n g  m a t t e r s .
The Requirement of Auditing Committee: To review compliance ofthe code annually should fall within the responsibility of the internal audit function.
The Accounting Function and Chief Accounting Officer: The publiccompany must maintain accounting functions that effectively meet their financial reporting obligations.
Internal Audit Function and Chief Accounting Auditor: The
re c o m m e n d a t io n  f o r  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  t o  m a in t a in  a n  e f f e c t i v e  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  s t a f f e d  w i t h  a n  a d e q u a te  n u m b e r o f  
q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n s  f o r  a  com pany o f  t h a t  s i z e  i s  f a i r  a n d  
r e a s o n a b le  f o r  la r g e  p u b l i c  c o r p o r a t io n s .  T he  c o m m is s io n  s h o u ld  
r e v ie w  t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  s m a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n ie s  w i t h  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  s u c h  a s  l i m i t e d  n u m b e rs  o f  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  
r e v e n u e s ,  o r  t o t a l  c a p i t a l  w h ic h  m ake t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  
n o n  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e .  T he  g e n e r a l  r u l e  r e q u i r i n g  a n  e f f e c t i v e  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  s h o u ld  b e  d e le t e d  a n d  r e p la c e d  b y  a 
re c o m m e n d a t io n  t h a t  t h e  com pany s h o u ld  e v a lu a t e  t h e  n e e d  f o r  
s u c h .  I f  a n  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  s t a f f  i s  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  t h e  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  s h o u ld  b e  in d e p e n d e n t  f r o m  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p r o c e s s .
FREEMAN PROPERTIES, INC.2517 Lebanon Road • P.O. Box 140478 • Nashville, Tennessee 37214 (615) 889-8250 . Tennessee WATS 1-800-221-7487 . Nationwide WATS 1-800-221-3947
86a
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
June 29, 1987
Page 2
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee; The requirements of an 
independent audit committee consisting solely of independent 
directors would put undue burden on small public entities as the 
cost in the future for retention of independent directors will 
escalate with the increased responsibilities. Additionally, the 
recommendation that a report be issued by the audit committee to 
be included in the financial statements increases the exposure of 
directors once again increasing fees. The result to a small 
company will be to place undue burden on its financial results.
In looking at the independent audit committee, the commission 
needs to evaluate a minimum requirement of capital or revenues 
for this obligation. It would be very difficult for small 
organizations to feasibly have independent directors who are 
informed and effective overseers to the financial reporting 
process without sufficient fees which could be detrimental to 
operations of a company.
Reporting on Responsibilities in the Annual Report to 
Stockholders: With the proposed change by the Auditing Standards
Board in the audit opinion letter releasing more responsibility 
from the independent accountant, the recommendation for a letter 
from the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Accounting Officer 
seems to be unnecessary in reporting. The public accounting 
profession has taken measures here to disassociate itself from 
responsibility for financial reporting and have stated so in the 
proposed new opinion letter. The proposed opinion letter 
describes the responsibility of the accountants. With the 
changes in the standard audit report, the responsibility of each 
party is clarified.
The requirement for the annual report to stockholders to contain 
a letter signed by the Chairman of the Audit Committee only 
increases economic burden on a small company to comply with the 
regulation. This recommendation should be removed from the 
re po rt.
Seeking a Second Opinion; When a second opinion is sought, the 
Audit Committee should be made aware. The recommendation to 
publicly disclose the nature of any material accounting or 
auditing issue is already handled through Item 304 of the S-K 
requirements whereby disagreements and changes in accountants are 
noted. The recommendation seems to be duplicating the public 
reporting requirement.
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Quarterly Reporting; With the utilization of independent 
directors working as the auditing committee, small businesses 
again run the risk of financial burden as well as timing problems 
by having the directors involved in the quarterly reporting 
process. The independent director requirement causes increased 
charges from travel and increased directors fees. The concern is 
one which potentially delays the quarterly reporting process 
while definitely increasing the cost with very little benefit.
Setting Standards for Internal Control: The recommendation for
the commission to sponsor organizations in establishing a body to 
guide public companies on internal control is positive. During 
this process, internal controls must considered that do not over 
burden small companies in developing the controls. The sponsor 
organization should develop what are reasonable controls as it 
relates to industry and allow flexibility to prevent strenuous 
detail being required.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Recognizing Responsibilities for Detecting Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting and Improving Detection Capabilities: The
establishment of the responsibility of the independent accountant 
to uncover fraud will continue to put the public company and 
accounting firms in adversarial positions to an even greater 
extent. Consideration must be given to avoid this conflict.
Most of the recommendations made in these sections should be 
required though any reputable firm should be performing the 
analytical review procedures. The requirement for independent 
public accountants review of quarterly financial data of the 
public company can create problems for the small company on the 
timing and costs associated with such review. The review 
currently required at year end on the smaller company should be 
sufficient.
Improving Audit Quality: All recommendations under improving
audit quality should be adopted by the SEC as these continue to 
improve the quality and performance of the audit review.
Communicating the Auditors Role: The proposal of the Auditing
Standards Board to revise the auditors report should be 
completed. This clarifies to the public the responsibility the 
accountants are taking and indicates responsibility of 
management. This report should make the public more aware of the 
assurance provided by accountants.
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Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board: The
reorganization of the Board should be completed so that users of 
the financial data have opportunity for input.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EDUCATION
Business and Accounting Curriculum; The recommendations for this 
area should be adopted as it provides the basis for what 
accounting schools and business schools should be providing to 
potential accountants and business persons which we are 
developing for the future.
Professional Certification Examinations and Continued 
Professional Educations; It is not necessary to extend the 
certification requirements or continued professional education as 
the profession has made adequate advances. The requirements of 
the AICPA are sufficient.
The recommendations by the National Commission of Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting should be adopted for use by the SEC with 
modifications as mentioned in the comments. Hopefully, this 
response will be helpful to the commission in defining the needs.
Sincerely,
Jerry T. Walker
JTW/pl
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Mr. G. Dewey Arnold 
Executive Director 
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 300 
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Mr. Arnold:
We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the
recommendations in the April 1987 Exposure Draft of the Report of the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
We are generally in agreement with the recommendations included
in the report and support the Commission's efforts to identify the causes 
of fraudulent financial reporting and identify steps to reduce its 
incidence. Our comments will cover those areas which we feel warrant 
further consideration or in which we have a particularly high level of 
support and interest.
We encourage further consideration of the following recommenda­
tions which we feel are unnecessary or impractical:
• We believe it is impractical for audit committees to approve 
financial results prior to public release. The timely review 
of financial results with the Audit Committee, discussion of 
significant changes in accounting or financial reporting 
practices, and approval of Form 10-Q before filing with the 
SEC should constitute adequate oversight measures. •
• We believe that advance approval of independent public 
accountants' management advisory services would be impractical 
and would inappropriately place the Audit Committee in an 
operating role. However, we feel that the Committee's 
oversight role should include a review of the management 
advisory services by the independent public accountants
in order that it may determine whether the extent of such 
services impairs objectivity.
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• We generally satisfy the requirement for independent public 
accountant's review of quarterly financial data in that a high 
level review is performed prior to each quarterly earnings 
press release and a complete review is completed before final 
release of 10Qs to the SEC. However, in our view, such a 
requirement for smaller firms would be onerous and extremely 
costly. Furthermore, if this recommendation is meant to 
require more extensive testing prior to quarterly press 
releases, we have a real concern in that such additional 
review would delay the release of earnings data and increase 
the risk of financial information being leaked on a selective 
basis.
• We believe independent public accountants should design audits 
to detect material errors in financial statements. While the 
risk of fraudulent financial reporting should be considered in 
developing audit plans, we feel it would be inappropriate to 
rely upon the audit for assurance of fraud detection. To do 
so would tend to detract from management's responsibility for 
fraud prevention and detection, would increase the audit fees 
and would not significantly affect the end result.
We strongly agree and support the Commission's view that the SEC 
should reconsider its long-standing position against corporate indemnifica­
tion. The perceived directors' and officers' insurance liability crisis 
could have a negative impact on financial reporting. In order to ensure 
qualified directors are available, indemnification should be allowed and 
the SEC should reconsider its position.
We are impressed with the comprehensiveness of the Commission's 
study and feel that your recommendations form a balanced response to 
fraudulent financial reporting. Our company is giving further considera­
tion to implementation of those few recommendations in which we presently 
do not fully comply.
Sincerely
Vice Chairman and 
Chief Financial Officer
8 A M E R IT E C H   
AMERICAN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
R O B E R T  P. S C H A E N
Vice President 
and Comptroller June 29, 1987
30 South Wacker Drive 
Chicago, Illinois 60606 
312/750-5250
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr.
Chairman
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Dear Mr. Treadway and Fellow Commissioners:
The Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
(Commission) is an excellent treatise on fraudulent financial reporting and 
American Information Technologies Corporation (Ameritech) supports the overall 
goal of the Commission. Most of the recommendations concerning public 
companies are being practiced at Ameritech today, therefore our comments will 
be brief and to the point. In addition to commenting on the public company 
recommendations, we also comment on the independent public accountant 
recommendations where they directly affect their business relationship with 
us.
AMERITECH'S REPLY COMMENTS
Tone at the Top
We are in basic agreement with the recommendations in this area. We believe 
the heading "Tone at the Top" captures the essence of what top management can 
do to prevent fraudulent financial reporting. However, in a large complex 
organization, top management must be able to rely on personnel with the 
professional skills to identify and assess factors that contribute to 
fraudulent reporting. Top management's obligation is to require that risk 
analyses be performed, evaluate the results, formulate policy and endorse 
appropriate changes. We suggest that your final recommendation focus more on 
management's initiation of appropriate actions and recognize the fact that top 
management's ability to place reliance on skilled professional employees is 
integral to running a well controlled company.
The recommendation concerning the establishment of "...internal controls that 
are adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting..." implies 
that management has the ability to reduce the potential for such reporting to 
a zero probability level. It has long been recognized in accounting and 
financial literature that there is a trade-off between the cost and associated 
benefits of implementing internal controls. In order to balance the interests 
of stockholders, creditors and customers, management necessarily evaluates 
cost/benefit trade-offs implicit in control systems. NO system of internal 
control can be so effective that it eliminates the possibility of fraudulent 
reporting and still remain affordable to customers and investors. We suggest 
that your final recommendation reflect this trade-off and indicate that it is 
more reasonable to seek systems that reduce the potential for fraudulent 
reporting to a low probability level.
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Accounting and Internal Audit
We agree with the recommendations in this area.
Audit Committee of the Board of Directors
We share the Commission's view that audit committees play a significant role 
in the financial reporting process. Their role is oversight in nature and 
they must be able to rely on management and outside professionals. Oversight 
is exercised by being knowledgeable of the company's business, asking 
appropriate questions and pursuing relevant issues. All of these things are 
largely accomplished through open and effective communications with management 
and outside professionals, such as the independent public auditor. Although 
the audit committee should be vigilant, they also have a right to place 
reliance on management and others to provide appropriate and accurate 
information. The audit committee also has a right to rely on the advice and 
counsel of experts. They can place reliance on others and still fulfill their 
integral role in the financial reporting process.
Although the Commission's recommendations emphasize the responsibilities of 
audit committees, they do not adequately recognize the nature of audit 
committees and the inherent limitations imposed on their role as overseers of 
the financial reporting process. We suggest that the recommendations in this 
area be placed in the context within which audit committees actually function
--- they provide oversight and must place substantial reliance on management
and external experts. By not providing the appropriate balance between the 
responsibilities of audit committees and the means by which they meet their 
responsibilities, the essence by which audit committees operate is missed and 
could potentially expose audit committee members to more liability than is 
justified.
We agree that the audit committee should have a written charter and it should 
be approved by the Board of Directors. However, we feel that an annual review 
of the charter is unnecessary and will become a perfunctory process. We 
believe the charter should be written in broad terms that identify the 
committee's major responsibilities. The charter should only be reviewed as 
the need arises, such as a significant change in the company's business 
environment (e.g., the company enters foreign markets for the first time).
We believe that the audit committee should have all the resources necessary 
for them to adequately fulfill their responsibilities. We believe these 
resources should come from the existing staff within the company and be used 
by the audit committee as the need arises.
We are in substantial agreement that management advisory services (MAS) should 
be reviewed and approved by the audit committee. However, no evidence exists 
to indicate that MAS detracts from the auditor's independence. Moreover, the 
audit committee already has the responsibility of evaluating situations which 
bear upon the auditor's independence. All MAS should be approved by the audit
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committee either before the service is rendered, or after. For practical 
reasons, a range of services which are of a routine operating nature may be 
pre-approved by the audit committee and reviewed in more detail with the 
committee after the fact. Those services which are more sensitive in nature, 
and which, in the audit committee's judgment may be perceived as influencing 
the auditor's independence, e.g., executive search services, actuarial 
services, etc., should be approved on a case by case basis by the Audit 
Committee in advance.
Reporting to the Public on Management and Audit Committee Responsibilities
We agree with the improvements you recommend for communicating management's 
responsibilities to the public. However, inclusion of a report from the audit 
committee chairman would result in predominantly redundant information and 
would become a perfunctory letter that no one will read. The report indicated 
that "...the audit committee members' awareness and acceptance of the 
importance of their responsibilities..." would be reinforced by such a letter. 
With the attention given by the media to shareholder suits and large 
settlements, the reality is that audit committee members, and board directors 
in general, are very much aware of their responsibilities. The fact that some 
companies are having difficulty obtaining qualified directors is clear 
evidence that awareness of the responsibilities at the board and audit 
committee levels is simply not an issue.
Additional Recommendations
We agree that the audit committee has a responsibility for the quarterly 
reporting process, just as it does for the annual reporting process. Whether 
a specific audit committee needs to improve their oversight of quarterly 
reporting depends on the individual facts and circumstances. In any event, we 
do not believe that the audit committees will significantly deter fraudulent 
financial reporting by approving quarterly financial results prior to public 
release. The quarterly financial reporting process is but one element of the 
entire system of internal control. The entire system is subject to the audit 
committee's oversight. In exercising its oversight responsibilities, the 
audit committee has a right to rely on management and the company's auditors 
(internal and independent). The internal and independent auditors have free 
and full access to the audit committee and its individual members.
Independent auditors should be required to review quarterly data prior to 
public release (and they do at Ameritech). The independent and internal 
auditors are obligated to inform the audit committee on a timely basis of 
material control deficiencies, including deficiencies associated with 
quarterly financial reporting. These relationships and processes provide the 
basis for preventing and detecting fraudulent financial reporting. By 
ensuring that these processes and lines of communication are in place, the 
audit committee has fulfilled its oversight responsibilities. Adding 
additional meetings would not be meaningful.
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Setting Standards for Internal Control
We believe that establishing an additional body to guide public companies on 
internal control concepts would not be productive. The report mentions that 
there have been varying interpretations and philosophies concerning internal 
control and sometimes disagreements occur between independent accountants, 
management and internal auditors over internal control issues. The report 
implies that the source of the disagreements result from the fact that many 
organizations study this issue. We do not believe that there has been 
sufficient work performed in this area to identify a cause and effect 
relationship. We believe that there can be disagreements in this area because 
it is a complex subject and not easily adaptable to precise or quantitative 
measurements. Including one more organization to study the matter will not 
improve the situation in light of the fact that the proposed new organization 
will be no more authoritative than the other organizations. Debates will 
continue and in most instances the debates are healthy in attempting to 
measure the costs and benefits associated with internal controls.
Other
With regard to those recommendations within the public company section for 
which we have not provided a specific reply, we are in basic agreement with 
the Commission's recommendations.
Independent Public Accountants
With regard to the Commission's recommendations concerning independent public 
accountants, there are three that we feel it is appropriate for us to comment. 
The three relate to:
. Establishing standards requiring independent accountants perform analytical 
review procedures;
. The requirement that independent accountants review quarterly financial data 
prior to public release; and,
. The requirements concerning concurring or second partner reviews.
These three areas deal directly with the independent accountant's engagement 
performance. In our view, all three add to the quality of services rendered 
by the public accountant and we agree with them.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide input and we hope you will consider 
our views as you develop the final report.
Sincerely,
N A T I O N A L  A S S O C I A T I O N  O F  A C C O U N T A N T S  
10 P A R A G O N  DRIVE 
M O N T V A L E , N E W  JERSEY 0 7 6 4 5 -1 7 6 0  
(2 0 1 )5 7 3 -9 0 0 0
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G e n t le m e n :
T h e  M a n a g e m e n t A c c o u n t i n g  P r a c t i c e s  (M AP) C o m m it te e  
o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  A c c o u n t a n t s  a p p r e ­
c i a t e s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  e x p r e s s  o u r  p o i n t s  o f  
v ie w  o n  t h e  REPORT OF THE N A T IO N A L  C O M M ISS IO N  ON 
FRAUDULENT F IN A N C IA L  R E P O R T IN G . We a p p la u d  t h e  
C o m m is s io n  o n  i t s  e x h a u s t i v e  r e s e a r c h  a n d  d o c u m e n ­
t a t i o n ,  a n d  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  e f f o r t  i s  a 
m a jo r  a c h ie v e m e n t  e x e m p la r y  f o r  p r e s e n t  a n d  f o r t h ­
c o m in g  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n i t i a t i v e s  t o  m i n im iz e  t h e  
i n c i d e n c e  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  I t  
i s  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  s u c h  a n  e f f o r t  h a s  b e e n  p e r ­
c e i v e d  n e c e s s a r y ,  a s  t h e  p r o b le m s  c a u s e d  b y  o n l y  a 
f e w  h a v e  c r e a t e d  c o n c e r n s  f o r  m a n y .  We n o t e  t h a t  
m o s t  c o m p a n ie s  a r e  h o n e s t  a n d  t h a t  m a n y  h a v e  lo n g  
a d h e r e d  t o  m o s t  o f  t h e  r e p o r t ’ s  g u i d e l i n e s .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  w e a r e  c o n c e r n e d  t h a t  y o u r  e f f o r t  a n d  
t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  o t h e r s  a r e  t e n d i n g  t o  b e  o v e r r e a c ­
t i v e  a n d  p o t e n t i a l l y  l e a d i n g  t o  c o s t  i n e f f i c i e n t  
p r a c t i c e s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  we w o u ld  e n c o u r a g e  
m e m b e rs  o f  t h e  b u s in e s s  c o m m u n i t y  t o  a s s i m i l a t e  
t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  a n d  t o  c o m p ly ,  i n  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e  
d e p e n d in g  u p o n  e a c h  m e m b e r 's  s i z e  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  
a b i l i t y ,  w i t h  i t s  s p i r i t .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  NAA w i l l  
h e l p  d i s s e m i n a t e  a n d  p u b l i c i z e  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t .  
M o r e o v e r ,  we t r u s t  t h a t  t h i s  p r o c e s s  w i l l  p r e c l u d e  
a n y  p e r c e i v e d  n e e d  f o r  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i o n  a s  a 
c u r e  f o r  t h e  p r o b le m s  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  r e p o r t .
O u r  c o m m e n ts  r e g a r d i n g  c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c  re c o m m e n ­
d a t i o n s  f o l l o w .  We h a v e  n u m b e re d  e a c h  re c o m m e n ­
d a t i o n  f o r  e a s e  o f  r e f e r e n c e  ( s e e  t h e  a t t a c h m e n t ) .
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY
The Tone a t  th e  Top and A c c o u n tin g  F u n c t io n  and C h ie f  A c c o u n tin g  
O f f ic e r
We f u l l y  a g re e  w i t h  th e  d e g re e  o f  im p o r ta n c e  t h a t  th e  C o m m is s io n  
h a s  p la c e d  on  th e  to n e  s e t  b y  to p  m anagem ent and  th e  need  f o r  an 
e f f e c t i v e  a c c o u n t in g  f u n c t i o n .  To  f u r t h e r  e n h a n c e  th e  d is c u s s io n  
o f  e t h i c s ,  th e  C o m m is s io n  s h o u ld  c o n s id e r  in c lu d in g  i n  th e  a p p e n ­
d ic e s  th e  c o d e s  o f  e t h i c s  o f  th e  s p o n s o r in g  o r g a n iz a t io n s .
Recommendation 2 : P u b l ic  com panies s h o u ld  m a in ta in  in t e r n a l
c o n t r o ls  t h a t  a re  adequa te  to  p re v e n t and d e te c t  f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .
I t  i s  v i r t u a l l y  im p o s s ib le  t o  p r e v e n t  f r a u d ,  e s p e c ia l l y  i f  i t  
in c lu d e s  c o l l u s i o n ,  o n c e  p e r p e t r a t o r s  s e t  t h e i r  m in d s  t o  i t .  
We recom m end t h a t  th e  C o m m is s io n  s u b s t i t u t e  " t o  r e a s o n a b ly  
a s s u re  th e  p r e v e n t io n  and d e t e c t io n  o f "  f o r  " t o  p r e v e n t  and 
d e t e c t . "
I n t e r n a l  A u d it  F u n c t io n  and C h ie f  I n t e r n a l  A u d ito r
Recommendation 5 : P u b l ic  com panies s h o u ld  m a in ta in  an e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  s t a f f e d  w i t h  an  a d e q u a te  num ber o f  
q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l a p p r o p r ia t e  t o  th e  s iz e  and th e  n a tu r e  o f  th e  
c o m p a n y .
O ur o n ly  c o n c e rn  w i t h  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n  i s  t h a t  i t  may be 
c o n s t r u e d  t o  r e q u i r e  th e  v e r y  s m a l l  p u b l i c  b u s in e s s  t o  h i r e  
som eone f o r  an  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  v i s - a - v i s  a s s ig n in g  
th e  f u n c t i o n  t o  an  e x i s t i n g  e m p lo y e e . T h e r e f o r e ,  we re c o m ­
mend t h a t  "a n d  p r a c t i c a l "  be  in s e r t e d  a f t e r  " a p p r o p r i a t e . "
Recommendation 6 : P u b l ic  com panies s h o u ld  e n su re  t h a t  t h e i r
in t e r n a l  a u d i t  fu n c t io n s  a re  o b je c t iv e .
We g e n e r a l l y  a g re e  w i t h  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n ,  b u t  we s u g g e s t  
e x p a n d in g  th e  d is c u s s io n  on  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  I n  i t s  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  th e  re c o m m e n d a t io n ,  th e  C o m m is s io n  s t r o n g ly  
e n c o u ra g e s  a r e p o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w h e re b y  th e  c h i e f  i n t e r ­
n a l  a u d i t o r  r e p o r t s  d i r e c t l y  t o  th e  CEO. F u r th e r m o r e ,  th e  
o r g a n iz a t io n  c h a r t  on  p ag e  15 f o r  "T h e  P u b l i c  C om pany" i n d i ­
c a te s  t h a t  th e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  r e p o r t s  d i r e c t l y  t o  
th e  CEO. We d is a g r e e  w i t h  th e  e m p h a s is  p la c e d  o n  t h i s  o r g a ­
n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  and f e e l  t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  n o t  be  w o rd e d  so  
r e s t r i c t i v e l y .
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Since the CFO takes an active role in the prevention of fraud 
(and "...should be held responsible for fraudulent financial 
reporting," according to page 32), he should also take an 
active part in the scope of the internal audit function. 
Hence, it is often more appropriate for the chief internal 
auditor to report to the CFO. Therefore, the report should 
deemphasize the reporting relationship with the CEO and 
recognize more explicitly that the appropriate reporting 
relationship depends on what is practical for the particular 
company. More emphasis, however, should be placed on the 
chief internal auditor's full and free access to the audit 
committee and CEO (and they to hi m ) .
In addition, we disagree with the discussion insofar as it 
requires a trained professional auditor in the chief audi­
tor's position. For some companies this is impractical, for 
others undesirable. The discussion should instead state that 
the position be staffed by a person qualified to manage the 
function, as deemed appropriate by both management and the 
audit committee.
Mandatory Independent Audit Committee
In addition to our comments below, we do have a general con­
cern with the overall recommended role of the audit commit­
tee. We are concerned with the Commission's objective to 
make the audit committee deeply involved in the financial 
reporting process. It is possible that the Commission's 
recommendations will cause the audit committee to become so 
embroiled in the financial reporting process that it will 
lose sight of its oversight role and become a mirror image 
of management, hence losing the independent control aspects 
the Commission is trying to achieve.
Recommendation 9 : The board of directors of all public companies
should be required by SEC rule to establish audit committees 
comprised solely of independent directors.
We support the concept of this recommendation, but we are 
concerned that it may be difficult to implement for small 
companies that are not covered by current NYSE rules. Rather 
than recommending an SEC mandate, we propose that the 
Commission recommend that the private sector take the ini­
tiative in voluntarily implementing this recommendation and 
that the question be reexamined by the SEC after a period of 
time.
Recommendation 1 4 : The audit committee should approve in advance
the types and the extent of management advisory services that 
management plans to engage the company's independent public 
accountant to perform.
National Association of Accountants •  10 Paragon Drive •  Montvale, New Jersey 07645-1760 • (201) 573-9000
-4-
We agree with the intent of this recommendation, but we take 
exception to the proposed implementation. Prior approval 
would involve the audit committee in operational concerns.
The audit committee should be made aware of these services in 
order to judge the independence of the public accountant (as 
cited in the previous recommendation) and to ensure that 
controls are in place, and should be kept informed as to the 
progress and completion of such projects. However, prior 
approval and review is impractical and unnecessary.
Reporting on Responsibilities in the Annual Report to
Stockholders
Recommendation 1 6 : All public companies should be required by
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders a 
letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee describing 
the committee's responsibilities and activities during the year.
The financial sections of many annual reports already include 
a report from management and a report from the independent 
public accountant. The requirement of a letter from the 
chairman of the audit committee would clearly constitute a 
case of information overload. The value of an audit commit­
tee lies in its oversight responsibility, not in its publi­
city. The reporting relationship the audit committee has 
with the board of directors carries with it an implication 
that the committee is fulfilling its responsibilities. A 
listing of the committee's members, a description of its 
duties, and the frequency of their meetings should be more 
than sufficient.
Seeking a Second Opinion
Recommendation 1 7 : Management should advise the audit committee
when it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
Does the Commission have in mind both informal and formal 
second opinions? We believe it should be made clear that 
this Report is not addressing the many and varied types of 
informal discussions that do take place between represen­
tatives of companies and other audit firms? e.g. at pro­
fessional meetings, at conferences, etc.
Recommendation 1 8 : When a public company changes independent
public accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to disclose 
publicly the nature of any material accounting or auditing issues 
discussed with its old and new auditors during the three-year 
period preceding the change.
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In general, we feel that this recommendation is burdensome 
and does not improve the existing financial reporting system. 
The C o m m i s s i o n 's recommendation implies that the underlying 
motivation of changing auditors is merely to improve the 
financial results. There are many valid reasons why a com­
pany might seek to change its auditors. Changes in auditors 
are management's prerogative.
During the normal course of a year, as well as a year-end 
audit, there are numerous client/auditor discussions on 
various material issues from which agreements and disagree­
ments result. To disclose these discussions would be unduly 
burdensome, and could violate a company's proprietary 
interests, even where the issue in question did not come to 
fruition. We believe current SEC Form 8-K requirements to 
disclose changes in and disagreements with auditors are ade­
quate to keep the public informed.
Quarterly Reporting
Recommendation 1 9 : Audit committees should increase their over­
sight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight should
include approving financial results prior to public release.
We agree with the general intent of this recommendation, but 
we believe individual audit committees should determine their 
involvement in the quarterly reporting process. An effective 
audit committee is continually involved in the assessment of 
the company's internal controls. This work would be the 
basis for their judgment as to the need to review and approve 
financial results prior to public release. In addition, the 
audit committee's pre-clearance of financial results would 
create many practical difficulties and would delay the time­
liness of the release, thereby inhibiting the flow of infor­
mation to the public. This recommendation should be optional 
rather than mandatory.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
Overall, the recommendations in this chapter are very good. We 
support the concepts proposed by the Commission and commend the 
AICPA and the Auditing Standards Board for their initiatives 
in addressing these issues. We generally support each of the 
specific issues, but we have cost/benefit concerns throughout the 
section. The following comments are limited since these issues 
are presently being addressed in the AICPA's due process pro­
ceedings.
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Im prov ing  D e te c t io n  C a p a b i l i t i e s
Recom m endation 2 3 : The SEC sh o u ld  r e q u i r e  in d e p e n d e n t p u b l ic
a c c o u n ta n ts  to  re v ie w  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  d a ta  o f  p u b l ic  com­
p a n ie s  b e fo r e  r e l e a s e  t o  th e  p u b l i c .
We a g re e  w i t h  th e  i n t e n t  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n  i n  t h i s  recom m en­
d a t i o n ,  b u t  we f e e l  t h e r e  may be s i g n i f i c a n t  c o s t  j u s t i f i c a ­
t i o n  p ro b le m s  w i t h  i t .  We a g re e  t h a t  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t s  p la y  
an  im p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  th e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  b u t  i t  
i s  u n c le a r  as  t o  w h e th e r  o r  n o t  th e  r e v ie w  o f  q u a r t e r l y  
f i n a n c i a l  d a ta  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e le a s e  w i l l  h e lp  t o  d e t e c t  
f r a u d .  We a c k n o w le d g e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a b e n e f i t  t o  a l i m i t e d  
r e v ie w ,  b u t  we f e e l  t h a t  th e  in c r e m e n ta l  b e n e f i t  may be o f f s e t  
b y  th e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t  i n c u r r e d ,  t im in g  p ro b le m s  c r e a t e d ,  and 
th e  in d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r ' s  s t a f f i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
Im prov ing  A u d it  Q u a l i ty
Recom m endation 2 5 : The A ICPA 's SEC P r a c t i c e  S e c t io n  re q u ire m e n t
f o r  a c o n c u r r in g ,  o r  s e c o n d  p a r t n e r ,  r e v ie w  o f  th e  a u d i t  r e p o r t  
s h o u ld  be r e v is e d  as p a r t  o f  an  o n g o in g  p r o c e s s  o f  r e v ie w  o f  t h i s  
r e q u i r e m e n t .  S ta n d a rd s  f o r  th e  c o n c u r r in g  r e v ie w  s h o u ld ,  among 
o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  (1 ) r e q u i r e  c o n c u r r in g  r e v ie w  p a r t n e r  in v o lv e m e n t  
i n  th e  p la n n in g  s ta g e  o f  th e  a u d i t  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  th e  f i n a l  
r e v ie w  s ta g e ,  (2 ) s p e c i f y  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  c o n c u r r in g  r e v ie w  
p a r t n e r  t o  r e q u i r e  p r i o r  e x p e r ie n c e  w i t h  a u d i t s  o f  SEC 
r e g i s t r a n t s  and f a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  th e  c l i e n t ' s  i n d u s t r y ,  and (3 ) 
r e q u i r e  th e  c o n c u r r in g  r e v ie w  p a r t n e r  t o  c o n s id e r  h im s e l f  a p e e r  
o f  th e  e n g a g e m e n t p a r t n e r  f o r  p u rp o s e s  o f  th e  r e v ie w .
We a r e  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  r e q u i r i n g  th e  c o n c u r r e n t  r e v ie w e r  t o  
be  in v o lv e d  i n  th e  p la n n in g  s ta g e  o f  th e  a u d i t .  I f  th e  
c o n c u r r e n t  r e v ie w e r  i s  to o  in v o lv e d  i n  th e  a u d i t ,  h i s  
o b j e c t i v i t y  w o u ld  be c o m p ro m is e d . We a r e  a ls o  c o n c e rn e d  
w i t h  th e  c o s t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t .
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEC AND OTHERS TO IMPROVE THE REGULATORY 
AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
A d d i t io n a l  SEC E n fo rcem en t R em edies
We s u p p o r t  th e  o v e r a l l  c o n c e p ts  d is c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t io n .  I n  
g e n e r a l ,  we f e e l  th e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  a r e  a p p r o p r ia t e ,  b u t  t h e r e  
may be a need  t o  b u i l d  i n  some c o n s t r a i n t s .  We a g re e  t h a t  th e  
SEC m u s t h a v e  s t r o n g  e n fo r c e m e n t  re m e d ie s  i n  o r d e r  t o  s t r e n g th e n  
d e t e r r e n c e ,  b u t  we a re  c o n c e rn e d  t h a t  t h e r e  may be some p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  a b u s e s .  We recom m end t h a t  th e  C o m m is s io n , i n  re c o m m e n d in g  
th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  SEC p o w e rs ,  a c k n o w le d g e  t h a t  f u l l  due  p r o c e s s  
and  d e f e n s iv e  re m e d ie s  a re  a v a i l a b l e .
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R ec o m m e n d a tio n  3 1 : T he SEC s h o u ld  h a v e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  i s s u e  a
c e a s e  and  d e s i s t  o r d e r  when a s e c u r i t i e s  la w  v i o l a t i o n  o r  an 
u n s o u n d  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r a c t i c e  i s  fo u n d .
The  te rm  u n s o u n d  c a n  d e s c r ib e  m any p r a c t i c e s  u n r e la t e d  t o  
g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p te d  a c c o u n t in g  p r i n c i p l e s .  We s u g g e s t  
r e s t a t i n g  th e  re c o m m e n d a t io n  as  f o l l o w s :
"T h e  SEC s h o u ld  h a ve  th e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  is s u e  a c e a s e  and 
d e s i s t  o r d e r  when a s e c u r i t i e s  la w  v i o l a t i o n ,  an o th e r w is e  
f r a u d u le n t  p r a c t i c e ,  o r  a d e p a r tu r e  f ro m  g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p te d  
a c c o u n t in g  p r i n c i p l e s  i s  f o u n d . "
F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n  R e g u l a t o r y  A g e n c ie s
R ec o m m e n d a tio n  3 8 : T he  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s
s h o u ld  p r o v id e  f o r  th e  e x c h a n g e  o f  in f o r m a t io n  b e tw e e n  th e  r e g u ­
l a t o r y  e x a m in e r  and  th e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n t .
We d is a g r e e  t h a t  th e  a u d i t o r  s h o u ld  be  e x p e c te d  t o  p r o v id e  
in f o r m a t i o n  d i r e c t l y  t o  r e g u l a t o r s .  An i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  an 
a u d i t  i s  th e  f r e e  f lo w  o f  in f o r m a t io n  b e tw e e n  th e  a u d i t o r  and 
th e  c l i e n t .  The  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  w o u ld  d e t r a c t  
f ro m  th e  a u d i t o r ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  o b t a in  t h i s  in f o r m a t i o n .  On 
th e  o t h e r  h a n d , we s u p p o r t  r e g u l a t o r s '  p r o v id in g  in f o r m a t io n  
t o  a u d i t o r s .
E n h a n c e d  E n f o r c e m e n t  by  S t a t e  B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n ta n c y
R ec o m m e n d a tio n  3 9 : S t a t e  b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n ta n c y  s h o u ld  im p le m e n t
p o s i t i v e  e n fo r c e m e n t  p ro g ra m s  t h a t  p e r i o d i c a l l y  w o u ld  r e v ie w  th e  
q u a l i t y  o f  s e r v ic e s  t h a t  th e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n ts  th e y  
l i c e n s e  r e n d e r .
We a g re e  w i t h  th e  i n t e n t  o f  t h i s  re c o m m e n d a t io n .  We f e e l ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  i t  i s  u n d u ly  o p t i m i s t i c .  T h e re  i s  a la c k  o f  
u n i f o r m i t y  b e tw e e n  s t a t e  b o a rd s  o f  a c c o u n ta n c y .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
th e  s t a t e  b o a rd s  s h o u ld  n o t  d u p l i c a t e  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  o t h e r  
o r g a n iz a t io n s .  T h is  p r o c e s s  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  a p e e r  r e v ie w ,  
w h ic h  i s  a l r e a d y  b e in g  a d d re s s e d  b y  th e  SEC.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EDUCATION
We f u l l y  a g re e  w i t h  th e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  i n  t h i s  s e c t io n .  
E d u c a t io n  o f  p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  th e  w o rk  f o r c e  
p la y s  an  i n t e g r a l  r o l e  i n  th e  p r e v e n t io n ,  d e t e c t i o n ,  and  d e t e r ­
r e n c e  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  We commend th e  
C o m m is s io n  on  i t s  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  th e  im p o r t a n t  r o l e  e d u c a t io n  
p la y s .  We e n c o u ra g e  e d u c a to r s '  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  th e  im p le m e n ­
t a t i o n  o f  th e s e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s .
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A ppendix  H -  Good P r a c t i c e  G u id e l in e s  f o r  A s s e s s in g  th e  R isk  o f  
F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c i a l  R e p o r tin g
The  C o m m is s io n 's  r e p o r t  d o e s  n o t  a d d re s s  o r  r e f e r  t o  l e g a l  
c o u n s e l ,  e i t h e r  in - h o u s e  o r  e x t e r n a l .  We e n c o u ra g e  th e  
C o m m is s io n  t o  in c lu d e  a r e fe r e n c e  t h a t ,  i n  an o b je c t i v e  
c a p a c i t y ,  g e n e r a l  c o u n s e l c a n  be an e f f e c t i v e  f o r c e  i n  
h e lp in g  t o  d e t e r  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
A ppendix M -  Good P r a c t i c e  G u id e l in e s  f o r  A u d it  C om m ittee 
C h a irm a n 's  L e t t e r
We do  n o t  f e e l  i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  t o  in c lu d e  t h i s  l e t t e r  i n  th e  
a n n u a l r e p o r t .  T h is  r e q u ir e m e n t  w o u ld  c r e a t e  u n n e c e s s a ry  
e x c e s s  in f o r m a t i o n .
* * * * * * * * * *
I n  c o n c lu s io n ,  th e  MAP C o m m itte e  w o u ld  a g a in  l i k e  t o  commend th e  
C o m m is s io n  on  i t s  a c c o m p lis h m e n t  and r e i t e r a t e  i t s  s u p p o r t  f o r  
a c h ie v in g  th e  s t a t e d  o b j e c t i v e s .  The MAP C o m m itte e  w o u ld  be 
p le a s e d  t o  f u r t h e r  d is c u s s  i t s  v ie w s  on  th e s e  is s u e s .
V ery t r u l y  y o u r s ,
W illia m  J .  I h l a n f e l d t
C hairm an
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N o  recommendations
C h a p t e r  T w o :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  P u b l i c  C o m p a n y
T h e  T o n e  at t he T o p
1 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  F o r  t h e  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  t o  d i s c h a r g e  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  o v e r s e e  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  i t  m u s t  i d e n t i f y ,  u n d e r s t a n d ,  a n d  a s s e s s  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  m a y  c a u s e  t h e  
c o m p a n y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  t o  b e  f r a u d u l e n t l y  m i s s t a t e d .
2  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  t h a t  a r e  a d e q u a t e  t o  p r e v e n t  a n d  
d e t e c t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  a n d  e n f o r c e  w r i t t e n  c o d e s  o f  c o r p o r a t e  c o n d u c t .  
C o d e s  o f  c o n d u c t  s h o u l d  f o s t e r  a  s t r o n g  e t h i c a l  c l i m a t e  a n d  o p e n  c h a n n e l s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t o  h e l p  
p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  A  c o m p a n y '  s  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  c o m p l i a n c e  
w i t h  t h e  c o d e  a n n u a l l y ,  i n c l u d i n g  c o m p l i a n c e  b y  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  r e p o r t  t h e r e o n  t o  t h e  b o a r d  o f  
d i r e c t o r s .
A c c o u n t i n g  F u n c t i o n  a n d  C h i e f  A c c o u n t i n g  Officer
4  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  a c c o u n t i n g  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  c a n  e f f e c t i v e l y  m e e t  
t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  o b l i g a t i o n s .
Internal A u d i t  F u n c t i o n  a n d  C h i e f  Internal A u d i t o r
5  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  a n  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  sta f f e d  w i t h  
a n  a d e q u a t e  n u m b e r  o f  q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  s i z e  a n d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y .
6  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  o b j e c t i v e .
7  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  I n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  n o n f i n a n c i a l  a u d i t  f i n d ­
i n g s  f o r  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .
8  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s '  
i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  a u d i t  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n d  p r o p e r l y  c o o r d i n a t e d  
w i t h  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .
M a n d a t o r y  I n d e p e n d e n t  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e
9  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  c o m p r i s e d  s o l e l y  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s .
10  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  b e  i n f o r m e d ,  v i g i l a n t ,  a n d  e f f e c t i v e  o v e r s e e r s  o f  t h e  f i n a n ­
c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  a n d  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
 
11 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  a  w r i t t e n  c h a r t e r  s e t t i n g  f o r t h  t h e  d u t i e s  a n d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  t h e  c h a r t e r ,  r e v i e w  i t  a t  l e a s t  
a n n u a l l y ,  a n d  m o d i f y  i t  a s  n e c e s s a r y .
1 2  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  h a v e  a d e q u a t e  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  a u t h o r i t y  t o  d i s c h a r g e  t h e i r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
1 3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  m a n a g e m e n t ’ s  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  f a c t o r s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e
i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ’ s  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .  B o t h  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  
a s s i s t  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  i n  p r e s e r v i n g  h i s  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
1 4  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  t y p e s  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y ’ s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ­
t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m .
R e p o r t i n g  o n  Responsibilities in the A n n u a l  R e p o r t  to S t o c k h o l d e r s
1 5  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l  
r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t s  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r  a n d  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  
o f f i c e r .  T h e  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t  s h o u l d  a c k n o w l e d g e  m a n a g e m e n t ’ s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l ,  d i s c u s s  h o w  t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w e r e  f u l f i l l e d ,  a n d  p r o v i d e  
m a n a g e m e n t ’ s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ’ s  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
1 6  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l  
r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  a  l e t t e r  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  c o m m i t t e e ’ s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r .
S e e k i n g  a  S e c o n d  O p i n i o n
1 7  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  M a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  a d v i s e  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  w h e n  i t  s e e k s  a  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n  o n  
a  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  i s s u e .
1 8  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  W h e n  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  c h a n g e s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  
r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  d i s c l o s e  p u b l i c l y  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a n y  m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t i n g  o r  a u d i t i n g  i s s u e s  
d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  i t s  o l d  a n d  n e w  a u d i t o r s  d u r i n g  t h e  t h r e e - y e a r  p e r i o d  p r e c e d i n g  t h e  c h a n g e .
Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g
1 9  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  
T h i s  o v e r s i g h t  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  a p p r o v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .
Setting S t a n d a r d s  for Internal C o n t r o l
2 0  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  s p o n s o r i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s h o u l d  e s t a b l i s h  a  b o d y  t o  g u i d e  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n i e s  o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
C h a p t e r  T h r e e :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t
R e c o g n i z i n g  Responsibility for De te c t i ng  F r a u d u l e n t  F i nancial R e p o r t i n g
2 1  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  s h o u l d  r e v i s e  s t a n d a r d s  t o  r e s t a t e  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t ’ s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  d e t e c t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  i n d e p e n ­
d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  ( 1 )  t a k e  a f f i r m a t i v e  s t e p s  i n  e a c h  a u d i t  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  s u c h  r e p o r t i n g  
a n d  ( 2 )  d e s i g n  t e s t s  t o  p r o v i d e  r e a s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e  o f  d e t e c t i o n .  R e v i s e d  s t a n d a r d s  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  
g u i d a n c e  f o r  a s s e s s i n g  r i s k s  a n d  p u r s u i n g  d e t e c t i o n  w h e n  r i s k s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d .
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Improving Detection Capabilities
22 Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards to require independent 
public accountants to perform analytical review procedures in ail audit engagements and should provide 
improved guidance on the appropriate use o f these procedures.
23 Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public accountants to review quarterly finan­
cial data o f public companies before release to the public.
Improving Audit Quality
24 Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section should strengthen its peer review program by 
increasing review o f audit engagements involving public company clients new to a firm. For each office 
selected for peer review, the first audit o f all such new clients should be reviewed.
25 Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section requirement for a concurring, or second part­
ner, review o f the audit report should be revised as part o f an ongoing process o f review o f this 
requirement. Standards fo r the concurring review should, among other things, (1) require concurring 
review partner involvement in the planning stage o f the audit in addition to the final review stage, (2) 
specify qualifications o f the concurring review partner to require prior experience with audits o f SEC 
registrants and familiarity with the client's industry, and (3) require the concurring review partner to 
consider himself a peer o f the engagement partner for purposes o f the review.
2 6 Recommendation: Public accounting firms should recognize and control the organizational and indi­
vidual pressures that potentially reduce audit quality.
Communicating the Auditor's Role
27 Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor’s standard report to state 
that the audit provides reasonable but not absolute assurance that the audited financial statements are free 
from material misstatements as a result o f fraud or error.
28 Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor’s standard report to describe 
the extent to which the independent public accountant has reviewed and evaluated the system o f internal 
accounting control. The Auditing Standards Board also should provide explicit guidance to address the 
situation where, as a result o f his knowledge o f the company’s internal accounting controls, the inde­
pendent public accountant disagrees with management’s assessment as stated in the proposed 
management’s report.
Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board
29 Recommendation: The AICPA should reorganize the Auditing Standards Board to afford a fu ll par­
ticipatory role in the standard-setting process to knowledgeable persons who are effected by and interested 
in auditing standards but who either are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public practice.
Chapter Four: Recommendations for the SEC and Others to Improve the 
________________ Regulatory and Legal Environm ent
Additional SEC Enforcement Remedies
30 Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to impose civil money penalties in administrative 
proceedings [including Rule 2(e) proceedings] and to seek civil money penalties from a court directly in 
an injunctive proceeding.
3 1  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  h a v e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  i s s u e  a  c e a s e  a n d  d e s i s t  o r d e r  w h e n  a  s e c u r i t i e s  
l a w  v i o l a t i o n  o r  a n  u n s o u n d  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r a c t i c e  is f o u n d
3  2 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  s e e k  e x p l i c i t  s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t y  t o  b a r  o r  s u s p e n d  c o r p o r a t e  o f f i c e r s  
a n d  d i r e c t o r s  i n v o l v e d  i n  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  f r o m  f u t u r e  s e r v i c e  i n  t h a t  c a p a c i t y  i n  a  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n y .
I n c r e a s e d  C r i m i n a l  P r o s e c u t i o n
3 3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  C r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  c a s e s  s h o u l d  b e  m a d e  a  
h i g h e r  p r i o r i t y . T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  c o n d u c t  a n  a f f i r m a t i v e  p r o g r a m  t o  p r o m o t e  i n c r e a s e d  c r i m i n a l  p r o s e ­
c u t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  c a s e s  b y  e d u c a t i n g  a n d  a s s i s t i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s  w i t h  
c r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n  p o w e r s .
I m p r o v e d  R e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t i n g  P r o f e s s i o n
3 4  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  r e q u i r e  a l l  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m s  t h a t  a u d i t  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  t o  
b e  m e m b e r s  o f  a  p r o f e s s i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h a t  h a s  p e e r  r e v i e w  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  o v e r s i g h t  f u n c t i o n s  a n d  
is a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  S E C , s u c h  a s  t h a t  s p e c i f i e d  b y  t h e  S E C P S  o f  t h e  A I C P A 's  D i v i s i o n  f o r  C P A  F i r m s .
3 5  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  t a k e  e n f o r c e m e n t  a c t i o n  w h e n  a  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  f i r m  f a ils  t o  
r e m e d y  d e f i c i e n c i e s  c i t e d  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n ’s  q u a l i t y  a s s u r a n c e  p r o g r a m .
S E C  R e s o u r c e s
3 6  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  m u s t  b e  g i v e n  a d e q u a t e  r e s o u r c e s  t o  p e r f o r m  e x i s t i n g  a n d  a d d i t i o n a l  
f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  h e l p  p r e v e n t ,  d e t e c t ,  a n d  d e t e r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n  R e g u l a t o r y  A g e n c i e s
3 7  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  C o m p t r o l l e r  o f  t h e  C u r r e n c y ,  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  B o a r d ,  t h e  
F e d e r a l  D e p o s i t  I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e  F e d e r a l  H o m e  L o a n  B a n k  B o a r d  ( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  F e d e r a l  
S a v i n g s  a n d  L o a n  I n s u r a n c e  C o r p o r a t i o n )  s h o u l d  a d o p t  m e a s u r e s  p a t t e r n e d  o n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’s  r e c ­
o m m e n d a t i o n s  d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  S E C  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e i r  o w n  r e g u l a t o r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r e l a t i n g  t o  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  u n d e r  t h e  f e d e r a l  s e c u r i t i e s  l a w s .
3 8  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c i e s  s h o u l d  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  e x c h a n g e  o f  
i n f o r m a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  e x a m i n e r  a n d  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .
E n h a n c e d  E n f o r c e m e n t  b y  S t a t e  B o a r d s  o f  A c c o u n t a n c y
3 9  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  S t a t e  b o a r d s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  s h o u l d  i m p l e m e n t  p o s i t i v e  e n f o r c e m e n t  p r o g r a m s  t h a t  
p e r i o d i c a l l y  w o u l d  r e v i e w  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  th e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  t h e y  l i c e n s e  
r e n d e r .
C o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  L i a b i l i t y  o n  A u d i t  Q u a l i t y
4 0  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P a r t i e s  c h a r g e d  w i t h  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  v a r i o u s  t o r t  r e f o r m  i n i t i a t i v e s  s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  liability c r i s i s  h o l d s  f o r  l o n g - t e r m  a u d i t  q u a l i t y  a n d  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t ' s  d e t e c t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
R e c o n s i d e r i n g  C o r p o r a t e  I n d e m n i f i c a t i o n
4 1  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  S E C  s h o u l d  r e c o n s i d e r  its l o n g - s t a n d i n g  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  th e  c o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i ­
f i c a t i o n  o f  d i r e c t o r s  f o r  liabilities t h a t  a r i s e  u n d e r  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  A ct  o f  1 9 3 3  i s  a g a i n s t  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a n d  
t h e r e f o r e  u n e n f o r c e a b l e .
C h a p t e r  F i v e :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  E d u c a t i o n
B u s i n e s s  a n d  A c c o u n t i n g  C u r r i c u l a
4  2  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h r o u g h o u t  t h e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l a ,  e d u c a t o r s  s h o u l d  f o s t e r  k n o w l ­
e d g e  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  m a y  c a u s e  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  
t h a t  c a n  l e a d  t o  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  its i n c i d e n c e .
4 3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l a  s h o u l d  p r o m o t e  a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  
f u n c t i o n  a n d  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s , i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l  e n v i r o n m e n t , i n  p r e v e n t i n g , 
d e t e c t i n g , a n d  d e t e r r i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
4 4  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : B u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  s t u d e n t s  s h o u l d  b e  w e l l - i n f o r m e d  a b o u t  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  
e n f o r c e m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  b y  w h i c h  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  p r i v a t e  b o d i e s  s a f e g u a r d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  s y s t e m  
a n d  t h e r e b y  p r o t e c t  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t .
4 5  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l a  s h o u l d  h e l p  s t u d e n t s  d e v e l o p  s t r o n g e r  a n a ­
lytical, p r o b l e m  s o l v i n g , a n d  j u d g m e n t  s k i l l s  t o  h e l p  p r e v e n t , d e t e c t ,  a n d  d e t e r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  w h e n  t h e y  b e c o m e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .
4 6  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l a  s h o u l d  e m p h a s i z e  e t h i c a l  v a l u e s  b y  i n t e g r a t ­
i n g  t h e i r  d e v e l o p m e n t  w i t h  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  s k i l l s  t o  h e l p  p r e v e n t ,  d e t e c t ,  a n d  d e t e r  
f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
4 7  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : B u s i n e s s  s c h o o l s  s h o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  f a c u l t y  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e i r  
o w n  p e r s o n a l  c o m p e t e n c e  a s  w e l l  a s  c l a s s r o o m  m a t e r i a l s  f o r  c o n v e y i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  skills, a n d  e t h i c a l  
v a l u e s  t h a t  c a n  h e l p  p r e v e n t ,  d e t e c t ,  a n d  d e t e r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
P r o f e s s i o n a l  C e r t i f i c a t i o n  E x a m i n a t i o n s
4 8  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : P r o f e s s i o n a l  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e x a m i n a t i o n s  s h o u l d  t e s t  s t u d e n t s  o n  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  
skills, a n d  e t h i c a l  v a l u e s  t h a t  f u r t h e r  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  t h a t  
p r o m o t e  its r e d u c t i o n .
C o n t i n u i n g  P r o f e s s i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n
4 9  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : A s  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  c o n t i n u i n g  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e d u c a t i o n ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s , a n d  c o r p o r a t e  a c c o u n t a n t s  s h o u l d  s t u d y  t h e  f o r c e s  a n d  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  t h e  r i s k  f a c t o r s  t h a t  m a y  i n d i c a t e  its o c c u r r e n c e ,  a n d  t h e  r e l e v a n t  e t h i c a l  
a n d  t e c h n i c a l  s t a n d a r d s .
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Baird, 
Kurtz & 
Dobson
Certified
Public
Accountants
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
Gentlemen:
We have read the Exposure Draft of the Report of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, April 1987. We appreci­
ate the Commission's willingness to give interested parties an 
opportunity to comment on its conclusions. The following observations 
are intended to highlight those conclusions we believe may have fallen 
short of the Commission's expressed objectives or those with which we 
disagree.
304 McDaniel Bldg. 
PO Box 1866 
Springfield,
Missouri 65805-1866 
417.831.7283
Recommendations for the Public Company
The "tone at the top" notion cannot be overemphasized. This hits a 
very important mark. Requiring top management to be knowledgeable 
about the company’s internal control system is wise, but requiring a 
public report on management's assessment is an invitation for boiler 
plate response. It is not reasonable to expect a top manager to 
report to the public that his company's controls are inadequate. It 
is reasonable to expect that manager to report on controls to the 
Board of Directors, who can not only ask questions to test that 
understanding, but also monitor corrective action. That would be a 
better approach.
We do not believe a code of corporate conduct will achieve very much. 
Employees do not take their cues about their employer's expectations 
from personnel handbooks; they imitate what they see around them. A 
corporate record of tough enforcement of candid reporting and account­
ing standards will achieve the correct tone rather than adopting a 
list of bromides.
Internal auditing can be very effective in a variety of situations, 
but making such a function mandatory is excessive. The size and com­
plexity of a company should dictate the need for internal auditing. 
The control environment should dictate the nature of internal audit 
work. This function should be expected to vary in emphasis and inten­
sity with differences in companies. We think insisting on the func­
tion for even the smallest public companies without specifying what 
the function is to achieve will create an ineffective activity that 
could actually increase the risks of undetected fraud.
W ith Offices In:
Arkansas
Kansas
Missouri
Nebraska
Oklahoma
Texas
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We believe placing a major responsibility for vigilance against fraud 
on the Board of Directors is correct. It should be the Board's choice 
whether that responsibility is delegated to the audit committee.
The Draft attempts to create an internal policeman in the form 
of the audit committee of independent directors. How can independent 
directors without the first hand benefit of audit procedures or man­
agement responsibility be adequately equipped to achieve the oversight 
role described in the Draft? If this notion were adopted, how would an 
independent director fulfill a requirement of "due care" in his 
duties? With the "right" to employ independent counsel, when would 
that duty be required? We suggest that the result of this would be to 
shift responsibility away from the Board to the committee.
A better approach is to require the independent public accountant and, 
if present, the internal auditor to meet with the Board of Directors 
and make a report on the matters described in the draft. That meeting 
should include a mandatory opportunity for independent directors to 
ask questions without management present. That places the responsi­
bility at the correct location and avoids making the Board and the 
committee adversaries.
The recommendation to form a body to develop internal control stan­
dards is disappointing. There is a great deal written about the con­
trol environment (even in the larger sense of the Draft). We question 
whether having another standard setting body will do anything produc­
tive other than create more quasi-regulation, internal corporate 
bureaucracy, and checklists. The call for new standards implies that 
"control" is somehow a mystery that needs definition. There is no 
hidden grand design. Instead, there is a need for meticulous 
understanding of each company's control problems. The "study" of 
internal control should be in the company's grassroots, not in a book.
We also point out that the Commission has itself recognized that many, 
if not most, frauds occurred outside the reach of traditional control 
systems. Consequently, more complex control organizations below top 
management are not likely to prevent a repetition of past frauds.
Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant
The discussion of "firm pressures" was not well developed and lacked 
recommendations that would solve problems. It should be a major con­
cern to all of us that competitive pressures in the auditing profes­
sion could compromise judgement or due care. Particularly, the Draft 
should consider whether those pressures ever prevent using the sea-
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soned judgement of veteran audit partners in each risk area. Many who 
have studied the ESM case believe that more seasoned partner involve­
ment was a major deficiency. The Draft needs to discuss that problem. 
It also needs to discuss frankly the counterproductive bidding process 
for audit engagements, and, in particular, the potentially disastrous 
results of "low balling" or "buying" audit engagements. The omission 
of this discussion is obvious.
Reorganization of the ASB is a major flaw in the Draft. Moving 
non-CPA's into an equal voting position just to give the cosmetic 
effect of "fulfilling the public policy aspects" is absurd. Audit 
standards setting is not and has not been a closed club. There has 
been considerable public airing of the views of the profession on each 
standard adopted, and the public at large has certainly had the 
opportunity to provide input. To shrink the ASB and have it dominated 
by non-CPA's (because the non-CPA's could essentially block any 
CPA-proposed matter) will not expand or hasten the standard setting 
process. Also, the potential for large company and large firm domi­
nance of ASB activities is clear in the proposed structure. That not 
only offers the potential for ignoring the needs of small business and 
small practitioners, but could lead to accusations of restraint of 
trade and competition.
It is simply not true that by piling more standards on top of what now 
exists, we can eventually smother fraud. It is true, however, that by 
shrinking the standard setting body, moving non-practitioners into a 
veto position, allowing standard drafting to become a profession 
within the profession, we can expect standards proliferation, confu­
sion and lop-sided rules that treat public and private companies as if 
they were all the largest companies in the country.
Matters Not Considered in the Draft
There were other issues we would have liked to have seen discussed 
in the Draft, including:
1. Discussion of the pressures of constant, quick reporting about 
financial activity. While quarterly reporting may enhance the 
public relations and market activity of securities, they also 
place a very clear pressure for short-term performance. We 
believe this is a major cause for top management's first 
unintentional step toward fraudulent reporting. "Making it up in 
the next quarter" is a real danger that is always a potential in 
management thinking. A cultural environment that places less 
emphasis on day-to-day performance and a premium on long-term
National Commission on Fraudulent
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9 0 c
quality activity could relieve some of this pressure. It is dis­
appointing that the Draft did not deal in some detail with this 
problem.
2. Management's Discussion and Analysis is not receiving the atten­
tion which it needs. This can be an important tool for 
communicating the correct interpretation of financial reports. It 
can be the testing ground for whether the numbers “make sense", 
yet it is barely mentioned. The quality of MD&A and particularly 
its candor should be heavily considered in any solution.
Fairness to Small Business
With both disappointment and alarm, we call your attention to the 
Draft's assertions that small firms and small companies are the real 
sources of fraudulent reporting. The Draft's only cited evidence for 
this assertion is in the counting of SEC actions. On page 22 the 
Draft states "All these findings indicate that any numerical estimate 
of the incidence of. fraudulent reporting would be unsound". In light 
of that statement, the proposition that nonnational CPA firms are the 
deficient organizations simply because of the percentage of SEC 
actions is insulting. One could just as easily make a case that 
national firms are the culprits because their fraudulent actions are 
the really big losses, or perhaps one could point out that nearly all 
national firms have been subject to SEC action while a very low per­
centage of nonnational firms practicing before the SEC have been acted 
against. There is a prejudice suggested here that is quite 
disturbing, and in light of such names as ESM and Penn Square, it is 
hardly justified.
The core of the matter is that, regardless of size of firm, individual 
partner performance and willingness to share problems with others is 
the key to maintenance of quality in any firm. If any firm allows an 
audit partner to make crucial decisions under pressure without involv­
ing independent minds and providing escape valves for the pressure, 
then the potential for fraud is raised.
That is also true for small business. Top managers can use high level 
assistants, directors and internal auditors to help deal with 
pressures, or they can insulate themselves from needed advice. The 
need for control systems grows with the size and complexity of the 
company; it is not an inverse relationship as the Draft suggests (page 
25 - "disproportionately greater risk").
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We hope the Draft has provoked debate. We also hope that the 
Commission will carefully consider the issues raised and make signifi­
cant amendments to the Draft. By streamlining and supporting the 
recommendations, focusing on ways to attack causal factors, and 
discriminating between cosmetic proposals and substantive, practical 
ideas, the Draft can be amended to achieve many more of the 
Commission's and the profession's objectives.
Manhattan SCHOOL OF BUSINESSMANHATTAN COLLEGE PARKWAY
RIVERDALE. NEW YORK 10471
(212) 920-0223
ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT
WALTER O. BAGGETT. Ph.D.. CPA
CHAIRMAN
29 June 1987
College
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National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen,
As my letterhead indicates, I am an accounting academician. 
I also maintain a small but active accounting practice in order 
to maintain a level of real world auditing experience. I have 
attached a printout of my current resume to provide any 
additional information you might wish regarding my background.
I have read with interest the April 1987 exposure draft of 
your report. Before I begin my commentary, may I say that while 
it is no literary treasure, it is a reasonably well written 
document. I was able to follow the logical development of your 
recommendations as well as the explanation of their intent.
I have naturally found some difficulty in organizing my 
comments since I have so many. In general you will see that my 
principle area of interest is internal control. This is where 
most of my comments are directed.
One of the prime sources of difficulty is that you present 
conclusions in many places before you present details. That 
leaves a commentator the difficult position of hoping that you 
will provide the promised detail later on. If you do not, and a 
commentator does no notice the lack of follow up, the comment may 
be lost.
Given this difficulty, I will present my comments serially, 
following your test. At time some of the comments may be covered 
later. If they are not, the comment will not be lost. More than 
likely, when the later detail does come up, I will be able to 
expand my commentary. (P.S.: I define a Paragraph as any sub­
heading, including recommendations as well as widows from the 
previous page.)
1
Most important of all, despite my looking for it, I never 
came accross this "private sector body to provide future guidance 
on internal controls." Maybe you do recommend this later, but it 
did not seem to come up in my reading.
Page 8, Para. 1.
You indicate that the audit committee should also oversee 
the company's system of internal control. Begining here and into 
the detailed report, you never suggest how that should be done. 
As we shall see this is an ongoing problem.
Page 9, Para. 2.
You use the phrase "Peer review should be strengthened..." I 
have always had the lurking fear that we really do not know how 
effect peer review is. There seems to be a feeling that perhaps 
more is better. I would in particular suggest that the accounting 
profession go outside itself to other professions and study in 
detail how they conduct peer reviews.
Page 11, Para. 3.
I agree there is a particular need to increase the coverage 
of internal control throughout the business and accounting 
curricula. As we shall perhaps see, currently it is only men­
tioned in the first course in the discussion of accounting sys­
tems and then does not come up again until auditing. I believe 
the most important area where its impact must be felt is in the 
Computer Information Systems courses. These academicians should 
be addressed specifically in your findings, and not lumped with 
the other business faculty.
Page 28, Para. 5.
Once again I must disagree with your findings that tone "is 
the most important factor." The best analogy that comes to mind 
is the weakest link in the chain. Tone in my view has been the 
missing link in many frauds, but that does not make it the most 
important. No matter how honorable the intentions of management, 
without the proper detailed structure of accounting systems and 
control, financial reporting will be poor.
Page 29, Para. 4.
In the last sentence you state the audit committee should 
review risks. Once again, I would like to suggest you provide 
some sort of structure for the audit committee. What should they 
be looking for? Who should they call in? I would certainly sug­
gest outsider review and discussions with operational personnel 
as well as discussion with management. Asking a fraudulent man­
agement what is wrong is like asking the cat to guard the bird!
Page 40, Para 3.
Page 7, Para. 3.
First no matter how much tone there is at the top there must
be detailed substance to the system designed in detail. Next,
while I know it is mentioned later, compliance with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) should be mentioned immediately.
2
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As I anticipated, you finally got around to the FCPA. What 
is most embarrassing is the way you sold the SEC's proposed 
comments so short. Let us go back to a literal reading of the 
proposal.
As I recall the auditing CPA firm would have had to prepare 
a letter stating that adequate systems of internal control were 
in effect at the client during the entire year. How that turns 
into self-incrimination I do not know, unless you do not believe 
in the watch dog role of the auditor.
Perhaps here the issue may turn. I fear that like diligent 
auditor search for fraud in the client's operation, the role of 
the auditor serving as watch dog on client operations and con­
trols has disappeared too. I think both of these points need to 
be reiterated in the commissions finding.
Page 41, Para. 4.
Here is the type of engagement suggested by the SEC: "opine
publicly on a company's system of internal accounting control." 
As we proceed, I trust you will see why this will probably rarely 
be done.
Page 43, Para. 8.
At last we find what may be the "private sector body" sug­
gested in your summary of recommendations. I guess this must be 
it. Who is going to support it? How will it be structured and go 
about its business. I would suggest you strengthen this finding a 
good bit so people know what you are talking about. I trust I 
will be able to provide further suggestions as we go along.
Page 47, Para. 3.
As mentioned above the assumption of management's integrity 
must go by the boards. While this is easy to say, I feel you must 
address the fact that you are doing away with a major theoretical 
underpinning of modern auditing. You must, therefore, acknowledge 
this fact and indicate that from theory to text to firm policies 
and procedures manuals, there must be a realignment of the 
auditing literature.
Page 51, Para. 6-7.
I would like to see you expand this suggestion. I think we 
all know it is true, but there should be some methods built into 
the system that would contain these presures. Perhaps you should 
look at the competitive bidding environment of audits.
Page 53, Para. 7.
In this communication with the users of financial statements 
I think we are getting closer to the heart of the issue. I think
this kind of communication will be difficult if readers have no
idea what internal control is. After all if we need to educate
business and accounting students as to the concept, think of how 
difficult it will be to educate financial statement users.
Page 64, Para. 3.
3
9 1 c
I have read Mr. Connor's suggestion on SRO's. Unfortunately, 
I do not know the details of the law regarding these 
organizations, and I believe most people do not. I would like to 
see a brief explanation of what these organizations are or must 
do. It would help explain most subsequent comments.
Page 65, Para. 3.
The statement that "most independent public accountants are 
members" of the AICPA is problematic. The issue that many are no 
longer members because of the histrionics caused by the goings on 
of the SEC, even though it is for a good cause, would help to 
clear the air here.
Page 67, Para. 2-3.
Your final conclusion to throw out the SRO baby with the 
drowning of the organizations water does not seem to cut it. I 
think more time should be taken to see about tailoring the 
organization to fit the SRO concept still might work. As has been 
done with cutting out the division of firms, perhaps a fit can 
yet be achieved.
I have indicated above I may not understand SRO's well 
enough. In order to make your argument stick better, I think a 
little more explaining should be done. This may allow you to sell 
me on the idea that an SRO would reek too much havoc on 
accounting's professional organizations.
Page 160, Para. 5-8.
At last we have perhaps the heart of the problem; your 
discussion of what internal control is. Look at it. It is a 
mumbo-jumbo fo catch phrases and ideas. I would suggest to you 
that one of the corner stones of my criticism. Quite simply I do 
not believe there exists a sytematic explanation of internal 
control. Until such a framework is build nobody can say how much 
is enough. No firm will be thrilled about putting its signature 
to an opinion because they can always be second guessed. Until 
this issue is resolved, I believe you will not be able to resolve 
the issue you have chosen to address.
Thank you for this opportunity to comment on your exposure 
draft. It was fun reading, if you are an auditor.
Again, thanks and good luck.
Very truly yourrs
Walter O .  Baggett 
M.B.A.,Ph.D.,CPA
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I. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
Graduates University of California, Los Angeles
Graduate School of Business Administration 
Masters of Business Administration 
Majors Finance 
1968
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
School of Business Administration
Doctor of Philosophy
Majors Organizational Behavior
1973
Undergraduate: Hanover College 
Bachelor of Arts 
Majors Business Administration 
1966
Professional Certifications Certified Public Accountant
North Carolina 1973 
New York 1975
II. PROFESSIONAL/BUSINESS EMPLOYMENT
A. Educational Institutions
Manhattan College
Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of 
Accounting and Law 
1983 - Present
Fairfield University
Associate Professor of Finance and Management 
1981 - 1983
Baruch College, City University of New York 
Assistant Professor of Accountancy 
1978 - 1981
Carolina Population Center
Research Associate - Cost and Incidence of Pregnancy in 
Industry Project
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University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
Teaching and Research Assistant 
1969 - 1971
University of California, Los Angeles, School of Public 
Health
Junior Statistician 
1967 -1968
B. Business
New York Times Company 
Senior Internal Auditor 
9/76 - 9/78
Performance of Financial and Operational Audits 
including EDP auditing.
Operational audit of WQXR programming function and the 
New York Time Information Bank.
Health Examinetics
Controller
3/76 - 10/76
Total financial responsibility for a mobile# multi- 
phasetic health testing organization with a branch in 
California and health testing units throughout the 
country.
Donaldson# Lufkin & Jenrette
Assistant Controller for Accounting Systems
10/75 - 3/76
Responsible for financial reporting systems for a major 
brokerage firm including bringing on line a 
minicomputer bond system.
Solomon Brothers 
Senior Internal Auditor 
5/75 - 10/75
Worked on routine brokerage audits and a number of 
special systems review of extremely sophisticated 
brokerage back room systems.
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E r n s t  & W h i n n e y  
S e n i o r  A c c o u n t a n t  
1 / 7 3  - 5 / 7 5
A u d i t  s t a f f  m e m b e r  d o i n g  f u l l  v a r i e t y  of a u d i t s  
i n c l u d i n g  b a n k s ,  b r o k e r a g e ,  c o r p o r a t e  h e a d q u a r t e r s ,  n o t  
for p r o f i t  and o t h e r  a u d i t s .
P e a t ,  M a r w i c k ,  M i t c h e l l  & Co.
A u d i t  I n t e r n  
1 / 6 8  - 3 / 6 8
A u d i t  e x p e r i e n c e  d u r i n g  w i n t e r  t e r m  w h i l e  c o m p l e t i n g  M B A
C. P r o f e s s i o n a l  C o n s u l t i n g
A T & T ,  I n f o r m a t i o n  S y s t e m s  D i v i s i o n ,  C u s t o m  P r o g r a m ­
m i n g  S u p p o r t  S e r v i c e  C e n t e r ,  V a l h a l l a ,  N . Y .  
P r o v i d i n g  A c c o u n t i n g  a d v i c e  and s u p p o r t  in the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  and i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  c o m p u t e r i z e d  
a c c o u n t i n g  s y s t e m s
A c c o u n t i n g  P r a c t i c e :
M e m b e r s h i p  in t h e  P r o f e s s i o n a l  A c h i e v e m e n t  R e g i s t r y  of 
the N e w  Y o r k  S t a t e  S o c i e t y  of C e r t i f i e d  P u b l i c  
A c c o u n t a n t s
C l i e n t s :  H u d s o n  V a l l e y  D a y  C a r e  C e n t e r ,  C h r i s t i a n
C a m p s , I n c ,  G r e e n b u r g  P r e s b y t e r i a n  C h u r c h ,  V a r i o u s  
p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s
P r e p a r a t i o n s  of f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  a u d i t s  and tax 
r e t u r n s  o n  a l i m i t e d  b a s i s  to m a i n t a i n  " p a r t n e r  l e v e l "  
e x p o s u r e  to o p e r a t i o n  o f  an a c c o u n t i n g  p r a c t i c e .  T h e s e  
c o n t i n u i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h a v e  m a i n t a i n e d  a c u r r e n c y  in 
a c t u a l  a u d i t , a c c o u n t i n g  and tax p r a c t i c e  e x p e r i e n c e .
C a r r i e  S. F i n l a y s o n  
A u d i t  A s s i s t a n c e
P l a n n i n g  and s u p e r v i s i o n  of a u d i t s  for a C P A  w h o  
s p e c i a l i z e s  t a x a t i o n .  T h i s  i n c l u d e s  r e s e a r c h  in a c ­
c o u n t i n g  p r o b l e m s ,  s u p e r v i s i o n  of a u d i t  s t a f f ,  and 
p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  o p i n i o n s .  T h i s  e x p o s u r e  p r o v i d e s  l i v e  
e x p e r i e n c e  to s t a f f  p r e s s u r e s  e x i s t i n g  in c u r r e n t  p r a c ­
tice.
D ' A r c a n g e l o  & Co.
S t a f f  S p e c i a l i s t
V a r i e t y  of t e c h n i c a l  a s s i g n m e n t s  w i t h  r e g i o n a l  C P A  f i r m  
i n c l u d i n g  p u r c h a s e  and s u p e r v i s i o n  of C o n t i n u i n g  
P r o f e s s i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n  p r o g r a m s ,  r e v i e w s  and o p i n i o n s  
o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l ,  b r o k e r a g e  f i l i n g s ,  f i r m  p o l i c y  
m a n u a l ,  as w e l l  as g e n e r a l  tax, a u d i t  and a c c o u n t i n g  
w o r k .
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Kent Publishing Company 
Editorial Reviewer
Review for Third Edition of Porter
Controls and Auditing.
& Perry's EPP:
Business Publications, Inc.
Editorial Reviewer
Review for Second Edition of Apple Blossom Cologne 
Company, Audit Case
Joseph Eisdorfer & Co.
Senior Associate
Part-time accounting work with a three-partner New York 
City firm. Include monthly write-ups for clients and 
complete range of tax return preparation as well as 
handling specialized audits such as pension funds and 
large inventories.
III. PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
A. Professional Organization Activities
American Accounting Association
Member, Membership Committee 1984 - 1985 
Member, Administrators of Accounting Program Group 
Attended 1984, 1985, 1986 & 1987 - Administrators
of Accounting Program
1984 New Chairman's Seminar.
This membership assures that the accounting 
program maintains the maximum currency with 
other academic institutions.
Auditing Sections
Vice Chairman, Northeast Region 1982 - 84
Coordinations of Northeast Region Audit 
Section activities providing contact 
with all major auditing researchers in 
the area.
Member Auditing Standards Subcommittees 1982- 
Assignments through current work on 
levels of assurance subcommittee 
provides exposure to current literature 
proposals in auditing and to 
academicians working in the area.
Editor of the "Have You Seen?" Section of the 
Audit Report 1984-
A summary of all auditing related arti­
cles published during the last four 
months•
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Paper Discussant 1982 Northeast Regional Meeting 
Attended 1978 - 1985 Northeast Regional Meeting 
Attended 1980 - 1984 National Meeting 
Regular attendance at these meetings has meant 
continued contact with the leaders in pro­
fessional and research activities that has 
been reflected in my own research.
Ad Hoc Reviewer 1980 for The Accounting Review
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Member Audit Testing Techniques Subcommittee of 
the Auditing Standards Board ( Formerly the 
Statistical Sampling Subcommittee ) 1984 
1986
Member Inherent Risks Task Force 1984 - 1986
Work on this subcommittee of the Auditing 
Standards Board (which write U.S. Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards) provides expo­
sures to the nations most prominent practi­
tioners and researchers in developing the 
forthcoming authoritative auditing literature.
New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants 
Member Statistical Sampling and Other Quantitative 
Methods Committee 1975 - 1978, 1985 - 
Chairman beginning in 1986
Continuation of work with quantification of 
auditing procedure in the profession, Liaison 
with associated AICPA committee.
Member Relations with Higher Education Committee 
1984 - 1986
As a member of this committee, I represent 
the College's view in the shaping of the 
State Society's policy toward higher 
education. In addition to fighting the five 
year requirement for the CPA certificate, I 
am working on a guide to Colleges for CPA 
firms to improve recruiting on campus by 
small practice units.
Member Publications Committee 1982 - 1985
Society on a committee responsible for the 
budget of the CPA Journal 
Member Auditing Standards Committee 1978 - 1981
Review at state level of forthcoming auditing 
standards
Faculty Bank; Teaching Statistical Sampling Course 
Westchester County Chapter
Member Accounting And Auditing Procedures 
Committee 1982 - Chairman beginning in 1986 
Putting on annual accounting and
auditing update for local practitioners 
Member Accounting Careers Committee 1983 -
Arranging annual chapter meeting for 
area college students to introduce them 
to local job opportunities in accounting
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National Association of Accountants
Westchester Chapter, Director of Manuscripts 1984- 
Responsible for manuscript solicitation and 
presubmission review
American Psychological Association 
Attended 1979 National Meeting
Review of literature to maintain currency in 
this allied discipline
Volunteer for Volunteer Urban Consulting Group, Inc. on 
three separate minority business consulting 
projects: Pretty Body, Inc.
Puerto Rican Association for Community 
Development
Dominican Sisters of the Sick Poor
Member American Academy of Management
Maintenance of relationship with this important 
allied discipline
D. Professional Program Presentations
A T & T ,  General Business Systems
July 1985
Challenges Facing the Accounting Profession
Westchester Chapter National Association of Accountants
November 8, 1984
Internal Control In A Corporate Environment
This presentation also made to Gaines Foods 
Division of Anderson Clayton in February 1986
Westchester Chapter New York State Society of Certified 
Public Accountants Accounting and Auditing Update 
December 1, 1984
SAS # 39 Effect on Non-statistical Sampling
IV. PUBLICATIONS
A. Refereed Journals
"Using Time-Sharing Facilities for Statistical Sampling", 
CPA Journal, October 1977, Vol. 47, No. 10, p. 85
This article has been reference in Audit Sampling audit 
guide published by the AICPA
"Operational Auditing: A Management-Based Approach", The
Internal Auditor. February 1982, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp.44-45
This article takes traditional management concepts and 
applies them to important auditing problems
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This article represents a cross over of knowledge from 
the behavioral area and represents a major restructuring 
for the profession in its approach to this concept 
"Using Templates in Accounting and Auditing With 
Microcomputers", National Public Accountant, May 1985
This article represents a new thrust in publications 
with the addition of computer expertise to those 
aspects of accounting and auditing where I have build 
my professional reputation.
B. Other Journal Articles
"Internal Control: Some Practical Applications from a
General Systems Theory Perspective", Manhattan College 
Journal of Business, Spring 1984, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp.30-33
A further development of ideas presented earlier that 
meed to be sold to the profession
"Internal Controls Insight from a General Systems Theory
Perspective", Journal Accounting Auditing and Finance,
Spring 1983, Vol. 6, N o . 3, pp.227-223
C. Other Publications
Book Review of Statistical Auditing, by Donald M. Roberts, 
AICPA Publisher, CPA Journal, January 1979, Vol. 49, No. 1, 
p. 72
A review of a major publications effort of the 
Statistical Sampling Subcommittee that was in essence a 
failure in its attempt to educate the profession
Associate Editor, Current Auditing Literature and Author of 
"Have You Seen" section of The Auditor' s Report, Fall 1984, 
Vol. 8, No. 3 To Present
This quarterly publication requires that I review all 
current auditing literature and summarize the better 
ones.
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National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D. C. 2006Gentlemen:
We a p p r e c ia t e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  c o m m e n tin g  o n  t h e  e x p o s u re  
d r a f t  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  r e p o r t .  The  C o m m is s io n , com pose d  o f  
M e s s rs .  T re a d w a y , B a t t e n ,  K a n a g a , M a rs h , S t o r r s  a n d  T r a u t l e i n ,  and  
i t s  s t a f f  a r e  t o  b e  com m ended f o r  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f o r t  e x p e n d e d  
a n d  r e s u l t s  o b t a in e d .  On b a la n c e  we f i n d  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  t o  b e  r e a s o n a b le .  I n  f a c t ,  m any o f  t h e  
recom m ended  p r o c e d u r e s  a r e  a l r e a d y  i n  p la c e  a t  T e x a s  I n s t r u m e n t s  
(a n d  l i k e l y  m any o t h e r  l a r g e ,  w e l l  c o n t r o l l e d  f i r m s ) .We do, however, have coments regarding certain of the Commission's recommendations, as follows.Recommendation: For the top management of a public
com pan y  t o  d is c h a r g e  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  o v e rs e e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  i t  m u s t i d e n t i f y ,  u n d e r s ta n d ,  a n d  a s s e s s  
t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  may c a u s e  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  
t o  b e  f r a u d u l e n t l y  m is s t a t e d .Coment: The discussion of this recommendation in the
e x p o s u re  d r a f t  n o te s  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  i d e n t i f y i n g ,  
u n d e r s ta n d in g ,  a n d  a s s e s s in g  t h e  c o m p a n y 's  r i s k  e n v ir o n m e n t  
a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  s h o u ld  b e  p a r t  o f  a n  o n g o in g  p r o c e d u r e ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a s e p a r a te  m anagem ent p r o j e c t .  We a g r e e .
H o w e v e r, t h e  d r a f t  t h e n  n o te s  t h a t  t h e  CEO a n d  CFO "m u s t  
s u p e r v is e "  t h a t  p r o c e d u r e .  We b e l ie v e  th e s e  p o s i t i o n s  a r e  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  C e r t a i n l y  t h e  CEO a n d  CFO w i l l  h e lp  s e t  t h e  
e t h i c a l  t o n e  o f  t h e  com pany a n d  p r o v id e  g e n e r a l  o v e r s ig h t  o f  
t h e  o n g o in g  c o n t r o l / e n v i r o n m e n t  r e v ie w  a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  B u t  t o  r e q u i r e  o f  th e m  a 
s u p e r v i s o r y  r o l e  i n  t h i s  o n g o in g  p r o c e d u r e  i s  im p r a c t i c a l  and  
u n n e c e s s a r y .  We a r e  c o n c e rn e d  t h i s  e m p h a s is  o n  CEO/C FO  
in v o lv e m e n t  w i l l  e n c o u ra g e  e x t e n s iv e  a n d  e x p e n s iv e  s p e c ia l  
p r o j e c t s  t o  d o c u m e n t c o m p a n ie s ' c o n t r o l s  a n d  e n v ir o n m e n t  
r e m in is c e n t  o f  s i m i l a r  p r o j e c t s  a fe w  y e a r s  a g o  i n  r e a c t io n  
t o  t h e  F o r e ig n  C o r r u p t  P r a c t i c e s  A c t .We suggest the CEO/CFO discussion be revised to reflect that their general oversight role in the review process is sufficient.
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Recommendation: Public companies should maintain an
effective internal audit function staffed with an adequate 
number of qualified personnel appropriate to the size and the 
nature of the company.
Comment: According to the draft, a suggested criterion 
for an effective internal audit staff is compliance with 
standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). We 
concur, with one exception: the IIA requirement for periodic
review. There is currently considerable debate within the 
internal auditing profession as to the cost effectiveness of 
this particular procedure. Its implementation has been 
limited. Securing qualified internal auditors who can commit 
the necessary time is difficult. And, the use of external 
auditors to conduct peer review on internal audit 
organizations has generally been unsatisfactory. Another 
concern is that internal auditors frequently review 
proprietary operational procedures that must remain 
confidential within a select employee group. We believe 
external peer review is likely an uneconomical procedure that 
could risk competitive harm.
We suggest that the endorsement of external peer review 
be eliminated.
Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that
their internal audit functions are objective.
comment: In the discussion of this recommendation the 
Commission encourages an organizational structure whereby the 
chief internal auditor would report directly to the CEO or a 
senior officer who is not directly responsible for preparing 
the company's financial statements. The stated purpose is to 
enhance auditor independence. We believe this is an emphasis 
of form over substance. Auditor independence is basically 
derived from unrestricted access by internal audits to the 
audit committee and the CEO. The reporting structure is 
secondary. In terms of efficiency and effectiveness, it may 
be preferable for internal audits to report to a financial 
executive, such as the CFO, who is fully conversant with 
ongoing financial issues.
We suggest the emphasis in this section be redirected 
from organizational structure to the basic source of 
independence: unrestricted access.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required
by SEC rule to include in their annual reports to 
stockholders management reports signed by the chief executive 
officer and chief accounting officer. The management report 
should acknowledge management’s responsibilities for the 
financial statements and internal control, discuss how these 
responsibilities were fulfilled, and provide management’s
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
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assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal 
controls.
Comment: It appears that the Commission has attempted
in some degree to immunize this recommendation from the 
criticisms leveled at the SEC's management-report proposal 
withdrawn in 1980. Our principal criticism of the SEC 
proposal was that the SEC had not shown that the proposed 
reports were needed. We stated, "Until the [SEC] comes 
forth with some real evidence indicating the need for the 
reports, we believe there should be a presumption against the 
issuance of regulations requiring the reports." We believe 
this criticism, at least, is applicable to the Commission's 
proposal as well as the SEC's proposal.
Moreover, the objective of the Commission's proposal 
seems to be a management guarantee, rather than a report, 
regarding internal controls. For example, the management 
report used as an illustration in Appendix L to the 
Commission's report has the CEO and CFO categorically stating 
that the financial statements "are not misstated due to 
material fraud or error." Absent dishonesty, recklessness or 
naivete, it is difficult to understand how they could go 
beyond stating their belief that the company's internal 
controls provide reasonable assurance that the financial 
statements are not materially misstated due to fraud or 
error.
Likewise, in the illustration, the CEO and CFO state 
that the system of internal control "provides reasonable 
assurance" as to, among other things, the detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting. Again, it would seem that 
their statement should be limited to their belief or, 
preferably, to a representation that the system of internal 
control is designed to provide reasonable assurance as to the 
detection of fraudulent financial reporting, etc.
We recommend that the Commission either drop the 
recommendation regarding management reports or follow many of 
the current models of reports, based on the guidelines of the 
Financial Executives Institute, that include statements such 
as: "The Company maintains a system of internal controls
designed to provide reasonable assurances that its records 
include the transactions of its operations in all material 
respects and to provide protection against significant misuse 
or loss of Company assets."
Recommendation: All public companies should be required
by SEC rule to include in their annual reports to 
stockholders a letter signed by the chairman of the audit 
committee describing the committee's responsibilities and 
activities during the year.
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
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Comment: As discussed above, if a management report is
to be required, we favor the FEI-based management report 
model. As that model contains a description of the audit 
committee functions, this proposed letter would be redundant. 
We see no need to include numerous internal representations 
in the annual report. One is sufficient, as a complement to 
the independent auditor report.
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should 
revise standards to restate the independent public 
accountant's responsibility for detection of fraudulent 
financial reporting, requiring the independent public 
accountant to (1) take affirmative steps in each audit to 
assess the potential for such reporting and (2) design tests 
to provide reasonable assurance of detection. Revised 
standards should include guidance for assessing risks and 
pursuing detection when risks are identified.
Comment: We are concerned about the cost of extending
the external auditor's efforts to explicitly search for 
fraud. This differs from the current auditing guidance 
contained in SAS No. 16 which calls for the auditor to gauge 
the fairness of the financial statement presentation 
including the likelihood that fraud has distorted that 
presentation. We think this change could result in a 
significant increase in ongoing audit fees with no equivalent 
benefit in return to the vast majority of companies not 
engaging in fraudulent reporting.
While the Commission states in the Summary of 
Recommendations section that "....the benefits justify the 
costs", in this instance we remain unconvinced. We suggest 
the Commission attempt a cost/benefit analysis of this 
recommendation. Certainly, the costs will be available 
through company and auditor estimates. This recommendation 
should be dollarized before it is released as part of the 
final report. We believe its cost efficiency is 
questionable.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with the 
Commission or its staff as appropriate.
Sincerely,
Marvin M. Lane, Jr. 
Vice President and 
Corporate Controller
MML:ww
A N H E U S E R - B U S C H  C O M P A N IE S Osmond ConradVice President and Controller
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June 2 9 , 1987
M r. G. Dewey A rn o ld  
E x e c u t iv e  D ir e c to r  
N a t io n a l C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t 
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W.
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20006
Dear M r. A rn o ld :
We a re  p le a s e d  to  o f f e r  o u r  comments on c e r t a in  a s p e c ts  o f  th e  A p r i l ,  1987 
E xposure  D r a f t  t i t l e d  "R e p o r t o f  th e  N a t io n a l Com m ission on F ra u d u le n t 
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g " .  In  r e le a s in g  th e  E xposu re  D r a f t  f o r  p u b l ic  com m ent, th e  
N a t io n a l C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  ("C o m m is s io n ")  in d ic a te d  
i t  hoped to  g e n e ra te  r e a c t io n s ,  s u g g e s t io n s  and o p in io n s  fro m  th o s e  conce rned  
w i th  o r  a f fe c te d  by f r a u d u le n t  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  As a m a jo r  p u b l i c l y  owned 
c o r p o r a t io n ,  o u r  company and th e  A u d i t  C om m ittee  o f  o u r  Board o f  D ir e c to r s  is  
e x tre m e ly  in te r e s te d  in  th e  s u b je c t  o f  e x te r n a l f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  As s u c h , 
we commend th e  C om m ission in  i t s  w o rk  to  d a te  and i t s  p r im a ry  goa l o f  
i d e n t i f y in g  th e  m a jo r  f a c to r s  c o n t r ib u t in g  to  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  
p r a c t ic e s  and th e  e x te n t  to  w h ich  th e y  can be p re v e n te d  and a t  le a s t  d e te c te d .
We b e l ie v e  f o r  th e  m ost p a r t  th e  E xposu re  D r a f t  re p re s e n ts  a good summary 
o f  th e  s te p s  p u b l ic  com panies s h o u ld  c o n s id e r  im p le m e n tin g  in  o rd e r  to  
m in im iz e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .  H ow ever, we a ls o  
b e l ie v e  t h a t  c e r t a in  c o m m e n ts /s u g g e s tio n s  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  E xposure  D r a f t  a re  
o v e rs ta te d  and u n r e a l i s t i c  such t h a t  t h e i r  im p le m e n ta t io n  c o u ld  r e s u l t  in  a 
s u b s ta n t ia l  bu rden  on th e  company and i t s  A u d i t  C om m ittee  w i th o u t  c le a r  
b e n e f i t  t o  th e  company o r  i t s  s h a re h o ld e rs .
The s p e c i f i c  s ta te m e n ts  t o  w h ich  we r e f e r  and w h ich  re p re s e n t  th e  fo c u s  o f  
o u r  comments a re  as f o l lo w s :
•  C h a r a c te r iz a t io n  o f  th e  A u d i t  C om m ittee  as b e in g  th e  p r im a ry  v e h ic le  
used by Board o f  D ir e c to r s  t o  d is c h a rg e  t h e i r  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  w i th  
re s p e c t  t o  th e  com pany 's  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g ;  and
•  The c h ie f  in t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  s h o u ld  r e p o r t  a d m in is t r a t iv e ly  to  a s e n io r  
o f f i c e r  who is  n o t d i r e c t l y  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  p re p a r in g  th e  com pany 's  
f i n a n c ia l  s ta te m e n ts .
A u d i t  C om m ittee  R e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s
A nheuse r-B usch  s t r o n g ly  s u p p o r ts  th e  A u d i t  C om m ittee  c o n c e p t and we 
s u p p o r t  th e  g e n e ra l g u id e l in e s  o u t l in e d  in  th e  E xposure  D r a f t  (A p p e n d ix  K, 
page 184) on th e  s t r u c t u r e  and f u n c t io n  o f  th e  A u d i t  C om m ittee . H ow ever, we 
b e l ie v e  th e  s ta te m e n ts  in  th e  E xposure  D r a f t  (on  pages 35 and 183) t h a t  (a )
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the Audit Committee is the "primary vehicle that the Board of Directors uses 
to discharge its responsibility with respect to the company's financial 
reporting" and (b) the Audit Committee "represents one of the most effective 
influences for minimizing fraudulent financial reporting" are unrealistic and 
misleading. We believe these statements considerably overstate the role 
played by the Audit Committee.
Audit Committees generally meet no more than three or four times a year. 
As such, Audit Committees necessarily must rely on the company's system of 
internal control and information supplied to them by senior management, 
internal audit representatives and independent certified public accountants 
... all of whom spend full time performing their duties and responsibilities. 
These factors (internal control, management, internal auditors and external 
auditors) all overseen by the Audit Committee, constitute the primary vehicles 
used by the Board of Directors to discharge their responsibility with respect 
to the company's financial reporting. To state that the Audit Committee 
itself is the primary control vehicle with regard to the integrity of the 
company's financial reporting is incorrect and would expose such Committees 
to an unfair burden from litigation due to any fraudulent activities which 
might take place at lower levels within a company.
Finally, if the Audit Committee is truly designed to be the primary 
vehicle for monitoring financial reporting, persons serving on such Committees 
will be required to hire their own full-time staff to fulfill their role or 
resign from the Committee. No knowledgeable individual would want to serve on 
an Audit Committee and bear the responsibility of primary control without 
having full-time staff to perform the necessary control functions. Such a 
situation would precipitate a chaotic environment of divided responsibilities 
at a considerable cost to the company, as well as make it very difficult to 
attract qualified individuals to serve on Audit Committees.
The solution to this problem would be simply for the Commission to revise 
the wording on pages 35 and 183 of the Exposure Draft to more accurately and 
realistically describe the role of the Audit Committee and its relationship 
with the true primary vehicles used to control the company's financial 
reporting process.
Internal Audit Function Reporting Relationship
The Exposure Draft recommends that the chief internal auditor report 
directly to a senior official who is not directly responsible for preparing 
the company's financial statements ... preferably the Chief Executive Officer. 
However, the Exposure Draft acknowledges that such an organizational structure 
(i.e. direct day to day reporting to the Chief Executive Officer) may be 
impractical in larger corporations. We agree and suggest that the Exposure 
Draft place less emphasis on the organizational structure/reporting 
relationship of the chief internal auditor and devote more attention to the 
internal audit function. We believe a reporting relationship of the internal 
audit function to the chief accounting officer in many cases is well justified 
and effective due to the intimate knowledge the chief accounting officer has 
of the company's operations and accounting/reporting functions. The chief
Mr. G. Dewey Arnold - 3 - June 29, 1987
accounting officer is the management official in the best position to 
effectively direct the internal audit function to those areas most meaningful 
and important to the integrity of the financial reporting process.
Numerous other controls/procedures are available to ensure the integrity 
of the internal audit function other than organizational reporting 
relationships. These control s/procedures include direct and unrestricted 
access to the Chief Executive Officer and Audit Committee, as well as periodic 
and private meetings with such persons. To restrict and eliminate a sound and 
meaningful reporting relationship simply for appearance sake is short-sighted 
and in the long term would be detrimental to the internal audit function and 
financial reporting process.
*  *  *  *  *
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on these issues and would be 
pleased to elaborate on any of the foregoing should you desire us to do so.
Sincerely
0. Conrad
Vice President and Controller 
(Chief Accounting Officer)
OC:cp
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D e a r  S i r s :
I  h a v e  r e v ie w e d  t h e  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  
C o m m is s io n  o n  F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  a n d  commend y o u  f o r  
p r e p a r in g  s u c h  a t h o u g h t f u l  d o c u m e n t r e g a r d in g  t h i s  im p o r t a n t  
p r o b le m .  I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  g r a t i f y i n g  t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n  r e c ­
o g n iz e s  t h e  r o l e  o f  e d u c a t io n  i n  r e d u c in g  th e  r i s k  o f  f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  I  am p le a s e d  t o  p r o v id e  y o u  w i t h  t h e  f o l ­
lo w in g  com m ents  p e r t a i n i n g  p r i m a r i l y  t o  th e  C o m m is s io n 's  re c o m ­
m e n d a t io n s  f o r  e d u c a t io n  i n  t h e  h o p e  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  b e  h e l p f u l  t o  
t h e  C o m m is s io n  i n  p r e p a r in g  i t s  f i n a l  r e p o r t .
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  I  b e l ie v e  t h e  C o m m is s io n  h a s  w e l l  d e f in e d  th e  
m u l t id im e n s io n a l  n a t u r e  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  h a s  
p r o p e r l y  p r i o r i t i z e d  th e  r o le s  o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  I  f u l l y  a g r e e ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h a t  t h e  o v e r a l l  
to n e  s e t  b y  t o p  m anagem ent " i s  t h e  m o s t im p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  c o n t r i b ­
u t i n g  t o  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  th e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s "  and  
t h a t  " in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ta n ts  p la y  a c r u c i a l ,  b u t  s e c o n d ­
a r y  r o l e . "  I t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  a n d  p r o p e r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  t h e  Com­
m is s io n  t o  fo c u s  m o s t o f  i t s  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  e d u c a t io n  on  
g e n e r a l  b u s in e s s  as  w e l l  as  a c c o u n t in g  c u r r i c u l a .  C le a r l y  a t t e n ­
t i o n  t o  e t h i c s ,  b e t t e r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s ,  and  
e x p o s u re  t o  th e  p ro b le m  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  s h o u ld  
p e rm e a te  t h e  b u s in e s s  c u r r i c u lu m .  I n  my e x p e r ie n c e ,  th e s e  t o p ic s  
a r e  c u r r e n t l y  e m p h a s iz e d  m uch m o re  s t r o n g l y  i n  a c c o u n t in g  c o u rs e s  
th a n  i n  a n y  o t h e r  a re a  o f  b u s in e s s  e d u c a t io n .  W h ile  e v e n  g r e a t e r  
e m p h a s is  i s  n e e d e d  i n  t h e  t y p i c a l  a c c o u n t in g  c u r r i c u lu m ,  i t  
a p p e a rs  t o  me t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  n o n - a c c o u n t in g  s e g m e n t o f  t h e  b u s i ­
n e s s  c u r r i c u lu m  w h ic h  i s  i n  g r e a t e s t  n e e d  o f  r e v i s i o n  t o  f o s t e r  
k n o w le d g e  a nd  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
is s u e s .
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  a n d  b u s in e s s  c o m m u n ity  to o  
o f t e n  e x p e c t  t h e  a c c o u n t in g  p r o f e s s io n  t o  be  t h e  e t h i c a l  p o l i c e ­
men o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  n o n ­
a c c o u n t in g  b u s in e s s  f a c u l t y  t o o  o f t e n  c o n s id e r  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n -
The Kogod College of Business Administration
Accounting Department
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cial reporting to be an "accounting" problem. In order to sig­
nificantly improve the financial reporting environment, fundamen­
tal changes in these misperceptions are necessary. In essence, 
top management as well as financial, marketing and other business 
managers must accept their share of responsibility for the inci­
dence of fraudulent financial reporting. Similarly, non­
accounting business faculty need to recognize the relevance of 
financial reporting issues to their disciplines and develop their 
own personal competence as well as classroom materials to prop­
erly convey an understanding of fraudulent financial reporting 
issues to their students. The business and academic communities 
cannot be allowed to pass the buck to accounting professionals 
and educators if they are serious about reducing the incidence of 
fraudulent financial reporting.
The Commission correctly recommends that business and 
accounting curricula should promote better understanding of 
internal controls and ethical values. In a general sense, inter­
nal controls provide a defensive mechanism against fraudulent 
financial reporting while ethical values provide a broad positive 
rationale for responsible behavior. Of the two, I believe that 
emphasis upon ethical behavior is paramount since no system of 
internal control can fully prevent fraudulent acts by dishonest 
people. Nevertheless, great emphasis on internal controls is 
essential in business and in academe given the imperfect ethical 
climate in our society and the difficulty of inculcating sound 
ethical values in a formal educational setting.
Clearly, one course in business ethics is "too little and too 
late." Unfortunately, the same can be said about the entire 
college curriculum. By the time students enter college, their 
basic ethical norms have long been established. I have found it 
extremely frustrating to discuss ethical issues in my classes 
because a large proportion of today's students consider the topic 
to be "academic" in the worst sense. This attitude is hardly 
surprising given the materialistic values which pervade our 
society in general and media depictions of business in particu­
lar. In this environment fraudulent financial reporting cannot 
be regarded as a unique phenomenon. Rather, it is a problem 
which is symptomatic of a society which increasingly accepts (and 
sometimes seems to glorify) manipulation, corruption, and basic 
dishonesty, not only in business, but also in public service and 
private life.
In my judgment the most effective way to encourage sound 
ethical values is to provide young people with exemplary role 
models. Obviously, this should begin at home with parents who 
are responsible participants in business and society. Sound val­
ues can be further fostered by media attention to corporate 
executive officers, professional accountants and other business 
leaders who have demonstrated exemplary ethical conduct. And 
educators can teach best by their example in dealing with aca­
demic dishonesty and maintaining the highest standards of integ­
rity on and off campus. The development of better case studies 
for classroom discussion will certainly help - particularly if
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such cases illustrate examples of personal and corporate integ­
rity as well as the more publicized cases of fraudulent activity.
The first part of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics is a 
philosophical statement which contains, in my opinion, the two 
most important sentences in the accounting literature:
"Ethical conduct, in the true sense, is more than merely 
abiding by the letter of explicit prohibitions. Rather 
it requires unswerving commitment to honorable behavior, 
even at the sacrifice of personal advantage."
Better understanding of internal control, knowledge of regu­
lation and law enforcement, and the study of corporate and pro­
fessional codes of conduct are sound recommendations for improv­
ing business and accounting curricula. But it is the thought 
expressed in the second sentence of the above quotation which 
should be emphasized in educational efforts to reduce fraudulent 
financial reporting and other unethical business practices.
As a final comment, I must express my disappointment at the 
Commission's failure to take an unequivocal position in support 
of a five year educational requirement for entry into the account­
ing profession. The Commission correctly observed that the 
recommended expansion of the accounting curriculum to deal with 
fraudulent financial reporting should not be at the expense of 
the liberal arts component of accounting education. The Commis­
sion further observed that the explosion of information related 
to accounting, auditing, and computerized systems necessitates 
more extensive educational preparation for entry-level positions 
in the accounting profession. The recommended development of 
stronger analytical, problem solving and judgment skills also 
requires a more extensive educational process than is presently 
available in a baccalaureate program. Additionally, more empha­
sis on ethics, internal control, and the regulatory and legal 
environment is advocated. Gentlemen, it is clear to me that 
these objectives cannot be accomplished within the limitations of 
a 4-year baccalaureate program.
Please note that I do not advocate a 5-year program for all 
accounting students. A 4-year baccalaureate program is appropriate 
for accounting as well as for other business majors. However, 
for those students aspiring to become C PA’s, a fifth year of 
study should be mandatory. In devoting an entire chapter of its 
report to recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant, 
the Commission recognizes that the role of the practicing CPA is 
more demanding and complex than that of the entry-level corporate 
accountant. In my judgment, a fifth year of study is absolutely 
necessary to adequately prepare students for entry into the 
accounting profession as certified public accountants. The Com­
mission would best serve the public interest by taking a strong 
position in favor of this expanded educational requirement for 
professional certification.
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I appreciate the opportunity to share the above comments with 
the Commission and look forward to the issuance of your final 
report.
Sincerely
Philip F. Jacoby, Chairman 
Department of Accounting
PJ/dp
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National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Sir:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Exposure 
Draft of the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting.
The Commission's report is a valuable compilation of the 
situations which allow fraudulent financial reporting to 
occur and provides viable solutions to the problem. If all 
the recommendations are implemented, fraudulent financial 
reporting by public companies would become less likely. My 
recommendation is that the Commission identify specific 
organizations, including government agencies, and receive 
from them a commitment to be responsible for overseeing 
implementation of the recommendations. Although the 
commitment would not be legally binding, it is a way to 
maintain the momentum towards eliminating fraudulent 
financial reporting.
I also offer the following suggestions for your considera­
tion:
1. As noted in the report, the AICPA has issued 
proposed standards concerning studies of internal 
controls and requirements to develop procedures to 
detect fraud in audits and to use analytical 
procedures. The Commission should consider not 
issuing its final report until after the proposed 
standards are issued in final form. This would 
allow the Commission to comment on whether the 
AICPA's new requirements adequately address the 
Commission's recommendations.
2. The Commission should consider a recommendation to 
require a CPA firm to report to the audit committee 
instances of fraud detected during a MAS engagement 
if the firm is also engaged to perform an audit.
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The requirement would help overcome the objection 
to allowing CPA firms to conduct MAS and audit 
engagements at the same time.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to comment on the 
exposure draft.
Sincerely,
 
James B. Thomas, Jr.
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The National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
I am writing on behalf of the Howard Savings Bank, a diversified 
financial services organization with total assets of $4.4 bil­
lion. I serve as the Chief Financial Officer of this organiza­
tion and am a Certified Public Accountant of the State of New 
Jersey.
We applaud the Commission's intentions in trying to prevent and 
deter fraudulent financial reporting. One need only review busi­
ness periodicals of the recent past to see the importance of 
achieving that objective. We feel, however, some of the Com­
mission's proposals could be too costly and impracticable.
The Commission recommends the Chief Internal Auditor (the 
"Auditor") report to the Chief Executive Officer (the "CEO") who 
would meet with the Auditor on a quarterly basis. We perceive no 
benefit to this arrangement. An Auditor with a direct relation­
ship to the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors has an 
established independence of operation. Secondly, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Code of Professional 
Ethics and established practices in industry fortify this 
independence. Lastly, auditing is still quintessentially a 
financial function. Active involvement with the Chief Financial 
Officer and other financial groups within the organization pro­
vides necessary channels of information to the Auditor, as well as 
providing alternative career paths for the young professionals in 
the Auditing Department. The limited time a CEO can devote to the 
Auditor is not sufficient to insure the effectiveness of this 
function.
The Commission also recommends the annual report contain letters 
from Management and the Chairman of the Audit Committee on the
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adequacy of internal controls. To the best of our knowledge, we 
do not know of any empirical evidence which suggests these letters 
will enhance the quality of disclosure in the annual report to 
shareholders. The annual report, proxy, and Form 10-K already 
provide volumes of information about any company.
Additional information such as what the Commission suggests should 
be added only if there is a clearly demonstrated need of the 
various stakeholders of the company which must be satisfied. We 
do not perceive this to be the case.
We respectfully ask the Commission to re-examine these issues in 
light of the potential costs and benefits of implementation. On 
the whole we applaud the Commission’s findings and recommendations 
as a welcome addition to corporate financial practices.
Very truly yours,
Joseph G . W ojak   
Ch ief Financial Officer
JGW:mam
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G e n t le m e n :
T h i s  l e t t e r  r e s p o n d s  t o  y o u r  r e q u e s t  f o r  c o m m e n ts  on  y o u r  
A p r i l  1 9 8 7  E x p o s u r e  D r a f t  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  C o m m is s io n  on 
F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g . O u r  o v e r a l l  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  R e p o r t  
I s  v e r y  f a v o r a b l e .  We b e l i e v e  y o u r  C o m m is s io n  h a s  d o n e  an  
o u t s t a n d i n g  j o b  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  c a u s e s  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  a n d  i n  s u g g e s t i n g  w a y s  t o  p r e v e n t  a n d  d e t e c t  i t .
T h e r e  a r e  a r e a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n  w h ic h  we q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r  
y o u r  C o m m is s io n 's  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  a r e  f e a s i b l e  a n d / o r  c o s t  e f f e c ­
t i v e .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  we b e l i e v e  t h e  R e p o r t  w o u ld  e x t e n d  t h e  r o l e  o f  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  e v e n  i n  m any p r o g r e s s i v e  c o m p a n ie s .  W h i le  we 
a g r e e  t h a t  a u d i t  c o m m it t e e  m e m b e rs  s h o u ld  b e  v i g a l a n t  a n d  
i n f o r m e d ,  t h e r e  a r e  l i m i t a t i o n s  on  w h a t  a u d i t  c o m m it t e e s  c a n  be  
e x p e c t e d  t o  a c c o m p l is h  w i t h o u t  t r a n s f o r m i n g  t h e i r  r o l e  f r o m  an 
o v e r s i g h t  t o  a p a r t i c i p a t o r y  o n e .  A l s o ,  t h e r e  i s  a d a n g e r  t h a t  
p u b l i c  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  c o u l d  b e  r a i s e d  t o  t o o  
h ig h  a l e v e l .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  w o u ld  s u b j e c t  a u d i t  c o m m it t e e  
m e m b e rs  t o  a d d i t i o n a l  l i a b i l i t y .  We b e l i e v e  t h e  R e p o r t  i n  g e n e r a l  
m ig h t  b e  " t o n e d  d o w n "  s o m e w h a t i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  a n d  we o f f e r  b e lo w  
som e s u g g e s t io n s  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s .
A s e c o n d  a r e a  o f  c o n c e r n  i s  t h e  e x p a n d e d  r o l e  t h a t  w o u ld  
b e  c r e a t e d  f o r  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s .  We s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  n e e d  
f o r  a s t r o n g ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i t h  no  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  o r  l i m i t a t i o n s  on  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  A t  t h e  sam e t im e ,  
t h e i r  r o l e  m u s t  be  c l o s e l y  c o o r d i n a t e d  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  o u t s i d e  
a u d i t o r s  t o  a c h ie v e  c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  r e s u l t s .  T h e r e  s h o u ld  b e  no  
d u p l i c a t i o n  o f  e f f o r t  b e tw e e n  t h e  tw o  g r o u p s .  A g a in ,  we s u g g e s t  
r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  i n  t h i s  a r e a  a s  
d is c u s s e d  f u r t h e r  b e lo w .
O u r  c o m m e n ts  o n  s p e c i f i c  r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  
t h o s e  i n  C h a p t e r  T w o : R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  P u b l i c  C o m p a n y  a n d
t o  r e l a t e d  G ood  P r a c t i c e  G u i d e l i n e s .  O t h e r  t h a n  a s  n o t e d ,  we 
a g r e e  w i t h  y o u r  C o m m is s io n ’ s r e c o m m e n d a t io n s .  I n  o t h e r  a r e a s  o f  
t h e  r e p o r t  we h a v e  r e v ie w e d  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  v ie w s  
e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  F E I  r e s p o n s e  l e t t e r .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : F o r  t h e  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  t o
d i s c h a r g e  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  o v e r s e e  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  
p r o c e s s ,  i t  m u s t  i d e n t i f y ,  u n d e r s t a n d ,  a n d  a s s e s s  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  
m a y  c a u s e  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  t o  b e  f r a u d u l e n t l y  
m i s s t a t e d .
C o m m e n t : W e  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  " t o n e  a t  t h e  t o p "  i s  t h e  k e y  t o  a
s u c c e s s f u l  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  p r o g r a m .  A l s o ,  w e  t h i n k  t h e  G o o d  
P r a c t i c e  G u i d e l i n e s  f o r  A s s e s s i n g  t h e  R i s k  o f  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  
R e p o r t i n g  i n  A p p e n d i x  H  w i l l  b e  v e r y  h e l p f u l  t o  D u  P o n t  a n d  o t h e r  
c o m p a n i e s  i n  g u a r d i n g  a g a i n s t  i m p r o p r i e t i e s .
O u r  o n l y  c o n c e r n  i n  t h i s  a r e a  i s  t h a t  y o u r  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
R e p o r t  n o t  c o n v e y  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  c o m p a n i e s  n e e d  t o  
i m m e d i a t e l y  m o u n t  a  c o s t l y ,  o n e - t i m e  c a m p a i g n  t o  d o c u m e n t  t h a t  a l l  
a r e a s  o f  c o n c e r n  h a v e  b e e n  r e v i e w e d  a n d  t h a t  a d e q u a t e  c o n t r o l s  
e x i s t .  W e  t h i n k  t h a t  i s  n o t  y o u r  i n t e n t ,  b u t  a d d i t i o n a l  
c o m m e n t a r y  i n  t h e  R e p o r t  t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h a t  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  w o u l d  b e  
a p p r o p r i a t e .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s
t h a t  a r e  a d e q u a t e  t o  p r e v e n t  a n d  d e t e c t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g .
C o m m e n t : W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  y o u r  R e p o r t  s h o u l d  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  c o n ­
c e p t  o f  " r e a s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e "  i n  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  T h i s  w o u l d  
b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  o t h e r  a r e a s  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  a n d  w o u l d  a l s o  a v o i d  
g i v i n g  t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  a  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  c a n  b e  
t o t a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  i n  p r e v e n t i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  a c c o u n t i n g  f u n c ­
t i o n s  t h a t  c a n  e f f e c t i v e l y  m e e t  t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  o b l i g a ­
t i o n s  .
C o m m e n t : W e  s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  c o m p a n i e s
m a i n t a i n  a n  e f f e c t i v e  a c c o u n t i n g  f u n c t i o n .  I n  t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  
r e p o r t  d i s c u s s i n g  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  c o m m e n t  i s  m a d e  
t h a t  t h e  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r  ( C A O )  s h o u l d  b e  h e l d  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  W e  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  
i s  a  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t h a t  c a n  b e  a s s i g n e d  t o  a  s i n g l e  i n d i v i d u a l .
T h e  r e p o r t  p o i n t s  o u t  i n  o t h e r  a r e a s  t h a t  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  c a n  b e  p e r p e t r a t e d  b y  v a r i o u s  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t h e  o r g a n i ­
z a t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  C E O ,  w h o  m a y  b e  a c t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l l y  o r  i n  
c o l l u s i o n  w i t h  o t h e r s .  I n  s u c h  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  C A O  m a y  h a v e  n o  
k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g  i s  t a k i n g  p l a c e  —  a t  l e a s t  i n  
t h e  n e a r  t e r m .  T h u s ,  w h i l e  w e  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  C A O  m a y  h a v e  p r i m a r y  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h i s  a r e a ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  
a  s h a r e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  a n d  t h e  C A O ,  d e s p i t e  h i s  b e s t  e f f o r t s ,  
m a y  s o m e t i m e s  b e  u n a b l e  t o  p r e v e n t  f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g .
2
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  a n  e f f e c t i v e
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  s t a f f e d  w i t h  a n  a d e q u a t e  n u m b e r  o f  
q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  s i z e  a n d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
c o m p a n y .
C o m m e n t :  W e  f u l l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  b u t  w e  d o  n o t  a g r e e
w i t h  t h e  c o m m e n t  i n  t h e  t e x t  t h a t  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  " p e e r "  r e v i e w s  
e v e r y  t h r e e  y e a r s .  F i r s t ,  w e  w o u l d  b e  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  " p e e r ”  
r e v i e w s  i f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  " p e e r s ”  w o u l d  b e  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t o r s  f r o m  o t h e r  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  m i g h t  b e  c o m p e t i t o r s ,  
c u s t o m e r s ,  o r  s u p p l i e r s .  T h i s  w o u l d  b e  u n a c c e p t a b l e  b e c a u s e  o f  
t h e  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  i n v o l v e d .  W e  n o t e  t h a t  
t h e  t e r m  " p e e r "  d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  I I A  S t a n d a r d ,  a n d  w e  
s u g g e s t  i t  b e  d r o p p e d  f r o m  t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  r e p o r t .
F u r t h e r ,  w h i l e  w e  s u p p o r t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  p e r i o d i c  e x t e r n a l  
r e v i e w s  b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s  ( a n d  i n  f a c t  h a v e  r e c e n t l y  
u n d e r g o n e  s u c h  a  r e v i e w  b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  
C o m p a n y ’ s ) ,  w e  d o  n o t  s e e  t h e  n e e d  t o  d o  t h i s  e v e r y  t h r e e  y e a r s  a s  
s t a t e d  i n  t h e  I I A  S t a n d a r d .  S u c h  r e v i e w s  a r e  q u i t e  e x p e n s i v e ,  a n d  
t h e y  c a n n o t  b e  c o s t  j u s t i f i e d  t h a t  f r e q u e n t l y .  W e  s u g g e s t  t h a t  
y o u r  C o m m i s s i o n  m o d i f y  t h e  c o m m e n t  i n  t h e  t e x t  t h a t  d e a l s  w i t h  
t h i s  i s s u e .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : P u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l
a u d i t  f u n c t i o n s  a r e  o b j e c t i v e .
C o m m e n t : W e  s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  b u t  w e  a r e
c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t w o  c o m m e n t s  i n  t h e  a c c o m p a n y i n g  d i s c u s s i o n .
F i r s t ,  w e  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  
n e c e s s a r i l y  n e e d s  t o  r e p o r t  t o  s o m e o n e  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  C A O .  T h e  
C A O  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  i n  m a n y  c o m p a n i e s  f o r  t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  t h e  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .  T h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  p l a y s  a  v i t a l  
r o l e  i n  e n s u r i n g  t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s ,  a n d  t h e  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  l o g i c a l l y  s h o u l d  s u p p o r t  t h e  
C A O ' s  e f f o r t s  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  R e p o r t  ( i n  a n o t h e r  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n )  w o u l d  c h a r g e  t h e  C A O  w i t h  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
p r e v e n t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  r e p o r t i n g ,  b u t  ( i n  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n )  
w o u l d  d e p r i v e  t h e  C A O  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  o n e  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  
d e t e r r e n t s .  W e  a l s o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  R e p o r t  o n  p a g e  2 0  i d e n t i f i e s  
c o m p a n i e s '  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  a s  b e i n g  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  f r a u d u l e n t  
r e p o r t i n g  i n  a  l a r g e  m a j o r i t y  o f  c a s e s  a n d  y e t  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  t h e  
c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  r e p o r t  t o  t h e  C E O .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i n  m o s t  
" r e a l  w o r l d "  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  w i l l  b e n e f i t  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f r o m  t h e  s u p p o r t  t h a t  t h e  C A O  c a n  g i v e  h i m .  T h i s  
e x t e n d s  a l s o  t o  p e r s o n n e l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  i n  s t a f f i n g  t h e  i n t e r n a l  
a u d i t  f u n c t i o n ,  s i n c e  t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  a u d i t i n g  d i s c i p l i n e s  a r e  
s o  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d .  W e  b e l i e v e  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  h a v e  t h e  
f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r ' s  r e p o r t i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  b e s t  s u i t s  t h e i r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
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S e c o n d ,  w e  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  
n e c e s s a r i l y  n e e d s  t o  h a v e  a  b a c k g r o u n d  a s  " a n  e x p e r i e n c e d  a u d i t  
p r o f e s s i o n a l ” . M a n y  l a r g e  c o m p a n i e s ,  s u c h  a s  D u  P o n t ,  h a v e  a n  
e x p e r i e n c e d ,  k n o w l e d g a b l e , a n d  h i g h l y  t r a i n e d  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
s t a f f .  T h e  f u n c t i o n  c a n  b e n e f i t  m o r e  f r o m  o u t s t a n d i n g  l e a d e r s h i p  
q u a l i t i e s  - -  i n c l u d i n g  e x t e n s i v e  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  a n d  k n o w l e d g e  o f  
c o m p a n y  o p e r a t i o n s  —  t h a n  f r o m  m e r e  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : M a n a g e m e n t  a n d  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  e n s u r e
t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s ' i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  a u d i t  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n d  p r o p e r l y  c o o r d i n a t e d  
w i t h  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .
C o m m e n t : A g a i n ,  w e  a g r e e  w i t h  a n d  s u p p o r t  t h e  b a s i c  r e c o m m e n d a ­
t i o n . H o w e v e r ,  w e  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  n e e d  f o r  
" a p p r o p r i a t e  i n v o l v e m e n t  b y  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  a t  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  
l e v e l " .  T h i s  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  r e s u l t  i n  d u p l i c a t i o n  o f  e f f o r t ,  
b e c a u s e  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s  n e c e s s a r i l y  m u s t  d i r e c t l y  
e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  p r e p a r e d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i t h  G A A P .  M o r e o v e r ,  i n v o l v e m e n t  a t  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  l e v e l  r e q u i r e s  
a n  i n - d e p t h  a n d  c u r r e n t  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  p u b l i s h e d  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  
d i s c l o s u r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  t h a t  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  g e n e r a l l y  d o  n o t  
p o s s e s s .  I t  w o u l d  b e  e x p e n s i v e  t o  r e q u i r e  t h i s  s p e c i a l i z e d  k i n d  
o f  t r a i n i n g  f o r  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  - -  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w h e n  i t  w o u l d  
m e r e l y  d u p l i c a t e  t h e  r o l e  o f  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s .  W e  s u g g e s t  t h i s  
r e f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  t e x t  b e  d e l e t e d .  W e  b e l i e v e  t h e  p r e v i o u s  r e c o m ­
m e n d a t i o n  —  t h a t  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
t h e i r  n o n f i n a n c i a l  a u d i t  f i n d i n g s  f o r  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  —  i s  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  e n o u g h  t h a t  f u r t h e r  s p e c i f i c  
g u i d a n c e  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e
t y p e s  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  ( M A S )  t h a t  
m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  
a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m .
C o m m e n t : W e  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  b e  i n f o r m e d  o f
a n d  s h o u l d  e v a l u a t e  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  M A S  p e r f o r m e d  b y  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
a c c o u n t a n t .  T h i s  w o u l d  n o r m a l l y  b e  d o n e  a s  p a r t  o f  a n o t h e r  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  r e v i e w  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  
t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  p r o p o s e d  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  t y p e s  a n d  e x t e n t  o f  M A S  
w o u l d  p o s e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o m p l e x i t i e s  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  t h e  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t ' s  s e r v i c e s  w e r e  r e q u i r e d  o n  s h o r t  n o t i c e  f o r  a n y  
r e a s o n  —  w h i c h  m i g h t  b e  t h e  c a s e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  
p r o p o s e d  a c q u i s i t i o n s  —  w h e r e  t i m e  i s  o f  t h e  e s s e n c e  a n d
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i n v o l v e m e n t  b y  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  i n  a n  M A S  c a p a c i t y  
m i g h t  g r e a t l y  f a c i l i t a t e  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n .  W e  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  n o n e  o f  y o u r  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  s t u d i e s  i n d i c a t e d  
a n y  a c t u a l  c a s e  w h e r e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  w a s  c o m p r o m i s e d  b e c a u s e  o f  M A S  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  a n d  w e  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h i s  b e  g i v e n  r e c o g n i t i o n  b y  
m o d i f y i n g  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  
b e  p e r i o d i c a l l y  i n f o r m e d  o f  a n d  e v a l u a t e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  M A S  —  b u t  
n o t  t o  r e q u i r e  a d v a n c e  a p p r o v a l .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C
r u l e  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  m a n a g e m e n t  
r e p o r t s  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r  a n d  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  
o f f i c e r .  T h e  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t  s h o u l d  a c k n o w l e d g e  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l ,  
d i s c u s s  h o w  t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w e r e  f u l f i l l e d ,  a n d  p r o v i d e  
m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  
i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
C o m m e n t : W e  s u p p o r t  t h e  b a s i c  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  b u t  w e  h a v e
c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  s o m e  o f  t h e  G o o d  P r a c t i c e  G u i d e l i n e s  f o r  
M a n a g e m e n t ' s  R e p o r t  i n  A p p e n d i x  L :
o  T h e  r e c o m m e n d e d  d i s c l o s u r e  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  " a r e  
n o t  m i s s t a t e d  d u e  t o  m a t e r i a l  f r a u d  o r  e r r o r ”  i s  r e d u n d a n t  
a n d  l i k e l y  t o  b e  m i s u n d e r s t o o d  b y  u s e r s .  I t  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  
r e q u i r e d .
o  T h e  G u i d e l i n e s  r e f e r  t o  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  o t h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  
a n n u a l  r e p o r t  ( i . e . ,  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s )  i s  
" c o r r e c t ”  o r  " a c c u r a t e " .  T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  s u c h  o t h e r  
i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  o b j e c t i v e  a n d  v e r i f i a b l e ,  w e  c e r t a i n l y  a g r e e  
t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  b e  c o r r e c t  a n d  a c c u r a t e .  S o m e  o t h e r  
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  f u t u r e  o u t l o o k  f o r  t h e  
b u s i n e s s  a n d  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  r i s k s  a n d  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  i s  
s u b j e c t i v e  a n d  j u d g m e n t a l  a n d  r e f l e c t s  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  o p i n i o n s  
o n  s u c h  m a t t e r s .  W e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  i t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  
u s e  t e r m s  s u c h  a s  " c o r r e c t "  o r  " a c c u r a t e "  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  
s u c h  i n f o r m a t i o n .
o  T h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  i s  a n  o n g o i n g  c o n c e r n  
r a t h e r  t h a n  a  p o i n t - i n - t i m e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a s  i m p l i e d  o n  
p a g e  1 8 7  a n d  i n  t h e  i l l u s t r a t i v e  r e p o r t  o n  p a g e  1 8 8 .
o  T h e r e  i s  u s u a l l y  a  t i m e  l a g  i n  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  a u d i t o r s '  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  n a t u r e  a n d  c o s t / b e n e f i t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  m a k i n g  i m p r o v e m e n t s  m u s t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  I n  
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h i s ,  w e  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  p r o p o s e d  s t a t e m e n t  
b e  m o d i f i e d  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  h a s  r e s p o n d e d  o r  i s  
c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  a u d i t o r s '  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
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o  T h e  i l l u s t r a t i v e  r e p o r t  i n c l u d e s  a  c o m m e n t  t h a t  a l l  r e p r e ­
s e n t a t i o n s  m a d e  t o  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  o u t s i d e  a u d i t o r s  w e r e  v a l i d  
a n d  a p p r o p r i a t e .  M a n y  c o n t a c t s  t a k e  p l a c e  b e t w e e n  a  
c o m p a n y ' s  e m p l o y e e s  a n d  t h e  o u t s i d e  a u d i t o r s  d u r i n g  t h e  
c o u r s e  o f  a n  a u d i t ,  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  c a n n o t  m o n i t o r  a l l  o f  
t h e s e  c o n t a c t s  t o  j u d g e  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a l l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  
m a d e  t o  t h e  a u d i t o r s .  W e  t h e r e f o r e  s u g g e s t  t h e  c o m m e n t  b e  
m o d i f i e d  t o  r e f e r  t o  " m a n a g e m e n t ' s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s "  r a t h e r  
t h a n  " a l l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s " .
W e  a r e  a l s o  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  t h e  c o m m e n t  o n  p a g e  4 1  o f  t h e  
t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  C E O  m a y  w a n t  t o  
p e r i o d i c a l l y  e n g a g e  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  
c o m p a n y ' s  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l s .  W e  h a v e  s t u d i e d  t h i s  a n d  
d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  t h e  a d d e d  c o s t  o f  s u c h  a  s u p p l e m e n t a r y  e x a m i n a t i o n  
c a n n o t  b e  j u s t i f i e d .  I n  o u r  o w n  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  o u r  
i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l s  i s  a l r e a d y  a d e q u a t e l y  c o v e r e d  b y  o u r  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  s t a f f ,  w o r k i n g  i n  c l o s e  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  o u r  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s .  T h i s  i n c l u d e s  c o o r d i n a t i o n  i n  p l a n n i n g  
a n d  r e v i e w  o f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  w o r k p a p e r s  b y  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s .  A n y  f u r t h e r  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
a c c o u n t a n t ' s  r o l e  w o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  d u p l i c a t i o n  o f  e f f o r t .  I f  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  b e l i e v e s  i t  d e s i r a b l e  t o  r e f e r  t o  a  s u p p l e m e n t a r y  
e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  a  c o m p a n y ' s  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l s  b y  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  w e  b e l i e v e  i t  s h o u l d  b e  c l a r i f i e d  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  s o m e t h i n g  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  b u t  m a y  n o t  b e  c o s t - j u s t i f i e d  
f o r  a l l  c o m p a n i e s .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : W h e n  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  c h a n g e s  i n d e p e n d e n t
a c c o u n t a n t s ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  d i s c l o s e  p u b l i c l y  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a n y  m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t i n g  o r  a u d i t i n g  i s s u e s  d i s c u s s e d  
w i t h  i t s  o l d  a n d  n e w  a u d i t o r s  d u r i n g  t h e  t h r e e - y e a r  p e r i o d  p r e c e d ­
i n g  t h e  c h a n g e .
C o m m e n t : A s  a  p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r ,  w e  b e l i e v e  i t  w o u l d  b e  v i r t u a l l y
i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  c o m p a n i e s  t o  c o m p l y  w i t h  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  b e c a u s e  
o f  t h e  m u l t i p l e  c o n t a c t s  a n d  d i s c u s s i o n s  t h a t  t a k e  p l a c e  b e t w e e n  
c o m p a n i e s  a n d  t h e i r  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s  o v e r  a  3 - y e a r  p e r i o d .  
M a n y  i n d i v i d u a l s  c a n  b e  i n v o l v e d ,  a n d  i n  m a n y  c a s e s ,  n o  w r i t t e n  
r e c o r d s  a r e  m a d e  o f  s u c h  d i s c u s s i o n s .  W e  b e l i e v e  e x i s t i n g  S E C  
r u l e s  i n  t h i s  a r e a  a r e  a d e q u a t e .
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R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t
o f  t h e  q u a r t e r l y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h i s  o v e r s i g h t  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  
a p p r o v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .
C o m m e n t : W e  b e l i e v e  i t  i s  i m p r a c t i c a l  f o r  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  t o  g e t
i n v o l v e d  i n  a p p r o v i n g  q u a r t e r l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  
r e l e a s e .  T h e  p r i m a r y  c o n c e r n  h e r e  i s  t h e  d e l a y  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  
i n v o l v e d  i n  r e l e a s i n g  e a r n i n g s  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  t h e  p u b l i c .
D e l a y i n g  t h e  r e l e a s e  w o u l d  b e  a  d i s s e r v i c e  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s ,  
c r e d i t o r s ,  a n d  t h e  i n v e s t i n g  p u b l i c  . A l s o ,  w e  d o  n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  
t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  g e n e r a l l y  h a s  a n y  b a s i s  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  
t h e  d i s c l o s u r e  p r o c e s s .  I t  r e q u i r e s  a n  i n - d e p t h  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  
c o m p a n y ’ s  c u r r e n t  o p e r a t i o n s  t h a t  o n l y  t h o s e  i n v o l v e d  o n  a  
f u l l - t i m e  d a y - t o - d a y  b a s i s  c a n  b r i n g  t o  b e a r .  A g a i n ,  w e  b e l i e v e  
t h i s  w o u l d  b e  a n  u n w a r r a n t e d  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e ’ s  
r o l e  f r o m  a n  o v e r s i g h t  t o  a  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  o n e .
O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  w e  w o u l d  h a v e  n o  o b j e c t i o n  t o  a n d  i n  f a c t  
w o u l d  s u p p o r t  a  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  a n y  c h a n g e s  i n  s i g n i f i c a n t  
a c c o u n t i n g  p o l i c i e s  m a d e  i n  i n t e r i m  p e r i o d s  s h o u l d  b e  c l e a r e d  w i t h  
t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  b e f o r e  t h e y  w e r e  a d o p t e d .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n : T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  s p o n s o r i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s h o u l d
e s t a b l i s h  a  b o d y  t o  g u i d e  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
C o m m e n t : I f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t o  m o d i f y  t h e  c o m ­
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  A I C P A ’ s  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  i s  a d o p t e d ,  w e  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  b o d y  c o u l d  a d e q u a t e l y  p e r f o r m  t h i s  r o l e  a n d  t h e r e b y  
a v o i d  t h e  c o s t  o f  a  s e p a r a t e  n e w  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
A s  n o t e d  a b o v e ,  w e  s u p p o r t  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  i n  
C h a p t e r  T w o  a n d  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  c o m m e n t  o n  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  f i n e  w o r k .
S i n c e r e l y ,
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The N a t io n a l C om m ission on F ra u d u le n t  
F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue, N.W.
W a s h in g to n , DC 20006
G en tlem en :
A m erican  E xp re ss  Company commends th e  C om m ission on i t s  e xp o s u re  d r a f t ,  
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING. As 
a la r g e  p u b l i c l y  h e ld  com pany, A m erican  E x p re s s  a lr e a d y  has i n  p la c e  a 
s u b s t a n t ia l  p o r t io n  o f  th e  C o m m iss io n 's  re co m m e n d a tio n s . T h is  i s  s u r e ly  
th e  ca se  f o r  many p u b l i c l y  h e ld  co m p a n ie s . U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  th e  few  w e l l  
p u b l ic iz e d  in c id e n t s  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  have  shaken  th e  
p u b l i c ' s  c o n f id e n c e  i n  w ha t i s  e s s e n t ia l l y  a v e r y  e t h i c a l  and e f f i c i e n t  
s y s te m . We hope t h a t  th e  e f f o r t s  o f  th e  C om m iss ion , a lo n g  w i t h  th e  
c o n s t r u c t iv e  in p u t  o f  th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  i n  th e  f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  
p ro c e s s , w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a r e d u c t io n  o f  th e  in c id e n c e  o f  f r a u d u le n t  
f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  and h e lp  r e s to r e  th e  p u b l ic  c o n f id e n c e  t h a t  th e  
sys te m  d e s e rv e s . A c c o r d in g ly ,  we f u l l y  s u p p o r t  th e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  
docum ent. We a re  c o n c e rn e d , h o w e ve r, t h a t  c e r t a in  recom m enda tio ns  c o u ld  
d is p r o p o r t io n a t e ly  b u rd e n  p u b l ic  com pan ies w i th o u t  s u f f i c i e n t  
c o r re s p o n d in g  b e n e f i t .
In  th e  a t ta c h e d  a p p e n d ix  a re  o u r  comments r e g a r d in g  c e r t a in  o f  th e  
s p e c i f i c  re co m m e n d a tio n s . F o r ease  o f  r e fe r e n c e ,  w e 'v e  a ls o  a t ta c h e d  
A pp e n d ix  A o f  th e  E xp o su re  D r a f t  and num bered each re co m m e n d a tio n .
In  c o n c lu s io n ,  A m erican  E xp re ss  a p p re c ia te s  th e  o p p o r tu n i t y  t o  e x p re s s  
i t s  v ie w p o in ts  on th e  C o m m iss io n 's  o u ts ta n d in g  e f f o r t .
V e ry  t r u l y  y o u rs ,
C o m p tro l le r  C o rp o ra te  A u d i to r
A tta c h m e n t
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY
Recommendation 1: For the top management of a public company to discharge its
obligation to oversee the financial reporting process, it must identify, under 
stand, and assess the factors that may cause the company's financial 
statements to be fraudulently misstated.
We are concerned that this recommendation may be interpreted as calling 
for the specific implementation of the guidelines included in Appendix H 
of the exposure draft. The conclusion of the appendix states that the 
guidelines do not represent a "cookbook" approach. Nevertheless, we 
believe that Appendix H will inevitably be viewed as a set of model 
procedures, giving rise to adverse inferences for lack of compliance. 
Because the factors that are relevant vary considerably from company to 
company, the use of Appendix H in such a manner would be inappropriate.
In addition, the text relating to the recommendation indicates that 
individuals at all levels perform parts of the assessment and that top 
level management (CEO and the CFO) must supervise the process. Typically, 
substantial documentation of the steps performed and the resultant 
findings and conclusions would be prepared as part of such a formal 
process. Top management's awareness of the factors that contribute to 
fraudulent financial reporting is a fundamental condition that facilitates 
the implementation of more specific controls. We agree with the tone of 
the recommendation but suggest that the Commission make it clear that it 
is not proposing that companies undertake massive and costly documentation 
efforts of their specific actions in this regard.
Recommendation 2: Public companies should maintain internal controls that are
adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
We recommend that the Commission encourage companies to "maintain internal 
controls that are adequate to reasonably assure the prevention and 
detection of fraudulent financial reporting". The concept of "reasonable 
assurance" implies that the cost of implementing specific controls should 
be commensurate with the benefits obtained and recognizes that no level of 
internal control could absolutely guarantee against all instances of 
fraudulent financial reporting.
Recommendation 6: Public companies should ensure that their internal audit
functions are objective.
Although we generally agree with this recommendation, we take exception to 
the suggestion in the accompanying text that a reporting relationship in 
which the chief internal auditor reports directly to the CEO is generally 
more desirable. From a practical standpoint, it is often more efficient 
for the chief internal auditor to report directly to the CFO, who is 
ultimately responsible for the implementation and operation of control
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procedures within the financial reporting process. The objectivity of the 
internal audit function would not be compromised by such a reporting 
relationship as long as the chief internal auditor has direct and 
unrestricted access to the audit committee of the board of directors.
Recommendation 14: The audit committee should approve in advance the types
and extent of management advisory services that management plans to engage the 
company's independent public accountants to perform.
Clearly, the audit committee should be aware of activities that would 
impair the independence of the company's independent public accountants. 
However, we disagree with this particular recommendation. In many (if not 
most) instances, we believe that the auditors' knowledge of their client's 
business would significantly add value to the quality of management 
services provided, as well as limit the related costs of such services.
The additional knowledge of the company and its operations attained by the 
auditors through the provision of non-audit services will also enhance 
audit quality. Consequently, it often makes logical business sense that 
the auditors provide services outside the scope of the audit itself. This 
particular recommendation would discourage such actions. We also believe 
that the perception that such services can impair independence is 
unfounded.
We suggest that this particular recommendation be deleted. Instead, the 
text accompanying Recommendation 13 could be expanded to suggest that the 
audit committee be periodically informed of the extent of management 
advisory services provided by the independent auditors. Advance approval 
is, in our opinion, highly impractical.
Recommendation 15: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to
include in their annual reports to stockholders management reports signed by 
the chief executive officer and chief accounting officer. The management 
report should acknowledge management's responsibilities for the financial 
statements and internal control, discuss how these responsibilities were 
fulfilled, and provide management's assessment of the effectiveness of the 
company's internal controls.
The primary responsibility for the fairness of the financial statements 
rests with management. The audit opinion that accompanies the financial 
statements provides investors with the assurance that an independent audit 
of such statements was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards. In our annual report to shareholders, an 
acknowledgment of management's responsibility for the preparation of the 
financial statements and a brief discussion of the Company's system of 
internal accounting controls follows the auditor's opinion. We do, 
however, question the desirability of an SEC rule that mandates such a 
report. With or without the report, the responsibility of management is 
the same. The likely result of a specific disclosure requirement is 
boilerplate narrative, particularly where such a requirement includes
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"management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal 
controls".
We are also concerned that this assessment will require management to 
document a formal assessment process. Such a process, which would involve 
substantial costs, would not significantly contribute to the establishment 
and maintenance of important controls.
If the aim of this recommendation is to increase management's attention to 
the adequacy of internal controls, we submit that this aim is better 
served by the Commission's substantive recommendations than by the effect 
of additional disclosure requirements.
Recommendation 16: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter signed by the 
chairman of the audit committee describing the committee's responsibilities 
and activities during the year.
American Express includes a report by management that addresses 
management's responsibility for the preparation of the financial 
statements. We also include a discussion of the membership and 
responsibilities of our audit committee. These disclosures, together with 
the report of the independent accountants is, in our opinion, sufficient. 
The inclusion of a signed report by the chairman of the audit committee 
places disproportionate emphasis on the role of the audit committee. 
(Accordingly, we see no need for Appendix M, Good Practice Guidelines for 
Audit Committee Chairman's Letter.)
Recommendation 17: Management should advise the audit committee when it seeks
a second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
There are increasingly more transactions, particularly with respect to 
financial instruments, for which definitive accounting guidance is not 
available. In such circumstances, it is management's responsibility to 
evaluate the propriety of the alternative accounting approaches. In 
discharging this responsibility, it is management's prerogative to seek 
input from accounting firms other than the independent auditors. After 
all, management is directly responsible for the preparation of the 
financial statements and has a very real stake in obtaining the correct 
accounting treatment. If the company and its auditors ultimately disagree 
on the accounting treatment of a material item, the auditors would be 
unable to opine on the financials without a qualification.
This recommendation implies that management seeks additional opinions on 
accounting issues for the purpose of identifying the one that will result 
in the intended financial reporting result. We believe that this is the 
exception to general practice. Therefore, while we recognize the intent 
of the Commission on this particular issue, we suggest that it be modified
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to address only those instances when management chooses to implement an 
alternative accounting approach without the concurrence of its independent 
auditors.
Recommendation 18: When a public company changes independent public
accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature 
of any material accounting or auditing issues discussed with its old and new 
auditors during the three-year period preceding the change.
Our concern with this recommendation is similar to our concern with 
Recommendation 17. This recommendation implies that changes in auditors 
were precipitated by disagreements on accounting issues. This is 
certainly not the case in all instances. Notwithstanding this concern, 
the disclosure of all material issues "discussed" is clearly not 
practical, given the increasing volume of issues for which no definitive 
guidance exists. We believe that the existing SEC requirements involving 
detailed disclosure under Item 4 of Form 8-K and in the company's proxy 
statement are sufficient. If a recommendation along these lines is to be 
retained, we strongly suggest that it be limited to material issues where 
disagreements actually occurred.
Recommendation 19: Audit committees should increase their oversight of the
quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include approving 
financial results prior to public release.
We strongly disagree with mandatory audit committee approval of financial 
results prior to public release. The oversight process of the audit 
committee is one that is ongoing. Accordingly, throughout the year, 
communications among the audit committee, senior management and the 
internal auditors and independent accountants should be sufficient to 
inform the audit committee about significant and/or controversial issues. 
The formal approval by the audit committee of financial results before 
public release would delay American Express' timely release of quarterly 
financial information to the public.
Recommendation 20: The Commission's sponsoring organizations should establish
a body to guide public companies on internal controls.
The specific design of effective internal controls is determined primarily 
by the nature of the organization to which they will apply. Given the 
significant diversity of organizational and operational structures among 
industries, the design of controls will also vary significantly. We 
question the need for a body to guide public companies in this area. 
Guidelines applicable to all public companies will, by definition, be very 
broad in nature. We don't think that such guidance will be particularly 
useful. The effectiveness of internal controls can only be determined 
from within a company.
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A general concern we have with this section relates to the overall role of the 
audit committee. While we recognize and support the role of the audit 
committee, we strongly believe that this role should be one of oversight. The 
Commission’s recommendations appear to blur the distinction between the 
oversight role of the audit committee and management's direct responsibility 
for financial statement preparation. For example, advance approval of 
management advisory services performed by the independent auditors 
(Recommendation 14), involvement in the initial stages of accounting research 
(Recommendation 17) and pre-release approval of quarterly results 
(Recommendation 19) are, in our opinion, managerial functions. The mandatory 
inclusion in annual reports, under SEC rule, of a letter from the audit 
committee chairman, further emphasizes this shift of the audit committee's 
role away from one of oversight to one of direct involvement. We urge that 
the Commission reconsider the crafting of these recommendations to avoid this 
undesirable shift in responsibility. (We also recommend the Appendix K, Audit 
Committee Good Practice Guidelines, be modified to reflect the comments made 
above.)
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
We support the efforts undertaken by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), many 
of which are responsive to the concerns expressed by the Commission. 
Accordingly, except for the two comments noted below, we defer to the ASB's 
proposed statements on auditing standards.
Recommendation 23: The SEC should require independent public accountants to
review quarterly financial data of public companies before release to the 
publ ic.
The review of financial data prior to public release would, in many 
instances, slow down the timely release of data valuable to investors. In 
addition, the extent of the review would be limited due to the resulting 
time constraints placed upon the auditors. We seriously question whether 
such a review would significantly reduce the incidence of fraudulent 
financial reporting. Ongoing and timely communication throughout the year 
between the auditor and the company would eliminate the necessity for a 
"quarterly" review.
Recommendation 29: The AICPA should reorganize the Auditing Standards Board
to afford a full participatory role in the standard-setting process to 
knowledgeable persons who are affected by and interested in auditing standards 
but who either are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public practice.
We agree with this recommendation. However, in the accompanying text, the 
second suggestion for implementation indicates that hal f of the membership 
of the ASB should be practicing public accountants. While we agree that 
representation of qualified and knowledgeable persons not engaged in
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public accounting will add value to the process, we don't think it is 
necessary that such representation constitute hal f of the total 
membership. The resultant benefit can certainly be achieved with a 
smaller proportion of the membership.
RECOMMENDATION FOR THE SEC AND OTHERS TO IMPROVE THE REGULATORY AND LEGAL 
ENVIRONMENT
Recommendation 31: The SEC should have the authority to issue a cease and
desist order when a securities law violation or an unsound financial reporting 
practice is found.
Although we do not take exception to the thrust of this recommendation, we 
suggest that "fraudulent" is a more appropriate description than 
"unsound", which is vague and not grounded in any legal standard, and thus 
likely to be misinterpreted.
Recommendation 38: The financial institution regulatory agencies should
provide for the exchange of information between the regulatory examiner and 
the independent public accountant.
A fundamental strength of the audit process is the free flow of 
information between the auditor and client. Under this recommendation, 
the independent accountant would effectively be utilized by regulatory 
agencies as a surrogate enforcement arm. In such circumstances, the 
relationship between the independent accountant and client may become 
unnecessarily adversarial in nature. We are concerned that this would 
hinder the free flow of information, which in turn would negatively impact 
the quality of audits. We suggest that this recommendation be 
reconsidered in light of the potential negative consequences.
Recommendation 39: State boards of accountancy should implement positive
enforcement programs that periodically would review the quality of services 
that the independent public accountants they license render.
The existence of an efficient peer review process should eliminate the 
need for similar activities by state boards of accountancy. The benefits 
of such an effort, in our opinion, would not be worth the resultant costs.
COMPLETE SET OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter One: Overview of the Financial Reporting System and Fraudulent 
_________________ Financial Reporting_____________________________________________
No recommendations
Chapter Two: Recommendations for the Public Company
The Tone at the Top
1 Recommendation: For  the top  management of  a public company to discharge its obligations to oversee  
the financial reporting process, it must i dentify, understand, and assist the factors thar may cause the 
company's financial statements to be fra u dulently  misstated.
2 Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal  controls that are adequate to prevent and 
detect fraudulent financial reporting
3 Recommendation: Public companies should develop and enforce written codes o f corporate conduct. 
Codes o f conduct should foster a strong ethical climate and open channels o f communication to help 
protect against fraudulent financial reporting. A company's audit commi ttee should review compliance 
with the code annually, including compliance by top management, and report thereon to the board o f
directors.
Accounting Function  and Chie f  Accountin g  Officer
4 Recommendation: Public companies should maintain accounting fu n ctions that can effectively meet
their financial reporting obligations.
Internal Audit Function and Chief  In ternal Audito r
5 Recommendation: Public companies should maintain an etfective internal audit function staffed with
6   Recommendation: Public commpanies should ensure that their internal audit functions are objective.
7 Recommendation: Internal au d its should consider the implications o f their nonfinancial audit find­
ings for the company's  financial   statements.
8 Recommendation: M anagement and the audit  committee should ensure that the internal auditors'  
involvement in the audit o f the entire financial  reporting process is appropriate and properl y coordinated 
with the independent  public accountant.
M andatory Independent  Audit Com m ittee
9 Recommendation: The board o f directors o f all  public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
establish audit committees comprised solely of  independent directors.
10 Recommendation: Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective overseers o f the finan­
ciai reporting process and the company's  internal controls.
11 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  a  w r i t t e n  c h a r t e r  s e t t i n g  f o r t h  t h e  d u t i e s  a n d  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  T h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  t h e  c h a r t e r ,  r e v i e w  i t  a t  l e a s t  
a n n u a l l y ,  a n d  m o d i f y  i t  a s  n e c e s s a r y .
1 2  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  h a v e  a d e q u a t e  r e s o u r c e s  a n d  a u t h o r i t y  t o  d i s c h a r g e  t h e i r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
13 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  r e v i e w  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  f a c t o r s  r e la t e d  t o  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t .  B o t h  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t   s h o u l d  
a s s i s t  t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  i n  p r e s e r v i n g  h i s  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
1 4  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  a u d i t   c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  a p p r o v e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  t y p e s  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  m a n ­
a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n ­
t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m .
R e p o r t i n g  o n  R e s p o n si b i lit i e s  i n  t h e  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  t o  S t o c k h o l d e r s
1 5  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u ir e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l  
r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t s  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r  a n d  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  
o f f i c e r . T h e  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t  s h o u l d  a c k n o w l e d g e  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l ,  d i s c u s s  h o w  t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w e r e  f u l f i l l e d ,  a n d  p r o v i d e  
m a n a g e m e n t s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f   t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
1 6  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  t h e i r  a n n u a l  
r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  a  l e t t e r  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  c o m m i t t e e ' s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  a c t i v i t i e s  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r .
S e e k i n g  a  S e c o n d  O p i n i o n
1 7  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  M a n a g e m e n t  s h o u l d  a d v i s e  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  w h e n  i t  s e e k s  a  s e c o n d  o p i n i o n  o n  
a  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c c o u n t i n g  i s s u e .
1 8  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  W h e n  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  c h a n g e s  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  
r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  d i s c l o s e  p u b l i c l y  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a n y  m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t i n g  o r  a u d i t i n g  i s s u e s  
d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  i t s  o l d  a n d  n e w  a u d i t o r s  d u r i n g  t h e  t h r e e  y e a r  p e r i o d  p r e c e d i n g  t h e  c h a n g e .
Q u a r t e r l y  R e p o r t i n g
1 9  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u ld  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  q u a r t e rl y  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  
T h i s  o v e r s i g h t  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  a p p r o v i n g  f i n a n c i a l  r e s u l t s  p r i o r  t o  p u b l i c  r e l e a s e .
S e t t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  f o r  I n t e r n a l  C o n t r o l
2 0  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  s p o n s o r i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s h o u l d  e s t a b l i s h  a  b o d y  t o  g u i d e  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n i e s  o n  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
C h a p t e r  T h r e e :  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  A c c o u n t a n t
R e c o g n i z i n g  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  D e t e c t i n g  F r a u d u l e n t  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g
2 1  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  s h o u l d  r e v i s e  s t a n d a r d s  t o  r e s t a t e  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  d e t e c t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  in d e p e n  
d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  ( 1 )  t a k e  a f f i r m a t i v e  s t e p s  i n  e a c h  a u d i t  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  s u c h  r e p o r t i n g  
a n d  ( 2 )  d e s i g n  t e s t s  t o  p r o v i d e  r e a s o n a b l e  a s s u r a n c e  o f  d e t e c t i o n .  R e v i s e d  s t a n d a r d s  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  
g u i d a n c e  f o r  a s s e s s i n g  r i s k s  a n d  p u r s u i n g  d e t e c t i o n  w h e n  r i s k s  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d .
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Improving Detection Capabilities
22 Recommendation : The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards to require independent 
public accountants to perform analytical review procedures in a ll audit engagements and should provide 
improved guidance on the appropriate  use o f these procedures.
23 Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public accountants to review quarterly ftnan­
cial data of  public companies before release to the public.
Improving Audit Quality
24 Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section should strengthen its peer review program by  
increasing review o f audit engagements involving public company clients new to a firm . For each office 
selected fo r peer review, the first audit of  all such new clients should be reviewed.
25 Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section requirem ent fo r a concurring, or second part­
ner , review o f the audit report should be revised as part o f an ongoing process o f review o f this 
requirement. Standards fo r the concurring review should, among other things, (1) require concurring 
review partner involvement in the planning stage o f the audit in addition to the fin al review stage, (2) 
specify qualifications o f the concurring review partner to require prior experience with audits o f SEC 
registrants and fam iliarity with the client's industry, and (3) require the concurring review partner to 
consider him self a peer o f the engagement partner fo r purposes o f the review.
26 Recommendation: Public accounting firm s should  recognize  and control the organizational and ind­
vidual  pressures that potentially reduce audit quality.
Communicating the Auditor’s Role
27 Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor’s standard report to state 
that the audit provides reasonable but not  absolute assurance that the audited financial statements are free  
from  m aterial misstatements as a result o f fraud or error.
28 Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor’s standard report to describe 
the extent to which the independent public accountant has reviewed and evaluated  the system o f internal  
accounting control. Tht Auditing Standards Board a l s o  should provide explicit guidance to address the 
situation where, as a result o f his knowledge o f the company's internal  accounting  controls, the inde­
pendent public accountant  disagrees with management's assessment as stated in the proposed 
management's report.
Reorganization of the Auditing Standards Board
29 Recommendation: The AICPA should  reorganize  the Auditing Standards Board to afford a fa ll par­
ticipatory  role in the standard-setting process to knowledgeable persons who are effected by and interested  
in auditing standards but who either  are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public practice.
Chapter Four: Recommendations for the SEC and Others to Improve the 
______________ Regulatory and Legal Environment____________________
Additional SEC Enforcement Remedies
30 Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to impose civil money penalties in administrative 
proceedings [including Rule 2(e) proceedings]  and to seek civil money penalties from  a court directly in 
an injunctive proceeding.
31 Recom m endation: The SE C  should have the authority to issu e a  cease and d esist order when a   secu rities 
law violation o r an  unsound fin an cial reporting p ractice is  fou n d .
32 Recom m endation : T he SE C  should  seek  ex p licit st atu to ry  authority to b ar or  su spend  corporate officers  
and d irectors involved in  frau du len t fin an cial reporting from  fu tu re service in  th at capacity in  a  public 
com pany.
Increased criminal Prosecution
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33 Recommendation: Criminal prosecution o f  fr audulent fin an c ia l reportin g  cases should  be made a  
higher priority. The  SE C  should  conduct an  affirmative program  to promote increased  crimi nal  prose­
cuti o n o f  fraudulent  financial reporting cases by educa ting and assisting  g overnment officials with
crimnal poseutw.
Improved Regulation of the Public Accounting Profession
34 Recom m endation : The  SE C  should  re g a in  a ll public accounting  firm s th at audit  pubhc  compan ie s to  
be m em bers o f a  professional  organiza tion th at h as peer review  an d independen t oversight fu nction s end 
is  approved by the SEC , each a s th at specified  by the SEC PS  o f the AICPA's  D ivision fo r  CPA F irm s.
35 Recom m endation : The SE C  shou ld  take enforcem ent action  when a  public accounting firm  fa ils  to  
rem edy defic iencies  cited  in  the public  accounting profession 's   f i f t y  assurance program .
SEC Resourc e s
36 Recom m endation: The SE C  m ust be given adequate  resources to perform  existin g an d additional  
fu n ction s th at help prevent, detect, an d deter frau du len t fin an cial reporting .
Financial Institution Regulatory  Agencies
37 Recom m endation: The O ffice o f  the C om ptroller o f the C urrency, the F ederal  R eserve B oard , the 
F ed eral Deposit  In suran ce Corporation , and the Federal  H ome Loan B ank B oard  (including the F ederal 
Savin gs and Loan Insurance Corporation)   should adopt measu res patterned on the Com m ission's  rec­
ommendations directed to the SEC  to carry out th eir own regulatory respon sibility relatin g to f inancial  
reporting under the fe d eral secu rities  laws .
38 Recom m endation: The fin an cial  in stitution regulatory agen cies shcu ld  provide fo r  the exchange o f
E nhanced Enforcement by State  Boards of A ccountancy
39 Recom m endation: State boards  o f  accountancy sh ould  im plem ent positive enfo rcem ent program s th at 
period ically  w ould review  the quality o f serv ices tha t the independent public  accountants  they licence 
render.
Considering the Implications  of Liability on Audit Quality
Recommendation:  Parties charged with respending to various  tort reform  initiatives should consider the 
impli c a tions that the perceived liability crisis holds for long-term audit quality a n d  t h e  in d e p e n d e n t  p u b l ic
accountant's detection of fraudulent financial reporting .
Reconsidering Corporate Indemnification
Recom m endation: The SE C  sh ould recon sider its lon g-stan din g position  th at the corporate  indem ni­
ficatio n  of  d irectors fo r  liab ilitie s th at a rise  under the Secu rities A ct of  1933 is  again st  public  policy and  
therefore unenforceable .
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Chapter Five: Recommendations for Education
B u s i n e s s  a n d  A c c o u n t i n g  C u r r i c u l a
4 2  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h r o u g h o u t  t h e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l a ,  e d u c a t o r s  s h o u l d  f o s t e r  k n o w l ­
e d g e  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  m a g  c a u s e  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d   t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  
t h a t  a m  l e a d  t o  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  i t s  i n c i d e n c e
4 3  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l a  s h o u l d  p r o m o t e  a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  
f u n c t i o n  a n d  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  i n  p r e v e n t i n g ,  
d e t e c t i n g ,  a n d  d e t e r r i n g  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
4 4  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  B u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  s t u d e n t s  s h o u l d  b e  w e t l l - inf o r m e d  a b o u t  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  a n d  
e n f o r c e m e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  b y  w h i c h  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  p r i v a t e  b o d i e s  s a f e g u a r d  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  s y s t e m  
a n d  t h e r e b y  p r o t e c t  d m  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t ,
4 5  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l a  s h o u l d  h e l p  s t u d e n t s  d e v e l o p  s t r o n g e r  a n a ­
l y t i c a l ,  p r o b l e m  s o l v i n g ,  a n d  J u d g m e n t  s k i l l s  t o  h e l p  p r e v e n t ,  d e t e c t ,  a n d  d e t e r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t i n g  w h e n  t h e y  b e c o m e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s
4 6  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  T h e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  c u r r i c u l a  s h o u l d  e m p h a s i z e  e t h i c a l  v a l u e s  b y  i n t e g r a ­
i n g  t h e i r  d e v e l o p m e n t  w i t h  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  s k i l l s  t o  h e l p  p r e v e n t ,  d e t e c t ,  a n d  d e t e r
 f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,
4 7  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  B u s i n e s s  s c h o o l s  s h o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  b u s i n e s s  a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  f a c u l t y  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e i r  
o w n  p e r s o n a l  c o m p e t e n c e  a s  w e l l  a s  c l a s s r o o m  m a t e r i a l s  f o r  c o n v e y i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  s k i l l s ,  a n d  e t h i c a l  
v a l u e s  t h a t  c a n  h e l p  p r e v e n t ,  d e t e c t ,  a n d  d e t e r  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
P r o f e s s i o n a l  C e r t i f i c a t i o n  E x a m i n a t i o n s
4 8  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  P r o f e s s i o n a l  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  e x a m i n a t i o n s  s h o u l d  t e s t  s t u d e n t s  o n  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  
s k i l l s ,  a n d  e t h i c a l  v a l u e s  t h a t  f u r t h e r  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  t h a t  
p r o m o t e  i t s  r e d u c t i o n .
C o n t i n u i n g  P r o f e s s i o n a l  E d u c a t i o n
4 9  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n :  A s  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  c o n t i n u i n g  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e d u c a t i o n ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s ,  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s ,  a n d  c o r p o r a t e  a c c o u n t a n t s  s h o u l d  s t u d y  t h e  f o r c e s  a n d  o p p o r t u n i tti e s  t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  
f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g ,  t h e  r i s k  f a c t o r s  t h a t  m a y  i n d i c a t e  o c c u r r e n c e ,  a n d  t h e  r e l e v a n t  e t h i c a l  
a n d  t e c h n i c a l  s t a n d a r d s .
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Chairman
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Washington, DC 20006
Dear Mr. Chairman and Members of the 
Commission:
Report of the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting:
Exposure Draft of April 1987
Introduction
The Machinery and Allied Products Institute (MAPI) is 
pleased to have this opportunity to present its views to the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (NCFFR or 
"the Commission") with respect to NCFFR's Exposure Draft of its 
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations.
As stated by NCFFR, its mission since October 1985 has 
been to identify causal factors that can lead to fraudulent finan­
cial reporting, and identify steps to reduce its incidence. Fur­
ther, NCFFR is a private-sector initiative, jointly sponsored and 
funded by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), the American Accounting Association (AAA), the Financial 
Executives Institute (FEI), the Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA), and the National Association of Accountants (NAA).
In our view, NCFFR has done an exemplary job of examin­
ing the phenomenon of fraudulent financial reporting and then 
proposing remedies. However, we hasten to add that the implemen­
tation of all of NCFFR's proposed recommendations would lead to a 
quantum leap in private-sector and public-sector regulation of 
publicly held companies and independent accountants. Although 
many public companies and independent accountants are well along 
the way toward conforming with most NCFFR recommendations, the 
Commission has taken some steps that imply current and future 
overhead costs and red tape of an indeterminate amount.
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We w i l l  a t te m p t,  w i th  some o f  th e  s u r g ic a l  p r e c is io n  th a t  
NCFFR seems to  have eschewed, to  id e n t i f y  the m arg ina l recommendations, 
and do so in  a s p i r i t  o f  c o n s t r u c t iv e  c r i t i c i s m .  As a p re lim in a ry  
m a t te r ,  we o f f e r  a few o b se rva tio n s  o f  a genera l na tu re  to  pu t m a tte rs  
in  p e rs p e c tiv e .
D im in is h in g  Returns
F i r s t ,  th e  Com m ission m ust re c o g n iz e  th a t  those in v o lv e d  in  
f r a u d u le n t  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  and a u d it  f a i lu r e  are  a ve ry  sm a ll f r a c ­
t i o n  o f  th e  t o t a l  p o p u la tio n  o f  in d iv id u a ls  and o rg a n iz a t io n s  p a r t i c i ­
p a t in g  i n  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  and a u d it .  I t  fo l lo w s ,  both i n t u i t i v e l y  
and e m p i r i c a l l y ,  t h a t  e f f o r t s  to  le sse n  fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  
and a u d i t  f a i l u r e  a t  such a r e l a t i v e l y  low  le v e l o f  invo lvem ent w i l l  
r e q u i r e  s iz a b le  e x p e n d itu re s  in  exchange f o r  any m easu rab le  ga ins . 
M o re o ve r, the cos ts  o f  a d d it io n a l e f f o r t  w i l l  in c rea se  e x p o n e n tia lly  as 
the  re la te d  g a in s  in c re a se  a t  a d im in is h in g  ra te .  We p o in t  t h is  o u t no t 
to  q u a r r e l  w i th  any p a r t i c u la r  recom m enda tion  b u t t o  s e n s i t iz e  the  
C o m m iss ion  to  th e  i m p l i c i t  c o s ts  and bu rdens  o f  i t s  e n t i r e  s e t  o f  
p roposa ls .
Commands and E x h o rta tio n s
On an e q u a l ly  im p o r ta n t  m a t te r ,  we b e l ie v e  th a t  the  key to  
reduced fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  and reduced a u d it  f a i lu r e  l i e s  in  
e t h ic a l  b e h a v io r by a l l  persons in v o lv e d  in  such processes. Persons so 
engaged m ust a c t  w i th  p ro fe s s io n a lis m  and recogn ize  th a t  they are in  a 
p o s it io n  o f  t r u s t .  They must have a b a s ic  sense o f  fa irn e s s  and o b lig a ­
t io n ,  and shou ld  no t to le r a te  any la c k  o f  a c c o u n ta b il i ty .  These a t t r i ­
b u te s  r e la t e  ra th e r  u n iq u e ly  to  persona l and s o c ie ta l va lues , and we do 
n o t c o n s id e r  them v e ry  s u s c e p tib le  to  a d d it io n a l " p o l ic in g "  ( e . g . , new 
r u le s  o r  p e n a lt ie s )  o r symbolism ( e .g . ,  ado p ting  codes o f  cond uc t). In  
o th e r  w o rd s , one can e x p e c t some m easure o f  c o m p lia n t re sp o n se  to  
commands and e x h o r ta t io n s ,  b u t such remedies can e n ta i l  h igh  cos t and 
d im in is h in g  re tu rn s .
C om pe tition  and A c c o u n ta b il ity
A n o th e r ite m  we w is h  to  r a is e  a t  th e  o u ts e t  i s  t h a t  a u d it  
f a i lu r e  can be reduced by s teps taken  to  prepare independent accountants 
more th o ro u g h ly  f o r  th e  c h a lle n g e s  o f  t h e i r  v o c a tio n . A lso , we agree 
t h a t  th e re  s h o u ld  be a d is m a n tlin g  o f  impediments to  su cce ss fu l accom­
p lis h m e n t  o f  th e  in d e p e n d e n t a u d it  m iss io n . On the  o th e r hand, we do 
n o t co n cu r i n  th e  p ro p o s it io n  th a t  "c o m p e tit io n "  n e c e s s a r ily  i s  in con ­
s is t e n t  w i th  a c c o u n t in g  p r o fe s s io n a lis m  o r independence . Nor do we 
b e l ie v e  t h a t  in d e p e n d e n t a u d ito rs  shou ld  be re lie v e d  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
f o r  the  q u a l i ty  o f  t h e i r  work. To le ssen  co m p e tit io n  and a c c o u n ta b il i ty  
would— in  our o p in io n — u lt im a te ly  weaken ra th e r  than s tre n g th e n  indepen­
d e n t a c c o u n ta n ts  and t h e i r  o r g a n iz a t io n s .  The Cohen Commission o f  a 
d eca de  ago was c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  i t s  recom m enda tions w i th  re s p e c t  to  
c o m p e t it io n  and p o te n t ia l  le g a l l i a b i l i t y ,  and we hope th a t  NCFFR w i l l  
be more c ircum spect.
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T h e  A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  a n d  
I n d e p e n d e n t  A c c o u n t a n t s
W e  n o t e  t h a t  a  n u m b e r  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  t e n t a t i v e  r e c o m m e n ­
d a t i o n s  a r e  d i r e c t e d  a t  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  o f  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s .  
I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  w o u l d  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e s  b y  h a v i n g  t h e m  f u n c t i o n  a s  " s c r e e n s ”  f o r  v a r i o u s  a c t i o n s  t h a t  
w o u l d  b e  t a k e n  b y  m a n a g e m e n t ,  r a n g i n g  f r o m  t h e  r o u t i n e  i s s u a n c e  o f  
i n t e r i m  r e p o r t s  t o  t h e  e n g a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  o u t s i d e  a u d i t o r  t o  p e r f o r m  
m a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s .  S h o r t  o f  o b j e c t i n g  t o  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s ,  w e  
w o u l d  r e m i n d  N C F F R  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  l i m i t s  t o  w h a t  c a n  b e  a s k e d  o f  i n d e ­
p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  w i t h o u t  h a v i n g  t h e m  f u n c t i o n  a s  m a n a g e m e n t  i t s e l f  o r  
a s  " i n s i d e "  d i r e c t o r s  ( b y  w h a t e v e r  d e f i n i t i o n ) .  I n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  
a r e  n o t  " o n  b o a r d "  f u l l  t i m e ,  a n d  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  g i v e n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  
a n d  p o t e n t i a l  l e g a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  a s  i f  t h e y  w e r e .  A  b a l a n c e  m u s t  b e  
s t r u c k ,  o r  e l s e  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n s  f o r  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  d u t y  w i l l  b e  l e s s e n e d .
" T a r g e t i n g "
C o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  f o r e g o i n g ,  w e  h a v e  a  n u m b e r  o f  o b s e r v a ­
t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  t e n t a t i v e  N C F F R  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  I n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  
s o m e  s h o u l d  b e  e l i m i n a t e d  a n d  o t h e r s  s h o u l d  b e  m o d e r a t e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  
g i v e  t h e  f i n a l  r e p o r t  a  " t a r g e t e d "  a p p e a r a n c e  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h a t  o f  a  
r a n d o m  c a t a l o g i n g  o f  i n i t i a t i v e s  t h a t  m i g h t  h a v e  s o m e  b e a r i n g  o n  t h e  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  a n d  a u d i t  f a i l u r e .  N o  
i m p l i c a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  d r a w n  a s  t o  t h e  I n s t i t u t e ' s  p o s i t i o n  a b o u t  a n y  
N C F F R  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  n o t  r a i s e d  i n  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t  f o r  d i s c u s s i o n .
B a c k g r o u n d
A c c o r d i n g  t o  N C F F R ,  i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ,  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r ,  f o r m  
a  " b a l a n c e d  r e s p o n s e "  t o  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .  F u r t h e r ,  N C F F R  
" c a n n o t  o v e r e m p h a s i z e "  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  e v a l u a t i n g  i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
i n  t h e i r  t o t a l i t y  i n  t h a t  n o  s i n g l e  o n e  i s  m e a n t  t o  b e  s e p a r a t e d  f r o m  
t h e  r e s t .  N C F F R  f u r t h e r  a v e r s  t h a t  i t s  g o a l  f r o m  t h e  o u t s e t  h a s  b e e n  t o  
d e v e l o p  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  p r a c t i c a l ,  r e a s o n a b l e  i n  t h e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  j u s t i f i e d  b y  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t o  b e  a c h i e v e d ,  a n d  l e n d  t h e m ­
s e l v e s  t o  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  " w i t h o u t  u n d u e  b u r d e n . "  A m o n g  N C F F R ' s  
c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
—  A  c o m p a n y  t h a t  r a i s e s  f u n d s  f r o m  t h e  p u b l i c  a s s u m e s  
a n  o b l i g a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  t r u s t  a n d  c o m m e n s u r a t e  
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .
—  T h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  w h o  a u d i t s  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  a l s o  h a s  a  
p u b l i c  o b l i g a t i o n .
—  T h e  e x t e n s i v e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  b y  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n i e s  i s  t h e  m o s t  c r i t i c a l  c o m p o n e n t  o f  t h e
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d isc losure  tha t ensures the e ffe c tiv e  fun c tion in g  o f 
the c a p ita l and c re d it markets in  the United States.
— The problem o f fraudu lent f in a n c ia l repo rting  cannot 
be q u a n t if ie d . However, the problem is  serious; i t  
can o c c u r in  any g iven  company; and th e re  i s  a 
r e a l is t ic  p o te n tia l fo r reducing th a t r is k .
— The re s p o n s ib il i ty  fo r re lia b le  f in a n c ia l re po rting  
resides f i r s t  and foremost a t the corporate le v e l.
— No one answer to  the problem o f fraudu lent f in a n c ia l 
repo rting  e x is ts .
— There are l im its  to  the a b i l i t y  to  prevent or detect 
f r a u d ,  no m a tte r  how much c o s t i s  in c u r r e d . 
[Emphasis supplied.]
MAPI Comments on the NCFFR 
Exposure D ra ft
The NCFFR Exposure D ra ft is  organized w ith  recommendations (1) 
fo r  the  p u b lic  company; (2) fo r  the independent pub lic  accountant; (3) 
fo r  the SEC and others to  improve the regu la to ry and le g a l environment; 
and (4 ) fo r  ed uca tio n . We w i l l  take these up in  the  same order as 
l is te d .
Recommendations fo r  
Public Companies
The NCFFR approach here is  to  improve the o v e ra ll environment 
in  which f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  occurs— in c lu d in g  the "tone" set by top 
management— and to  maximize the e ffectiveness o f the functions w ith in  
the company tha t are c r i t ic a l  to  the in te g r ity  o f f in a n c ia l repo rting .
In te rn a l c o n tro ls . — One NCFFR recommendation fo r  the pub lic  
company is  to  m aintain in te rn a l con tro ls  th a t are adequate to  "prevent" 
and detect fraudu len t f in a n c ia l re po rting .
As NCFFR undoubtedly is  aware, the absolute "prevention" o f 
fra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re po rting  is  a goal, but should not necessarily be 
a measure o f adequacy in  given circumstances. No set o f in te rn a l con­
t r o ls  can prevent fraudu lent f in a n c ia l re po rting  under a l l  circumstances 
because c o llu s io n  can circumvent con tro ls  and judgmental elements— not 
to  m ention human and machine e rro r— always are a t work. Our suggestion 
is  th a t the word "prevent" be changed to  "d e te r."
Codes o f conduct.--NCFFR a lso  s ta te s  th a t  pub lic  companies 
should develop and en fo rce  w r it te n  codes o f corporate conduct. These 
codes should fo s te r  a s tro n g  e th ic a l  c lim a te  and open channels o f 
communication to  he lp  p ro te c t against fraudu lent f in a n c ia l repo rting .
9d
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F u r t h e r ,  N C F F R  w o u l d  r e c o m m e n d  t h a t  a  c o m p a n y ' s  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  
r e v i e w  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  c o d e  a n n u a l l y ,  i n c l u d i n g  c o m p l i a n c e  b y  t o p  
m a n a g e m e n t ,  a n d  r e p o r t  t h e r e o n  t o  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s .
W e  d o  n o t  o b j e c t  i n  p r i n c i p l e  t o  t h i s ,  b u t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  
b e g s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  t h e  r e v i e w  a n d  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e d u r e  s h o u l d  b e  
r e g u l a t e d  a n d  f o r m a l i z e d  b y  s o m e  b o d y  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  o r  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r .  I n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  t h e  r e v i e w  a n d  r e p o r t  p r o c e d u r e  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  
r e g u l a t e d ,  b u t  i n s t e a d  s h o u l d  b e  l e f t  " f r e e  f o r m ”  s o  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  c a n  t a i l o r  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a t  h a n d .
W e  s u g g e s t  t h a t  N C F F R  t a k e  t h e  p o s i t i o n  j u s t  m e n t i o n e d  w h e n  i t  
p r e p a r e s  f i n a l  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .  I f  t h e  r e v i e w  a n d  r e p o r t i n g  p r a c t i c e  i s  
m a n d a t e d  b y  s o m e  r e g u l a t o r y  o r  q u a s i - r e g u l a t o r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  f o r m a l  
p r o c e d u r e s  w i l l  f o l l o w  a n d  t h e  r e p o r t  w i l l  e m e r g e  a s  " b o i l e r p l a t e . "
I n t e r n a l  a u d i t . - - A n o t h e r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  t h a t  p u b l i c  
c o m p a n i e s  m a i n t a i n  a n  " e f f e c t i v e "  ( a n d  " o b j e c t i v e " )  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
f u n c t i o n  s t a f f e d  w i t h  a n  " a d e q u a t e "  n u m b e r  o f  q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  s i z e  a n d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y .
W e  d o  n o t  k n o w  h o w  t o  d e f i n e  a n  " e f f e c t i v e "  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
f u n c t i o n  s t a f f e d  w i t h  a n  " a d e q u a t e "  n u m b e r  o f  q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l ,  a n d  
r a t h e r  s u s p e c t  t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  w o u l d  b e  e l u s i v e ,  i f  a t t e m p t e d .  N o r  
d o  w e  k n o w  h o w  a  p u b l i c  c o m p a n y  c a n  e n s u r e  t h a t  i t s  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  
f u n c t i o n  i s  " o b j e c t i v e . "
I s  a n  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  " i n e f f e c t i v e "  i f  i t s  i n v e s t i g a ­
t i o n s  p r o d u c e  l i t t l e ?  O r  i s  i t  n o t  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  " a d e q u a c y "  o f  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n n e l  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  t h e  
c o n t r o l  s y s t e m s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  p l a c e ?  I s  N C F F R  c o n c e r n e d  t h a t  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t i o n s  b e  " o b j e c t i v e "  r a t h e r  t h a n  " s u b j e c t i v e , "  o r  i s  
N C F F R  i m p l y i n g  s o m e t h i n g  a b o u t  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r ' s  i n d e p e n d e n c e ?
O n  t h i s  l a s t - m e n t i o n e d  i t e m ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t o  u s  f r o m  t h e  t e x t  
s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  t h a t  " i n d e p e n d e n c e "  i s  t h e  i n t e n d e d  t e s t  
o f  " o b j e c t i v i t y . "  F u r t h e r ,  N C F F R  r e f e r s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  a  " c h i e f  
i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r "  h a v i n g  s p e c i f i c  r e p o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  T h e  C o m m i s ­
s i o n  e v e n  o p i n e s  t h a t  t h e  c h i e f  i n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  s h o u l d  o c c u p y  a  
p o s i t i o n  o f  " h i g h  s t a t u r e "  w i t h i n  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  c h i e f  
e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r  s h o u l d  m e e t  w i t h  h i m  n o  l e s s  f r e q u e n t l y  t h a n  e v e r y  
q u a r t e r .  W e  h a v e  n o  s t r o n g  d i s a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  c o n t e n t  o f  N C F F R ' s  
a r g u m e n t .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s e e m s  t o  u s  t o  b e  " m i c r o - m a n a g i n g "  
a n d  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  r e g u l a t o r y  f o l l o w - o n  c o n c e r n  u s .
A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s . - - A n o t h e r  N C F F R  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  
b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  o f  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  
r u l e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  c o m p r i s e d  s o l e l y  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  
d i r e c t o r s .
C o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  o u r  f e e l i n g  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t a l  i n t r u s i o n  i n  
a f f a i r s  o f  a c c o u n t a n c y  s h o u l d  b e  s p a r i n g ,  w e  o p p o s e  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .
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I f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  m u s t  b e  m a n d a t e d ,  w e  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i t  r e m a i n  a  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  S e l f - R e g u l a t o r y  O r g a n i z a t i o n s  ( S R O s ) .  A s  N C F F R  i s  
a w a r e ,  t h e  o n l y  S R O  w i t h  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  t h i s  s o r t  t o  d a t e  i s  t h e  N e w  
Y o r k  S t o c k  E x c h a n g e  ( N Y S E ) .  F u r t h e r ,  w e  c o n c u r  i n  t h e  c o n c e p t  
u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  N Y S E  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  “ i n d e p e n d e n t "  d i r e c t o r .
W e  n o t e  s o m e  a m b i v a l e n c e  i n  t h e  t e x t  s u p p o r t i n g  N C F F R ' s  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  m a n d a t i n g  o f  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  i s  n e c e s s a r y  
b u t  d o e s  n o t  g o  f a r  e n o u g h .  S o o n  t h e r e a f t e r ,  N C F F R  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  S E C  
b e  a b l e  t o  g r a n t  e x c e p t i o n s  o n  a  c a s e - b y - c a s e  b a s i s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
d e a r t h  o f  q u a l i f i e d  p e r s o n s  t o  s e r v e  a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s ,  p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  i n  s m a l l ,  n e w l y  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s .  A m b i v a l e n c e  a s i d e ,  t h e  l a t t e r  
p o i n t  i s  w e l l  t a k e n .
I n  o u r  o p i n i o n — t o  r e p e a t — t h e  f a c t  o f  t h e  m a t t e r  i s  t h a t  t h e  
a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i s s u e  d o e s  n o t  j u s t i f y  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  
F u r t h e r ,  a n y  c o m p a n i e s  t h a t  h a v e  i n s t i t u t e d  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  c o n t r o l s  
f u n c t i o n a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a n  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  q u a l i f y  f o r  
e x c e p t i o n  f r o m  a n y  s u c h  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  e v e n  i f  i m p o s e d  b y  a n  S R O .
M a n a g e m e n t  a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e . — N C F F R  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  t h e  a u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  a p p r o v e  i n  a d v a n c e  t h e  t y p e s  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  
a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m .
W e  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  p r o b l e m  i n v o l v e d  h e r e ,  b u t  a l s o  
f e e l  t h a t  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  a w k w a r d  i n  p r a c t i c e .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
a  c o m p a n y  t h a t  u s e s  a  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t  f o r  a u d i t  m i g h t  
l i k e  p e r i o d i c a l l y  t o  c a l l  o n e  o f  t h a t  f i r m ' s  t a x  p a r t n e r s  t o  i n q u i r e  
a b o u t  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  r u l e s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  t a x  c o m p l i a n c e  t h a t ,  
i n  f a c t ,  a r e  i m m a t e r i a l .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  c l i e n t  m i g h t  w i s h  t o  c a l l  t h e  
a u d i t o r  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h a t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  w a y  o f  n e w  m a n a g e m e n t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  s y s t e m s  s e r v i c e s .  I n  y e t  a n o t h e r  s c e n a r i o ,  t h e  c l i e n t  m i g h t  
w i s h  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  a u d i t o r  t o  r e v i e w  t h e  s y s t e m s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  o f  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  d e p a r t m e n t  a n d  m a k e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  i m p r o v e d  e f f i c i e n c y .
W h y  s h o u l d  t h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  b e  c o n s u l t e d  i n  a d v a n c e  a b o u t  
a n  e n g a g e m e n t  t h a t  w o u l d  n o t  a d d  c o m m e r c i a l  p r e s s u r e s  t o  t h e  a u d i t  
e x a m i n a t i o n  a n d  w o u l d  n o t  i m p a i r  i n d e p e n d e n c e ?  W e  r e c o m m e n d  t h a t  N C F F R  
r e v i s i t  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  a n d  d o  w h a t  i t  c a n  t o  " t a r g e t "  t h e  a d v a n c e -  
a p p r o v a l  p r o p o s a l .
M a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t s . - - I n  a n o t h e r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n ,  N C F F R  s t a t e s  
t h a t  a l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  r e q u i r e d  b y  S E C  r u l e  t o  i n c l u d e  i n  
t h e i r  a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  t o  s t o c k h o l d e r s  m a n a g e m e n t  r e p o r t s  s i g n e d  b y  t h e  
c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r  a n d  c h i e f  a c c o u n t i n g  o f f i c e r .  T h e  m a n a g e m e n t  
r e p o r t  s h o u l d  a c k n o w l e d g e  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  f i n a n ­
c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a n d  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s ,  d i s c u s s  h o w  t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i ­
t i e s  w e r e  f u l f i l l e d ,  a n d  p r o v i d e  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s .
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W e  n o t e  t h a t  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  i s  m o r e  s w e e p i n g  t h a n  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t  u n d e r  t h e  F o r e i g n  C o r r u p t  P r a c t i c e s  A c t  ( F C P A )  i n  t h e  s e n s e  
t h a t  i t  c o v e r s  a l l  i n t e r n a l  c o n t r o l s  r a t h e r  t h a n  ’’i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  
c o n t r o l s . "  A l s o ,  i t  i s  l e s s  s w e e p i n g  i n  t h a t  N C F F R  i n s e r t s  a  
m a t e r i a l i t y  t h r e s h o l d  w h e r e a s  F C P A  d o e s  n o t .
As i n  th e  case o f  SEC’ s a b o r te d  1979 p roposa l on management 
re p o r ts ,  we b e lie v e  th a t  t h is  one i s  aimed a t  e s ta b lis h in g  a requ irem en t 
f o r  a sta tem ent o f  com pliance w ith  the  law , and would have the  e f fe c t  o f  
i d e n t i f y in g  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  v io la t io n s  o f  the  law . Consequently, the 
p r o p o s a l  may v i o l a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o t e c t i o n s  a g a in s t  s e l f ­
in c r im in a t io n ,  and s h o u ld  be rev iew ed by counsel to  determ ine whether 
such an exposure e x is ts .
I n  t h a t  c o n n e c t i o n ,  w e  n o t e  N C F F R ' s  c o m m e n t  t h a t  a  c h i e f  
e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r  m a y  w a n t  p e r i o d i c a l l y  t o  e n g a g e  t h e  c o m p a n y ’ s  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  t o  p e r f o r m  a  c o m p l e t e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o m p a n y ’ s  s y s t e m  o f  i n t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  c o n t r o l .
I s  N C F F R  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  t h e  o u t s i d e  a u d i t o r  m i g h t  b e  e n g a g e d  t o  
c o n d u c t  " o p e r a t i o n a l "  a u d i t  r a t h e r  t h a n  a c c o u n t i n g  a u d i t ?  T o  w h a t  
e x t e n t  w o u l d  t h e  a u d i t o r ’ s  " o p i n i o n "  p r o t e c t  t o p  m a n a g e m e n t  f r o m  c h a r g e s  
o f  n e g l e c t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  i n  w h i c h  t o p  
m a n a g e m e n t  d i d  n o t  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  e n g a g e ?  W o u l d  t h e  o u t s i d e  
a u d i t o r  g i v e  a  p o s i t i v e  a s s u r a n c e  o r  a  n e g a t i v e  a s s u r a n c e ?  I f  t h e  
l a t t e r ,  s h o u l d  N C F F R  s a y  s o m e t h i n g  a b o u t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  o p i n i o n  t o  b e  
r e n d e r e d ?  T h e s e  e n g a g e m e n t s  a r e  e x p e n s i v e ,  a n d  t h o s e  w h o  p e r f o r m  t h e m  
m u s t  b e a r  s o m e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e  t h e y  
r e n d e r .
N e w  r e g u l a t o r y  b o d y . — N C F F R  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  i t s  s p o n s o r i n g  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h  a  b o d y  t o  g u i d e  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  o n  i n t e r n a l  
c o n t r o l s .
M A P I  d o e s  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s — a l r e a d y  h e a v i l y  
r e g u l a t e d  b y  p u b l i c - s e c t o r  a n d  p r i v a t e - s e c t o r  r e g u l a t o r y  b o d i e s — n e e d  
a n o t h e r  s u c h  a g e n c y  t o  p r o m u l g a t e  r u l e s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  c o n d u c t  
o f  c o r p o r a t e  a f f a i r s .  A s  w e  a l r e a d y  h a v e  s t a t e d ,  t h e  " l a w  o f  d i m i n i s h ­
i n g  r e t u r n s "  i s  i n  e f f e c t .
O n e  s i m p l y  d o e s  n o t  c r e a t e  a  n e w  r e g u l a t o r y  b o d y  e v e r y t i m e  
t h e r e  i s  a  f l u r r y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  f r a u d s  o r  a u d i t  f a i l u r e s .  O f  a l l  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  m a d e  b y  N C F F R ,  t h i s  o n e  i s  t h e  m o s t  i n d i s c r i m i n a t e  a n d  
e x t r a v a g a n t ,  a n d ,  i n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  w o u l d  d e v o u r  s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s  i n  
e x c h a n g e  f o r  m i n i m a l  b e n e f i t s .
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
I n d e p e n d e n t  P u b l i c  
A c c o u n t a n t
N C F F R  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  f i r s t  a n d  
f o r e m o s t  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  t h e  r e p o r t i n g  e n t i t y .
-  8 -
N otw ithstanding, the independent public accountant plays a c ruc ia l ro le  
in  the fin an c ia l reporting  process.
NCFFR' s proposals encompass (1) the design of aud it scope and 
procedure  to  co n sid er the p o ten tia l for fraudulent fin an c ia l reporting  
and d e te c t  the  same; (2) th e  increased use of an a ly tica l review, plus 
tim e ly  review  of q u a r te r ly  f in a n c ia l  d a ta ; (3) proposals to  improve 
aud it q u a lity ; (4) strengthened communications with users of the outside 
a u d ito r ' s rep o rt; and (5) reorganization  of the Auditing Standards Board 
(ASB) of AICPA.
Detection. —In somewhat more d e ta il ,  NCFFR recommends th a t ASB 
re v is e  i t s  s ta n d a rd s  to  r e s t a t e  the  independent public  accountant' s 
r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r de tection  of fraudulent fin an c ia l reporting , requ ir­
ing  the  independent public accountant to  (1) take affirm ative  steps in  
each a u d it  to  a s se s s  th e  p o te n tia l  for such reporting ; and (2) design 
te s ts  to  provide reasonable assurance of detection .
Our only comments with respect to  th is  recommendation are th a t 
ASB—as NCFFR i s  w e ll aware—has c ircu la ted  fo r public comment 10 pro­
posed new and /o r amended auditing  standards. The ASB action  evidently 
was a n t ic ip a to ry  of NCFFR' s recommendation, and i t  might be useful to  
see what evo lves from the  ASB proceed ing  b e fo re  a rr iv in g  a t  a f in a l 
recommendation.
The o th e r  item  concerning us i s  simply to  take care th a t any 
new or rev ised  aud iting  standards are co s t-e ffec tiv e . When the organi­
z a tio n  c re a t in g  the  s ta n d a rd s  i s  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  of p ro fe ss io n a ls  
expected to  benefit from them, there i s  a presumed bias toward expanding 
th e  scope of r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  w hile  a ttem p tin g  to  narrow the scope of 
p o te n t ia l  legal l i a b i l i t y .  NCFFR should monitor very closely  the costs 
and benefits  of ASB in i t ia t iv e s  and be sen sitiv e  to  sub tle  s h if ts  in  the 
burden of lega l l i a b i l i t y .
Q u a rte rly  r e p o r t s . — As a lre ad y  in d ic a te d , NCFFR recommends 
th a t  SEC re q u ire  independent p u b lic  acco u n tan ts  to  review quarterly  
fin an c ia l data of public companies before re lease  to  the public.
In  our o p in io n , t h i s  should remain voluntary with companies, 
and th o s e  t h a t  p re fe r  a look-back  review  from year end should be 
p e rm itte d  to  con tinue  w ith  the  same. We note with some in te re s t  th a t 
NCFFR conducted a study of year-end w rite -o ffs  and found a concentration 
of the same in  the fourth  quarte r. There i s  no mention, however, th a t a 
c o r r e la t io n  appeared between companies with fourth quarter w rite -o ffs  
and look-back  q u a r te r ly  rev iew . I f  there i s  no evidence from NCFFR' s 
study  to  support a costly  requirement of timely quarte rly  review, then 
the proposal s tr ik e s  us as extravagant.
C oncurring rev iew . —On co ncu rring  ( i . e . ,  "second partner") 
rev iew s, NCFFR recommends rev is io n  of the AICPA' s SEC P ractice  Section 
requ irem en t fo r  a co n cu rrin g , or second partner, review of the audit 
rep o rt.
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The s ta n d a rd s  p roposed  by NCFFR f o r  th e  c o n c u r r in g  rev iew  
s h o u ld ,  among o th e r  th in g s ,  (1 )  r e q u i r e  c o n c u r r in g  re v ie w  p a r tn e r  
in v o lv e m e n t in  the  p lann ing  stage o f  the  a u d it  i n  a d d it io n  to  the  f i n a l  
r e v ie w  s ta g e , (2 )  s p e c i fy  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  c o n c u r r in g  re v ie w  
p a r tn e r  to  r e q u i r e  p r io r  experience w ith  a u d its  o f  SEC re g is t r a n ts  and 
f a m i l i a r i t y  w i th  th e  c l i e n t ' s in d u s try ,  and (3) re q u ire  the c o n cu rr in g  
re v ie w  p a r tn e r  to  cons ide r h im s e lf  a peer o f  the  engagement p a rtn e r fo r  
purposes o f  the  rev iew .
A g a in , NCFFR i s  p ro p o s in g  to  have e x t r a  la y e rs  o f  presumed 
p r o t e c t io n  a g a in s t the  r is k  o f  fra u d . C le a r ly ,  the  requ irem en t to  have 
a c o n c u r r in g  rev iew  p a rtn e r in v o lv e d  in  the  p la n n in g  stage o f  the  a u d it  
i n  a d d i t io n  to  the  f i n a l  rev iew  stage cou ld  be expensive in  r e la t io n  to  
th e  a n t ic ip a te d  b e n e f i ts .  We do no t th in k  th a t  p roposa ls  o f  t h is  s o r t  
s h o u ld  be a d v a n c e d  w i t h o u t  f i e l d  t e s t i n g ,  s u rv e y in g ,  and o th e r  
procedures to  ensure cost e f fe c tiv e n e s s .
I f  NCFFR were determ ined a t any cos t to  squelch f in a n c ia l 
fra u d  and end a u d it  f a i lu r e ,  would the  Commission next go to  th ird  
p a rtn e r or second f irm  review? Where would th is  d izzying s p ira l o f 
costs end?
Standard r e p o r t . — NCFFR recommends th a t the ASB revise the 
a u d ito r ' s s tandard  re p o r t  to  s ta te  tha t the aud it provides reasonable 
but not abso lu te  assurance th a t the aud ited  f in a n c ia l statements are 
fre e  from m ateria l misstatements as a re s u lt o f fraud or e rro r.
A lso , NCFFR recommends th a t ASB revise the a u d ito r ' s standard 
re po rt to  describe the extent to  which the independent pub lic  accountant 
has reviewed and eva lua ted  the system o f in te rn a l accounting co n tro l. 
P ro v is io n  a lso  would be made fo r  exp la in ing disagreements between the 
independent pub lic  accountant and management in  th e ir  assessments o f the 
in te rn a l accounting con tro ls .
We have no o b je c t io n  to  re v is in g  the standard re po rt to  make 
i t  more communicative. As NCFFR should be aware, the Cohen Commission 
recommended the same th in g , but the  p ro je c t was dropped by a specia l 
ta sk  fo rc e  o f AICPA due to  fa i lu re  o f the members o f the task force to  
agree on the outcome.
Reorganize ASB. —NCFFR recommends th a t AICPA should reorganize 
the ASB to  a f fo rd  a f u l l  p a r t ic ip a to ry  ro le  in  the  standard-se tting  
process to  knowledgeable persons who are a ffected  by and in te res te d  in  
a u d it in g  standards but who e ith e r are not c e r t i f ie d  p u b lic  accountants 
or are CPAs no longer in  pub lic  p rac tice .
For the most p a r t ,  we concur in  th is  recommendation. On the 
o th e r hand, we th in k  th a t  con tinu ing  consideration should be given to  
e s ta b l is h in g  th e  ASB fu n c t io n  more a long l in e s  o f the F in a n c ia l 
Accounting Standards Board.
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Recommendations f o r  the SEC 
and O thers To Improve the  
R egu la to ry  and Legal 
Environment
NCFFR' s p roposa ls  in  t h is  area in v o lv e  a d d it io n a l SEC en fo rce ­
ment re m e d ie s , in c re a s e d  c r im in a l  p ro s e cu tio n , improved re g u la t io n  o f  
the  p u b lic  accou n ting  p ro fe s s io n , SEC's resou rces , f in a n c ia l  in s t i t u t io n  
r e g u la to r y  a g e n c ie s , enhanced e n fo rc e m e n t by s ta te  boards o f  accoun­
tancy , and the  c u rre n t le g a l c lim a te .
Fines.--NCFFR recommends th a t  SEC have the  a u th o r i ty  to  impose 
c i v i l  money p e n a lt ie s  i n  a d m in is t ra t iv e  proceedings and to  seek c i v i l  
money p e n a lt ie s  d i r e c t ly  in  an in ju n c t iv e  proceeding .
We w o u ld  have fo u n d  i t  u s e fu l  i f  NCFFR had d is c u s s e d  th e  
p o l ic y  re a so n  a d o p te d  e a r l i e r  by C ongress f o r  n o t v e s t in g  SEC w ith  
a u th o r i ty  to  impose c i v i l  money p e n a lt ie s — o th e r than in  in s id e r  t ra d in g  
c a se s . As we understand th e  m a tte r , SEC o r ig in a l ly  was g iven  a u th o r ity  
o v e r  d is c lo s u r e  s ta tu te s ,  and C ongress b e lie v e d  th a t  the  f re e  m arket 
w o u ld  mete o u t s u f f i c i e n t  pun ishm en t to  th o s e  fo u n d  to  have f i l e d  
im p r o p e r  o r  in a d e q u a te  d is c lo s u r e s .  We do n o t d is a g re e  w i th  th e  
o r ig in a l  p o l ic y ,  bu t we a ls o  do no t d isag ree  w ith  the p ro p o s it io n  th a t  a 
c i v i l  money p e n a lty  would add to  the  opprobrium . O bv ious ly , th e re  must 
be p r o v is io n  f o r  a d m in is t r a t iv e  a p p e a l and subsequen t appeal to  the  
ju d ic ia r y .
C e a s e -a n d -d e s is t  o rd e rs . — NCFFR recommends th a t  SEC have the 
a u t h o r i t y  to  is s u e  a c e a s e -a n d -d e s is t  o rd e r  when a s e c u r i t ie s  la w  
v io la t i o n  o r  an unsound f i n a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g  p ra c t ic e  i s  found . T h is  
w o u ld  be a m ild e r  remedy th a n  a c i v i l  in ju n c t iv e  a c t io n  because, fo r  
exam p le , an in ju n c t io n  a ls o  m igh t e n ta i l  the  s ta tu to ry  d is q u a l i f ic a t io n  
from  s e rv in g  as an o f f i c e r  o r a d ire c to r  o f  an investm en t company.
We ag ree  w i th  t h i s  recommendation, s u b je c t to  some m o d ific a ­
t io n s .  F i r s t ,  th e  remedy would be h e lp fu l in  cases in  which SEC la c k s  
s u f f i c i e n t  e v id e n c e  to  d e m o n s tra te  a reasonab le  l ik e l ih o o d  o f  fu tu re  
v io la t i o n s ,  and i n  cases i n  w h ic h  th e  SEC m ig h t h e s i t a te  to  pursue 
in ju n c t i v e  r e l i e f  because i t  w o u ld  seem to o  h a rs h . Inasmuch as SEC 
m ig h t be u s in g  t h is  remedy in  m a rg ina l cases, we b e lie v e  th a t  the  c i v i l  
money p e n a lty  to  be assessed and c o lle c te d  fo r  each day d u r in g  which the  
v io la t i o n  con tinues  shou ld  be re fu n d a b le , w ith  in te r e s t ,  and SEC shou ld  
be r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  d e fe n d a n t ’ s c o u r t  c o s ts  i f  th e  d e fe n d a n t 
e v e n tu a lly  p re v a ils  on the  is s u e .
A u d it  q u a l i t y . — Among o th e r p ropo sa ls , NCFFR recommends th a t  
SEC s h o u ld  r e q u i r e  a l l  p u b l ic  a c c o u n t in g  f i r m s  t h a t  a u d i t  p u b l ic  
com pan ies to  be members o f  a p r o fe s s io n a l o rg a n iz a t io n  th a t  has peer 
re v ie w  and in d e p e n d e n t o v e rs ig h t fu n c t io n s  and i s  approved by the  SEC, 
such as t h a t  s p e c i f ie d  by the SEC P ra c tic e  S e c tio n  o f  AICPA' s D iv is io n  
f o r  CPA F irm s . A lso , NCFFR recommends th a t  s ta te  boards o f  accountancy 
im p le m e n t p o s i t i v e  enforcem ent programs th a t  p e r io d ic a l ly  would rev iew
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t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  s e r v i c e s  r e n d e r e d  b y  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t s  
t h e y  l i c e n s e .
W e  d o  n o t  d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  e x c e p t  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  
d e g r e e .  A g a i n ,  w e  h a v e  a n  i n s t a n c e  o f  N C F F R ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  a d d i n g  o r  
r e i n f o r c i n g  l a y e r s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n .  T h e  r e g u l a t i o n ,  i n  t u r n ,  i m p l i e s  
c o s t ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b u r d e n ,  a n d  d e l a y .  W e  r e p e a t  t h a t ,  i n  o u r  o p i n i o n ,  
N C F F R  h a s  n o t  t a k e n  s u f f i c i e n t  c a r e  t o  " t a r g e t "  t h e s e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
a n d  h a s  n o t  b e e n  a d e q u a t e l y  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  c o s t s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i t s  p r o g r a m .
I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  l i a b i l i t y . — N C F F R  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  p a r t i e s  
c h a r g e d  w i t h  r e s p o n d i n g  t o  v a r i o u s  t o r t  r e f o r m  i n i t i a t i v e s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  l i a b i l i t y  c r i s i s  h o l d s  f o r  l o n g - t e r m  
a u d i t  q u a l i t y  a n d  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t 's  d e t e c t i o n  o f  
f r a u d u l e n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g .
N C F F R  s t a t e s  t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  l e g a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  a r e  j e o p a r d i z i n g  
t h e  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t i n g  p r o f e s s i o n ' s  ( 1 )  a b i l i t y  t o  a t t r a c t  a n d  r e t a i n  
h i g h - c a l i b e r  p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  a n d  ( 2 )  f u t u r e  e c o n o m i c  v i a b i l i t y .  W h e t h e r  
t h i s  i s  t r u e  o r  n o t — a n d  w e  s u s p e c t  t h a t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  i s  o v e r s t a t e d — w e  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t o r t  r e f o r m  m u s t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  a  m u c h  l a r g e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  
t h a n  t h a t  o f  a  s i n g l e  p r o f e s s i o n .  O v e r a l l ,  w e  r a t h e r  s u s p e c t  t h a t  t h e  
t h r u s t  o f  N C F F R ' s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  w o u l d  s e r v e  t o  " t i l t "  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
p o t e n t i a l  l e g a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  t o w a r d  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  a w a y  f r o m  i n d e p e n d e n t  
a c c o u n t a n t s .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  w e  f i n d  s o m e w h a t  i n c o n g r u o u s  t h e  i m p l i c i t  
m e s s a g e  t h a t  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s  n e e d  s p e c i a l  t o r t - r e f o r m  p r o t e c t i o n  
i n  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t .
C o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n . - - N C F F R  r e c o m m e n d s  t h a t  S E C  
r e c o n s i d e r  i t s  l o n g - s t a n d i n g  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  c o r p o r a t e  i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n  
o f  d i r e c t o r s  f o r  l i a b i l i t i e s  t h a t  a r i s e  u n d e r  t h e  S e c u r i t i e s  A c t  o f  1 9 3 3  
i s  a g a i n s t  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  u n e n f o r c e a b l e .
W e  a d m i t  t o  h a v i n g  m i x e d  f e e l i n g s  a b o u t  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n .  
W i t h  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  o w n e r s h i p  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  t h a t  e x i s t s  i n  p u b l i c l y  
h e l d  c o m p a n i e s ,  d i r e c t o r s  m u s t  b e a r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a c t i n g  o n  t h e  
s h a r e h o l d e r s '  b e h a l f .  C r e a t i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r  v a l u e  i s  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  
p r i m a r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  a n d  w e  v i e w  w i t h  s k e p t i c i s m  p r o p o s a l s  t h a t  
e i t h e r  w o r k  t o  d i s e n f r a n c h i s e  s h a r e h o l d e r s  o r  c o m p r o m i s e  t h e  i n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  m e c h a n i s m s  t h a t  f o c u s  m a n a g e m e n t  a t t e n t i o n  o n  t h e  s h a r e h o l d e r s '  
i n t e r e s t s .  T h e  t r e n d  o f  c h a n g e s  i n  s t a t e  c o r p o r a t i o n  l a w s  n o t e d  b y  
N C F F R  c o u l d  c o n t i n u e  a n d  a c c e l e r a t e  a s  s t a t e s  c o m p e t e  t o  p r o v i d e  a  
" f r i e n d l y  c o r p o r a t e  d o m i c i l e . "  I f  t h i s  w e r e  t o  h a p p e n ,  f e d e r a l  
p r e e m p t i o n  m i g h t  c o m e  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  a n d  w e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  
C o n g r e s s  w o u l d  b e  s o l i c i t o u s  o f  b o a r d  m e m b e r s '  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  
i d e m n i f i c a t i o n .
T h e  o t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  c o i n  i s  t h a t  t h e r e ,  i n  f a c t ,  i s  a  
s e r i o u s  s h o r t a g e  o f  o f f i c e r s '  a n d  d i r e c t o r s '  l i a b i l i t y  c o v e r a g e .  
W h e t h e r  w o r r i e s  a b o u t  p e r s o n a l  l i a b i l i t y  h a v e  r e a c h e d  t h e  p o i n t  o f  
j e o p a r d i z i n g  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i r e c t o r s  i s  a
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matter on which we would prefer to reserve judgment. If all of NCFFR's 
recommendations were to be adopted, there would be a sizable shift of 
responsibility to audit committee members, such that they could be 
expected to demand both more compensation and additional liability 
protection. This would put the corporation in a difficult position if 
it could not acquire satisfactory liability insurance and if it were not 
permitted by state law to offer broad indemnification.
In other words, we recognize the dilemma, and also see 
exposures in the proposed remedy. We might add that NCFFR's "Audit 
Committee Good Practice Guidelines" are very demanding. When it is 
considered that some publicly held companies— generally smaller ones—  
still do not have audit committees but instead perform audit committee 
functions while sitting as the full board of directors, one wonders 
whether there should not be more flexibility in the recommendations to 
account for and accommodate to the lesser resources of smaller firms.
Recommendations for 
Education
NCFFR offers a number of recommendations pertaining to (1) the 
role of education in preparing participants in the financial reporting 
system; (2) business and accounting curricula; (3) five-year accounting 
programs; (4) professional certification examinations; (5) continuing 
professional education; and (6) educational initiatives by public 
companies. The stated idea behind the proposals is to help to make 
present and future participants in the financial reporting process 
better informed about fraudulent financial reporting and better prepared 
to prevent, detect, and deter it.
We concur in all of the recommendations presented by NCFFR for
education.
Concluding Comment
In conclusion, we repeat that the Commission has, in our 
opinion, done a masterful job with a difficult subject. The document 
containing the final recommendations will chart a course and set an 
agenda that should lead to a lesser incidence of fraudulent financial 
reporting and audit failure. Our only wish is that the recommendations 
for the public company, the independent public accountant, and the legal 
environment be "tightened up" and "targeted." In accomplishing this, we 
hope that the Commission will demonstrate more sensitivity about cost- 
effectiveness, and justify each of its proposals with an analysis of 
costs and benefits.
Finally, NCFFR should be aware that its final report, if not 
moderated, could be the engine for a regulatory juggernaut that could do 
more harm than good. Financial fraud and audit failure— however 
grievous when they occur— are relatively infrequent phenomena, and the 
measures taken to arrest them should be flexible, conservative, and 
exception-oriented.
- 13 -
We hope these views will be of use to NCFFR. If the Commis­
sion or its staff would like to discuss the matter further, please do 
not hesitate to call us at 202/331-8430.
Very truly yours, 
P r e s i d e n t
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Washington
Gas
Washington Gas Light Company 
1100 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20080
Frederic M. Kline
Controller
June 30, 1987
Mr. James C. Treadway, Jr., Chairman 
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Mr. Treadway:
Washington Gas Light Company (Washington Gas) appreciates the oppor­
tunity to express its views on the Exposure Draft: Report of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Washington Gas is a natural gas 
company engaged primarily in the purchase, distribution and sale of natural gas 
at retail in the metropolitan area of Washington, D. C., which includes the 
District of Columbia and adjoining areas in the states of Maryland and Virginia, 
with over $700 million in annual revenues.
Washington Gas supports the Commission in its undertaking to identify 
causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting and develop 
recommendations to minimize its occurence. We generally agree with the 
recommendations made by the Commission, which embrace all participants in the 
financial reporting process. Our primary interest, however, lies in the recom­
mendations for the public company.
Washington Gas agrees with most of the recommendations proffered by the 
Commission on ways public companies can prevent and detect fraudulent financial 
reporting. The recommendations reaffirm our belief that the responsibility for 
reliable financial reports rests primarily with top management in that manage­
ment sets the tone and establishes the financial reporting environment. We also 
agree with the recommendations which emphasize the importance of adequate 
internal controls, an effective and objective internal audit function and the 
role of the audit committee in overseeing the integrity of the company's finan­
cial reporting. Indeed, Washington Gas has in place many of the concepts 
embodied within the recommendations.
We are concerned, however, with the Commission's apparent disregard of 
the significance of the cost of its recommendations. The Commission weakly 
attempts to address the cost/benefit relationship in Section VI of Chapter One 
with the rather broad conclusion that "the long-term benefits of these 
recommendations - enhanced corporate control and ethical business conduct - 
outweigh the costs of implementing them." It is not apparent from the report 
that any specific studies were performed with regards to, for instance, 
quarterly reviews by the audit committee of the financial statements or the
F.M.K.-J.C.T. 2 June 30, 1987
mandatory inclusion in annual reports of a management letter regarding the 
adequacy of the entire internal control system. A pilot program could be 
undertaken to quantify the costs associated with the Commission's recommen­
dations, thus providing a more concrete foundation for evaluating the cost/ 
benefit relationship.
Washington Gas appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Exposure 
Draft: Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Corporate Offices
600 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
l0l
Rockwell
International
June 30, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
We are pleased to respond to the Exposure Draft of the Report of the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Generally, we support the recommendations outlined in the Commission's Exposure 
Draft. In fact, procedures at Rockwell International already are in accordance 
with the majority of the Commission’s recommendations. However, there is one 
proposal which we believe should be reconsidered with a view to its deletion.
We strongly oppose the Commission's recommendation that audit committees 
approve quarterly financial results prior to public release. The Commission's 
specific recommendations regarding the audit committee's role in preventing 
and detecting fraudulent financial reporting are contained in Section IV of 
Chapter Two. The basic thrust of these recommendations is that the audit 
committee should be comprised solely of independent directors who can provide 
informed, vigilant, and effective oversight of the the company's financial 
reporting process and internal controls. We fully endorse this independent 
oversight role for the audit committee. Implementation of these specific 
recommendations would provide that (1) the audit committee satisfies itself as 
to the adequacy of internal controls, (2) the audit committee is kept informed 
of important developments that affect quarterly financial results and (3) the 
external auditors review the quarterly financial results. We believe these 
procedures properly safeguard the integrity of the financial reporting process.
We have, however, two significant concerns regarding the proposal to have 
audit committees approve quarterly financial results prior to public release. 
First, the approval requirement would make audit committees an integral 
component of the financial reporting process thereby detracting from their 
ability to serve as independent overseers of the financial reporting process. 
Second, it will significantly impede the timely release of quarterly financial 
results and thereby deprive investors of prompt availability of important 
financial data without any compensating benefit.
The financial reporting process is the primary responsibility of management 
and should not be shared by a committee of the board of directors. Instead 
the board of directors should retain an oversight responsibility which acts as 
a check and balance to management's primary responsibility. In our view, 
joint responsibility will damage, both in appearance and in fact, the audit 
committee's crucial oversight role without discernibly improving the quality 
of quarterly financial information.
National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
June 30, 1987 
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Moreover, timely release of financial results will be impossible, or at best 
substantially delayed, if outside directors must approve quarterly financial 
results prior to public release. This inevitable delay also will result in 
added risks of premature leaks of the preliminary data.
We have reviewed this letter with the Chairman of the Audit Committee of 
Rockwell International's Board of Directors. He has asked us to state his 
full concurrence in the views expressed herein and to emphasize his view that 
an audit committee has a primary oversight responsibility rather than a 
participatory responsibility in the financial reporting process.
We urge you to delete this requirement from the final report of the Commission.
Respectfully submitted,
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
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Raymond H. Alleman 
Senior Vice President 
and Comptroller
IT T  Corporation
World Headquarters
320 Park Avenue 
New York, N .Y. 10022 
Telephone (212) 7 5 2 -6000
June 30, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
SUBJECT: Exposure Draft - Findings, Conclusions, and
____________Recommendations of the Commission____________
Members of the Commission:
I participated in the preparation of the comment letter on the 
Exposure Draft that is being submitted by the Management 
Accounting Practices Committee of the National Association of 
Accountants, and I endorse the points made in that letter.
The publicity that surrounds the issue of fraudulent reporting 
has encouraged overreactions in proposals by some groups, 
including some of the proposals by the Auditing Standards Board 
that the Commission plans to consider for its final report. The 
Commission's Exposure Draft, however, generally reflects 
resistance to the pressures for overreactions; the tone of the 
Draft is constructive. The Commission appropriately placed 
emphasis on the importance of the "tone at the top" of 
companies, and on the creation of systems and attitudes within 
companies that facilitate proper practices. This emphasis goes 
to the heart of whether or not problems will begin. Consistent 
with that, the recommendations that the SEC's enforcement powers 
be enhanced are logical and appropriate responses to wrong 
doings that occur.
Several of the Commission's recommendations, however, go too 
deeply into specific details of how responsibilities are to be 
carried out:
1. Commission Recommendation:
Annual reports should include a letter from the chairman
of the audit committee and a report of management.
2Comment - These types of disclosures tend to become 
boiler-plate that dilutes rather than fulfills 
responsibilities. The risk disclosures required by the 
SEC under Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K is an 
instructive analogy. That risk disclosure is intended 
to arm the investor with knowledge of the specific risks 
of an enterprise. In practice, the disclosures 
generally are broadly similar, from company to company, 
with little help for the reader on the specific 
situation. In the case of managements', directors', and 
audit committees' responsibilities for financial 
statements and supporting systems, the responsibilities 
exist, they are well known to users of statements, and 
they are inescapable for managements and directors. 
Letters in annual reports will not enhance these 
responsibilities, and, in fact, may dilute them.
2. Commission Recommendation:
When a company changes independent public accountants, 
the company should be required to disclose publicly the 
material accounting or auditing issues discussed.
Comment: Considerable rigidity will be introduced in
accountant-client discussions. Disclosure of "issues" 
is too vague an instruction in the light of the range of 
topics that are discussed each year in even the most 
idyllic accountant-client relationships. Further, 
legitimate discussions could be misinterpreted if 
disclosed in such circumstances, causing inappropriate 
harm to the participants. The present SEC requirements 
with respect to disclosure of disagreements between 
accountant and client are sufficient and appropriate.
3. Commission Recommendation:
The audit committee should approve interim financial 
statements prior to public release.
Comment: ITT involves the entire Board in review of
quarterly and full-year projections and developments in 
each Board meeting. With this background, the Directors 
then review the financial statements and associated 
management messages. This is one of a number of 
appropriate approaches, none of which is superior to 
another. We see no reason for a particular approach to 
be imposed on all U.S. public companies.
3The Commission is urged to make a distinction between 
assignments of responsibilities and specific direction on the 
method of fulfilling these responsibilities, and to adopt 
recommendations only in the former.
The Exposure Draft noted that the Commission will consider the 
Auditing Standards Board's (ASB) proposed standards that address 
issues related to fraudulent reporting. The ASB went too far in 
its proposal on Errors and Irregularities. The ASB assigned to 
public accountants the impossible (but costly) task of detecting 
errors and irregularities. The ASB's proposal is contrasted 
with the Commissions' more balanced direction "... to design 
tests to provide reasonable assurance of detection." The 
direction in the Commission's Exposure Draft should be retained.
In summary, the Commission's Exposure Draft represents a solid 
response to the problem of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Although there have been relatively few cases of fraudulent 
reporting, their existence has cast doubt on general reporting 
practices. Many of the Commission's recommendations represent 
steps already followed by most large companies, but it is 
appropriate that these steps be made standard practice for all 
public companies. In a few areas, the Exposure Draft went too 
far into the specifics of how responsibilities are to be 
discharged; the document would be better without such specifics.
cc: Management Accounting Practices Committee of the National 
Association of Accountants
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P E N N Z O I L  C O M P A N YPENZOIL PLACE •P.O. BOX 2967 • HOUSTON, TEXAS 7252-2967 • (713)546-8974June 30, 1987
N. J. LUKE Group Vice President Corporate Finance and Acounting
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Gentlemen:
Pennzoil Company is pleased to submit written comments on the Exposure Draft of the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. We agree with the Commission that many of the recommendations are not new and have in fact already been considered and implemented in many public companies, including Pennzoil Company. Pennzoil endorses the Commission's efforts to identify those factors that can  lead to fraudulent financial reporting and concurs with the spirit of the Commission's recommendations, if not the letter in all cases.
We agree wholeheartedly with the tone and intent of the Commission's recommendations. We would ask that the Commission reconsider the recommendation that the audit commit­tee be required to approve quarterly financial results before they are released to the public. While it is agreed that the board of directors has ultimate responsibility for accurate and timely reporting of financial condition and operating results, Pennzoil feels that it is impractical for the audit committee to approve quarterly financial results before release. We believe that arranging for pre-release review of financial results by the audit committee will result in delays and require more detailed involvement by independent public account­ants, perhaps even requiring audits of quarterly results.There is little flexibility in the schedule for preparation and release of quarterly financial results. In many instances audit committees are comprised of directors who must travel from distant locations and whose schedules would make difficult a meaningful pre-release review of a company's quarterly results each and every quarter. It is possible that a require­ment for a pre-release review each quarter might make it more difficult to attract qualified audit committee members.Each company has its own culture and as a practical matter has its own procedures established for the review of informa­tion released to the public (including quarterly financial results).
June 30, 1987
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Pennzoil follows the practice of having the indepen­
dent accountants review financial results each quarter and 
furnish a letter covering that review to the board of directors. 
While this review is not a full audit, it is an extension 
of the independent public accountants' review of the company's 
financial condition and results of operations for the total 
year on which an opinion is expressed. We feel this procedure, 
along with appropriate internal controls, and such other 
specific oversight as the audit committee may decide to exer­
cise in particular cases, is adequate to prevent release 
of fraudulent and misleading financial information. It is 
our opinion the audit committee should satisfy themselves 
that adequate controls are in place to ensure the desired 
results. These procedures in some cases may indeed include 
a review by the audit committee. In other cases internal 
controls and procedures agreed to by the audit committee 
will be adequate and any additional benefits of a review 
before financial results are released will be outweighed 
by the costs.
As a practical matter it is impossible to assemble 
a set of rules or guidelines which are infallible. Ethics 
in the business environment cannot be legislated in an effort 
to eliminate fraudulent financial reporting. The managements 
of Corporate America can only provide an environment which 
is conducive to ethical business conduct and select those 
managers who will best perform in that environment. Adequate 
internal controls are only a part of that environment or 
culture.
In general the Commission's recommendations for 
public companies form an excellent foundation on which all 
companies can build a system of checks and balances. Each 
company's corporate environment, reporting structure, and 
personnel should be considered in determining the appropriate 
degree and form of implementation.
In any case, each company and its board should be 
allowed to establish review procedures applicable to the 
release of quarterly earnings. These procedures should be 
suited to a company's corporate culture, competitive and 
business environment and industry segment. We do not feel 
that a set of inflexible rules and mandates will necessarily 
improve the incidence of fraudulent reporting.
Thank you for the opportunity to reply to the Commis­
sion's Exposure Draft on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Very truly yours,
N . J . Luke
C. Perry Colwell
Corporate Vice President and Controller
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Room 29-3142 
550 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10022-3297 
212 605-5200
June 3 0 , 1987
M r. G. Dewey A r n o ld ,  E x e c u t iv e  D i r e c t o r  
N a t io n a l  C om m iss ion  o n  
F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W.
W a s h in g to n , D .C . 20026
D e a r M r. A r n o ld ,
AT&T a p p r e c ia te s  t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  re s p o n d  t o  t h e  
A p r i l  1987 E x p o s u re  D r a f t ,  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  N a t io n a l  Comm is s io n  o n  
F r a u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  and  commends t h e  Comm is s io n  f o r  i t s  
e f f o r t s .  F o r  t h e  m o s t p a r t ,  we a g re e  t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  
re co m m e n d a tio n s  a r e  p r a c t i c a l ,  re a s o n a b le  i n  t h e  c irc u m s ta n c e s ,  
j u s t i f i e d  b y  t h e  b e n e f i t s  t o  b e  a c h ie v e d , and  c a n  b e  im p le m e n te d  
w i t h o u t  undue  b u rd e n . The C om m iss ion  h a s  done  a n  e x c e l le n t  jo b  i n  
i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  c a u se s  o f  f r a u d u le n t  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t in g  and  
d e v e lo p in g  co m p re h e n s iv e  re co m m e n d a tio n s  t o  m i t i g a t e  ( b u t  n o t  
p re v e n t)  i t  f ro m  o c c u r r in g ,  a s  w e l l  a s  enhance  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
d e te c t io n  s h o u ld  i t  o c c u r .  G iv e n  th e  c o m p le x i t ie s  o f  f r a u d  and  
t h e  d yn a m ic  e n v iro n m e n ts  t h a t  m o s t co m pan ies  o p e ra te  w i t h i n ,  we 
u rg e  t h e  C om m iss ion  t o  r e e n fo r c e  t h e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  t h a t  th e s e ,  o r  
a n y  c o s t  e f f e c t i v e  re co m m e n d a tio n s  h a v e  l i m i t a t i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  p r e v e n t  a n d  d e te c t  f r a u d .
We c o n c u r  w i t h  t h e  need  t o  e v a lu a te  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  
re co m m e n d a tio n s  i n  t h e i r  t o t a l i t y ,  s in c e  i t  i s  t h e  o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  
t h a t  w i l l  a c h ie v e  t h e  d e s ir e d  im p ro ve m e n t, r a t h e r  th a n  a n y  s in g le  
re co m m e n d a tio n  o r  g ro u p  o f  re co m m e n d a tio n s  s ta n d in g  a lo n e .
H ow ever, we d o  h a ve  c o n c e rn s  r e g a r d in g  c e r t a in  re co m m e n d a tio n s  a s  
d is c u s s e d  b e lo w .
C h a p te r  Two: R ecom m endations f o r  t h e  P u b l ic  Company
1 . R ecom m enda tion : F o r  t h e  t o p  m anagement o f  a  p u b l i c  com pany 
t o  d is c h a rg e  i t s  o b l i g a t io n  t o  o v e rs e e  th e  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t in g  p ro c e s s ,  i t  m u s t i d e n t i f y ,  u n d e rs ta n d , a n d  a s s e s s  
t h e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  may ca u se  th e  comp a n y 's  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  
t o  b e  f r a u d u le n t l y  m is s s ta te d .
.. .2
Response: The ED does not discuss possible steps that 
management can take to discharge this obligation. The 
recommendation can be interpreted to require a significant 
documentation effort similar to what many companies did in 
response to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Although some 
flexibility in the recommendation is desirable, we urge the 
Commission to clarify the expectations of Management in the 
implementation of the recommendation.
2. Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal
controls that are adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Response: The concept of reasonable assurance should be
incorporated into the recommendation to recognize the 
oost/benefit considerations in developing an internal control 
system.
3. Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that their
internal audit functions are objective.
Response: While we agree that "public companies should 
ensure that their internal audit functions are objective 
(independent), ” having the chief internal auditor report to 
the CEO does not achieve that goal and, in fact, may well be 
counterproductive. The report gives the impression (p 34) 
that anything less than direct administrative reporting to 
the CEO is second best. We believe objectivity and 
independence are achieved not so much in the administrative 
reporting relationship as in other aspects of organizational 
positioning and relationships. For example, it is very 
important (as the Commission report states) that the chief 
internal auditor have direct and unrestricted access to both 
the CEO and the audit committee. To ensure the reality of 
this access, periodic private meetings with both should be 
held, either as a matter of course or as the occasion 
demands. Furthermore, the chief internal auditor, and in 
fact all internal auditors, should have unrestricted access 
to all operations, records, personnel, and physical 
properties which they consider relevant in the performance of 
their audits. It should be clear to all managers and other 
employees that they are expected to be candid with internal 
auditors, and to make available any material or information 
requested in the course of the audit. In other words, it is 
these functional relationships and unrestricted access, 
rather than administrative reporting lines, which make 
objectivity and independence a reality. We therefore believe
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that the Commission should not attempt to prescribe the 
reporting relationship for the chief internal auditor, but 
rather provide that an informed audit committee and 
management determine the appropriate organizational 
placement.
4. Recommendation: The audit permittee should approve in
advance the types and the extent of management advisory 
services that management plans to engage the company's 
independent public accountant to perform.
Response: This recommendation is unnecessarily restrictive
and may inhibit management's responsiveness in cases when 
prompt action is required. An "after-the-fact" review by the 
audit committee would provide for adequate review and 
evaluation of issues concerning independence of public 
accountants.
In addition, it should be recognized that the circumstances, 
as well as time constraints, affecting each company and audit 
committee are different. Consequently, the audit permittee 
and management should determine the best approach to 
satisfying their responsibilities.
5. Recommendation: All public companies should be required by 
SBC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders a 
letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee 
describing the committee's responsibilities and activities 
during the year.
Response: We disagree with the inclusion of a letter signed 
by the chairman of the audit permittee in the annual report. 
We believe that with the acceptance of the other 
recommendations by the Commission, the activities and 
responsibilities of the audit committee will become known, 
and within the larger public companies, probably 
standardized. The audit committee chairman's letter 
acknowledging these responsibilities will add minimal value 
and will become "boilerplate" wording in the report. 
Additionally, activities and responsibilities of the audit 
committee can be effectively incorporated into the Report of 
Management or in other sections of the Annual Report should 
such disclosure be deemed appropriate.
6. Recomm endation: When a public company changes independent 
accountants, it should be required by SBC rule to disclose 
publicly the nature of any material accounting or auditing 
issues discussed with its old and new auditors during the 
three-year period preceding the change.
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Response: We believe that existing SEC disclosure 
requirements which cover ".. any disagreements with the 
former accountant on any matter of accounting principles or 
practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope 
or procedure, which disagreements if not resolved to the 
satisfaction of the former accountant would have caused him 
to make reference in connection with his report to the 
subject matter of the disagreement ..." are adequate. There 
are many reasons for changing auditors unrelated to 
accounting and auditing issues. We do not believe it would 
serve any useful purpose to require disclosures which may not 
be related to the reasons for a change.
7. Recommendation : Audit committees should increase their
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to public 
release.
Response: We do not believe that, as a general rule, the 
audit committee should be required to review or approve 
quarterly financial results prior to their release. It is 
not practical to have the audit committee do this and at the 
same time release such results on a timely basis. The 
logistics involved in furnishing quarterly results to the 
audit committee and the time spent by the committee in 
exercising its oversight responsibility, would unnecessarily 
delay the timeliness of their release and, therefore, inhibit 
the flow of information to the public.
8. Recommendation : The Commission's sponsoring organizations
should establish a body to guide public companies on internal 
controls.
Response: The establishment of a body to guide the 
development of internal controls will impose an unnecessary 
cost on sponsoring organizations when there already exists 
adequate guidelines for internal controls. Major public 
accounting firms and effective internal auditing functions 
have very good internal control review checklists that can be 
utilized by management to ensure that proper internal 
controls exist. In addition, organizations such as the AICPA 
and Institute of Internal Auditors provide guidance on 
internal control matters. Given the competency requirements 
of management, work performed by independent accountants and 
internal auditors, as well as enhanced communication with 
audit committees, we believe that a standard body for 
internal controls is unnecessary. The key factor in the 
concept of internal control is management's determination to 
put controls in effect.
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Chapter Three: Recommendations for the Independent Public 
Accountant
1. Recom mendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise
standards to restate the independent public accountant's 
responsibility for detection of fraudulent financial 
reporting, requiring the independent public accountant to (1) 
take affirmative steps in each audit to assess the potential 
for such reporting and (2) design tests to provide reasonable 
assurance of detection. Revised standards should include 
guidance for assessing risks and pursuing detection when 
risks are identified.
Response: AT&T's concerns with respect to auditing standard
exposure drafts relating to this recommendation have been 
incorporated into responses by the Financial Executives 
Institute forwarded directly to the Auditing Standards 
Board.
2. Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise
the auditor's standard report to describe the extent to which 
the independent public accountant has reviewed and evaluated 
the system of internal accounting control. The Auditing 
Standards Board should provide explicit guidance to address 
the situation where, as a result of his knowledge of the 
company's internal accounting controls, the independent 
public accountant disagrees with management's assessment as 
stated in the proposed management's report.
Response: The Commission recognizes that in some
circumstances an adequately designed system of internal 
accounting controls is not justified. However, including a 
description of the extent of review and evaluation of 
internal accounting controls in the auditor's standard 
report may result in unfair and misleading interpretations of 
companies in which controls were not tested or partially 
tested. We question whether financial statement users are 
better equipped to appreciate this distinction than the 
broader concern of the Commission. We disagree with 
in troducing this technical complexity in the standard 
report.
Sincerely,
C. P. Colwell
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Dear Mr. A rn o ld :
F in a n c ia l E xecu tives I n s t i t u t e 's  (FE I) a p p re c ia te s  th is  o p p o rtu n ity  to  
respond to  the  A p r i l  1987 Exposure D ra ft  Report o f  the  N a tio n a l Commission on 
F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R e p o rtin g .
FEI commends the  Commission fo r  i t s  e f f o r t s .  The Commission has done an 
e x c e lle n t job  in  id e n t i f y in g  the  causes o f f ra u d u le n t f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  and 
deve lop ing  a comprehensive se t o f  recommendations designed to  preven t i t  from  
o c c u rr in g  and to  d e te c t i t  when i t  does occu r. For the  most p a r t ,  we agree 
th a t  the  Commission's recommendations are p r a c t ic a l ,  reasonable in  the circum ­
stances, ju s t i f i e d  by the b e n e fits  to  be ach ieved , and would lend themselves 
to  im plem enta tion  w ith o u t undue burden.
We a ls o  agree w ith  the  Commission th a t  the  e x is t in g  f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  
system fu n c tio n s  rem arkab ly w e ll ,  and o rg a n iz a tio n s  charged w ith  oversee ing 
the  process o f s e t t in g  standards by and la rg e  do an adm irab le job  o f appro­
p r ia te ly  ba lanc ing  the  p u b lic  in te re s t  and the  burdens re g u la t io n  imposes on 
bus iness. We s tro n g ly  b e lie v e  th a t the  p r iv a te -s e c to r  in s t i t u t io n s  in  p lace , 
supplemented by the  Commission's recommendations, are the  a p p ro p ria te  and most 
e f fe c t iv e  method o f m eeting the  p u b lic 's  needs. Separate le g is la t io n  — o th e r 
than as may be needed to  implement c e r ta in  o f  the  Commission's 
recommendations - -  is  no t needed and would p o te n t ia l ly  i mpose a d d it io n a l costs  
on U.S. in d u s try  th a t  cou ld  no t be ju s t i f i e d  by the  re la te d  b e n e fits  and would 
weaken the  U.S. c o m p e tit iv e  p o s it io n  in  w o rld  m arkets.
We recogn ize  the  need to  eva lua te  the  Commission's recommendations in  t h e ir  
t o t a l i t y ,  s ince  i t  i s  the  o v e ra l l e f fe c t  th a t  w i l l  achieve the des ired  im­
provement, ra th e r  than any s in g le  recommendation o r group o f recommendations 
s tand ing  a lone . In  t h is  regard , we have an o v e r r id in g  concern th a t  the
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re p o r t ,  in  i t s  t o t a l i t y ,  would impose an u n r e a l is t ic  burden on members o f 
a u d it  com mittees. We n o te , f o r  example, the comment in  Appendix K on page 43 
th a t ,  "An a u d it committee c o n s is tin g  o f  independent d ire c to rs  is  the  p rim ary  
v e h ic le  th a t  the board o f d ire c to rs  uses to  d ischarge i t s  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  w ith  
respect to  the company's f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g . "  We do no t b e lie v e  (a ) th is  is  
a v a l id  re p re s e n ta tio n  o f the  s itu a t io n  th a t  e x is ts  a t  most companies today, 
and (b ) i t  is  a reasonable e xpe c ta tio n  f o r  the  fu tu re  un less the  ro le  o f a u d it  
committees is  r a d ic a l ly  a lte re d  from an o v e rs ig h t to  a p a r t ic ip a to ry  r o le .  
We, th e re fo re , urge the  Commission to  re co n s id e r the  o v e ra ll tone o f i t s  
approach in  t h is  rega rd . Our comments in  response to  s p e c if ic  recommendations 
th a t  bear on th is  issue  c o n ta in  a number o f suggestions.
We a lso  have some concerns and f in e - tu n in g  suggestions about v a r io u s  
o th e r recommendations. Our responses to  s p e c if ic  recommendations are se t 
f o r th .
Si n c e re ly ,
R o b e rt W. Moore
RWM/af
c c : Chairman James C. Treadway
Commissioners W illia m  M. B a tten
W illia m  S. Kanaga 
Hugh L. Marsh, J r .  
Thomas I .  S to rrs  
Donald H. T ra u t le in
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CHAPTER TWO: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY
Recommendation: For the top management of a public company to discharge its 
obligation to oversee the financial reporting process, it must identify, 
understand, and assess the factors that may cause the company's financial 
statements to be fraudulently misstated.
Response: The text accompanying this recommendation states that the process of 
assessing risk is an ongoing procedure rather than a separate project. Also, 
management judgment dictates the extent and nature of the assessment. The Good 
Practice Guidelines for Assessing the Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting in 
Appendix H (page 158) reinforce this by stating that assessing the risk does 
not necessitate a separate effort.
Despite this, an organized effort of some kind seems indicated with 
participation by "individuals at all levels of the company," and supervised by 
"top-level corporate management, such as the CEO and the CFO." We are con­
cerned that this could be interpreted to require a massive documentation effort 
on the part of U.S. industry, along the lines of that which many companies 
undertook to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practice Act. Accordingly, we request that the Commission clarify its intent 
that this recommendation is not intended to impose a burdensome documentation 
effort.
In conjunction with this issue, we believe the Good Practice Guidelines in 
Appendix H provide helpful insights regarding matters that should be taken into 
consideration in identifying, understanding, and assessing the factors that may 
cause a company's financial statements to be fraudulently misstated. We 
compliment the Commission on developing these guidelines. Again, however, we 
believe it should be further stressed that it is not the Commission's intent to 
require comprehensive documentation of the issues covered in the Guidelines.
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain internal controls that are
adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent financial reporting.
Response: Just as the concept of "reasonable assurance" is an integral part of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, it is essential that "reasonable assurance 
be explicitly included in the above recommendation to avoid any possible 
misunderstanding —  just as it is included in the first recommendation in
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Chapter 3. Clearly, the cost of 100% prevention would be prohibitive. 
Comments in other areas of the Report, such as those on page 24 under the 
heading "Need for Cost-Effective Responses," indicate that the Commission is 
sensitive to this concern. We urge that this same sensitivity be reflected in 
the recommendation by changing it to read "Public companies should maintain 
internal controls that are adequate to reasonably assure the prevention and 
detection of fraudulent financial reporting."
Recommendation: Public companies should develop and enforce written codes of
corporate conduct. Codes of conduct should foster a strong ethical climate
and open channels of communication to help protect against fraudulent
financial reporting. A company's audit committee should review compliance 
with the code annually, including compliance by top management, and report 
thereon to the board of directors.
Response: We concur with the Commission's views regarding the need for a
written code of corporate conduct. However, review of compliance with the 
code of conduct should be an integral part of the audit committee's ongoing 
oversight process. The last sentence of the recommendation could be inter­
preted to imply that such review is somehow separate from the financial 
reporting process and internal control system. We suggest this be clarified 
by prefacing the last sentence with the words "As part of its ongoing 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls, a company's audit 
committee ... .” Also we suggest the word "annually" be changed to
"periodically," since the need for review may be more or less frequent than 
annually.
Recommendation: Public companies should maintain accounting functions that
can effectively meet their financial reporting obligations.
Response: The text accompanying this recommendation indicates that the chief
accounting officer is directly responsible for the financial statements and 
should be held responsible for fraudulent financial reporting. This statement 
implies that the CAO has control and knowledge of all factors that influence 
fraudulent financial reporting, which is contrary to fact and inconsistent 
with other aspects of the draft report. For example, there can be cases where 
the CEO, the CFO, and/or other top executives, acting independently or in 
collusion, can adopt fraudulent financial reporting practices that, at least 
for a period of time, might not be detected by the CAO. Clearly, the CAO 
cannot be held responsible for such practices when he is not in the informa­
tion stream and has no knowledge of them. We believe the Commission's Report 
must recognize this and, in addition, must enhance the ability of the CAO to 
meet his responsibilities in all possible ways. These would include, for 
example, participation in audit committee meetings and a requirement that 
management must discuss with the audit committee the reasons for changes in a 
CAO.
FEI Statement of Position
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Recommendation: Public companies should maintain an effective internal audit 
function staffed with an adequate number of qualified personnel appropriate to 
the size and the nature of the company.
Response: The text accompanying this recommendation indicates that the
company should set forth in writing the scope of responsibilities of the 
internal audit function, and the audit committee should adopt this document 
formally. We support properly defining the scope of the internal audit 
function, but we strongly believe that this is a management function. Formal 
adoption by the audit committee takes that committee beyond an oversight role 
and effectively makes the committee a part of operating management. We 
believe the Commission must be very careful in defining the role and 
activities of the audit committee to assure that it retains its independent 
oversight status.
The text also refers to the IIA's Quality Assurance Standard that calls 
for external (peer) reviews of the internal audit function. We do not agree 
that this is an appropriate way to enhance the effectiveness of the internal 
audit function, because it would potentially expose confidential corporate 
information to competitors, suppliers, and customers. The close working 
relationship of the external and internal auditors effectively provides an 
ongoing oversight of the internal audit function. However, if the Commission 
believes a more formal review is required, we suggest that the internal audit 
function be reviewed periodically by an independent accounting firm —  either 
the company's current firm or another firm. In addition, we strongly object 
to any imposed frequency of such reviews, as well as the concept of review by 
internal auditors from other companies.
Recommendation: Public companies should ensure that their internal audit
functions are objective.
Response: While we certainly agree that "public companies should ensure that
their internal audit functions are objective [independent]"; having the chief 
internal auditor report to the CEO does not achieve that goal and, in fact, 
may well be counterproductive. The report gives the impression (page 34) that 
anything less than direct administrative reporting to the CEO is second best. 
We believe objectivity and independence are achieved not so much in the 
administrative reporting relationship as in other aspects of organizational 
positioning and relationships. For example, it is very important (as the 
Commission report states) that the chief internal auditor have direct and 
unrestricted access to both the CEO and the audit committee. To ensure the 
reality of this access, periodic private meetings with both should be held, 
either as a matter of course or as the occasion demands. Furthermore, the 
chief internal auditor, and in fact all internal auditors, should have 
unrestricted access to all operations, records, personnel, and physical 
properties which they consider relevant in the performance of their audits.
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It should be clear to all managers and other employees that they are expected 
to be candid with internal auditors, and to make available any material or 
information requested in the course of the audit. In other words, it is these 
functional relationships and unrestricted access, rather than administrative 
reporting lines, which make objectivity and Independence a reality. We, 
therefore, believe that the Commission should not attempt to prescribe the 
reporting relationship for the chief internal auditor, but rather require that 
an informed audit committee assume responsibility for reviewing and approving 
the reporting relationship.
The text under this recommendation indicates that, "The chief internal 
auditor should be an experienced audit professional ... ." We disagree that 
this is a necessary prerequisite. Many large companies are well staffed with 
highly trained and experienced internal auditors, who bring to bear the 
necessary expertise to perform the function. The chief internal auditor 
should bring to the function desirable leadership attributes, broad experience 
(not necessarily in auditing, per se), personal integrity, and the ability to 
work effectively with fellow senior officers. Previous auditing experience is 
not essential, however, and the overall effectiveness of the function could be 
diminished if this were an absolute requirement. Companies must have the 
latitude to staff such a position based on what they deem to be the appro­
priate qualifications.
Recommendation: Internal auditors should consider the implications of their
nonfinancial audit findings for the company's financial statements.
Response: We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: Management and the audit committee should ensure that the 
internal auditors' involvement in the audit of the entire financial reporting 
process is appropriate and properly coordinated with the independent public 
accountant.
Response: We support this recommendation in principle. However, a number of 
member companies are concerned about required participation of internal 
auditors in the consolidation process, because they view this as unnecessary 
duplication of effort.
Recommendation: The board of directors of all public companies should be 
required by SEC rule to establish audit committees comprised solely of 
independent directors.
Response: While we strongly support the establishment of audit committees of 
the board by all public companies, we recognize that there are important 
questions relating to the availability of qualified independent directors to 
serve on these committees, particularly with respect to smaller companies.
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Recommendation: Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, and effective
overseers of the financial reporting process and the company's internal 
controls.
Response: We support this recommendation. We are including separately
comments on Audit Committee Good Practice Guidelines.
Recommendation: All public companies should develop a written charter setting 
forth the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee. The board of 
directors should approve the charter, review it at least annually, and modify 
it as necessary.
Response: We support this recommendation, except that we suggest the word 
"annually" be changed to "periodically." Annual review would not be necessary 
in many cases.
Recommendation: Audit committees should have adequate resources and authority
to discharge their responsibilities.
Response: We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: The audit committee should review management's evaluation of
factors related to the independence of the company's public accountant. Both 
the audit committee and management should assist the public accountant in 
preserving his independence.
Response: We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: The audit committee should approve in advance the types and 
the extent of management advisory services that management plans to engage the 
company's independent public accountant to perform.
Response: This recommendation is unnecessarily restrictive and could inhibit 
management flexibility in cases where quick action is needed. For example, a 
situation could arise in an acquisition or divestiture where it was essential 
to engage the company's independent accountants for some type of management 
advisory services on a time-critical basis which would not be logistically 
possible to clear with the audit committee in advance. In any event, we 
believe the substance of this recommendation is implicitly covered by the 
provisions of the previous recommendation. If the Commission believes this 
matter requires separate attention, we suggest it indicate that the audit 
committee should perform an after-the-fact review of such management advisory 
services rather than approving them in advance. We believe it is important to 
note that none of the Commission's studies indicated any actual case where 
independence was compromised by the performance of such services. This
response also pertains to the comparable recommendation in Appendix K.
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Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders management reports signed by 
the chief executive officer and chief accounting officer. The management 
report should acknowledge management's  responsibilities for the financial 
statements and internal control, discuss how these responsibilities were 
fulfilled, and provide management's assessment of the effectiveness of the 
company's internal controls.
Response: We strongly support the concept of a management report, and we are 
commenting separately on the Good Practice Guidelines for Management's 
Report. However, we are very concerned with the suggestion on page 41 that 
CEOs should periodically engage independent accountants to examine and opine 
on the company's system of internal accounting control. FEI studies conducted 
in conjunction with SEC proposals related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
indicated that such examinations could increase audit fees some 40% to 50% on 
average. The proposal was dropped because it was not believed such costs were 
justified by the benefits. Most companies that maintain a strong, effective 
internal audit function continue to believe that further examination of 
internal accounting controls by independent auditors cannot be cost 
justified. We, therefore, request that the inference be removed that all 
companies have their outside auditors periodically conduct such an examination 
other than as required to permit the auditors to render an opinion on the 
financial statements.
Recommendation: All public companies should be required by SEC rule to 
include in their annual reports to stockholders a letter signed by the 
chairman of the audit committee describing the committee's responsibilities 
and activities during the year.
Response: Many companies now include in the financial section of their annual 
report a letter from management and a letter from the independent accountant. 
Requiring a letter from the chairman of the audit committee would result in 
unnecessary redundancies. The value of the audit committee lies in the 
oversight that it provides, not its publicity value. Acknowledgment of the 
existence and activity level of such a committee should suffice to satisfy the 
information needs of most users.
The above response also pertains to Appendix M. However, the substantive 
information in Appendix M should be considered for inclusion in the Management 
Report (Appendix L).
Recommendation: Management should advise the audit committee when it seeks a
second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
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Response: We do not believe this recommendation in its present form is war­
ranted. We strongly agree with the textual comment that "Management has, and 
should have, the prerogative to seek second opinions." This is certainly 
true; in fact in some cases, management may even be considered to have a 
responsibility to seek a second opinion, as, for example, in situations where 
it is dealing with the novel application of accounting principles to important 
transactions. The responsibility of management to advise the audit committee 
should be limited to cases where the second opinion differed from that of its 
independent public accountant, and the company relied on the second opinion to 
support an accounting treatment that the independent accountants originally 
disagreed with. Anything beyond this encroaches on management’s responsibili­
ties and unnecessarily overburdens the audit committee with irrelevant detail.
Recommendation: When a public company changes independent accountants, it 
should be required by SEC rule to disclose publicly the nature of any material 
accounting or auditing issues discussed with its old and new auditors during 
the three-year period preceding the change.
Response: During the course of an audit, companies and their auditors 
routinely discuss material accounting and auditing issues. In the accounting 
area, for example, accounting changes resulting from new FASB Standards 
usually require discussion with auditors as regards the most appropriate 
application for the company. In the vast majority of cases, such situations 
are resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the company and its auditors 
without major disagreement. In the auditing area, routine discussions are 
required to ensure that there is appropriate coordination between internal and 
outside auditors to provide complete audit coverage and avoid duplication of 
effort.
We do not believe it would serve any useful purpose to require companies 
to disclose such discussions when they change auditors. There are many valid 
reasons why companies might seek to change auditors, including merely wanting 
a "fresh look" by a different accounting firm. The proposed disclosure would 
imply a sort of stigma attached to any change in auditors and would add to 
information overload. It would inhibit companies from changing auditors for 
legitimate reasons other than disagreement on an accounting or auditing issue.
We believe that existing SEC disclosure requirements which cover "... any 
disagreements with the former accountant on any matter of accounting princi­
ples or practices, financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope or 
procedure, which disagreements if not resolved to the satisfaction of the 
former accountant would have caused him to make reference in connection with 
his report to the subject matter of the disagreement ..." are quite adequate.
Recommendation: Audit committees should increase their oversight of the 
quarterly reporting process. This oversight should include approving 
financial results prior to public release.
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Response: We do not believe that the audit committee should be required to 
review or approve quarterly financial results prior to their release. It is 
not practical to have the audit committee do this and at the same time release 
such results on a timely basis. The logistics involved in furnishing quar­
terly results to the audit committee, and the time spent by the committee in 
exercising its oversight responsibility and in approving such results could 
and often would unnecessarily delay the timeliness of their release and, 
therefore, inhibit the flow of information to the public. This would re­
present, on balance, a step backward from current practice.
For example, we believe most audit committees meet on the same day as the 
company's board of directors (or the day before or after). If earnings are 
not ready for release until several days after such meeting, there could be a 
two or three week delay until there was another audit committee meeting. Any 
such delays would be unfair to the company's stockholders, would increase the 
likelihood of leaks, and would expose company management unnecessarily to 
charges of inappropriate use of insider information.
Moreover, we believe this activity would cloud the distinction between 
the audit committee's oversight responsibility and participation in the 
financial reporting process, which is clearly a management responsibility.
We believe the recommendation in Chapter Three to have the independent 
accountant review quarterly results should suffice to enhance the integrity of 
the quarterly financial reporting process.
Recommendation: The Commission's sponsoring organizations should establish a
body to guide public companies on internal controls.
Response: There may be a need for more guidance in this area along the lines
suggested in the Exposure Draft. However, we believe the appropriate body to 
provide this guidance would be the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) Auditing Standards Board (ASB), if it is reconstituted 
along the lines recommended by the Commission on pages 55-57. The reconsti­
tuted ASB would include broad-based representation from the several 
constituencies involved and would provide the appropriate forum in which to 
deliberate these issues. It would obviate the need for a new body, which 
would be more costly to establish and maintain.
CHAPTER THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise standards to
restate the independent public accountant's responsibility for detection of 
fraudulent financial reporting, requiring the independent public accountant to 
(1) take affirmative steps in each audit to assess the potential for such
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reporting and (2) design tests to provide reasonable assurance of detection. 
Revised standards should include guidance for assessing risks and pursuing 
detection when risks are identified.
Response: Financial Executives Institute's (FEI) Committee on Corporate 
Reporting (CCR) has previously commented to the Auditing Standards Board on 
its Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, "The Auditor's Responsibility to 
Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities." Since this recommendation 
addresses the substance of that proposal, we are attaching as Exhibit A CCR’s 
June 11, 1987 letter to the Auditing Standards Board in response to this 
recommendation.
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards to 
require independent public accountants to perform analytical review procedures 
in all audit engagements and should provide improved guidance on the appro­
priate use of these procedures.
Response: We support this recommendation. CCR has previously commented to 
the Auditing Standards Board on its Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, 
"Analytical Procedures," and we are attaching as Exhibit B a copy of CCR's 
June 11, 1987 letter.
Recommendation: The SEC should require independent public accountants to
review quarterly financial data of public companies before release to the 
public.
Response: We support this recommendation and are aware that many companies
follow some form of auditor quarterly review. There may be some question as 
to whether, in current practice, companies and their auditors are following 
all of the procedures outlined in the recommendation. Nevertheless, we 
believe the operative phrase is "enhance the reliability of quarterly data," 
and we believe that timely reviews will serve to focus attention on the 
interpretation of transactions or events which can best be dealt with either 
before or just after they occur.
If full review procedures are to be adopted; it may not be feasible, in 
many cases, to complete this review before release of financial data to the 
public. In many cases, the press release contains only summary income 
statement information, and a full set of financial statements has not been 
completed. We believe it will be more practical and uniform to call for 
completion of the review procedures before filing of the quarterly Form 10-Q. 
This would allow an additional two to four weeks beyond conventional press 
release dates.
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Frequently, review procedures begin before the end of the quarter and 
proceed throughout the period to the filing of the Form 10-Q. Generally, 
sufficient review can be accomplished to accommodate the public release within 
two to three weeks of the close of the quarter. The balance of the review 
procedures can then be completed before filing of the Form 10-Q.
Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section should strengthen its peer
review program by increasing review of audit engagements involving public 
company clients new to a firm. For each office selected for peer review, the 
first audit of all such new clients should be reviewed.
Response: We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: The AICPA's SEC Practice Section requirement for a con­
curring, or second partner, review of the audit report should be revised as 
part of an ongoing process of review of this requirement. Standards for the 
concurring review should, among other things, (1) require concurring review 
partner involvement in the planning stage of the audit in addition to the 
final review stage, (2) specify qualifications of the concurring review 
partner to require prior experience with audits of SEC registrants and 
familiarity with the client's industry, and (3) require the concurring review 
partner to consider himself a peer of the engagement partner for purposes of 
the review.
Response; We have no position on this recommendation. We do note, however, 
that the requirement for the concurring review partner to have familiarity 
with the client's industry could possibly impose a hardship on some smaller 
public accounting firms.
Recommendation: Public accounting firms should recognize and control the 
organizational and individual pressures that potentially reduce audit quality.
Response: In the textual discussion on page 51, it is indicated that tight 
reporting deadlines can pressure auditors to stop pursuing identified problems 
prematurely. We take exception to this observation because we do not think it 
is true in practice and may be misleading to lay readers. Proper planning for 
the audit should take such matters into consideration and provide for 
appropriate follow-up and resolution.
We also take exception to the discussion under the heading of "Broad 
accounting principles" on page 52. We do not think that there are identifi­
able links between choice of accounting methods and fraudulent financial re­
porting. It seems to us that this paragraph weakens the impact of the report 
and undermines the independence of the FASB and their prodigious efforts over 
many years to narrow acceptable practices.
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Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's
standard report to state that the audit provides reasonable but not absolute 
assurance that the audited financial statements are free from material 
misstatements as a result of fraud or error.
and
Recommendation: The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's
standard report to describe the extent to which the independent public 
accountant has reviewed and evaluated the system of internal accounting 
control. The Auditing Standards Board also should provide explicit guidance 
to address the situation where, as a result of his knowledge of the company's 
internal accounting controls, the independent public accountant disagrees with 
management's assessment as stated in the proposed management's report.
Response: CCR has previously commented to the Auditing Standards Board on its 
Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards, "The Auditor’s Standard Report." 
Since these recommendations address the substance of that proposal, we are 
attaching as Exhibit C CCR's June 11, 1987 letter to the Auditing Standards 
Board in response to this recommendation.
Recommendation: The AICPA should reorganize the Auditing Standards Board to 
afford a full participatory role in the standard-setting process to knowledge­
able persons who are affected by and interested in auditing standards but who 
either are not CPAs or are CPAs no longer in public practice.
Response: We strongly support this recommendation and related suggestions for 
implementation. Industry participation on the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, on the Emerging Issues Task Force, and on the Accounting Standards 
Executive Committee has provided a needed and pragmatic balance. We believe 
that it would have the same salutary effect on the Auditing Standards Board. 
While such assignments are time consuming and demanding in other ways, we feel 
certain that competent and experienced individuals can be found outside of the 
practicing profession to contribute to the ASB process.
CHAPTER FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SEC AND OTHERS TO IMPROVE THE
REGULATORY AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to impose civil money
penalties in administrative proceedings [including Rule 2(e) proceedings] and 
to seek civil money penalties from a court directly in an injunctive 
proceeding.
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Response: We support this recommendation; however, recent substantive
criminal penalties and sizable liability judgments in several highly 
publicized cases of fraudulent financial reporting seem to suggest that the 
SEC could achieve similar results by utilizing its existing powers more 
effectively. If the SEC were to obtain express fining authority, the amount 
of the fine and the related violation should be clearly defined. Also to be 
considered is the establishment of procedures for appeal, so that such broad 
authority will not lead to the inequitable levy of fines. Finally, your 
Commission should consider whether there should be consistency and linkage 
between the SEC's authority to impose fines and those of other regulatory 
bodies (e.g., the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and other self- 
regulatory organizations).
Recommendation: The SEC should have the authority to issue a cease and desist
order when a securities law violation or an unsound financial reporting 
practice is found.
Response: We support this recommendation; however, we believe that the SEC
should also more fully explore the range of options currently available to it 
to prevent unsound financial reporting practices from harming the public. For 
example, the SEC could refuse to accept filings by companies previously 
associated with unsound financial reporting practices until they have satis­
factorily redressed all known past wrongdoings and answered all legitimate 
complaints. Also, the term "unsound financial practices" is too vague. It 
requires a definition, or at least examples, to be properly understood. We, 
therefore, recommend that the final report elaborate on what is meant by 
"unsound financial practices" so that the SEC will not have difficulty in­
corporating it into their rules and enforcing it. We also believe that if 
cease and desist authority is given to the SEC, the nature of the activities 
within its scope and the circumstances in which it can be used should be 
clearly defined.
Recommendation: The SEC should seek explicit statutory authority to bar or 
suspend corporate officers and directors involved in fraudulent reporting from 
future service in that capacity in a public company.
Response: We support this recommendation, but we believe it essential that 
the guidelines for imposing a bar or suspension and the requisite due process 
proceedings be clearly stated by the SEC.
Recommendation: Criminal prosecution of fraudulent financial reporting cases 
should become a higher priority. The SEC should conduct an affirmative 
program to promote increased criminal prosecution of fraudulent financial 
reporting cases by educating and assisting government officials with criminal 
prosecution powers.
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Response: We support this recommendation to make criminal prosecution of 
fraudulent financial reporting cases a higher priority. Fraudulent financial 
reporting would lead to substantial social and economic costs. On the one 
hand, the public may suffer direct financial losses in relying on the integ­
rity of the reported financial information. On the other hand, there is a far 
more serious consequence when the public and business community lose con­
fidence in the marketplace because of the presence of or the potential for 
fraudulent and manipulative practices. The SEC should be encouraged to follow 
through on its enforcement efforts with every attempt to bring criminal 
proceedings against offenders, such as transmitting evidence to the United 
States Attorney General, assisting the Department of Justice and the U.S. 
Attorneys to the maximum extent in cases that ought to be litigated, provid­
ing access to investigative files, and providing personnel to assist in 
presenting these cases before the courts.
Recommendation: The SEC should require all public accounting firms that audit 
public companies to be members of a professional organization that has peer 
review and independent oversight functions and is approved by the SEC, such as 
that specified by the SECPS of the AICPA's Division for CPA Firms.
Response: We believe that the SEC should encourage public accounting firms to 
be members of a professional organization that has peer review and independent 
oversight functions; however, since most major public accounting firms are 
already members, this recommendation will primarily affect smaller firms. The 
typical requirements and quality assurance systems for large firms, such as 
in-house continuing professional education programs, rotation of partners, 
involvement of second partners, and internal inspection programs, etc., may 
not be cost beneficial for smaller firms unless modified or administered 
differently. Therefore, while we fully endorse the idea of requiring uniform 
quality assurance standards for all public accounting firms that audit public 
companies, including peer review, mandatory membership in a professional 
organization should not be required.
Recommendation: The SEC should take enforcement action when a public 
accounting firm fails to remedy deficiencies cited by the public accounting 
profession's quality assurance program.
Response: We support this recommendation. Your Commission should recommend 
that the SEC formalize its procedures for reviewing and monitoring public 
accounting firms* failure to remedy the deficiencies cited by the public 
accounting profession's quality assurance program. Similar to requiring 
auditors to report their disagreements with their clients to the SEC, it would 
be constructive for the SEC to require accounting firms performing peer review 
of other firms to report to the SEC major quality deficiencies which have not
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been remedied. In addition, the SEC should specify the range of enforcement 
actions which it may impose in such circumstances, such as censure and 
moratorium on acceptance of new public clients, in order to deter public 
accounting firms from ignoring severe deficiencies.
Recommendation: The SEC must be given adequate resources to perform existing
and additional functions that help prevent, detect, and deter fraudulent 
financial reporting.
Response: We support this recommendation.
Recommendation: The financial institution regulatory agencies should provide 
for the exchange of information between the regulatory examiner and the 
independent public accountant.
Response: We support this recommendation. However, although there are 
benefits from enhanced communication, we believe that the scope of the 
information to be shared should be clearly defined and some parameters should 
be established for this higher level of cooperation and disclosure. We be­
lieve that this must be done in a way which would not jeopardize existing 
client-auditor confidentiality, generate potential conflict of interest, or 
impair the effectiveness of the independent auditor. For example, without 
explicit guidelines, the recommendation could be read to include the auditor's 
working papers. This could lead to precedents being set for the exchange of 
information resulting in the loss of confidentiality of the auditor's working 
papers. By being more specific, such as recommending an exchange of "material 
findings" or "summary reports," communication between the regulatory examiners 
and the independent public accountant could be enhanced without the adverse 
effects.
Recommendation: The SEC should reconsider its long-standing position that the 
corporate indemnification of directors for liabilities that arise under the 
Securities Act of 1933 is against public policy and, therefore, unenforceable.
Response: We strongly support this recommendation and believe that this 
recommendation should be emphasized and raised as a priority issue. The 
inability to obtain directors' insurance would severely undermine public 
companies' success in recruiting and retaining qualified outside directors. 
We agree with the Commission that outside directors are necessary components 
of an effective audit committee, which, in turn, is a key to preventing 
fraudulent financial reporting. Accordingly, we believe strongly that the 
SEC's long-standing position regarding corporate indemnification of directors 
should be reconsidered because it would not be beneficial to the prevention of 
fraudulent financial reporting.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EDUCATION
The recommendations in this chapter appear reasonable. However, we are not in 
a position to express a view as to the viability of their implementation.
APPENDIX K -  AUDIT COMMITTEE GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES
Issue: The post audit good practice guidelines suggest that the audit
committee should determine the open years on federal income tax returns and 
whether there are any significant items that have been or might be disputed by 
the IRS, and inquire as to the status of the related tax reserves.
Response: We believe that the suggested measure extends beyond the oversight 
responsibility of the audit committee. It is the responsibility of management 
to review the status of income tax returns and related accruals. Furthermore, 
the measure appears redundant to the suggested inquiry as to the existence and 
substance of significant accounting accruals, reserves, or estimates made by 
management that had a material impact on the financial statements. We do not 
believe that the oversight function should extend to individual accruals or 
issues that do not have a material effect on the financial statements. We 
recognize that the measures enumerated are not prescribed by the Commission, 
but, nonetheless, believe that many companies and/or their audit committees 
will view the practices as obligatory.
Issue: The post audit good practice guidelines include a requirement for the 
audit committee to request an explanation from financial management and the 
independent public accountant of changes in accounting standards or rules that 
have an effect on the financial statements.
Response: We support the recommendation for audit committee inquiry as to 
accounting changes but believe it should be limited to those which are likely 
to have a material effect on the financial statements.
Issue: The post-audit good practice guidelines recommend that the audit 
committee review the MD&A section of the annual report with management and ask 
the extent to which the independent public accountant reviewed the MD&A 
section. It is further suggested that the audit committee inquire of the 
independent public accountant as to the consistency of other information in 
the annual report with that reflected in the financial statements.
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Response: We believe that the audit committee review with management, as 
contained in the first recommendation of this section, is sufficient as to the 
MD&A section of the annual report. The independent public accountant would 
presumably be present during this discussion. Further, the independent public 
accountant is already obliged under general accepted auditing standards to 
read other information in annual reports to determine whether there are 
material inconsistencies or misstatements of fact, as compared with the infor­
mation presented in the financial statements. Once again, we are concerned 
that this recommendation will be interpreted literally and that a new de facto 
auditing standard will emerge in practice.
APPENDIX L - GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR MANAGEMENT'S REPORT
Issue: The illustrated management report is somewhat redundant, potentially 
confusing in certain respects and negative as to tone in other respects.
Response: We believe that the representations regarding the integrity and 
reliability of financial statements in the illustrative report are sufficient 
to support the conclusion that they are not materially misleading as a result 
of intentional or reckless conduct (fraudulent financial reporting, as defined 
by the Commission). Accordingly, the phrase "and are not misstated due to 
material fraud or error” is redundant (and unnecessarily negative) and should 
be deleted. The phrase "and the prevention and detection of fraudulent 
financial reporting" is similarly redundant and should also be deleted.
The statement in the second paragraph that "management believes all 
representations made to XYZ Co. during its audit were valid and appropriate" 
is potentially confusing to the uninformed reader, is somewhat redundant to 
the preceding sentence and is of questionable value in the overall context of 
a management report of this nature.
Issue: The illustrated management report includes the signature of the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Chapter 2 
(page 40, paragraph 5) indicates that the management report should be signed 
by the CEO and the Chief Accounting Officer (CAO).
Response: We agree with the Commission's observation (page 32) that,
depending on the size and nature of a company, the role of the CAO may be 
vested with the controller or CFO. We suggest that the illustrative report 
contain the proviso for signatures of the CEO and CAO.
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American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Auditing Standards Division 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10109-0004
File 2545
Proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards:
The Auditor's Responsibility 
to Detect and Report Errors 
and Irregularities__________
Gentlemen:
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of Financial Executives Institute 
appreciates the opportunity to comment on the AICPA's Proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS), "The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report 
Errors and Irregularities." We support the overall thrust of the proposed 
SAS, including expanding the auditor's responsibility to reasonably ensure 
that errors and irregularities are detected, and to inform the audit committee 
about irregularities. However, we object to several significant aspects of 
it content upon which we wish to comment.
Expectation of Auditing Standard
In paragraph 5, the proposal states, "An examination conducted in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards should be designed to detect 
material misstatements that affect the financial statements.” Paragraph 6 
appears to reduce the auditor's responsibility since it states, "Because of 
the characteristics of certain irregularities, particularly those involving 
forgery and collusion, a properly designed and executed examination may not 
detect a material irregularity." To provide consistency and clarify what 
users may expect from auditors, we suggest that the Board modify paragraph 5 
to state, "An examination conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards should be designed to provide reasonable assurance that
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materlal misstatements that affect the financial statements will be detected" 
(underlining indicates change). This revision is also consistent with the 
statement in paragraph 7, "Since the auditor's opinion on the financial 
statements is based on the concept of reasonable assurance, the auditor is not 
an insurer and his report does not constitute a guarantee."
Paragraph 22 states, "The auditor's first concern is to reach a conclusion on 
whether the financial statements, taken as a whole, are materially 
misstated." We agree that whether the financial statements are "materially 
misstated" is a matter of concern to the auditor. However, we believe the 
auditor's first and broadest concern is whether the financial statements are 
"fairly presented." We suggest that the statement in paragraph 22 be revised 
to reflect a more positive approach. Also, the revised statement should be 
moved to the beginning of paragraph 5 to emphasize that the detection of a 
material misstatement is not, in and of itself, the goal of the audit.
Taking all the above into consideration, the first two sentences of para­
graph 5 would read as follows: "The auditor's first concern is whether the 
financial statements, taken as a whole, are fairly presented. Consequently, 
an examination conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards should be designed to provide reasonable assurance that material 
misstatements that affect the financial statements will be detected."
Definition of Errors and Irregularities
Paragraph 3 states that "Irregularities include fraudulent financial reporting 
undertaken to render misleading financial statements, sometimes called 
management fraud, and misappropriation of assets, sometimes called employee 
fraud or defalcations." We recognize that the term "management fraud" is used 
in SAS 16; however, as a synonym for fraudulent financial reporting, it is 
both inaccurate and unnecessarily provocative. Indeed, in discussing 
fraudulent financial reporting, the April 1987 Exposure Draft Report of the 
National Commission of Fraudulent Financial Reporting properly acknowledges on 
page 2, paragraph 1, that "Company employees at any level may be involved, 
from top to middle management to lower-level personnel." Accordingly, we 
believe that the term "management fraud" should be eliminated. Similarly, the 
term "employee fraud" could be interpreted to exclude higher-level personnel. 
This would be equally inaccurate, because top and middle management could be 
involved in misappropriation of assets or defalcations. As a result, we 
suggest that the above sentence in paragraph 3 be modified to read as follows:
Irregularities include fraudulent financial reporting undertaken to 
render financial statements misleading, and misappropriations of 
assets, sometimes called defalcations.
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We agree with the statement in paragraph 2, footnote 2 that "Errors do not 
include the effect of accounting processes employed for convenience." 
However, we believe that the statement is equally applicable to 
irregularities. For example, a company may intentionally and systematically 
not recognize a liability (and the related offsetting entry) for goods shipped 
FOB shipping point but not received if the cost of accounting for these 
transactions exceeds the benefit, and the simplified accounting does not 
materially affect the financial statements. Accordingly, we recommend that a 
similar footnote be added to paragraph 3. We suggest the following which 
incorporates the discussion above:
Irregularities do not include the effect of accounting processes 
employed for convenience, such as not recognizing a liability (and 
the related offsetting entry) in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles for goods shipped FOB shipping point but not 
received, if the cost of accounting for these transactions exceeds 
the benefit and the simplified accounting does not materially 
affect the financial statements.
This footnote would be referenced to the word "disclosure," the last word in 
paragraph 3.
The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect Errors and Irregularities
We are concerned that the proposal does not discuss the cost/benefit 
considerations involved in an audit. Although the proposal discusses 
materiality of errors and irregularities, it remains unclear about the amount 
of effort that must be expended by the auditor to detect such amounts. As a 
result, the amount of effort required to comply with the proposal will be 
subject to different interpretatio n , some of which may result in excessive 
audit costs. Accordingly, we believe that the proposal should explicitly 
recognize that audits of financial statements are subject to cost/benefit 
considerations. We believe that the proposal should recogn iz e, as does 
SAS 16, that the cost of an audit should bear a reasonable relationship to the 
benefits expected to be derived.
Consideration of the Possibility of Material Misstatements in Audit Planning
Paragraph 10 discusses the effect that the size, complexity, and ownership 
characteristics have on the factors that influence audit risk. The example 
relating to a large public company cites several factors that the auditor 
should consider. We believe the list should be extended to include the 
effectiveness of the internal auditing function, which would be consistent 
with the SAS 9 requirement that the auditor considers the work of ". . .
internal auditors in determining the nature, timing, and extent of his own 
auditing procedures."
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Evaluation of Audit Teat Results
Paragraph 21 states that if the auditor suspects an Irregularity, he must 
pursue several audit steps to determine whether the financial statements could 
be materially misstated. We are concerned about the implications of this 
requirement, because in many cases, additional audit procedures may not be 
necessary. This might be true, for example, when management has already 
investigated the irregularity and resolved the situation, when low-level 
employees are involved, or when amounts are clearly immaterial. We suggest
that paragraph 21 be modified to reflect this concern. The advice in
paragraph 23b seems much more appropriate —  to be satisfied that the
implications of the suspected irregularity have been adequately considered.
The Effect of Irregularities on the Audit Report
Paragraph 26 requires auditors to disclaim an opinion on the financial
statements and communicate their audit findings in writing to the board of 
directors when the scope of the audit has been restricted so that the auditor 
is precluded from applying the necessary procedures to detect irregularities.
We appreciate the intent of this proposal to limit such reporting procedures 
to circumstances where the auditor is prevented from applying audit procedures 
significant to the auditor's ability to express an opinion on the financial 
statements. However, we are concerned that the term "necessary" does not 
sufficiently clarify this intent and consequently may be misinterpretated. It 
is conceivable that a disclaimer could result when the omitted procedure 
relates only to a small or insignificant part of the audit even though the 
auditor is able to complete the majority of the audit work. In this 
circumstance, we do not believe that a disclaimer and the related reporting to
the board of directors is appropriate. Rendering a disclaimer on the 
financial statements in this circumstance is also inconsistent with current 
auditing standards. Accordingly, we urge the Board to modify paragraph 26 to 
permit the auditor to exercise judgment in deciding whether sufficient
information has been obtained to render an opinion on the financial statements.
Paragraph 26 also discusses the auditor's response when there is uncertainty 
about whether possible irregularities may materially affect the financial
statements. In this circumstance, auditors are also required to disclaim an
opinion and indicate their audit findings to the board of directors. We
believe that auditors should be permitted to exercise judgment and, depending 
on the circumstances, either qualify the opinion or disclaim an opinion, as 
now permitted by SAS 16.
AICPA A u d it in g  Standards Board June 11, 1987
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Communications Concerning E rro rs  o r  I r r e g u la r i t ie s
We are  a ls o  concerned about the term " c le a r ly  in c o n s e q u e n tia l"  in  paragraph 28 
which is  used as a th re s h o ld  above which re p o r t in g  o f  i r r e g u la r i t ie s  to  the 
a u d it  committee is  re q u ire d . Th is  term would seem to  re q u ire  the  re p o r t in g  o f 
many m inor item s to  the  a u d it  com mittee. A ls o , we are no t aware th a t the term 
is  used, o r o the rw ise  d e fin e d , in  g e n e ra lly  accepted a u d it in g  standards o r in  
g e n e ra lly  accepted accoun ting  p r in c ip le s .  We b e lie v e  th a t  i t  would be
p re fe ra b le  to  l i m i t  the  item s being repo rte d  to  the  a u d it  committee to
"m a te r ia l"  i r r e g u la r i t ie s .  However, we recogn ize  th a t  in  c e r ta in  in s ta n ce s , 
an i r r e g u la r i t y  which i s  no t m a te r ia l to  the  f in a n c ia l  s ta tem ents, taken as a 
w hole ; may be o f s u f f ic ie n t  s ig n if ic a n c e  to  w a rran t re p o r t in g  to  the  a u d it  
com m ittee. T h is  m ight be the  case, f o r  example, when s e n io r management is  
in v o lv e d .
Consistency Among A u d it in g  Standards
Paragraph 8 re fe rs  to  fa c to rs  th a t  i n fluence  a u d it  r is k .  The term  "a u d it  
r is k "  i s  d e fin e d  in  SAS 47. We suggest th a t  the  SAS 47 d e f in i t io n  and 
a p p ro p ria te  c ross- re fe ren ce  be shown in  a fo o tn o te .
Paragraph 8 a ls o  in d ic a te s  th a t  the a u d ito r  should o b ta in  an understand ing  o f 
the  c o n tro l environm ent. We b e lie v e  th e re  is  some ove rlap  here w ith  the
guidance in  the  proposed SAS on "The A u d ito r 's  R e s p o n s ib il ity  f o r  Assessing
C o n tro l R is k ."  To avo id  co n fus ion , we b e lie v e  these two SAS's should use 
c o n s is te n t te rm in o lo gy  and avo id  d u p lic a t io n  to  the  e x te n t p o s s ib le . We would 
expect the  broader guidance to  appear in  the  "C o n tro l R isk " SAS.
In  the  in te r e s t  o f cons is te ncy  w ith  the  proposed SAS on "Communications W ith 
A u d it Committees o r Others W ith E q u iva len t A u th o r ity  and Responsibility," we 
suggest th a t  the f i r s t  sentence o f paragraph 27 be m od ified  to  read (a d d it io n  
u n d e r lin e d ) , " th e  a u d ito r 's  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to  communicate the  im p lic a t io n s  o f 
a u d it  ad justm ents • • ."
In  a d d it io n ,  paragraph 27 re q u ire s  th a t  im m a te ria l and waived a u d it  
ad justm ents be repo rte d  to  the  a u d it  com m ittee. C ons is ten t w ith  our response 
to  the SAS on "A u d it Committee Communications," we suggest th a t  the  re p o r t in g  
to  the  a u d it  committee be l im ite d  to  m a te r ia l amounts.
The CCR would be pleased to  d iscuss any questions you may have on i t s  v iew s.
S in c e re ly ,
 Joseph A ,  S c ia r r in o  
JAS/af  
cc : Messrs. J e rry  D. S u lliv a n ,  Chairman o f the A u d it in g  Standards D iv is io n
A. C larence Sampson, S e c u r it ie s  and Exchange Commission
i nda C. Quinn, S e c u r it ie s  and Exchange Commission 
N a tio n a l Commission on F raudu len t F in a n c ia l R eporting
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Proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards: 
Analytical Procedures
Gentlemen:
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of Financial Executives Institute 
(FEI) welcomes the opportunity to express its views on the Exposure Draft (ED) 
on the Proposed Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS), "Analytical Procedures."
The CCR strongly supports the proposal in the ED that analytical procedures 
"should be applied in all examinations of financial statements made in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards." FEI's position on the 
"Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act of 1986" addressed this issue 
and supported the related conclusions of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting. FEI's position paper stated that "Greater reliance 
should be placed on analytical review procedures." Accordingly, we comend 
the Board for requiring, in the ED, the use of these procedures on all 
engagements and believe the incremental costs of performing such procedures 
will be minimal in relation to the potential benefits derived.
Sincerely,
JAS/af
cc: Mr. Jerry D. Sullivan, Chairm a n  of the Auditing Standards Board 
National C o m mission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
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Proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards:
The Auditor's Standard Report
Gentlemen:
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of Financial Executives Institute 
is pleased to respond to the AICPA Exposure Draft (ED), Proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards, "The Auditor's Standard Report."
We concur with the Board's statement that the purpose of the auditor's 
standard report is to communicate the nature of the auditor's work and the 
auditor's conclusions about the financial statements. However, we do not 
agree that the present auditor's report contains overly technical language 
warranting such drastic revision. Contrary to the perception of the Board, we 
believe the present wording of the auditor's report has gained understanding, 
acceptance and support by its universe of users. To us, an element by element 
comparison of the present wording to that of the proposal suggest that 
adoption of this proposal will do little or nothing to close the "expectation 
gap."
The underlying purpose of the auditor's report is to relay audit findings. 
While a restatement of the auditor's role may offer some assurance to the 
auditor that he has fulfilled his responsibilities, we do not believe users 
will perceive any additional assurance. To us, the "expectation gap" is one 
of perception. Thus, no matter how commendable the motives of this proposed 
change in wording, closure will not be effected by a mere change in 
communication but must be responded to by efforts to raise the quality of 
audit work.
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Consistent with the above, we do not agree with the following proposed changes
a. (1.c.) A statement that the financial statements are the 
representations of management.
The present codification of generally accepted auditing 
standards correctly states that ". . • Management has the
responsibility for adopting sound accounting policies, for 
maintaining an adequate and effective system of accounts, for 
the safeguarding of assets, and for devising a system of 
internal control that will, among other things help assure the 
production of proper financial s t a t e m e n t s ." Historically, 
this responsibility has been clearly outlined in many 
companies' Report of Management which is located in the Annual 
Report adjacent to the independent auditor's report.
If not withstanding the above, it is decided to retain this or 
a similar statement, we urge that the last sentence of the 
introductory paragraph end with the more appropriate phrase; 
are the responsibility of X Company's management. Further­
more, we believe this statement should only be required when 
it is not presented in the Report of Management.
b. Independent Auditor's Report, Scope Paragraph.
We have serious problems with the proposed scope paragraph.
Our problems arise when the auditor's report diverts from a 
statement of auditing standards to a partial statement of 
auditing procedures. Of necessity, the auditor's report 
cannot enumerate all of the significant procedures performed.
We do not accept the principle that auditing standards require 
that an audit be designed ". • • to evaluate whether the
financial statements are materially misstated (intentionally 
or unintentionally)." This is an unduly negative way to 
describe the audit process. Moreover, we view the evaluation 
of whether financial statements are materially misstated, 
albeit an important audit objective, to be only one of several 
objectives. We do not believe the scope paragraph is an 
appropriate place for a partial listing of auditing procedures 
that the auditor must accomplish in order to achieve 
reasonable assurance. Again, this problem appears to arise 
because of the mixture of auditing procedures with auditing 
standards, and in the process, we believe the audit design 
suggests a strong similarity to transaction audits. 
Otherwise, how can the auditor possibly discern intention? In 
any event, we oppose the negative and provocative description 
of the intent of an audit.
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Because of our concern, we urge the Board to reconsider the 
entire scope paragraph. The presently worded scope has served 
the profession well and we recommend its continuance; "our 
audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards and, accordingly, included such other 
auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the 
circumstances."
c. Independent Auditor's Report, Opinion Paragraph.
We also have serious problems with the proposed opinion 
paragraph which appears to he the most radical change to the 
present standard report. The draft proposes to state that 
". . .the financial statements referred to above are, in all 
material respects, fairly presented ."  That is
significantly different than the present opinion which states 
that ". . .the statements referred to above present fairly the 
financial position of (name of company) at December 31, 19XX 
and the results of operations, and changes in financial 
position for the year then ended . . .." We do not object to 
the addition of the words "in all material respects" to inform 
the reader that the opinion does not attest to the absolute 
accuracy of the financial statements. What bothers us is the 
elimination of a truly meaningful opinion about the financial 
statements. Each statement has a particular purpose, i.e., to 
portray financial position/condition, results of operations or 
changes in financial position. Either the financial
statements give a fair view of a company's financial condition 
and results of operations, i.e., "present fairly" or they do 
not, and that's what the auditors should be opinining on - not 
that the financial statements themselves are fairly presented.
We urge the Board to reconsider the opinion paragraph.
d. Finally, we oppose the proposed modification to auditor's 
standard reports regarding uncertainties. Specifically, we 
question replacing "subject to" opinions with "modified" (add 
on) language in regard to general uncertainties. To do so, 
discounts the importance users have placed on "subject to" as 
a traditional flag alerting users that, although the 
financials are fairly presented, unquantified material 
uncertainties exist that could have a material impact on the 
company's financial statements. Our primary concern regarding 
this proposed revision is that it will either worsen the 
"expectation gap" by causing more clean opinions in troubled
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situations or "more likely" result in a proliferation of 
modifications to the extent that mechanical boilerplate 
language will be the general rule rather than the exception. 
We consider either alternative to be unacceptable and 
recomen d  retention of the "subject to" standard.
Having stated a strong preference for the present wording of the auditor's 
report, if the Board is determined to change such wording then we find the 
following proposed changes in basic elements of the revised auditor's report 
to be acceptable:
a. The report should be titled, and the title should include the 
word independent.
b. The report should include a statement that the financial
statements were audited.
c. The report should include a statement that the audit was
performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards.
d. The report should include a statement that the auditor
believes the procedures performed were appropriate in the 
circumstances to express the opinion presented.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on these important matters and would 
be glad to discuss our response with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,
Joseph A. Sciarrino
JAS:af
cc: Messrs. Jerry D. Sullivan, Chairman of the Auditing Standards Board
A. Clarence Sampson, Securitas and Exchange Commission 
Ms. Linda C. Quinn, Securities and Exchange Commission 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
  Kimberly-Clark David W. DusendschonStaff Vice Prsident
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June 30, 1987
M r . G . Dewey Arnold 
Executive Director 
National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006
RE: Exposure Draft - Report of the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the "Commission")
Dear Mr. Arnold:
K i m b e r l y - C l a r k  C o r p o r a t i o n  is r e s p o n d i n g  to th e above 
s u b j e c t  exposure draft dated April 1987, hereinafter referred 
to as the "Treadway Report" or the "Report."
Overall View
In general, we support the efforts of the Commission and 
e n d o r s e  th e majority of the recommendations contained in the 
Treadway Report. Further, we have already "adopted" or shortly 
plan to "adopt" many of the recommendations in the Report. We 
do, however, have the following comments, questions and observations 
to offer on certain recommendations, accompanying text or Good 
Practice Guidelines contained in the Report.
Chapter Two - Recommendations for the Public Company
Recommendation 1. For the top management of a public company 
to discharge its obligation to oversee the financial reporting 
process, it must identify, understand, and assess the factors 
that may cause the company's financial statements to be fraudulently 
misstated.
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We agree with the intent of the recommendation and the 
accompanying Good Practice Guidelines. We further support the 
statements in the text accompanying the recommendation that ... 
"the process of assessing risk of fraudulent financial reporting, 
which is part of an ongoing operating procedure rather than a 
separate management project, requires exercise of judgment and 
creativity. Top management's  judgment dictates the extent and 
the nature of the assessment appropriate to a particular company." 
The Good Practice Guidelines also state that "... assessing the 
risk of fraudulent financial reporting does not necessitate a 
separate effort..."
We are concerned, however, that the Commission may be 
anticipating some type of an organized documentation effort of 
"fraudulent financial reporting risk" based on other language 
of the exposure draft, with participation by "individuals at all 
levels of the company," supervised by "top-level corporate 
management, such as the CEO and the CFO." This language could 
be interpreted to suggest a massive documentation effort, 
similar to that undertaken to comply with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practice Act (FCPA). We do not believe such a documentation 
effort will be cost effective for many enterprises. Accordingly, 
we suggest the Commission state that it does not intend that 
implementation of the recommendation result in a comprehensive 
and exhaustive documentation effort.
Recommendation 2. Public companies should maintain internal 
controls that are adequate to prevent and detect fraudulent 
financial reporting.
The Commission acknowledges in the accompanying text that 
the FCPA embraced the concept of "reasonable assurance" with 
respect to the operation of a company's system of internal 
accounting control, but the wording of the actual recommendation 
fails to contain the "reasonable assurance" qualification. It 
is our experience that construction of any internal control system 
adequate to prevent all errors or irregularities is either 
impossible or prohibitively expensive.
In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, we urge 
the Commission to modify its recommendation similar to the 
following:
Public companies should maintain internal controls 
that are adequate to provide reasonable assurance 
that fraudulent financial reporting wi l l _be_prevented 
and/or detected.
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Recommendation 3. Public companies should develop and enforce 
w r i t t e n  codes of corporate conduct. Codes of conduct should 
foster a strong ethical climate and open channels of communication 
to h e l p  p r o t e c t  ag a i n s t  f r a u d u l e n t  financial reporting. A 
c o m p a n y ' s  au d i t  c o m m i t t e e  should review compliance with the 
code annually, i n c l u d i n g  c o m p l i a n c e  b y top management, and 
report thereon to the board of directors.
We support the recommendation.
Recommendation 4. Public companies should maintain accounting 
functions that can effectively meet their financial reporting 
obligations.
We support the recommendation.
Recommendation 5. Public companies should maintain an effective 
in te rn al a u d i t  f u n c t i o n  s t a f f e d  w i t h  an adequate number of 
qualified personnel appropriate to the size and nature of the 
company.
A l t h o u g h  w e  s u p p o r t  th e recommendation, we believe the 
accompanying text should be modified to eliminate the requirement 
th at th e "... audit committee should adopt this document ... 
(i.e., the written scope of responsibilities for the internal 
audit function)." In our view, adoption of such a document is 
a legitimate function of management. In contrast, adoption of 
the document by the audit committee would extend the committee 
beyond its oversight role and into a management role.
The text also endorses the Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA) Quality Assurance Standard for periodic external (peer) 
reviews of the internal audit function. We strongly disagree 
with the recommendation. We do not believe it is good practice 
to permit access of non-Kimberly-Clark internal auditors to our 
in t e r n a l  a u d i t  working papers which may contain confidential 
a n d  p r o p r i e t a r y  information. Further, we are not convinced 
that internal auditors have the capabilities and resources to 
c o n d u c t  a c o m p r e h e n s i v e  and cost effective peer review. We 
have no objection, however, to our independent public accountant 
reviewing our internal audit function on a periodic basis.
Recommendation 6. Pu b l i c  companies should ensure that their 
internal audit functions are objective.
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Although we support the concept of an objective internal audit 
function, w e  are c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  the te x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  the 
recommendation wherein the Commission encourages an administrative 
r e p o r t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  in w h i c h  the ch i e f  internal auditor 
reports directly to the CEO.
In ou r view, it is u n n e c e s s a r y  that the administrative 
reporting relationship of the chief internal auditor be restricted 
to the CEO for the function to be effective and objective. At 
Kimberly-Clark, our chief internal auditor reports administra­
tively to a Senior Vice President and General Counsel (a direct 
deputy of our Chief Executive Officer). In addition, our chief 
internal auditor has direct, private and unencumbered access to 
both our audit committee and our CEO. We believe this reporting 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  an d  f u n c t i o n i n g  of the c h i e f  internal auditor 
ensures objectivity. There are, no doubt, other administrative 
reporting relationships that would likewise ensure objectivity 
in other organizations.
Accordingly, we believe the Commission should not attempt 
to prescribe the reporting relationship for the chief internal 
auditor, b u t  r a t h e r  r e q u i r e  the au d i t  committee review and 
endorse the reporting relationship.
The text following the recommendation states that, "The chief 
in te rn al a u d i t o r  should be an experienced audit professional 
..." While this may often be desirable, it should not be an 
a b s o l u t e  requirement. Depending on the size of the internal 
audit function and complexity of the entity, prior audit experience 
may be less essential than other attributes such as leadership 
skills, significant knowledge of a particular business, broad 
business and organizational skills, integrity, and the ability 
to f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y  w i t h  other senior executives of the 
entity. In o u r  view, p r e v i o u s  a u d i t i n g  e x p e r i e n c e  is not 
a l w a y s  e s s e n t i a l  to the ov e r a l l  e f f e ct iv en es s of the chief 
internal auditor. We strongly believe that companies must have 
the latitude to staff such a position based on what they deem 
to be the appropriate qualifications.
Recommendation 7. I n t e r n a l  a u d i t o r s  s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e i r  n o n f i n a n c i a l  au d i t  fi n d i n g s  for the 
co mp an y's financial statements.
We support the recommendation
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Recommendation 8. M a n a g e m e n t  and the audit committee should 
ensure that the internal auditors' involvement in the audit of 
the entire financial reporting process is appropriate and properly 
coordinated with the independent public accountant.
In our view, the notion of "appropriate involvement by the 
internal auditors at the corporate level" as suggested in the 
te xt m a y  n o t  be workable without duplication of audit effort 
an d an increase in audit costs. Generally accepted auditing 
s t a n d a r d s  r e q u i r e  th e i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t o r  to p e r f o r m  m a n y  
corporate audit functions directly (e.g., test and review the 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n  p r o c e s s  or i n co me ta x  accruals) in o r d e r  to 
express an opinion on the financial statements and any overlap 
b y  in t e r n a l  a u d i t  at th e corporate level may, therefore, be 
duplicative and more costly.
In addition, we believe that the limited exposure by the 
internal auditing staff to the consolidation process (they would 
perform only one year-end examination and perhaps three quarterly 
reviews each y e a r ) , together with the requisite need to be an 
expert in the applicable FASB and SEC accounting requirements, 
w o u l d  ha nd ic ap the internal audit staff due to their limited 
dealings with these matters. Also, we believe that "involvement 
at the corporate level" may cause the internal audit staff to 
be uncomfortable in discharging the added responsibility suggested 
by the Commission.
Recommendation 9. The board of directors of all public companies 
s h o u l d  be required by SEC rule to establish audit committees 
comprised solely of independent directors.
We support the recommendation.
Recommendation 10. Audit committees should be informed, vigilant, 
and effective overseers of the financial reportin g  process and 
the comp an y's internal controls.
We support the recommendation. We realize that the Commission 
has attempted to qualify the "authority" of the Audit Committee 
Good Practice Guidelines contained in Appendix K. Nevertheless, 
we b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e s e  " g ui de li ne s" w i l l  become the minimum 
standards of audit committee performance. Accordingly, we have 
the following observations on selected duties and responsibilities 
contained in the Good Practice Guidelines.
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Guideline
The committee should determine the open years on federal 
income tax returns and whether there are any significant 
items that have been or might be disputed by the IRS, 
and inquire into the status of the related tax reserves.
Observation
We believe the task of "determining whether there are 
any s i g n i f i c a n t  items th a t  h a v e  b e e n  or mi gh t be 
disputed by the IRS" to be beyond the capabilities of 
most audit committee members and also would extend the 
function of the audit committee into those of management. 
W e  b e l i e v e  the au d i t  c o m m i t t e e ' s  o v e r s i g h t  role 
p r o p e r l y  w o u l d  b e  fulfilled if the committee would 
in q u i r e  of th e  i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t  w h e t h e r  he 
believes the tax accruals have been reasonably stated 
by management in view of actual or potential disputed 
IRS items.
Guideline
The committee should review with management the MD&A 
S e c t i o n  of the Annual Report and ask the extent to 
which the independent public accountant has reviewed 
t h e  M D & A  Section. The committee should inquire of 
the independent public accountant if the other sections 
of the annual report to stockholders are consistent 
w i t h  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e f l e c t e d  in th e fi nancial 
statements.
Observation
We have no objection to the audit committee reviewing 
with management the MD&A section of the annual report.
Ho wever, w e  are c o n c e r n e d  that the inquiry of the 
p u b l i c  a c c o u n t a n t  of the e x t e n t  to w h i c h  he has 
r e v i e w e d  the M D & A  s e c t i o n  m a y  u l t i m a t e l y  l e a d  to 
i n c r e a s e  au d i t  fees and less robust and meaningful 
MD&A sections in annual reports.
There is currently no requirement that MD&A be audited 
b y  th e i n d e p e n d e n t  public accountant, although the 
AICPA has a draft Statement on Auditing Standards for 
examining and reporting on MD&A. We are fearful that 
audit committees, in a defensive attitude, will begin 
to insist that the independent accountant examine MD&A 
if audit committees are "required" by the Good Practice 
G u i d e l i n e s  to m a k e  su ch inquiry. So me co mm it te e
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m e m b e r s  m a y  feel th a t  a n e g a t i v e  r e s p o n s e  by the 
i n d e p e n d e n t  a c c o u n t a n t  to the in q u i r y  c o n n o t e s  a 
" d e f i c i e n t  p e r f o r m a n c e . ” R e q u i r i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t  
auditor examination of MD&A will, no doubt, lead to 
i n c r e a s e d  au di t fees and a mu ch narrower focus of 
M D & A  if it is r e s t r i c t e d  to on ly that w h i c h  the 
a u d i t o r  is able to test and examine. We feel that 
the narrower-focused MD&A will, in turn, represent a 
step backward in shareholder communications.
With respect to the last sentence of the Guideline, 
existing generally accepted auditing standards require 
the auditor to make such a "consistency” determination, 
and, for the Commission to require the audit committee 
to make inquiry as to the auditor's performance of a 
generally accepted auditing standard seems redundant.
Recommendation 11. A l l  p u b l i c  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  d e v e l o p  a 
written charter setting forth the duties and responsibilities of 
the audit committee. The board of directors should approve the 
charter, review it at least annually, and modify it as necessary.
W e  support the recommendation but believe directors only 
need to review the audit committee's charter periodically rather 
than annually.
Recommendation 12. A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  s h o u l d  h a v e  ad e q u a t e  
resources and authority to discharge their responsibilities.
We support the recommendation.
Recommendation 13. The a u d i t  committee should review management's 
evaluation of factors related to the independence of the company's 
public accountant. Both the audit committee and management should 
assist the public accountant in preserving his independence.
We support the recommendation.
Recommendation 14. T h e  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  s h o u l d  ap p r o v e  in 
advance the types and the extent of management advisory services 
th at m a n a g e m e n t  p l a n s  to e n g a g e  th e c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  
public accountant to perform.
Th is p a rt ic ul ar recommendation has limited applicability 
to Kimberly-Clark because we usually have any needed management 
a d v i s o r y  s e r v i c e s  (MAS) performed by someone other than our 
i n d e p e n d e n t  pu b l i c  accountant. However, for those companies
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that do engage their independent public accountants to perform 
MAS, w e believe audit committee approval either before or after 
the fact should suffice if the intent of the recommendation is 
to ascertain whether the MAS engagement somehow compromised the 
independent accountant's independence. (See the previous recommen­
dation.)
Recommendation 15. All public companies should be required by 
SEC ru le to i n cl ud e in th ei r annual reports to stockholders 
management reports signed by the chief executive officer and chief 
accounting officer. The management report should acknowledge 
management's responsibilities for the financial statements and 
in t e r n a l  control, d i s c u s s  h o w  t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w e r e  
fulfilled, and provide ma nagement's assessment of the effectiveness 
of the company's internal controls.
Since 1980, Kimberly-Clark has been voluntarily including 
a statement of Ma na ge me nt's Responsibility for Financial Statements 
in its an n u a l  re p o r t  to s t o c k h o l d e r s  and, ac co rd in gl y, we 
s u p p o r t  th e c o n c e p t  of a " m a n a g e m e n t  report," although our 
present "statement" is unsigned.
The text accompanying the recommendation suggests that CEOs 
s h o u l d  periodically engage independent accountants to examine 
and opine on the company's system of internal accounting control. 
M a n y  comp an ie s, in cl ud in g Kimberly-Clark, spend considerable 
sums each year to ensure the maintenance of an effective internal 
accounting control system which is examined and tested throughout 
the year by internal auditors. We continue to believe that further 
e x a m i n a t i o n  of in t e r n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  co nt ro l b y  i n d e p e n d e n t  
a u d i t o r s  ca nn ot be cost justified. We, therefore, recommend 
that the Commission remove the suggestion that the independent 
accountant perform a special examination of the internal accounting 
control system.
The sample management report contained in the Good Practice 
Guidelines for Management's Report in Appendix L contains the 
following negative reference which we strongly urge be removed 
or modified in the final Treadway Report.
• A  s t a t e m e n t  th at the financial statements "are not 
misstated due to material fraud or error." 
• A  statement that representations made to the CPA by 
management are "valid and appropriate."
Mr. Arnold
June 30, 1987
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• A  s t a t e m e n t  th at m a n a g e m e n t  m a i n t a i n  a s y s t e m  of 
in te rn al control that provides reasonable assurance 
as to th e " p r e v e n t i o n  and d e t e c t i o n  of fraudulent 
financial reporting."
With respect to the first two references, we believe that 
each statement would need to be prefaced by "to the best of our 
knowledge and belief," and to say more would be neither appropriate 
nor accurate. More importantly, we believe the negative connotation 
of the above statements in the overall context of the report is 
u n n e c e s s a r y  a n d  d i m i n i s h e s  o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  m a t t e r s  in the 
"Responsibility Statement."
Recommendation 16. All public companies should be required by 
SEC rule to include in their annual reports to stockholders_a 
letter signed by the chairman of the audit committee describing 
the committee's responsibilities and activities during the year.
W e  b e l i e v e  t h i s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  is u n n e c e s s a r y .  M o s t  
companies, including Kimberly-Clark, have included a paragraph 
in t h e i r  M a n a g e m e n t  Report explaining the composition, scope 
an d f u n c t i o n i n g  of t h e i r  au d i t  co mm it te e. W e  b e l i e v e  the 
separate letter from the audit committee chairman may represent 
information overload and may contain information that is redundant 
of that contained in the Management Report or the Report of the 
I n d e p e n d e n t  A c c o u n t a n t s .  We, therefore, su g g e s t  t h a t  the 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n  be r e d r a f t e d  to p e r m i t  d i s c l o s u r e  of audit 
committee matters either in Management's Report or a separate 
letter from the chairman of the audit committee.
Recommendation 17. Management should advise the audit committee 
when it seeks a second opinion on a significant accounting issue.
Th e  a c c o m p a n y i n g  te xt stat es that "Management has, and 
s h o u l d  have, t h e  p r e r o g a t i v e  to se ek second opinions." We 
agree. As a consequence, we believe the only time when management 
should be obliged to report second opinions to the audit committee 
is when the company relied on a second opinion with which the 
c o m p a n y ' s  i n d e p e n d e n t  accountants disagreed. To report all 
"second opinion" matters to the audit committee could result in 
information overload and poor use of their time and management 
resources.
Recommendation 18. W h e n  a p u bl ic company changes independent 
public accountants, it should be required by SEC rule to disclose 
p u b l i c l y  th e n a t u r e  of a n y m a t e r i a l  acco un ti ng or auditing 
issues d i s c u s s e d  w i t h  its old and n e w  a u d i t o r s  d u r i n g  the 
three-y ear period preceding the change.
Mr. Arnold
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We s u p p o r t  the existing SEC requirement which calls for 
p u b l i c  d i s c l o s u r e  of "... any disagreements with the former 
accountant on any matter of accounting principles or practices, 
financial statement disclosure, or auditing scope or procedure, 
which disagreement if not resolved to the satisfaction of the 
fo rm er accountant would have caused him to make reference in 
connection with his report to the subject matter of the disagree­
ment ...”
The expansion suggested by the recommendation to disclose 
" d i s c u s s i o n s "  on accounting or auditing whether or not there 
was disagreement seems unnecessary and could be an impediment 
to a change in auditors that is being considered for reasons 
u n r e l a t e d  to a c c o u n t i n g  or auditing matters, such as better 
service or lower audit fees. In addition, keeping a log of all 
su ch d i s c u s s i o n s  a n d  r e q u i r i n g  the p u b l i c  to r e a d  t h r o u g h  
r o u t i n e  d i s c u s s i o n s  in o r d e r  to loca te one that involved a 
disagreement is an unnecessary burden on all involved.
Recommendation 19. A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e s  sh o u l d  in cr ea se th e i r  
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to public release.
We strongly disagree with this recommendation. Requiring 
the audit committee to approve the financial results prior to their 
release to the public could well result in an unnecessary delay 
in timely reporting of interim results by management. In our 
view, t h e  Commission has not demonstrated that lack of audit 
c o m m i t t e e  involvement in the quarterly reporting process has 
resulted in fraudulent financial reporting, especially when one 
considers the implications of the Commission's recommendation later 
in the Treadway Report, with which we agree, for "improved quarterly 
reporting" by requiring a timely review of quarterly results by 
the independent accountant.
Recommendation 20. Th e C o m m i s s i o n ' s  sponsoring organizations 
should establish a body to guide public companies on internal 
controls.
In view of all of the rulemakers (e.g., FASB, SEC, AICPA 
A c c o u n t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  E x e c u t i v e  Co mmittee, F A S B ' s  E m e r g i n g  
Is su es T a s k  Force, an d A I C P A  Auditing Standards Board), the 
establishment of yet another body seems unnecessary. We suggest 
that internal control guidance, if any is needed, can be handled 
adequately by an existing or reconstituted rulemaking body.
Mr. Arnold
June 30, 1987
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Chapter Three - Recommendations for the Independent Public Accountant
In general, the recommendations for the independent public 
accountant are logical and, except for the following, we support 
them.
R e co mm en da ti on: The Auditing Standards Board should revise
the auditor' s standard report to state that the audit provides 
reasonable but not absolute assurance that the audited financial 
statements are free from material misstatements as a result of 
fraud or error.
T h e  A u d i t i n g  S t a n d a r d s  B o a r d  of the AICPA has proposed 
su ch a revision. However, w e  b e l i e v e  th e revised standard 
report does not represent any real improvement and is likely to 
w i d e n  r a t h e r  t h a n  n a r r o w  th e so-called auditor "expectation 
gap," a ga p  b e t w e e n  i n v e s t o r ' s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  from the audit 
process and what the CPA is actually delivering in his standard 
report on the financial statements. A  copy of our response to 
the Auditing Standards Board is attached.
Chapter Four - Recommendations for the SEC and Others to Improve 
The Regulatory and Legal Environment
In general, we support, or have no comments to offer, on these 
recommendations except for the following.
Recommendation: The SEC should have authority to impose civil
money penalties in administrative proceedings, [including Rule, 2 (e ) 
p r o c e e d i n g s ] an d to s e e k  civil money penalties from a court 
directly in an injunctive proceeding.
We believe the imposition of money penalties by the SEC might 
be an effective enforcement remedy if the standard for assessing 
such fines were made clear to the public at large. In the text 
a c c o m p a n y i n g  th e  re co m m e n d a t i o n ,  th e C o m m i s s i o n  spea ks of 
"depriving perpetrators ... of ill-gotten gains ... would help 
m a i n t a i n  p u b l i c  confidence ...". The meaning of "ill-gotten 
gain s" is to o  v a g u e  to act as an effective guide. A  clear 
standard for money penalty should be identified for a specific 
fact or set of facts. In addition, a determination should be 
m a d e  of w h a t  e x t e n t  a m o n e y  p e n a l t y  w o u l d  se rv e to either 
restrict, deter or punish fraudulent financial reporting.
Mr. Arnold
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Recommendation: The SEC should seek explicit statutory authority 
to bar or suspend corporate officers or directors involved in 
f r a u d u l e n t  fi na nc ia l r e p o r t i n g  fr om future service in that 
capacity in a public company.
Although we agree with the intent of the recommendation, 
we suggest that the phrase "involved in" is too broad and needs 
to be more specific. Perhaps, the words "involved in" should 
be c h a n g e d  to "c on vi ct ed of a felony involving" in order to 
sharpen the focus of what is actually intended by the recommen­
dation.
Chapter Five - Recommendations for Education
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  recommendations in Chapter Five appear 
reasonable.
We would be pleased to discuss any of our observations with 
the Commission or its staff if they so desire.
Sincerely,
David W. Dusendschon
DWD/dc
DWD-101-87
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  S N E T
June 30, 1987
Chairman and CommissionersNational Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Chairman and Commissioners:
We congratulate the Commission on a job well done, and respectfully submit the attached comments on behalf of the management and the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of Southern New England Telecommunications Corporation (SNET). Please note that our comments apply only to those recommendations that pertain to audit committees or internal auditing for which we have proposed revisions.
We endorse the re p o r t 's  o v e ra ll d ire c t io n  and emphasis and, in  
p a r t ic u la r ,  agree w ith  and s tro n g ly  support the  p o s it io n  o f  the 
Commission as s ta te d  on page 5 o f  the Exposure D ra f t  th a t  a "key 
p ra c t ic e  1s the board o f  d ir e c to r s ' es tab lishm en t o f  an in fo rm ed, 
v ig i la n t  and e f fe c t iv e  a u d it  committee to  oversee the company's 
f in a n c ia l re p o r t in g  p ro ce ss ." The Board o f  SNET took such a c t io n  some 
tim e ago. The A u d it Committee i s aware o f  i t s  resp o n s ib il i t i e s , and 
endeavors to  a c t in  the re q u ire d  manner a t a l l  tim es.
 
Da n ie l  J . Mig l io Senior Vice President Finance & Planning
James R. Greenfield Chairman of the Audit Committee
Attachment
3124N/pl
RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING EXPOSURE DRAFT
SUBMITTED BY THE MANAGEMENT AND 
AUDIT COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (SNET)
NOTE: ALL BOLD TYPE ITEMS ARE QUOTES FROM THE COMMISSION REPORT TEXT
SOURCE: CHAPTER TWO - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY - Tone at the
Top, page 29.
COMMISSION Recommendation: "For the top management of a public
company to discharge its obligation to oversee the financial 
reporting process, it must identify, understand, and assess the 
factors that may cause the company's financial statements to be 
fraudulently misstated."
SNET Comment: AGREE, WITH PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE RECOMMENDATION.
The Commission is correct in identifying management's responsibility in 
the area of risk assessment. However, we disagree with the discussion beneath 
the recommendation which states that, "In addition, the audit 
committee of the board of directors should review annually the 
company's risk assessment process and management's responses to 
significant identified risks." We believe that such reviews are not 
properly part of the responsibilities of the audit committee, and are an 
unnecessary burden that would necessarily reduce the time available to the 
audit committee for oversight of those actually responsible for such reviews, 
namely, the auditors.
We believe recommendations should be added in subsequent sections to 
identify the responsibility for review of management's risk assessment program 
as belonging to the internal and external auditors. It would then become the 
duty of the audit committee to ensure that the auditors are properly 
performing their responsibilities. We also believe that these reviews should 
not be performed annually, but continuously.
3124N/p2
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SOURCE: CHAPTER TWO - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY - Two Key
Functions: Accounting and Internal Audit, page 33.
COMMISSION Recommendation: "Public companies should ensure that 
their internal audit functions are objective."
SNET POSITION: AGREE, WITH COMMENTS.
Objectivity is absolutely required of the internal audit function. 
However, we disagree that objectivity is jeopardized without placement of the 
function reporting "administratively to a senior officer who is not 
directly responsible for preparing the company's financial 
statements."
In our opinion, this is unnecessary as long as the chief internal auditor 
has "direct and unrestricted access to the audit committee," 
meets "privately with the committee on a regular basis," is "an 
experienced audit professional," and "attends all audit 
committee meetings." In addition, we agree that "the audit 
committee should review the appointment and the dismissal of the 
chief internal auditor." These controls should be sufficient to 
maintain objectivity.
3124N/p4
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SOURCE: CHAPTER TWO - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC COMPANY - Two Additional
Recommendations, page 42.
COMMISSION Recommendation: "Audit committees should increase their 
oversight of the quarterly reporting process. This oversight 
should include approving financial results prior to public 
release."
SNET POSITION: DISAGREE.
We do not believe that the audit committee should approve quarterly 
financial results prior to public release as this 1s management's 
responsibility. The chief accounting officer has specific duties related to 
the quarterly reporting process; since this officer serves at the discretion 
of the full board, adequate oversight is thus provided. The external auditor 
also serves at the recommendation of the audit committee, and has 
responsibility to Inform the audit committee of any problems 1n this area. In 
our opinion, the review of the annual financial statements that 1s performed 
by the audit committee is adequate.
3124N/p5
Mailing Adres:P.O. Box 318, Church Stret StationNew York, New York 1015
Bankers Trust Company280 Park Avenue, New York, New York 1015
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George J. VojtaExecutive Vice President Telephone: 212-850-1072
June 26, 1987
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20006
Res April 1987 Exposure Draft of the Report of theNational Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Gentlemen:
In general, Bankers Trust New York Corporation supports the overall objectives of the draft report and we are pleased to note that most of your recommendations have been in place in our company for many years. However, we are concerned about the quasi-management role for audit committees reflected in several of your recommendations which we believe is incompatible with an audit committee oversight function.
We, therefore, urge the Commission to reconsider the recommendations requiring the audit committee to:
. Approve quarterly financial results prior to public release.
. Approve in advance management advisory services to be performed by independent public accountants.
. Be advised of management's research and discussion ofalternative approaches ("second opinions") to significant accounting issues not involving a change of auditors.
Requiring the audit committee to perform these management functions would place it in an operating role, thus creating a basic conflict in its role as an independent arm of the board of directors.
National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial
Reporting 2 June 26, 1987
We further urge the Commission to reconsider the recommendations 
for corporate annual reports to include a report that acknowledges 
m a n a g e m e n t s  responsibilities and a letter describing the audit 
committee's responsibilities and activities. We do not believe 
that these recommendations will result in improved communication 
with financial statement users to any meaningful degree.
The Commission is urged to reflect in its final report the 
enhancement of the role of the audit committee which would be 
achieved through many of your recommendations. The audit 
committee role, however, should not be broadened to include 
responsibilities which are traditionally and properly the role of 
management. We believe this is unfair to the audit committee, as 
well as to management.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this exposure draft.
Very truly yours
W E L L S  F A R G O  B A N K
110
DOYLE L. ARNOLD
Senior Vice President & 
General Auditor
June 29 , 1987
525 Market Street 
San Francisco, CA 94163
N a t io n a l Com m ission on F ra u d u le n t  F in a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
1701 P e n n s y lv a n ia  A venue , N.W.
W a sh in g to n , DC 20006
Dear Members o f  th e  C om m iss ion :
T h is  l e t t e r  resp o n d s  to  y o u r  re q u e s t f o r  comments on th e  C o m m iss io n 's  
"E xp o su re  D r a f t "  d a te d  A p r i l  1987.
O v e r a l l ,  th e  w ork o f  th e  C om m ission is  to  be commended. The E xposure  D r a f t  is  
g e n e r a l ly  t h o u g h t f u l ,  p re s e n ts  many p o t e n t i a l l y  u s e fu l re co m m e n d a tio n s , and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  m e r i t s  a t t e n t io n  f o r  i t s  fo c u s  on th e  im p o rta n c e  o f  th e  " to n e  a t  
th e  to p "  as an im p o r ta n t  f a c t o r  in  d e te r r in g  f r a u d u le n t  f in a n c ia l  r e p o r t in g .
H ow ever, I  b e l ie v e  t h a t  tw o s p e c i f i c  recom m enda tions  w a r ra n t  f u r t h e r  
c o n s id e r a t io n  and m o d i f ic a t io n  in  th e  f i n a l  r e p o r t .  Each is  d is c u s s e d  f u r t h e r  
b e lo w . In  a d d i t io n ,  one s ig n i f i c a n t  comment is  s u b m itte d  re g a rd in g  th e  
o v e r a l l  c o s ts  and b e n e f i t s  o f  th e  C o m m iss io n 's  re co m m e n d a tio n s .
S e c t io n  I I I - B .  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t  F u n c t io n  and C h ie f  I n t e r n a l  A u d i t o r — I IA  
S ta n d a rd s  ( p .  33)
In  i t s  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  recom m enda tion  t h a t  p u b l ic  com panies 
a d o p t I I A  s ta n d a rd s ,  th e  Com m ission s p e c i f i c a l l y  "e n d o rs e s  
( th e )  c o n c e p t o f "  th e  I I A  Q u a l i t y  A ssu ra n ce  S ta n d a rd  c a l l i n g
f o r  p e r io d ic  e x te r n a l  p e e r re v ie w s .  I  b e l ie v e  t h a t  t h i s
recom m enda tion  has m e r i t ,  b u t  o n ly  i f  i t  is  f l e x i b l y  and 
i n t e l l i g e n t l y  a p p l ie d .  Banks and bank h o ld in g  com panies 
unde rgo  f r e q u e n t  e x a m in a t io n  by fe d e r a l  a n d /o r  s ta te  r e g u la ­
t o r y  and s u p e r v is o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  A lm o s t a l l  such exam ina ­
t io n s  in c lu d e  some re v ie w  o f  th e  in t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n ,  and
a t  le a s t  th e  N a t io n a l Bank E xam iners  o f  th e  O f f ic e  o f  th e
C o m p tro l le r  o f  th e  C u rre n c y  p e r i o d i c a l l y  s in g le  o u t in t e r n a l  
a u d i t  f o r  an in te n s iv e  " t a r g e t  e x a m in a t io n ."
These r e g u la to r y  r e v iew s more th a n  a d e q u a te ly  com po rt w i th  th e  
c o n c e p t o f  a p e r io d ic  e x te r n a l  p e e r re v ie w  o f  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  
th e  in t e r n a l  a u d i t  f u n c t io n .  To r e q u ir e  an a d d i t io n a l  p e e r 
re v ie w  s o le ly  o f  c o m p lia n c e  w ith  I I A  s ta n d a rd s  is  n o t c o s t  
j u s t i f i e d  in  such c irc u m s ta n c e s  and s h o u ld  n o t be r e q u ir e d .
-  1 -
110a
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Comments on Exposure Draft 
June 29, 1987
Section III-B. Internal Audit Function and Chief Internal Auditor- 
Objectivity of the Internal Audit Function
The Exposure Draft recommends that "Public Companies should 
ensure that their internal audit functions are objective" and 
should have regular access to the CEO and to the audit commit­
tee. I agree.
The discussion of the recommendation, however, also states on 
page 34 that "(t)he chief internal auditor should be an expe­
rienced audit professional, trained either in internal audit­
ing or in public accounting, . . ." On this I strongly 
disagree with the Exposure Draft. Certainly the chief 
internal auditor should have adequate knowledge of accounting 
and of internal control techniques. However, there are many 
ways to acquire such knowledge other than by being a 
"professional, trained either in internal auditing or in 
public accounting." This recommendation is dangerously close 
to requiring some form of certification, for which no support 
is given by the Commission.
At Wells Fargo & Company, the CEO selects a member of senior 
management to serve as chief internal auditor for a period of 
several years. The individual selected is qualified for the 
job by virtue of knowledge and experience. Almost by 
definition, that individual has "the necessary business acumen 
to work effectively with fellow senior officers" and 
"occup(ies) a position of high stature within the 
organization," as recommended by the Commission. However, 
that individual, by conscious design, is not always an "audit 
professional." I am aware of several other major corporations 
that operate strong internal audit functions very successfully 
under a similar approach.
The discussion of this recommendation should be modified to 
focus simply on qualifications. It should not be a 
potentially thinly disguised attempt to require CPA or CIA 
certification.
Finally, it should be noted that many of the recommendations contained in the 
Exposure Draft will result in increased costs for public companies. However, 
nowhere has the Commission quantified these costs or the benefits expected to 
flow from implementing its recommendations. The Exposure Draft does note that 
the Commission concluded (p. 4) that "quantification (of the problem of 
fraudulent financial reporting) proved to be impossible." However, the Draft 
does not even demonstrate that whatever problem of fraudulent financial 
reporting exists has grown worse since the last major change in auditing and 
reporting standards, nor does it even note any attempt at quantifying the 
costs of adopting its recommendations.
-  2  -
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I would submit that no public policy of this magnitude should be recommended 
or adopted without some reasoned attempt to weigh its costs and benefits. The 
most disappointing aspect of the Commission's draft is that such an attempt, 
if it was made, was not itself described and submitted to public scrutiny and 
comment.
Very truly yours,
Doyle L. Arnold
- 3 -
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PURCHASE. N Y. 10577
TEL. (914) 253 — 3406
J u n e  2 9 , 1987
ROBERT L. CARLETON VICE PRESIDENT, CONTROLLER
N a t io n a l  C o m m is s io n  On 
F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g  
170 1  P e n n s y lv a n ia  A v e n u e , N .W .
W a s h in g to n ,  D. C. 200 06
D e a r S i r s :
P e p s iC o , I n c .  i s  p le a s e d  t o  h a v e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p r e s e n t  
i t s  v ie w s  t o  t h e  C o m m is s io n  o n  t h e  E x p o s u re  D r a f t  on  
F r a u d u le n t  F i n a n c ia l  R e p o r t in g .  O u r com m ents  h a v e  n o t  y e t  
b e e n  r e v ie w e d  w i t h  o u r  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  s h o r t  
d e a d l in e  s e t  b y  t h e  C o m m is s io n  f o r  r e s p o n s e s .
O v e r a l l ,  we a g re e  w i t h  t h e  f o c u s ,  c o n c lu s io n s  a n d  
re c o m m e n d a t io n s  i n  t h e  r e p o r t .  We commend t h e  C o m m is s io n e rs  
a n d  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  s p o n s o rs  f o r  u n d e r t a k in g  t h i s  im p o r t a n t  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n i t i a t i v e .  We a r e  l i m i t i n g  o u r  s p e c i f i c  
com m ents  t o  t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  co m p a n y . We 
h a v e  r e v ie w e d  t h e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  g ro u p s  a nd  
h a v e  n o  m a jo r  o b je c t io n s  t o  th e m . F u r th e r m o r e ,  we b e l i e v e  a n y  
s u b s t a n t i v e  re c o m m e n d a t io n s  c a n  m o re  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  b e  made b y  
p r o f e s s io n a ls  w i t h i n  th e s e  g r o u p s .
O u r s p e c i f i c  com m ents  a r e :
o We d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  a l e t t e r  i n  t h e  a n n u a l
r e p o r t  s ig n e d  b y  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  C h a irm a n  
i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e f u l .  We d is a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  
C o m m is s io n ’ s  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  p r o x y  
s ta te m e n t  d i s c lo s u r e s  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  A u d i t  
C o m m it te e ’ s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  a n d  r o l e s  a r e  
in a d e q u a te .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  we d o n ' t  b e l i e v e  
t h i s  l e t t e r  w i l l  s e r v e  t h e  C o m m is s io n 's  s t a t e d  
p u rp o s e  " t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h e  A u d i t  C o m m itte e  
m e m b e rs ’ a w a re n e s s  a n d  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  t h e  
im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . "
I n s t e a d ,  we b e l i e v e  t h e  l e t t e r  w i l l  becom e a 
r o u t i n e ,  a n n u a l s u b m is s io n  t h a t  may c o n fu s e  
t h e  r e a d e r  a s  t o  who i s  p r i m a r i l y  r e s p o n s ib le  
f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s t a te m e n ts .
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o We disagree that the Audit Committee should approve, 
in advance (or at anytime), the release of quarterly 
financial results to the public. We believe this 
requirement is too detailed a procedure to require of 
the Committee. Practically, it would be 
administratively difficult and delay the reporting of 
quarterly financial results. It also could increase 
the risk of information leaks.
We offer these comments in a constructive manner and we are 
pleased that we are both in agreement and in compliance with 
so many of the Commission's recommendations.
Sincerely,
R. L. Carleton
Vice President and Controller
cc: D. W. Calloway
R. G. Dettmer 
C. C. Garvin
